Australian cartel regulation: law, policy and practice in an international context
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Port Melbourne, VIC
Cambridge Univ. Press
2011
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
Beschreibung: | XXXI, 618 S. |
ISBN: | 9780521760898 0521760895 |
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020 | |a 0521760895 |c hbk |9 0-521-76089-5 | ||
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100 | 1 | |a Beaton-Wells, Caron |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)139725660 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Australian cartel regulation |b law, policy and practice in an international context |c Caron Beaton-Wells ; Brent Fisse |
264 | 1 | |a Port Melbourne, VIC |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2011 | |
300 | |a XXXI, 618 S. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
650 | 4 | |a Cartels |z Australia | |
650 | 4 | |a Antitrust law (International law) | |
651 | 4 | |a Australien | |
700 | 1 | |a Fisse, Brent |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
856 | 4 | 2 | |m SWB Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024495229&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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adam_text | IMAGE 1
CONTENTS
FOREWORD BY THE HON PETER HEEREY QC PAGE V FOREWORD BY PROFESSOR GEORGE
HAY VII ABOUT THE AUTHORS XXI PREFACE XXIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS XXV
ABBREVIATIONS XXIX
1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 WHY FOCUS ON ANTI-CARTEL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT? 1 1.2
A NEW ANTI-CARTEL REGIME FOR AUSTRALIA - BACKGROUND 3 1.3 AIMS, SCOPE
AND STRUCTURE OF THIS BOOK 7
2 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING CARTEL CONDUCT 10 2.1 INTRODUCTION - A
COMPLEX REGIME 10 2.2 OUTLINE OF THE STATUTORY REGIME 10
2.3 COVERAGE OF THE STATUTORY REGIME 13 2.3.1 ENTITY COVERAGE 13 2.3.2
TERRITORIAL COVERAGE 14 2.3.3 TEMPORAL COVERAGE 18
2.4 THE CRIMINAL/CIVIL DIVIDE 19
2.4.1 FLAWS IN THE DISHONESTY PROPOSAL 19 2.4.1.1 A DISHONESTY ELEMENT
IS INCAPABLE OF LIMITING A CARTEL OFFENCE TO SERIOUS CARTEL CONDUCT 20
2.4.1.2 A DISHONESTY ELEMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ADEQUATELY
DIFFERENTIATING CRIMINAL FROM CIVIL LIABILITY 20 2.4.1.3 THE TEST FOR
DISHONESTY IS UNCERTAIN AND VULNERABLE TO UNMERITORIOUS DENIALS OF
LIABILITY 20 2.4.1 A A DISHONESTY ELEMENT DOES NOT ACCURATELY LABEL OR
SIGNAL THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF CARTEL OFFENCES 22 2.4.1.5 QUESTIONABLE PRECEDENT FOR
A DISHONESTY ELEMENT IN A CARTEL OFFENCE 23 2.4.2 UNWORKABILITY OF
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES 23 2.4.3 QUESTIONABLE ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT
APPROACH 2 5
2.4.3.1 BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS SUFFER FROM OVERREACH AND
UNCERTAINTY 25 2.4.3.2 THE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROHIBITIONS ARE
INADEQUATELY DISTINGUISHED 27 2.4.3.3 DETERMINATION OF SERIOUSNESS
SHOULD NOT BE LEFT SUBSTANTIALLY TO
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND/OR SENTENCING 28 2.4.3.4 PROVISION FOR
AUTHORISATION IS NOT A SUFFICIENT CURE FOR OVERREACH AND UNCERTAINTY 31
IMAGE 2
CONTENTS
2.4.4 A MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC APPROACH 31
2.5 CONCLUSION 34
3 COLLUSION (CONTRACTS, ARRANGEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS) 36 3.1
INTRODUCTION - THE LAW IN FLUX ON COLLUSION 36 3.2 A SPECTRUM OF
DEALINGS 39 3.3 CONCEPTUAL BOUNDARIES 43 3.4 LOOKING OVERSEAS FOR
WORKABLE MODELS 47
3.4.1 THE APPROACH TAKEN IN THE US AND THE EU 47 3.4.2 EQUATING
UNDERSTANDING WITH CONCERTED PRACTICE ? 52 3.5 EVIDENTIARY
CONSIDERATIONS 58 3.5.1 PROBLEMS WITH THE ACCC S 2007 LIST OF PROPOSED
FACTUAL MATTERS 59
3.5.2 ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS 65 3.6 MEANING OF MAKES A CONTRACT OR
ARRANGEMENT, ARRIVES AT AN UNDERSTANDING OR GIVES EFFECT TO A
PROVISION 67 3.6.1 MAKES OR ARRIVES AT 68
3.6.2 GIVES EFFECT TO 68 3.6.2.1 PURPOSES OF THE GIVES EFFECT
TO OFFENCE AND PROHIBITIONS 69 3.6.2.2 MEANING OF GIVES EFFECT TO 69
