Srebrenica: dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Buch |
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Beograd
Fond Istorijski Projekat Srebrenica
2010
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| Ausgabe: | 2. izd. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | PST in engl. Sprache. - In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. und franz. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 239 S. |
| ISBN: | 9788688135085 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | САДРЖАЈ
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СОДЕРЖАНИЕ
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Рецензија
(Пётр Ахмедович Искендеров)
.......... 7
УВОД (Стефан КаргановиК)
............... 1]
ПРЕДГОВОР (Стефан
Каргсшовић)
............ 15
1.
ИМАЈУ
ЛИ
МУСЛИМАНСКЕ ЖРТВЕ ИКАКВЕ
ВЕЗЕ СА СРП-
СКИМ ЖРТВАМА?
(Стефан
КаргановиК).........
33
2.
ДЕМИЛИТАРИЗАЦИЈА
(Стефан КаргановиК)
....... 53
3.
АНАЛИЗА ФОРЕНЗИЧКИХ
ИЗВЕШТАЈА
ХАШКОГ ТРИБУНА¬
ЛА
(Љубиша Симић)..................
63
4.
ТУМАЧЕЊЕ
И ПРИКАЗ
РЕЗУЛТАТА
ПО МАСОВНИМ ГРОБ-
НИЦАМА
(Љубиша СимиК)
............... 83
5.
ДА ЛИ
JE
ПОСТО
ЈАЛА
НАМЕРА У
ЈУЛУ
1995
ДА
СЕ СВИ
МУСЛИМАНИ
ЗАРОБЉЕНИ
У СРЕБРЕНИЦЕ И ОКО
ЊЕ
ПО-
ГУБЕ? (Стефан КаргановиК)
.............. 95
6.
АНАЛИЗА ГУБИТАКА МУСЛИМАНСКЕ КОЛОНЕ УСЛЕД
МИНСКИХ
ПОЉА,
БОРБЕНИХ
ДЕЈСТАВА
И ДРУГИХ
УЗРОКА (Стефан КаргаиовиК)
.............. 113
7.
БИЛАНС (Стефан КаргановиК)
.............. 131
SREBRENICA: THE DECONSTRUCTION OF A VIRTUAL GENO¬
CIDE (Summary)
.................... 143
LA DECONSTRUCTION
D UN
GENOCIDE
VIRTUEL
(Resume)
153
Прилози
....................... 165
Поговор.......................
263
Summary:
SREBRENICA: THE DECONSTRUCTION
OF A VIRTUAL GENOCIDE
It is scarcely possible to discuss meaningfully the events surrounding
Srebrenica without taking a holistic approach. That means that the core event,
the prisoner massacre that occurred between July
11
and
1 9, 1995,
must be
broadly contextualised to include an analysis of the role of major external actors
[e.g. international community, media, etc.] as well as important internal factors
[e.g. attacks on surrounding Serbian villages, failed demilitarisation process,
etc.] which shaped the events that culminated in the large scale loss of life.
The reductionist approach, which has been dominant in the Srebrenica de¬
bate until recently, avoids dealing with contextual complexities and seeks in¬
stead to offer an explanation that is simplistic [a sudden desire to wipe out an en¬
tire community] and notoriously careless with the facts [an exaggerated death
toll which is insisted upon to lend credibility to the charge of genocide].
The justified nervousness of the reductionist camp has been palpable. It
has been working hard to encourage the passing at various levels of political res¬
olutions and punitive measures designed to
sacralise
the dogmatic version of
Srebrenica events and to impose it as the only correct way to view them.
The primary goal of this monograph is to analyse the losses suffered in the
Srebrenica theatre by the Moslem side in the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict in
July
1995.
This is an important issue for several reasons. First, because those
losses are raised as evidence of guilt of the Serb side in the BH conflict, even in
the collective sense of that word; second, assuming that some form of responsi¬
bility may indeed be imputed, it is fair to try to assess as accurately as possible
the character and scope of those losses, otherwise the nature of the responsibility
hardly can be properly established; further, those losses are not treated as a rou¬
tine wartime event but have become widely regarded as exemplifying the most
heinous crime known to international law: genocide, so it becomes additionally
important to sort things out. Finally, all pragmatic considerations aside, there is
also a moral imperative: the truth has an enormous healing power which both
communities in Srebrenica
—
and in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole
—
should
welcome if it is indeed their wish to live in peace and not to allow the recent hor¬
rors to ever be repeated.
