Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX: ideologii, mitologii, extremisme
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Romanian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Iaşi
Ed. Univ. "Alexandru Ioan Cuza"
2011
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 180 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9789737035721 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | SUMAR
INTRODUCERE
/7
CAPITOLUL
I
IDEOLOGIE ŞI MITOLOGIE POLITICĂ ÎN BALCANI
/ 25
Iugoslavismul
/ 25
Megáii
Idea
1
42
CAPITOLUL
II
IPOSTAZE ALE EXTREMISMULUI BALCANIC
/ 53
Organizaţia Revoluţionară Internă Macedoneană
/ 56
Mişcarea
Ustaša
1
67
CAPITOLUL III
BALCANII ŞI LIDERII SĂI
/ 81
Elefthérios Kyriákou Venizélos
/81
Josip Broz
Tito
/ 89
EnverHoxha/
106
CAPITOLUL
IV
NAŢIONALISMUL ÎN R.S.F. IUGOSLAVIA
/115
Bosnia: islamismul emergent
/119
Croaţia: etno-centrismul
/ 127
Velika Srbija:
comunismul naţionalist
/ 137
Kosovo: iredentismul albanez/
145
ADDENDA/
153
REFERINŢE BIBLIOGRAFICE
/ 163
SUMMARY/
167
INDICE DE NUME
/177
SUMMARY
The interest in studying the history of the Balkans and the choice
for a close and subtle look on the phenomena specific to this region
have been a permanent challenge so far.
An unbiased history of South-East Europe has not be written yet
and cannot be written. The
historiographie
records prove it: the British,
German, French and Italian ones, as well as the writings of the
Bulgarian, Yugoslav and Greek historiographers.
What we have so far are histories of the Balkans, most of them
being great; in our opinion, one of their main characteristics is still the
power to challenge, to open other ways for new and useful research in
the field.
The interest in studying the history of South-East Europe has
benefited from political incentives from the very beginning. The
phenomenon can be explained by simply looking at the restless region
and the changes
-
sometimes radical
-
which took place in the Balkans
in short periods of time, as well as the constant involvement of the
Great Powers in the south-east of Europe.
The events in
1878, 1908, 1912-1913, 1914-1918, 1940-1945
or,
why not,
1991-1995
and
1999
are representative for the
historiographie
strife to justify and explain the presence of a third part in the Balkan
region. At the same time, the flexibility in the region has left its mark
upon the writings.
Albania is an early twentieth century creation;
1918
bears a major
significance, similar to the years
1908
and
1919
in Bulgaria. For the
Serbs,
1918
represents the fulfillment of their national dreams, but a
dissapointment for the Croats and the Slovenes; Greece s attempt to
168
Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului
XX
end the
dispute
with its historic rival, Turkey at the end of the Great
War resulted in a epic humiliation for the former.
All these events have deeply marked the historical writings in the
Balkans which show a vengeful and revanchist spirit. This kind of spirit
faded during Communism and went off in the last decade of the last
century, together with triggering the civil wars which led to the fall of
Yugoslavia viewed as a representative countiy for the complexity of
the Balkans.
No region in Europe knows as rich cultural, ethnic, linguistic and
religious diversity as the Balkan Peninsula. At the same time, no region
but the Balkans has emerged from crisis with such difficulty.
In this sense, it is significant what Joseph Roucek, an American
historian and politologist and a great expert in the problems of Central
and South-East Europe, stated seven decades ago: The Balkans have
proved to be a striking example of lack of geographic, ethnic, linguistic,
religious, cultural and political unity so far (i.e.,
1939).
From the
géomorphologie
point of view, the name Balkan
Peninsula may be accurate; but from the point of view of human
geography , the subtleties, instructions and circumstances are still
unclear and have no end.
The phenomenon can be explained; the opponents played for a
high stake, that of the negative semantic meaning the word Balkan
acquired in the last two centuries.
During the years of the Cold War, the Iron Courtain leads to new
splits. Greece, a member of NATO, becomes the Occident s outpost in
the Balkans, a position favoured by its accession in the EEC in
1981.
The old political and diplomatic relations and the traditional economic
relations with the Balkan countries almost disappear, being completely
reoriented. The conscious feeling of political division has been so
strong that Greece, perceived as a Balkan state before, is now viewed as
belonging to the Western World.
Another traditional concept, that of Central Europe, stops
existing from similar reasons. Thus, after World War II, Greece was
drawn out from the Balkans and aligned with the southern part of
NATO, sharing its Mediterranean fate with Italy, Spain and Portugal.