3.7 PARTIES TO A CONTRACT, ARRANGEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING 71 3.8
CONCLUSION - THE NEED FOR CLARITY AND RESTRAINT IN DEFINING COLLUSION 73
4 CARTEL AND OTHER PROVISIONS 75 4.1 INTRODUCTION-THE PIVOTAL ELEMENT OF
A PROVISION 75 4.2 CLASSIFICATION OF PROVISIONS 76 4.2.1 BASIC ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES RELEVANT TO CLASSIFICATION 77
4.2.2 THE US APPROACH TO CLASSIFICATION 79 4.2.3 THE EU APPROACH TO
CLASSIFICATION 83 4.2.4 THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH TO CLASSIFICATION 86 4.3
PRICE-FIXING PROVISIONS 89
4.3.1 PRICE-FIXING PURPOSE, EFFECT OR LIKELY EFFECT 90 4.3.1.1 PURPOSE
90 4.3.1.2 EFFECT OR LIKELY EFFECT 93 4.3.2 FIXING, CONTROLLING,
MAINTAINING OR PROVIDING FOR THE FIXING, CONTROLLING OR
MAINTAINING OF A PRICE, DISCOUNT, REBATE, ALLOWANCE OR CREDIT 95 4.3.2.1
FIXING 95 4.3.2.2 MAINTAINING 96 4.3.2.3 CONTROLLING 97 4.3.2.4
PROVIDING FOR 99
4.3.2.5 PRICE, DISCOUNT, REBATE, ALLOWANCE OR CREDIT 100 4.3.3 GOODS OR
SERVICES SUPPLIED OR ACQUIRED, OR LIKELY TO BE SUPPLIED OR ACQUIRED, BY
THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT, ARRANGEMENT OR UNDERSTANDING, OR
RE-SUPPLIED, OR LIKELY TO BE RE-SUPPLIED, BY PERSONS OR CLASSES OF
PERSONS
SUPPLIED OR LIKELY TO BE SUPPLIED BY ANY OR ALL OF THE PARRIES 100 4.4
EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS 102 4.4.1 NATURE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY PURPOSE 104
4.4.2 OBJECT(S) OF THE EXCLUSIONARY PURPOSE 105
4.4.3 REFORM PROPOSALS 108 4.5 OUTPUT RESTRICTION PROVISIONS 111 4.5.1
OUTPUT RESTRICTION PURPOSE 112 4.5.2 PRODUCTION, CAPACITY AND SUPPLY 114
IMAGE 3
CONTENTS XI
4.5.2.1 PRODUCTION 115
4.5.2.2 CAPACITY 116 4.5.2.3 SUPPLY 116
4.6 MARKET ALLOCATION PROVISIONS 118 4.6.1 MARKET ALLOCATION PURPOSE 119
4.6.2 ALLOCATION 120 4.7 BID-RIGGING PROVISIONS 121
4.7.1 BID-RIGGING PURPOSE 122 4.7.2 JOINT BIDDING 125 4.8 SLC PROVISIONS
127 4.9 CONCLUSION - THE NEED FOR REFORMULATION UNDERPINNED BY A MORE
PRINCIPLED AND MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH 131
5 FAULT ELEMENTS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCES 135 5.1 INTRODUCTION - THE
CARTEL OFFENCES AND THEIR PHYSICAL AND FAULT ELEMENTS 135 5.2 FAULT
ELEMENTS - A QUINTESSENTIAL FEATURE OF THE CARTEL OFFENCES 137
5.2.1 MAIN FAULT ELEMENTS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCES 137 5.2.2 FAULT
CONCEPTS 137 5.2.3 COVERAGE AND APPLICATION OF THE FAULT ELEMENTS 139
5.3 INTENTION 140
5.3.1 INTENTION TO MAKE A CONTRACT OR ARRANGEMENT OR ARRIVE AT AN
UNDERSTANDING 140 5.3.2 INTENTION TO GIVE EFFECT TO A CARTEL PROVISION
142 5.4 KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF THAT A CONTRACT, ARRANGEMENT OR
UNDERSTANDING
CONTAINS A CARTEL PROVISION 142 5.4.1 THE SUBJECT MATTER THAT MUST BE
KNOWN OR BELIEVED 142 5.4.2 KNOWLEDGE 143 5.4.3 BELIEF 145 5.4.4 WILFUL
BLINDNESS 147 5.4.5 KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF AS TO THE PURPOSE OF THE CARTEL
PROVISION
ALLEGED 150
5.4.6 DEGREE OF DETAIL OF WHICH D MUST BE AWARE 151 5.5 IGNORANCE AND
MISTAKE OF FACT OR LAW 152 5.5.1 IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF FACT 152
5.5.2 IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE OF LAW 153 5.6 FAULT ELEMENTS APPLICABLE IN
RELATION TO A CARTEL PROVISION AS REFORMULATED IN CHAPTER 4 155 5.7
CONCLUSION - THE ULTIMATE CHALLENGE OF FORMULATING WORKABLE
JURY DIRECTIONS 156 5.7.1 THE COMPLEXITY OF THE CARTEL OFFENCES AND THE
FAILURE TO REVERSE ENGINEER THEIR ELEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF CONCEIVABLY
WORKABLE JURY DIRECTIONS 156 5.7.2 TOWARDS MODEL JURY DIRECTIONS 157
6 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 158 6.1 INTRODUCTION - THE
SYMBOL OF JAIL AND ILLUSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 158 6.2
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AS A PRINCIPAL PARTY 159
6.2.1 THE BASIS FOR INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AS A
PRINCIPAL PARTY 159
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XUE CONTENTS
6.2.2 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY AS A PRINCIPAL PARTY ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 160 6.2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 160 6.2.2.2 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY
FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AS A PRINCIPAL PARTY FOR ALLOWING OR AUTHORISING
CARTEL CONDUCT 161 6.2.3 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AS A
PRINCIPAL ON THE BASIS OF
VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY 165
6.3 INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN CARTEL CONDUCT 167 6.3.1 THE
VARIOUS BASES OF LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN CARTEL CONDUCT 168 6.3.2
PHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN CARTEL
CONDUCT ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 169
6.3.2.1 INTRODUCTION 169 6.3.2.2 LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY ON THE BASIS
OF AN OMISSION TO INTERVENE 170 6.3.2.3 IS LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN
CARTEL CONDUCT LIMITED BY A SPECIAL
REQUIREMENT OF WRONGFULNESS? 173 6.3.3 FAULT ELEMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL
LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN CARTEL CONDUCT ON THE BASIS OF PERSONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 173 6.3.3.1 FAULT ELEMENTS OF LIABILITY FOR AIDING,
ABETTING, COUNSELLING OR
PROCURING 174
6.3.3.2 FAULT ELEMENTS OF BEING KNOWINGLY CONCERNED IN A CARTEL OFFENCE
OR CONTRAVENTION 175 6.3.3.3 FAULT ELEMENTS OF COMPLICITY IN RELATION TO
THE FAULT ELEMENTS OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFENCE OR CONTRAVENTION 176 6.3.3.4
FAULT ELEMENTS OF COMPLICITY IN RELATION TO THE TYPE OF PRINCIPAL
OFFENCE OR CONTRAVENTION COMMITTED 178 6.3.3.5 FAULT ELEMENTS OF
COMPLICITY IN RELATION TO THE MODE OF COMMISSION OF THE PRINCIPAL
OFFENCE OR CONTRAVENTION 179 6.3.3.6 IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE 181 6.3.4
LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY IN CARTEL CONDUCT ON THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS
RESPONSIBILITY 181 6.3.5 APPLICATION OF EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENCES TO
LIABILITY FOR COMPLICITY 182 6.3.6 SIMPLIFYING AND OTHERWISE IMPROVING
THE DEFINITION OF COMPLICITY IN
CARTEL CONDUCT 182
6.4 INDIVIDUAL INCHOATE LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT - ATTEMPT,
CONSPIRACY, INDUCEMENT AND ATTEMPTED INDUCEMENT 184 6.4.1 THE THICKET OF
INCHOATE LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 184 6.4.2 DOUBLE INCHOATE
LIABILITY 185 6.5 TACIT IMPLICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF THE SHUT-EYED
SENTRY 186
6.5.1 SHUT-EYED SENTRIES AND THE INSULATED CONDUCTOR STRATAGEM 186 6.5.2
A DIFFICULT CHALLENGE 189 6.6 AVAILABILITY OF CORPORATE LIABILITY AND
THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 191
6.6.1 INTRODUCTION - CORPORATE VERSUS INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 191
6.6.2 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AND ENFORCEMENT
DISCRETION 192 6.6.3 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT AND
CORPORATE INTERNAL
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEMS 195 6.6.4 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CARTEL
CONDUCT, CORPORATE LIABILITY AND EFFICIENCY 198 6.7 SIDEWINDER LIABILITY
199
6.7.1 OFFENCES RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 200
IMAGE 5
CONTENTS
6.7.1.1 TPA SS 155(5) AND 154R(2) 200
6.7.1.2 CRIMINAL CODE OFFENCES 201 6.7.1.3 CRIMES ACT OFFENCES 202
6.7.1.4 OFFENCES OF CONCEALING OR COMPOUNDING A CARTEL OFFENCE 202 6.7.2
MONEY LAUNDERING AND FORFEITURE OF PROCEEDS OF CRIME 203
6.7.2.1 MONEY-LAUNDERING OFFENCES 203 6.7.2.2 FORFEITURE ORDERS 204
6.7.3 OFFENCES RELATING TO ORGANISED CRIME 205 6.7.3.1 ASSOCIATING IN
SUPPORT OF SERIOUS ORGANISED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
205
6.7.3.2 SUPPORTING A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 205 6.7.3.3 DIRECTING AN
ACTIVITY OF A CRIMINAL ORGANISATION 206 6.8 CONCLUSION - TOWARDS
SOLUTIONS AND AWAY FROM BLACK MAGIC 207
7 CORPORATE LIABILITY 209 7.1 CORPORATE CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITY
UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN ANTI-CARTEL REGIME 209 7.1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE TPA