144
Сребреница: Деконструкција једног виртуелног
геноцида
In line with the holistic approach, available data relative to the scope of
Moslem losses which resulted directly from the takeover of the Srebrenica en¬
clave by Serbian forces [VRS] are considered. That is the primary focus of this
monograph. In the chapters prepared by Dr.
Ljiibiša Simić,
a detailed analysis is
presented of the forensic material that is used by ICTY prosecution to demon¬
strated Srebrenica Moslem casualties in the various Srebrenica-related trials.
That forensic material is the only corpus delicti of the crime of Srebrenica and
the only available physical evidence for the allegation that in July of
1995
the
Serb side committed genocide by executing
8000
Moslem men and boys.
The other aspect of this issue is practically unknown to the public at large.
It concerns the losses inflicted on the
12,000
to
15,000
strong column of the 28th
Division of the Bosnian Moslem army, which included military personnel and ci¬
vilians, who attempted a break through from Srebrenica to
Tuzla
after the en¬
clave s fall on July
11, 1995.
As a result of clashes with Serbian forces, mine¬
fields, and other calamities, the column suffered considerable losses. Such a
mixed military-civilian column is a legitimate target according to international
law and, in contrast to the execution of prisoners, its casualties are not even a
war crime, let alone a more serious offence. Therefore, regardless of prisoner ex¬
ecutions elsewhere, which was a war crime, casualties sustained by the column
must be distinguished and treated separately. They are not even victims of mas¬
sacre, let alone genocide.
The systematic avoidance of the column as a distinct piece of the
Srebrenica jigsaw puzzle during the critical period in July of
1995
and the ab¬
sence of any analysis of those casualties is a salient example of the perils of
reductionism and of the need to take a holistic approach. If there is a will to es¬
tablish the authentic number of Moslem victims of Srebrenica in July of
1995
and to properly delineate the scope of the crime which forms the material basis
for the charge of genocide, legitimate losses resulting from combat must not be
conflated with executed prisoners of war. The causes and structure of those legit¬
imate losses is discussed in the chapter authored by Stephen
Karganović.
The ac¬
count of combat activities and losses incidental to them is based on hitherto un-
examined and unpublished statements of Moslem column members who were
successful in reaching
Tuzla
and were debriefed about their experiences by au¬
thorities there.
If the holistic approach is to be fruitful, it cannot be confined to a break¬
down of Moslem casualties in July of
1995
but must encompass all elements
which influenced the situation on the ground from the outbreak of hostilities in
April of
1992
to the fall of the enclave in July of
1995.
As a minimum, that re¬
quires that attention be paid to two key factors: the agreed to but never imple¬
mented demilitarisation and dissolution of Moslem armed forces within the en¬
clave and systematic attacks launched out of the enclave which devastated Ser¬
bian villages surrounding Srebrenica, and which were accompanied by the mass
killing and expulsion of the peaceful non-Moslem population. These events are
part and parcel, morally and forensically speaking, of the
dénouement
of July of
1995,
and in this monograph they are treated accordingly.
Summary
145
The empirical analysis of authentic Moslem casualties, and their proper
categorisation, is the core issue with regard to Srebrenica. Without a corpse,
there is no murder, or genocide for that matter. The forensic evidence of
Srebrenica is the only corpus delicti we have, and its quality and correct interpre¬
tation are crucial to understanding and properly interpreting what happened. Dr.
Ljubiša Simić,
in two essays, presents the results of his critique of the forensic
data, after having reviewed the entire,
30,000
page, record of ICTY s Office of
the Prosecutor on this subject.
The numerous errors and methodological shortcomings in the prosecution
forensic results, which Dr.
Simić
identifies, strongly suggest that the Hague tri¬
bunal drew huge and mostly unwarranted conclusions based on scant and im¬
properly construed evidence. The critique of the forensic aspect of ICTY prose¬
cution s Srebrenica case is a metaphor for the factual untenability of several
other key props upon which that case rests.
Three of those major props are closely examined.
[1]
The
Erdemović
evidence.
Dražen Erdemović
is a the prosecution s key
Srebrenica ocular witness as well as an alleged participant in the commission of
the crimes which he describes. He became the star Srebrenica prosecution wit¬
ness after concluding a plea bargain. In return for a benign sentence of
5
years
for allegedly taking part in the execution of
1200
prisoners at
Pilice
and murder¬
ing up to
100
personally,
Erdemović
has given evidence in five Srebrenica trials
so far. But his evidence is shown to be highly problematic, contradictory, and in
many key details plainly unconvincing. An example of
Erdemović
s fundamen¬
tal lack of credibility is the fact that at
Pilica,
where this mass crime allegedly in¬
volving about
1,200
victims occurred, ICTY prosecution forensic teams ex¬
humed the remains of only
137
potential victims, of whom
70
had blindfolds
and/or ligatures, which confirms that the story as told by this witness is partially
correct, but nevertheless enormously exaggerated.