Summary
169
From the geopolitical point of view, the Balkan Peninsula
includes a western and Mediterranean country at the same time, called
Greece, and communist states as Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
The Balkan communist area redefines itself in its turn: Albania chooses
quasi-seclusion and Yugoslavia led by Joseph Broz Tito chooses to
establish cordial relations with the Free World . The latter still remains
an Eastern country like its neighbour, Bulgaria, or like the former
Central European states , Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in autumn in
1989
unsurprisingly
revives the old Greek-Serbian solidarity, as well as the utter hostility
between Athens and Tirana or between the Greeks and the Slavic
Macedonians.
However, according to the writer Georgios Prevelakis, one can
undeniably speak about a Balkan matrix or an emblematic nucleus for
the region: the imaginary axis
Belgrade-Sofía-Salonica-Athens-Tirana-
Sarajevo-Belgrade is still considered representative for the Balkans in
terms of the collective mental state. The conclusion is obvious: the
concept of the Balkans is a relative one which is likely to be devoided
of contents depending on how the Balkans are seen, examined or
analyzed.
Actually, semantic reasons are held responsible for the refusal of
the inhabiting nations to belong to the Balkans and especially the
Balkan world . Winston Churchill said The Balkans produce more
history than they can consume . Joseph Stalin also maliciously stated
that The Balkans have always been Europe s backyard . Georges
Duhamel
believed that The Balkans were a trap for diplomats, a kind
of purgatory for the Occident, a reservoir of catastrophes or else an
Asiatic inland for our Europe . Other critics agreed that The Balkans
produce as many borders as their leaders want .
The insidious current use of the famous phrase the Balkans
-
the
powder keg of Europe , the obstinacy in viewing the Balkan Peninsula
as opposed to the morals, culture and life standards of the Occident
and the negative overuse of the term balkanization have certainly
obliged the Balkan nations themselves to redefine their status. Georgios
170
Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului
XX
Prevelakis
also mentioned that The Balkan Peninsula is a study theme
rather than a great region .
Another group of critics still believe in the tragic destiny of the
Balkan history and rejected the idea that The Balkans exist in the mind
of people first of all and then of the ground .
Starting with Hermann
Keyserling
who sees it as a region of
shady diplomacy , a territory of eternal feud and continuing with
Edmund
Stillman
and Samuel
Huntington,
the advocates of the theory
according to which nothing has changed in the Balkans throughout the
last century truthfully insist on the conflicting differences and
discrepancies in the region.
The Balkans is said to be the most obvious dividing line among
civilizations and mentalities all over Europe: a line between Christianity
and Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism, Ottoman and Byzantine
civilization, the East and the West ; here, the pro-Russian attitudes
are fundamentally opposed to the pro-Austrian ones; the multinational
state has survived along with the national state; the two military
alliances
-
NATO and the Warsaw Pact
-
have had common ground.
Moreover, the Balkans have experienced quasi-isolation in Enver
Hoxha s Albania and misalignment in Tito s Yugoslavia.
Edmund
Stillman
wrote on these grounds four decades ago that
The Balkans is a severe warning for those who mistake
10
years in a
nation s life for eternity, for those who believe that national prestige,
power and prosperity remain untouched by the continous develpoment
of the world. The Balkans is a true denial of shallow opportunism
.
In our opinion, the second phrase
-
South-East Europe
-
bears a
valuable semantic meaning, similar to the phrase related to the Balkans.
Differences are seen on the level of intellectual comfort . Thus, any
scientific inquiry into the problems of South-East Europe seems free of
any parti-pris which brings into discussion an issue related to this space
ab initio,
irrespective of its political, ideological or historical reasons.
First of all, South-East Europe has a geographic meaning
-
the
Adriatic Sea, the Aegean Sea, the
Sava
River and the Danube are
generally considered landmarks for the precise identification of the area
-
doubled by cultural, political and civilization features which lend a
Summary
171
relative unity to this region. One can paraphrase King Alexander of
Yugoslavia, a great leader of this region, and say that people especially
speak about South-East Europe in the diplomatic salons and about the
Balkans only on the battlefield.
We totally rejected to illustrate a factual histoiy of the Balkans.
Such kind of history can be easily identified and used due to the many
accurate and outstanding syntheses on South-East Europe.
Our purpose has been to highlight those phenomena and events
that strongly and sometimes definitely marked the destiny of these
regions of the continent both in the interwar period and post-World War
II period and had great consequences on the south-eastern European
societies on the whole.
Moreover, most of these consequences are still felt nowadays: in
politics, in diplomacy, in assuming new national identities and
especially in the collective mental state.
We wish to emphasize the national political movements which
led to the establishment of new types of states attempting to become
viable in the post-World War I period. This explains, for example the
yugoslavism. We also interested in the national project for the Greeks
devised by the Athenian political order in the same period. The dream
of 4he Greater Greece , which was likely after the fall of the Ottoman
Empire, but imbued with the idea that the Hellenic state had a unique
unhoped chance to fulfill territorial unity, will soon change into a
nightmare . The military catastrophe in Anatolia has made Athens to
yearn for the chair of
leader of the Balkans
,
but the concept of the
Great Idea quickly became devoided of meaning.