PROVISIONS RELATING TO CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR
CARTEL CONDUCT 209 7.1.2 PRESSURE TESTING THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES
RELATING TO CORPORATE LIABILITY 212 7.2 POLICY REASONS FOR HAVING
CORPORATE AS WELL AS INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL AND
CIVIL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 213 7.2.1 PROFOUNDLY SUSPECT
INDIVIDUALISTIC CONCEPTIONS OF LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 213 7.2.2
INABILITY OF METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM TO EXPLAIN CORPORATE ACTION
AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 214 7.2.3 HEROIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE
DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 216 7.2.4
UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE DETERRENT INCAPABILITY OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 218 7.2.5 RETRIBUTIVE PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS AND
CORPORATE FAULT 218 7.2.6 CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY AS A LESS DRASTIC
AVENUE OF DETERRENCE OR
RETRIBUTION THAN INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 220 7.2.7 CONCLUSION AS
REGARDS THE POLICY OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CARTEL CONDUCT
220 7.3 CORPORATE CAPACITY TO BE HELD CRIMINALLY OR CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
CARTEL
CONDUCT 221 7.3.1 VARIOUS RULES GOVERN CORPORATE CAPACITY TO BE HELD
LIABLE UNDER PT IV OF THE TPA 221 7.3.2 A CORPORATION MUST BE OF THE
TYPE REQUIRED FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER
THE TPA 222
7.3.3 AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION IS NOT SUBJECT TO CORPORATE
LIABILITY UNDER THE TPA 223 7.3.4 GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES ARE SUBJECT
TO LIABILITY SO FAR AS THEY CARRY ON A BUSINESS 224 7.3.5 A CORPORATION
IS NOT LIABLE FOR CONDUCT COMMITTED BEFORE INCORPORATION OR
BEFORE OR AFTER DISSOLUTION BUT A SUCCESSOR CORPORATION MAY BE LIABLE
FOR THE CONDUCT OF A PREDECESSOR CORPORATION 227 7.4 PRINCIPLES
GOVERNING THE ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT AND FAULT TO A CORPORATION 229
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XIV CONTENTS
7.4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR ISSUES RELATING TO CORPORATE FAULT AND
VICARIOUS
RESPONSIBILITY 229 7.4.2 SHOULD THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF CORPORATE FAULT
UNDER THE CRIMINAL CODE HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM THE CARTEL OFFENCES? 229
7.4.3 CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE UNDER S 12.4 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE 232 7.4.4
LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF S 84(1) AND (2) TO CARTEL OFFENCES
WHERE THE DIRECTOR, EMPLOYEE OR AGENT ACTED WITH INTENT TO BENEFIT THE
CORPORATION 233 7.4.5 A DEFENCE OF CORPORATE REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS AND
DUE DILIGENCE 234 7.4.5.1 A DEFENCE OF CORPORATE REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS
AND DUE
DILIGENCE - TOO EASY TO ESTABLISH? 235 7.4.5.2 A DEFENCE OF CORPORATE
REASONABLE PRECAUTIONS AND DUE DILIGENCE - AN INSUFFICIENT INCENTIVE TO
PREVENT THE COMMISSION
OF CARTEL OFFENCES? 238 7.4.5.3 ADEFENCE OF CORPORATE REASONABLE
PRECAUTIONS AND DUE DILIGENCE - AN UNJUSTIFIED DEPARTURE FROM THE
GENERAL PRINCIPLE REQUIRING PROOF OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BEYOND A
REASONABLE
DOUBT? 239
7.4.6 CAN VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY BE IMPOSED IN RELATION TO A
SUBJECTIVE FAULT ELEMENT BY COMBINING THE MENTAL STATES OF A NUMBER OF
REPRESENTATIVES TO CREATE A COLLECTIVE CONSTRUCT OF INTENTION, PURPOSE,
KNOWLEDGE OR BELIEF? 240 7.4.7 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES VICARIOUS
RESPONSIBILITY EXTEND TO UNAUTHORISED
CONDUCT? 242
7.4.8 DOES VICARIOUS RESPONSIBILITY EXTEND TO THE CONDUCT AND FAULT OF A
SUBSIDIARY CORPORATION? 244 7.5 CORPORATE CARTEL CONDUCT 246 7.5.1
LOOKING BEYOND THE HUMANOID MODEL OF CARTEL CONDUCT UNDER
THETPA 246