Since
Erdemović
is a key ocular witness/participant, a great deal of the of¬
ficial Srebrenica narrative rests on his shaky testimony, plus the grossly misrep¬
resented forensic findings.
[2] DNA
evidence.
DNA was
introduced into the Srebrenica investigation
process as an evidentiary tool rather late in the game, but with great pomp. Its
application in the gathering of evidence is under the auspices of the International
Commission for Missing Persons in the former Yugoslavia [ICMP] whose offi¬
cial mission is to help identify suspected remains of individuals who went miss¬
ing during the conflict. Although ICMP officially tries to nurture the profile of a
non-political and humanitarian organisation, its background shows close ties to
the US political establishment and, in fact, its president is appointed by the US
Secretary of State. That suggests the possibility of a conflict of interest because
it raises the spectre of client relationship with a government which is competing
tenaciously for influence in the region and is committed to a specific version of
the Srebrenica narrative. It should be noted also that ICMP s purported identifi-
146
СРЕБРЕНИЦА: Деконструкцша
једног
виртуелног геноцида
cation
of over
6000
out of Srebrenica s
8000
alleged victims just happens to
dovetail very conveniently with that government s Bosnian agenda.
While
DNA
evidence, with its aura of cutting edge science, can undoubt¬
edly be used to make a huge impression on behalf of whatever cause it is trotted
out to support, its effectiveness in bringing ICTY prosecution to within striking
distance of its goal of identifying
8,000
Srebrenica victims is highly uncertain.
Where it was presented in court, as in the
Popović
et al. case,
that was in closed
session and under highly restrictive conditions which limited defence s opportu¬
nity to properly examine and criticise the application of this procedure in the
identification of Srebrenica victims. It seems, surprisingly, that even the Office
of the Prosecutor was denied full access. The stated reason for this secretiveness
is that supposedly, in the interest of privacy,
DNA
test samples and analytical re¬
sults cannot possibly be released or made public without the written permission
of surviving relatives. Since such permission is hardly forthcoming, that effec¬
tively makes ICMP s tender of
DNA
evidence unverifiable and a matter of faith.
The acceptance of such faith based evidence does not generate any meaningful
scientific or judicial data and it is a serious violation of the procedural rights of
the accused.
But beyond these disclosure controversies there is an aspect that is practi¬
cally never addressed. Identification by
DNA,
assuming it is performed accu¬
rately by ICMP, can indeed be useful in giving some comfort to the families. But
it is useless to establish time and manner of death, which are the key facts of in¬
terest in a criminological investigation such as Srebrenica.
[3]
Satellite photos. Evidence in this category has been known and avidly
discussed since August of
1995,
when US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
showed to the UN Security Council what she claimed were photos of Srebrenica
mass graves. But as with the
DNA
evidence, it also is inaccessible and unverifi¬
able, in this case for the alleged reason of national security. But it has recently
come to light, as a result of an interview given by
Jean-René Ruez, ICTY
prose¬
cution s chief investigator during the initial stages of the Srebrenica investiga¬
tion, that the widespread impression nurtured over the years, that Srebrenica
mass graves and evidence of disturbed earth suggesting reburials were reliably
recorded from outer space using the latest satellite technology, is in fact false.
According to
Ruez,
aerial recognisance over Srebrenica was conducted not by
technologically advanced satellites whose intelligence gathering techniques
might justifiably be subject to secrecy, but by much older U2 spy planes. Since a
U2 had been shot down over the USSR some time ago, it may be assumed that its
major features are quite well known to foreign intelligence, thus eliminating the
need for placing a 50-year seal on Srebrenica photos on the pretext that it is nec¬
essary in order to protect sophisticated intelligence gathering technology.
In sum, it turns out that what were thought to be satellite photos are actu¬
ally nothing of the kind and that, upon closer examination, this particular prop of
the official Srebrenica narrative is as unverifiable as the
DNA
evidence and as
unreliable as the testimony of
Dražen
Erdemović.