The emergence, development and forms of nationalist extremism
in the Balkans represent another feature of the time. The specialized
literature emphasizes the consequences the anarchist Balkan
movements had on triggering fortuitous events such as the assasination
in Sarajevo in June,
28, 1914
claimed by one of the best known
anarchist Serbian society,
Ujedinjenje ili Smrt
(Unification or Death).
Therefore, a complete mythology of revenge shaped on a history
of frustrations has led to the emergence and development of nationalist
and extremist movements all over the Balkans in the interwar period.
172
Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului
XX
Of
course,
their forms have differed from one country to another,
depending on the political evolution in a specific state and the degree of
acceptance shown by the Governments. In addition, the extreme forms
of some of these movements were fostered by the random interpretation
of the provisions mentioned in the Paris-Versailles Treaty
-
similar to
what happened in Bulgaria
-
or by the emergence of political leftism of
the Croatian leaders in accepting the Serbian hypercentralized state in a
multinational state in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
Two nationalist extremist movements are famous for their
violence: the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO)
and
Ustaša.
The former aimed at creating a fully unstable environment in the
region as its advocates were striving to create an independent Macedo-
Slavic state using paramilitary means. From this point of view, the
Serbian-Bulgarian and the Greek-Bulgarian tensions activated by the
IMRO s acts of violence on the territory of these three states seriously
impaired the inter-Balkan relations, which had already been prejudiced
after
1919.
The latter questioned the instability of the
1918
Yugoslavian
state to the highest degree. Initially, the movement wished to represent
the Croatian dreams of extended autonomy in Yugoslavia, but it soon
changed and, with the help of IMRO, became the originator of King
Alexander s assasination and of the Croatian fascist regime during
1941-1945.
The movement extended itself in the Diaspora in the mid
70s,
where it was responsible for a series of attacks on the Serbian
diplomatic missions to the prejudice of Yugoslav interests.
The presentation of some famous political people in the Balkans
has also been necessary. For example, Eleftherios Venizelos is important
for his great influence on Greek politics. He was appointed Prime-
Minister five times between
1910
and
1932.
Moreover, he accomplished
the state union of the Greeks. This nation owes to him the unification of
Crete, Epirus and part of Macedonia to Salonica in
1913,
Western and
Eastern Thrace in
1919
and a large part of Aegean Archipelago in
1920.
Important studies in Hellenic historiography are dedicated to him and
his memory is honoured.
Summary
173
In relation to Joseph Broz Tito and Enver Hoxha, their contribution
to the radical changes in the ideological, cultural, economic and political
profile of the countries they ruled with a heavy hand for almost
halfa
century is essential.
Their destinies were similar to one point. Both were leaders of
the Yugoslavian and Albanian communist parties illegally; they both
activated in the Comintern and Cominform and had the same Stalinist
vision regarding class struggle and getting the upperhand in the name of
the working class. They shared the belief in the myth of a Worldwide
Revolution and a successful partisan fight. Without the help of the
Soviet Red Army and with the agreement of the majority, getting the
upperhand was easy for them. From this point of view, Albania and
Yugoslavia represented the unusual cases in the history of European
communism.
Personal and strategic reasons kept the distance between them
and Joseph Stalin
-
but not from Stalinism in Hoxha s case
-
in order to
put into practice their own vision on communist society. They even
thought of making Albania the seventh republic in the Yugoslavian
federation since Hoxha had considered Tito a real mentor.
From that point on, their destinies developed differently. Albania
became a hermetically closed state in which the communist dictatorship
imposed one of the harshcat political systems in Europe whose dimensions
were never really known or clarified. Yugoslavia experienced Titoism,
an envied social and economic hybrid, but, in fact, the result of
Yugoslavian realities. The re-emergence of the Albanian irredentism in
Kosovo followed by vindicatory measures on the part of the provincial
Serbian authorities would ultimately
tum
the two leaders into enemies
for life on both the nationalistic and ideological level.
After the beginning of the Yugoslavian civil war in June
1991,
much has been said about the so-called specific reasons that triggered
the first military conflict in Europe after World War II. The width and
dimensions of the hostilities have caused a series of questions related to
the mechanisms of a cruel interethnic war fought by the same nation
who were educated for the Titoist doctrine of
Bratstvo i Jedinstvo
(Brotherhood and Unity) decades in a row.
174
Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului
XX
Beyond the hypocrisy of this motto, the political leaders are
responsible for this meaningless war cry. Their names have become
symbols of interethnic hate, of a tribal type of intolerance and
authoritarianism, all latent in the public consciousness before the civil
wars.