7.5.2 CORPORATENESS AND THE CONCEPT OF A CONCERTED PRACTICE UNDER EU
COMPETITION LAW 247 7.5.3 REPEATED CARTEL CONDUCT AND THE CONCEPT OF THE
SWHOLE CARTEL 248 7.5.4 CORPORATE ANCILLARY LIABILITY 249 7.5.5
CORPORATE RATIFICATION AND REACTIVE DISREGARD OF CARTEL CONDUCT 250 7.6
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ATTRIBUTION OF AN EXCEPTION TO A
CORPORATION 253 7.6.1 WHOSE STATE OF MIND COUNTS AS THAT OF A
CORPORATION WHERE AN EXCEPTION REQUIRES A STATE OF MIND? 253 7.6.2 A
SOLUTION 255 7.7 CONCLUSION - TOWARDS GREATER RECOGNITION OF THE
CORPORATENESS OF
CORPORATE CARTEL CONDUCT 256
8 EXCEPTIONS 259 8.1 INTRODUCTION - THE IMPORTANCE OF EXCEPTIONS UNDER
THE ANTI-CARTEL LEGISLATION AND THEIR CURRENT STATE OF DISARRAY 259 8.2
RELATED CORPORATIONS, DUAL LISTED COMPANIES AND PARTNERSHIPS 262
8.2.1 RELATED CORPORATIONS 262 8.2.2 DUAL LISTED COMPANIES 264 8.2.3
PARTNERSHIPS 266 8.3 JOINT VENTURES 267
8.3.1 THE JOINT VENTURE EXCEPTIONS 267 8.3.2 THE JOINT VENTURE
REQUIREMENT 270
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CONTENTS
8.3.2.1 JOINT VENTURE 270
8.3.2.2 THE REQUIREMENT UNDER SS 44ZZRO AND 44ZZRP THAT THE JOINT
VENTURE BE FOR THE PRODUCTION AND/OR SUPPLY OF GOODS OR SERVICES 273
8.3.3 THE REQUIREMENT OF A CONTRACT OR CONTRACT PROXY 274
8.3.3.1 RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE CONTRACT REQUIREMENT 275
8.3.3.2 UMBRELLA JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS 276 8.3.3.3 PRE-CONTRACTUAL
JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS 279 8.3.3.4 CONTRACT PROXY
REQUIREMENT THAT EACH PARTY HAVE THE REQUISITE
INTENTION AND REASONABLE BELIEF 280 8.3.3.5 THE CONTRACT REQUIREMENT IS
AN INEFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE PROBLEM OF SHAM JOINT VENTURES 281 8.3.4
THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE CARTEL PROVISION OR EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION BE
FOR THE PURPOSES OF A JOINT VENTURE 282 8.3.4.1 OBSCURITIES PERSIST
282 8.3.4.2 THE PURPOSES OF THE JOINT VENTURE 284 8.3.4.3 FOR THE
PURPOSES OF A JOINT VENTURE 287
8.3.4.4 THE NEED OR OTHERWISE FOR A COMPETITION TEST AS AN ELEMENT OF A
JOINT VENTURE EXCEPTION 291 8.3.4.5 CREATING A NEW EXCEPTION FOR
COLLABORATIVE VENTURES BETWEEN COMPETITORS 292 8.3.5 CONCLUSION AS
REGARDS THE JOINT VENTURE EXCEPTIONS 295 8.4 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND
COLLECTIVE ACQUISITION 296
8.4.1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 296 8.4.2 COLLECTIVE ACQUISITION AND JOINT
ADVERTISING 298 8.5 ANTI-OVERLAP OF CARTEL PROHIBITIONS WITH NON-CARTEL
PROHIBITIONS 299 8.5.1 THE ANTI-OVERLAP EXCEPTIONS 299
8.5.2 EXCLUSIVE DEALING EXCEPTIONS 300 8.5.3 ACQUISITION OF SHARES OR
ASSETS EXCEPTIONS 301 8.5.4 RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE EXCEPTIONS 302 8.6
SUPPLY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPETITORS 303 8.6.1 THE FAILURE OF THE TPA
TO EXCLUDE ECONOMICALLY BENEFICIAL OR INNOCUOUS
SUPPLY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPETITORS FROM THE OPERATION OF THE CARTEL
PROHIBITIONS 303 8.6.2 SUPPLY AGREEMENTS CONTAINING A CARTEL PROVISION
THAT IS NOT COVERED BY ANY EXCEPTION OTHER THAN AUTHORISATION 304 8.6.3
INPUT SUPPLY AGREEMENTS CONTAINING A CARTEL PROVISION THAT IS NOT
COVERED
BY ANY EXCEPTION OTHER THAN AUTHORISATION 304 8.6.4 RECIPROCAL SUPPLY
AGREEMENTS CONTAINING CARTEL PROVISIONS AND EXCLUSIONARY PROVISIONS THAT
ARE NOT COVERED BY ANY EXCEPTION OTHER THAN
AUTHORISATION 307 8.6.5 A SPECIFIC EXCEPTION FOR SUPPLY AGREEMENTS
BETWEEN COMPETITORS 307 8.7 STANDARD-SETTING 309
8.7.1 THE EXCEPTION UNDER S 51(2) (C) 309 8.7.2 THE MAIN ISSUES IN
STANDARD-SETTING THAT HAVE YET TO BE ADDRESSED AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED 310 8.8 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 312
8.8.1 THE EXCEPTIONS UNDER S 51(3) 312 8.8.2 THE NEED FOR AND THE
IMPLICATIONS OF FUNDAMENTALLY REASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CARTEL PROHIBITIONS 314
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XVI CONTENTS
8.9 EXPORT ARRANGEMENTS 316
8.9.1 THE S 51(2)(G) EXCEPTION 316 8.9.2 DOES THE S 51 (2) (G) EXCEPTION
HAVE A COGENT RATIONALE? 317 8.10 LINER CARGO SHIPPING SERVICES 318