Summary
147
In chapter I, Have Moslem victims anything to do with Serbian victims? ,
the three days in July of
1995,
during which Moslem residents of the Srebrenica
enclave were victims, are balanced against the record of the three preceding
years of the war, during which residents of surrounding Serbian villages were
targeted systematically in a campaign of devastation and mayhem. However, this
balancing account is steadfastly ignored by the proponents of the official
Srebrenica narrative, and for a reason which makes eminent sense from their per¬
spective. If the original crime of Srebrenica was the pogrom of the Serbian popu¬
lation during the first three years of the conflict, then the picture and the under¬
standing that flows from it change fundamentally. The conclusion that then
would more naturally fit the facts might be that the crime committed in
1995
against the symbolic perpetrators of the original crime of Srebrenica was re¬
venge, a settling of accounts. But such a conclusion hardly presents suitable ma¬
terial from which to fashion a victimological narrative and a genocide cult.
The so-called international community and its various agencies and institu¬
tions failed to rise to the challenge and serve as honest brokers in encouraging an
equitable solution early on to the tripartite ethnic conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Instead, they served mainly as enablers for one of the sides, while
consistently misrepresenting the position, goals, and conduct of another.
The perspective of UNPROFOR commander Gen. Philippe
Morillon on
the
players and the nature and background of the conflict in Bosnia is extensively
examined. He has discussed in great detail the brutal methods employed by
Naser
Orić,
the local commander of Moslem forces in Srebrenica, the destructive
and lethal consequences of his raids on surrounding Serbian villages, and the de¬
gree of
intercommunal
hatred that this extraordinarily brutal campaign of vio¬
lence generated. Evidence is presented that representatives of the international
community were well aware of the impact of the violence which
Orić
orches¬
trated, openly boasting to foreign journalists and to General
Morillon
of fighting
a war where no prisoners are to be taken. Considering that
Orić
was the local
field commander for the Sarajevo Moslem-dominated government which en¬
joyed international recognition and also in considerable measure political sup¬
port, the failure of the international community to make its concerns over this
outrageous conduct known created a climate of impunity where practically no re¬
straints were imposed on the Moslem side. The result were numerous attacks on
Serb civilian targets in which over
1,000
inhabitants were killed while dozens of
villages were burned and to this day remain uninhabitable.
In chapter II, Demilitarisation, an overview of the failed demilitarisation
process is presented, including a discussion of the salient features and implemen¬
tation record of both demilitarisation agreements that were concluded on April
Π
and May
8, 1993,
respectively. The agreed upon terms for the cessation of the
successful Serbian counter-offensive in the Spring of
1993
against the vastly ex¬
panded enclave under the control of
Naser
Orić s
Moslem forces included the
stationing of a UN peacekeeping force within the protected enclave, the handing
°ver by Moslem troops of all their weapons to it, and the dissolution of all
non-UN military units within the enclave. The latter two points of the agreement
148
Сребреница: Деконструкцша
једног
виртуелног геноцида
were never carried out, and evidence is presented that the UN knew and tolerated
it, in disregard of its duty to ensure the successful implementation of the demili¬
tarisation agreement. In fact, raids continued to be conducted outside the enclave
by armed units of the Moslem army throughout the period of existence of the
demilitarised safe zone, right up to late June of
1995,
culminating with an at¬
tack on the village of
Višnjica.
Evidence is presented that at that stage the fully
operational 28th Division of the Bosnian Moslem army inside the enclave was
about
5,000
men strong. Proof of consistent violations of the demilitarisation
agreement by the Moslem side is also presented from the Debriefing document
of the Dutch Battalion.
Chapter III, Analysis of ICTY Forensic Reports, consists of a sustained
critique of ICTY prosecution forensic experts abduction reports based on exhu¬
mations of
13
mass graves in the region of Srebrenica conducted between
1996
and
2002.
The results of those exhumations were offered by the prosecution to
the various ICTY chambers dealing with Srebrenica as demonstrating that the
overwhelming majority of the victims were executed, with but a negligible per¬
centage showing a pattern of injury consistent with combat activity. In chapter
IV, Interpretation and presentation of results of mass grave exhumations, both
this contention and the prosecution s assessment of the total number of bodies in
the mass graves are effectively challenged. But the main focus of these chapters
is on the prosecution forensic experts methodology, which ultimately led to fac¬
tually unsupported and properly unexamined impressions passing for facts,
which severely infected the substance of the
Krstić
judgment
(2001).
All the
main judicial findings regarding Srebrenica were reached in that case and in the
subsequent cases were mostly replicated and elaborated. Some of the major con¬
clusions of the
Krstić
court are taken to task in light of its uncritical acceptance
of many of prosecution forensic experts professionally defective data.
