Resolving insurgencies:
Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for ei...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Carlisle, PA
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
2011
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| Schriftenreihe: | External Research Associates Program
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns |
| Beschreibung: | "June 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-95) Summary --- Introduction -- Approach -- Insurgency -- Chronic insurgency and shadow governance -- Counterinsurgency -- Historical analysis : four different outcomes -- Group 1 : insurgent victories -- Group 2 : government victories -- Group 3 : degenerate insurgencies -- Group 4 : success through co-option -- Lessons -- A strategy of co-option -- Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan -- Conclusion |
| Beschreibung: | VIII, 95 S. |
| ISBN: | 9781584874959 |
Internformat
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| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-95) | ||
| 500 | |a Summary --- Introduction -- Approach -- Insurgency -- Chronic insurgency and shadow governance -- Counterinsurgency -- Historical analysis : four different outcomes -- Group 1 : insurgent victories -- Group 2 : government victories -- Group 3 : degenerate insurgencies -- Group 4 : success through co-option -- Lessons -- A strategy of co-option -- Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan -- Conclusion | ||
| 520 | |a Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Mockaitis, Thomas R. 1955- |
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:07:44Z |
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| isbn | 9781584874959 |
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| publishDate | 2011 |
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| spelling | Mockaitis, Thomas R. 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)13638594X aut Resolving insurgencies Thomas R. Mockaitis Carlisle, PA Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2011 VIII, 95 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier External Research Associates Program "June 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 84-95) Summary --- Introduction -- Approach -- Insurgency -- Chronic insurgency and shadow governance -- Counterinsurgency -- Historical analysis : four different outcomes -- Group 1 : insurgent victories -- Group 2 : government victories -- Group 3 : degenerate insurgencies -- Group 4 : success through co-option -- Lessons -- A strategy of co-option -- Implications for Iraq and Afghanistan -- Conclusion Understanding how insurgencies may be brought to a successful conclusion is vital to military strategists and policymakers. This study examines how past insurgencies have ended and how current ones may be resolved. Four ways in which insurgencies have ended are identified. Clear-cut victories for either the government or the insurgents occurred during the era of decolonization, but they seldom happen today. Recent insurgencies have often degenerated into criminal organizations that become committed to making money rather than fighting a revolution, or they evolve into terrorist groups capable of nothing more than sporadic violence. In a few cases, the threatened government has resolved the conflict by co-opting the insurgents. After achieving a strategic stalemate and persuading the belligerents that they have nothing to gain from continued fighting, these governments have drawn the insurgents into the legitimate political process through reform and concessions. The author concludes that such a co-option strategy offers the best hope of U.S. success in Afghanistan and in future counterinsurgency campaigns Insurgency / Case studies Counterinsurgency / Case studies Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd rswk-swf Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4522595-3 Fallstudiensammlung gnd-content Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 s Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 s DE-604 Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.) Sonstige (DE-588)1046371-9 oth |
| spellingShingle | Mockaitis, Thomas R. 1955- Resolving insurgencies Insurgency / Case studies Counterinsurgency / Case studies Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003554-2 (DE-588)4112701-8 (DE-588)4522595-3 |
| title | Resolving insurgencies |
| title_auth | Resolving insurgencies |
| title_exact_search | Resolving insurgencies |
| title_full | Resolving insurgencies Thomas R. Mockaitis |
| title_fullStr | Resolving insurgencies Thomas R. Mockaitis |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resolving insurgencies Thomas R. Mockaitis |
| title_short | Resolving insurgencies |
| title_sort | resolving insurgencies |
| topic | Insurgency / Case studies Counterinsurgency / Case studies Aufstand (DE-588)4003554-2 gnd Bekämpfung (DE-588)4112701-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Insurgency / Case studies Counterinsurgency / Case studies Aufstand Bekämpfung Fallstudiensammlung |
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