8.10.1 THE PT X EXEMPTIONS 318
8.10.2 ARE THE PTX EXEMPTIONS JUSTIFIED? 320 8.11 UNDERWRITING
ARRANGEMENTS AND FUNDING SYNDICATES 321 8.12 SETTLEMENT OF LITIGATION
322 8.13 AUTHORISATION 324
8.13.1 AUTHORISATION UNDER S 88 324 8.13.2 CONDUCT PRELIMINARY TO A
GRANT OF AUTHORISATION 326 8.13.3 THE ROLE OF AUTHORISATION 327 8.14
WITHDRAWAL 328
8.14.1 WITHDRAWAL UNDER THE TPA - NAVIGATING THE MAZE 328 8.14.2
WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY AS A PRINCIPAL FOR MAKING A
CONTRACT OR ARRANGEMENT OR ARRIVING AT AN UNDERSTANDING CONTAINING A
CARTEL PROVISION OR EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION 329
8.14.3 WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY AS A PRINCIPAL FOR
GIVING EFFECT TO A CARTEL PROVISION OR EXCLUSIONARY PROVISION 330 8.14.4
WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY FOR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT A
CARTEL OFFENCE OR ATTEMPTING TO CONTRAVENE A CIVIL PROHIBITION AGAINST
CARTEL CONDUCT 331 8.14.5 WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
COMPLICITY IN A CARTEL OFFENCE OR BREACH OF A CIVIL PROHIBITION AGAINST
CARTEL CONDUCT 331 8.14.6 WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A
CARTEL OFFENCE OR CONSPIRACY TO CONTRAVENE A CIVIL PROHIBITION AGAINST
CARTEL CONDUCT 332 8.14.7 WITHDRAWAL AND CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LIABILITY FOR
INDUCING OR ATTEMPTING TO INDUCE THE COMMISSION OF A CARTEL OFFENCE OR
THE CONTRAVENTION OF A CIVIL
PROHIBITION AGAINST CARTEL CONDUCT 333 8.14.8 CONCLUSION AS REGARDS
WITHDRAWAL 333 8.15 HONEST AND REASONABLE CONDUCT THAT OUGHT FAIRLY TO
BE EXCUSED 333 8.16 DE MINIMIS CONDUCT 334 8.17 CONCLUSION - THE NEED
FOR FUNCTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION 335
9 ENFORCEMENT POLICY 337 9.1 INTRODUCTION - THE ROLE OF ENFORCEMENT
POLICY IN AN ANTI-CARTEL REGIME 337 9.2 THE ACCC S COMPLIANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT POLICY 338 9.3 THE ACCC-CDPP MOU, ACCC INVESTIGATION
GUIDELINES AND CDPP
PROSECUTION POLICY 341 9.3.1 AGENCY ROLES 342 9.3.2 DECISION-MAKING
CRITERIA 348 9.3.2.1 INVESTIGATION 349
9.3.2.2 REFERRAL 352 9.3.2.3 PROSECUTION 358 9.3.3 DUAL PROCEEDINGS 362
9.3.3.1 THE STATUTORY PROTECTION UNDER S 76B 363
9.3.3.2 THE MEANING OF SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME CONDUCT 364 9.3.3.3
CONCURRENT VERSUS SEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS 365 9.3.3.4 CIVIL PROCEEDINGS
AFTER CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 368 9.3.3.5 CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AFTER CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS 371
IMAGE 9
CONTENTS XV11
9.4 CONCLUSION - THE NEED FOR POLICY CONSOLIDATION AND EXTENSION 375
10 IMMUNITY AND COOPERATION POLICIES 378 10.1 INTRODUCTION - THE ROLE OF
IMMUNITY AND COOPERATION POLICIES IN ANTI-CARTEL LAW ENFORCEMENT 378
10.2 IMMUNITY AND COOPERATION POLICIES UNDER A DUAL CIVIL/CRIMINAL
REGIME 380 10.2.1 IMMUNITY POLICY 380 10.2.1.1 IMMUNITY FROM CIVIL
PROCEEDINGS 383 10.2.1.2 IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 388 10.2.2
COOPERATION POLICY 392
10.2.2.1 COOPERATION IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS 394 10.2.2.2 COOPERATION IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 398 10.2.2.3 THE CANADIAN APPROACH TO COOPERATION
POLICY 403 10.3 IMMUNITY AND COOPERATION POLICIES AND PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT 405
10.3.1 THE ACCC S TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO DISCLOSURE 407 10.3.2 THE
PCI SCHEME 410 10.3.2.1 SECTION 157C 412 10.3.2.2 SECTION 157B 414
10.3.3 OVERSEAS APPROACHES TO DISCLOSURE 415 10.3.3.1 US 415 10.3.3.2 EU
417 10.4 CONCLUSION - A CALL FOR A MORE COHERENT AND EFFECTIVE APPROACH
419
11 SANCTIONS 421 11.1 INTRODUCTION - INADEQUACIES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN
SANCTIONS DESIGN AND APPLICATION 421 11.2 THE STATUTORY SCHEME GOVERNING
SANCTIONS FOR CARTEL CONDUCT 423 11.3 CIVIL SANCTIONS 424
11.3.1 LEVEL OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES AGAINST CORPORATIONS 424 11.3.2
INFLUENCE OF ACCC SETTLEMENTS ON PENALTY ASSESSMENTS 433 11.3.2.1