Some of the main issues identified here are the misleading implication that
each of the
3,658
prosecution autopsy reports
=
one body, when in fact it may
consist of no more than a few bones from which no meaningful forensic conclu¬
sions may even be drawn; the presence of injuries inflicted by „high velocity
bullets is unexplored, although
—
as is demonstrated here
—
such injuries could
only have been made by artillery projectiles and are highly indicative not of exe¬
cutions but of combat deaths; although victims with blindfolds overlap to a large
extent with those with ligatures
(442
in total), they are presented in the
Krstić
judgment as separate categories, apparently in an attempt do almost double the
number of victims who were incontestably executed; also in
Krstić,
there is no
analysis to distinguish and set aside victims of artillery ammunition or mine
fragments, who could not possibly have been executed; prosecution forensic re¬
ports show as well the presence of complete bodies with various amounts of soft
tissue and no perceptible injuries, suggesting that some residents of the enclave
died of natural causes rather than execution, but no proper account is taken of
that; in
Krstić,
the number of bodies in the mass graves is put at
2,028,
when in
fact forensic evidence after a few more years of exhumation activity supports the
presence of at most about
1,920,
encompassing several causes of death; based on
Summary
149
prosecution projections, the
Krstić
chamber accepts in
2001
that an additional
4,805
bodies would be found in as yet unexhumed mass graves, but almost ten
years later this anticipated evidence that would have retroactively made the
Krstić
judgment look more credible has failed to emerge.
Several issues are singled out for specific discussion.
The forensic evidence unearthed by the prosecution at
Pilica
is compared
to the evidence given by their principal witness,
Dražen Erdemović,
who alleg¬
edly took part in the mass execution which occurred there. The enormous dis¬
crepancy between
Erdemović
s
claim of how many were executed (about
1,200
in five hours) and the forensic evidence on the spot
(137)
is but one of the prob¬
lems. Additionally, in the form and at the pace described by
Erdemović
there
would have been but
2,5
minutes per batch of prisoners to do the job in that time
frame. A comparison with evidence of the mass execution of
1,000
prisoners at
another location in the
Blagojević
and
Jokić
case, which that chamber heard and
accepted, reveals that in that episode it took about three times longer to execute
fewer prisoners.
Another issue is that in many cases the pattern of injury that is described in
the forensic reports as resulting from a bullet in fact is not necessarily consis¬
tent with the impact of conventional bullets from automatic and semi-automatic
weapons that are commonly used in executions. Upon closer examination, even
prosecution autopsy reports give important clues, such as „high velocity bullet
and „burst out injuries, which suggest that the more likely cause were artillery
munitions. A close technical analysis leads to the conclusion that out of
655
deaths in the exhumed mass graves that are attributable to a bullet, about
150
show characteristics more consistent with artillery such as the
Praga
gun that
was widely used against infantry during the Bosnian war. An analysis of numer¬
ous statements given by surviving members of the retreating 28th Division col¬
umn amply documents the widespread use of the
Praga,
and artillery in general,
by Serbian forces in the combat which took place along the column s route. That
strongly suggests that a significant number casualties attributed to bullets may in
fact have been victims of combat related artillery injuries, thus to some extent
excluding execution even in that category.
A list of column member statements indicating artillery barrages by Ser¬
bian forces during the retreat route is provided, along with their reference num¬
bers in the electronic data base of the Hague tribunal.
Other serious methodological issues in the treatment of the forensic evi¬
dence are discussed. For example, a number of bodies were exhumed in primary
graves in
1996
which exhibited only skeletons, without any soft tissue, which
virtually excludes that they could have been execution victims only a year ear¬
lier, given that the decomposition process takes several years. Also, a number of
individual forensic reports are highlighted for special comments to illustrate
their low level of professionalism.