Franjo
Tuđman
-
in Croatia,
Alija
Izetbegovic -
in Bosnia and
Slobodan Milosevic
-
in Serbia have rejected the old Titoist doctrine in
unison and turned Yugoslavia into the bloodiest
warzone
known in
Europe after
1945
in the name of nationalism.
The secession movements in their initial stage have apperead in
Yugoslavia in the late
60s.
Disconcerted attitudes and words favoured
by the debate circles in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana or Sarajevo will be
apparently overlooked in a country where public debates and polemics
are well established in a society which cannot be encountered in
another communist country.
The activists
Franjo
Tuđman
and
Alija
Izetbegovic
have expressed
their principles here, which drew attention on some interethnic issues in
Tito s Yugoslavia in the name of their own ethnic groups. Punished by
the communist regime, the two will reappear on the public scene in the
early
90s
and become the protagonists of the Yugoslavian tragedy,
together with the Serb Slobodan Milosevic.
After Joseph Broz Tito s death in
1980,
we witness the re-
emergence of the Albanian irredentism in the Serbian Autonomous
Province Kosovo-Metohija. Although irredentism has old roots, it will
be strongly revived by Tito s death. The gradual weakening of federal
authority, the continuosly diminution of the ethnic Serbian element in
the communist party from the moment when Kosovo becames a quasi-
autonomous province within Serbia
(1974)
and the cancellation of this
status in
1989
have been sufficient and necessary conditions for triggering
the first forms of secessionism in the multinational Yugoslavian state.
The mentors of this type of reaction were the opinion leaders of
the Albanian community in Kosovo
-
Ibrahim
Rugova
is worth
mentioning
-
the Albanian Intelligence services interested in destabilizing
pluriethnic Yugoslavia and the nationalist circles in Zagreb, Ljubljana
and Sarajevo at the same time.
Summary
175
Therefore, if the Bosnian Muslims symphatized the Albanian
vision for religious reasons, the Croats and the Slovenes would use it as
an excuse for promoting their own interests; actually, they felt deep
antipathies towards the Albanian ethnic group because of the huge
cultural, economic and social differences between the
rieh
north-west
and the underdeveloped south-cast of the Yugoslav federation.
From this perspective, the advocates of the Yugoslavian
secessionism took advantage of the problems in Kosovo and used them
for their own purposes. The disavowal of Serbia as oppressor represented
a great opportunity to bring into discussion its dominant status within
the federation once more and to get the public opinion ready for
changes related to its maintenance in the multinational state.
From this point of view, the issues in Kosovo came to generate
the break-up of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the last decade of the
twentieth century.
|
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| genre | (DE-588)4188171-0 Verzeichnis gnd-content |
| genre_facet | Verzeichnis |
| geographic | Balkan (DE-588)4069099-4 gnd Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Balkan Jugoslawien |
| id | DE-604.BV039533859 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-10T00:05:41Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789737035721 |
| language | Romanian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-024386079 |
| oclc_num | 750871824 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 180 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateSearch | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | Ed. Univ. "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Lazăr, Dan 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)140602615 aut Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme Dan Lazăr Iaşi Ed. Univ. "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" 2011 180 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 2010 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1900-1990 gnd rswk-swf Ideologie (DE-588)4026486-5 gnd rswk-swf Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd rswk-swf Nationalismus (DE-588)4041300-7 gnd rswk-swf Balkan (DE-588)4069099-4 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4188171-0 Verzeichnis gnd-content Balkan (DE-588)4069099-4 g Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Nationalismus (DE-588)4041300-7 s Ideologie (DE-588)4026486-5 s Geschichte 1900-1990 z DE-604 Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 s Geschichte 2010 z Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024386079&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024386079&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Lazăr, Dan 1967- Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme Ideologie (DE-588)4026486-5 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd Nationalismus (DE-588)4041300-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4026486-5 (DE-588)4056618-3 (DE-588)4041300-7 (DE-588)4069099-4 (DE-588)4028966-7 (DE-588)4188171-0 |
| title | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme |
| title_auth | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme |
| title_exact_search | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme |
| title_full | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme Dan Lazăr |
| title_fullStr | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme Dan Lazăr |
| title_full_unstemmed | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX ideologii, mitologii, extremisme Dan Lazăr |
| title_short | Naţionalismul în Balcanii secolului XX |
| title_sort | nationalismul in balcanii secolului xx ideologii mitologii extremisme |
| title_sub | ideologii, mitologii, extremisme |
| topic | Ideologie (DE-588)4026486-5 gnd Staat (DE-588)4056618-3 gnd Nationalismus (DE-588)4041300-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Ideologie Staat Nationalismus Balkan Jugoslawien Verzeichnis |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024386079&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=024386079&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT lazardan nationalismulinbalcaniisecoluluixxideologiimitologiiextremisme |