APPROACH TO NEGOTIATED PENALTIES 433 11.3.2.2 IMPACT
OF NEGOTIATED PENALTIES 436
11.3.3 APPROACH TO PENALTY ASSESSMENT 438 11.3.3.1 BASE FINE 440
11.3.3.2 ADJUSTMENTS FOR AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS 443 11.3.3.3
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE APPROACH TO PENALTY
ASSESSMENT 445
11.3.4 PENALTY MAXIMA BASED ON BENEFIT AND TURNOVER 446 11.3.4.1 THE
BENEFIT MAXIMUM 447 11.3.4.2 THE TURNOVER MAXIMUM 450
11.3.5 NON-MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS 453 11.3.5.1
ALTERNATIVES TO MONETARY PENALTIES UNDER THE TPA 453 11.3.5.2 PROBATION
ORDERS 455 11.3.5.3 COMMUNITY SERVICE ORDERS 457 11.3.5.4 INFORMATION
DISCLOSURE ORDERS AND ADVERTISEMENT ORDERS 459 11.3.5.5 ADVERSE
PUBLICITY ORDERS 460 11.3.6 LEVEL OF PECUNIARY PENALTIES AGAINST
INDIVIDUALS 462 11.3.7 DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 464
11.3.7.1 RATIONALE FOR DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 465 11.3.7.2 LENGTH OF
DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 466
IMAGE 10
XVUEI CONTENTS
11.3.7.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF DISQUALIFICATION ORDERS 469
11.3.8 BAN ON INDEMNIFICATION 470 11.4 CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 472 11.4.1
STATE OF FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW 472 11.4.2 APPROACH TO SENTENCING FOR
CARTEL OFFENCES 473
11.4.3 SENTENCING PURPOSES 475 11.4.4 SENTENCING PRINCIPLES 478 11.4.4.1
PROPORTIONALITY 478 11.4.4.2 TOTALITY 481
11.4.4.3 PARITY 482 11.4.5 SENTENCING FACTORS 483 11.4.5.1 THE NATURE
AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENCE 485
11.4.5.2 OTHER OFFENCES (IF ANY) THAT ARE REQUIRED TO BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT 487 11.4.5.3 IF THE OFFENCE FORMS PART OF A COURSE OF CONDUCT
CONSISTING OF A SERIES OF CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE SAME OR A SIMILAR
CHARACTER - THAT
COURSE OF CONDUCT 488 11.4.5.4 THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF ANY VICTIM
OF THE OFFENCE 488 11.4.5.5 ANY LOSS, INJURY OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM
THE OFFENCE 489 11.4.5.6 THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PERSON HAS SHOWN
CONTRITION FOR THE
OFFENCE 492
11.4.5.7 IF THE PERSON HAS PLEADED GUILTY TO THE CHARGE IN RESPECT OF
THE OFFENCE - THAT FACT; AND THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PERSON HAS
COOPERATED WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
OFFENCE OR OF OTHER OFFENCES 493 11.4.5.8 THE DETERRENT EFFECT THAT ANY
SENTENCE OR ORDER UNDER
CONSIDERATION MAY HAVE ON THE PERSON 496 11.4.5.9 THE NEED TO ENSURE
THAT THE PERSON IS ADEQUATELY PUNISHED FOR THE OFFENCE 496 11.4.5.10 THE
CHARACTER, ANTECEDENTS, CULTURAL BACKGROUND, AGE, MEANS
AND PHYSICAL OR MENTAL CONDITION OF THE PERSON 497 11.4.5.11 THE
PROSPECT OF REHABILITATION OF THE PERSON 498 11.4.5.12 THE PROBABLE
EFFECT THAT ANY SENTENCE OR ORDER UNDER
CONSIDERATION WOULD HAVE ON ANY OF THE PERSON S FAMILY OR DEPENDANTS 498
11.4.5.13 FACTORS SPECIFIC TO THE SENTENCING OF CORPORATIONS 499 11.4.6
SENTENCING OPTIONS 501
11.4.6.1 GENERAL 501 11.4.6.2 FINES 501 11.4.6.3 IMPRISONMENT 505
11.4.6.4 DISMISSALS, DISCHARGES AND RELEASES 512 11.4.6.5 STATE AND
TERRITORY OPTIONS 514 11.4.6.6 NON-MONETARY SANCTIONS AGAINST
CORPORATIONS UNDER THETPA 515
11.4.6.7 OTHER TPA OPTIONS 515 11.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE
ACTIONS AND THE PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT REGIME 517 11.5.1 RESTITUTION AS A
CONDITION OF IMMUNITY 518
11.5.2 IMPACT OF ACCC SETTLEMENTS ON PRIVATE FOLLOW-ON ACTIONS 522
11.5.3 COMPENSATION AS A RELEVANT FACTOR IN SETTING PENALTIES 524 11.6
CONCLUSION - THE NEED FOR GREATER COHERENCE AND CERTAINTY 527 11.6.1
CIVIL SANCTIONS 527
IMAGE 11
CONTENTS XIX
11.6.2 CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 529
11.6.3 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRIVATE ACTIONS AND PUBLIC SANCTIONS 532
12 COMPLIANCE AND LIABILITY CONTROL 533 12.1 INTRODUCTION - CORPORATE
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ANTI-CARTEL LEGISLATION FOR COMPLIANCE AND LIABILITY
CONTROL 533 12.2 COMPLIANCE AND LIABILITY CONTROL AS GUIDES TO CORPORATE
INTERNAL CONTROL 536 12.2.1 COMPLIANCE 536 12.2.2 LIABILITY CONTROL 543
12.3 TRAPS SET BY THE ANTI-CARTEL LEGISLATION 548
12.3.1 IDENTIFYING THE TRAPS AND MANAGING THEM 548 12.3.2 GIVING EFFECT
TO A CARTEL OR OTHER PROVISION 548 12.3.3 CARTEL PROVISIONS AND OTHER
PROVISIONS 549 12.3.4 FAULT ELEMENTS OF THE CARTEL OFFENCES 551 12.3.5
INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY 552 12.3.6 CORPORATE LIABILITY 552 12.3.7
EXCEPTIONS 554 12.3.8 SIDEWINDER LIABILITY 555 12.4 OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ADROIT BOUNDARY-RIDING 556
12.4.1 IDENTIFYING THE OPPORTUNITIES 556 12.4.2 COMMITMENT TO AVOID
COMMITMENT 559 12.4.3 FACILITATING PRACTICES 560 12.4.4 JV ULTRA-LIGHTS
562 12.4.5 CONDITIONS IMMUNISED BY AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCEPTION
UNDER S 51(3) 563 12.4.6 INSULATION OF SENIOR MANAGERS VIA THE INSULATED
CONDUCTOR STRATAGEM 563 12.5 CONCLUSION - THE IMPLICATIONS OF A
LIABILITY CONTROL FRAMEWORK 564
13 CONCLUSION 567 13.1 REFLECTING ON THE AIMS OF THIS BOOK 567 13.2
CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS 568 13.3 THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ANTI-CARTEL REGIME 571
13.3.1 A COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 571 13.3.2 MULTIPLE OBJECTS AND
MATCHING MODES OF ENFORCEMENT 572 13.3.3 RULES REFLECTING ECONOMIC
SERIOUSNESS 573 13.3.4 FAULT-BASED LIABILITY 574 13.3.5 RULES THAT ARE
WORKABLE 575 13.3.6 INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY 575 13.3.7 CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 576 13.3.8 ENFORCEMENT POLICY 577 13.3.9 IMMUNITY AND
COOPERATION POLICY 577 13.3.10 EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS 578 13.3.11
COMPLIANCE AND LIABILITY CONTROL 579 13.4 MANAGING THE FUTURE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN ANTI-CARTEL REGIME 580
APPENDIX: TRADE PRACTICES ACT 1974 (CTH) PTIVDIV L;PTIVDIV2S 45 583
INDEX 601
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Beaton-Wells, Caron Fisse, Brent |
author_GND | (DE-588)139725660 |
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dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 343 - Military, tax, trade & industrial law |
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dewey-search | 343.940721 |
dewey-sort | 3343.940721 |
dewey-tens | 340 - Law |
discipline | Rechtswissenschaft |
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spelling | Beaton-Wells, Caron Verfasser (DE-588)139725660 aut Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context Caron Beaton-Wells ; Brent Fisse Port Melbourne, VIC Cambridge Univ. Press 2011 XXXI, 618 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Cartels Australia Antitrust law (International law) Australien Fisse, Brent Verfasser aut SWB Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024495229&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Beaton-Wells, Caron Fisse, Brent Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context Cartels Australia Antitrust law (International law) |
title | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context |
title_auth | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context |
title_exact_search | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context |
title_full | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context Caron Beaton-Wells ; Brent Fisse |
title_fullStr | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context Caron Beaton-Wells ; Brent Fisse |
title_full_unstemmed | Australian cartel regulation law, policy and practice in an international context Caron Beaton-Wells ; Brent Fisse |
title_short | Australian cartel regulation |
title_sort | australian cartel regulation law policy and practice in an international context |
title_sub | law, policy and practice in an international context |
topic | Cartels Australia Antitrust law (International law) |
topic_facet | Cartels Australia Antitrust law (International law) Australien |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024495229&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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