In chapter IV, „Interpretation and presentation of results of mass grave ex¬
humations, a thorough analytical breakdown is presented of the over
30,000
Pages of forensic material which constitutes not the main but the only physical
150
Сребреница: Деконструкцша
једног
виртуелног геноцида
evidence
of Srebrenica, with a separate discussion for each burial site. The first
fundamental conclusion reached is that while in the Prosecution evidence there
are said to be
3,658
cases, that does not equal
3,658
exhumed bodies. On more
careful examination, it turns out that in about
44%
of these cases , or a total of
1,583
of the available ICTY autopsy reports, not only was there absolutely noth¬
ing resembling a complete body from which meaningful forensic conclusions
might be drawn, but what was termed a case may have consisted of no more
than a body fragment, often a single bone, incapable of generating any forensic
conclusions at all. In fact, even the prosecution s own forensic experts concede
that in
92,4%
of these autopsy reports, which consisted of body fragments, the
cause of death could not be determined. But even the slightly over
50%
of the
exhumed remains which do allow the possibility of some forensic conclusions
nevertheless do not present a uniform picture and they do not necessarily support
the prosecution s case. In the breakdown by pattern
ofinjury,
it is suggested by
the evidence clearly that a number of deaths were the result of combat rather
than execution. If we combine victims with blindfolds and ligatures,
442,
and
those with bullet or bullet fragment wounds only,
505,
the total of victims whose
condition and pattern of injury at the time of exhumation were consistent with
execution is
947.
That is less than a third of the autopsies, or cases, in ICTY
prosecution s forensic evidence, and far short of the official Srebrenica execu¬
tion figure of about
8,000.
A control analysis was also conducted to determine
the total number of victims in the
13
exhumed Srebrenica mass graves, irrespec¬
tive of other relevant factors. The method selected was simple but extremely reli¬
able: count all the right and left femur bones, which happens to be one of the
sturdiest skeletal components. When paired, the femurs give a total of just under
2,000
victims
(1919),
which is about
6,000
short of the
8,000
figure which must
be properly documented if the authorised version of Srebrenica events is to be
sustained.
In chapter V, „Is there evidence of intent in July of
1995
to execute all cap¬
tured Moslems in and around Srebrenica?
,
it is argued that the execution of pris¬
oners in July of
1995
can only be viewed as either a war crime of significant pro¬
portions or as an act of genocide, as ICTY has claimed. But for the latter option to
be selected, there must be persuasive evidence of the existence of intent to execute
every Srebrenica Moslem who might have fallen into the hands of Serbian forces,
at least during the critical period, July
11
to
19.
That intent should have mani¬
fested itself in the indiscriminate liquidation of all such prisoners.
But statements of surviving soldiers and civilians from the Srebrenica en¬
clave who during that period were captured by Serbian forces, some of whom
had been wounded and were properly treated in Serbian medical facilities, lend
no support to such a hypothesis. In total,
59
statements are considered (all prop¬
erly referenced to the ICTY electronic data base) and chief prosecution investi¬
gator
Jean-René Ruez
is quoted to the effect that a total of about
1200
were
taken. In
14
of those cases, the person was captured between July
12
and
19,
1995
and was properly processed by Serbian forces, and in
29
cases the POW
Summary
і
5
1
was properly registered with the International Red Cross. Each of the
59
state¬
ments is briefly summarised.
The issue, can genocidal intent be attributed to the mass killing which fol¬
lowed the takeover of Srebrenica on July
11, 1995,
is also considered from sev¬
eral additional angles.
1.
The existence of such intent is inconsistent with the transfer of about
20,000
women, children, and elderly by Serbian forces to territory under Moslem
army control.
2.
On July
16, 1995,
VRS opened a corridor to allow passage to the retreat¬
ing Srebrenica column instead of using all its available assets in an attempt to
annihilate it, which would have been more consistent with genocidal intent.
3.
In his testimony, Dutchbat doctor, A. A.
Schouten,
who was present in
Srebrenica and nearby Bratunac for several days following the takeover, denies
seeing anything that would support the suspicion that large numbers of Moslem
men were being taken away for execution.
4.
In the debriefing of three UN military observers, taken on July
24, 1995,
it is also denied that in the aftermath of the takeover any evidence or reports of
mass killing of military age men had reached them.
5.
The fact, noticed by prosecution military expert Richard Butler, that
thousands of prisoners would have been an excellent bargaining chip for the Ser¬
bian side, which could have exchanged them for its own captured personnel, mil¬
itates strongly against the irrational decision having been made to execute Mos¬
lem prisoners.
6.
The Serbian military plan of attack also was inconsistent with intent to
eliminate all Moslem residents of the enclave as such. Instead of tightly sur¬
rounding the enclave, leaving no possibility of escape, VRS attacked from the
south, leaving plenty of escape options which the mixed male
12.000
to
15.000
strong military/civilian column used in undertaking the trek from Srebrenica to
Tuzla.
Based on this evidence, it is clear that the reductionist approach fails once
again and that a nuanced picture must be sought if these events are to be under¬
stood properly.
In chapter VI, Analysis of Moslem column losses due to minefields, com¬
bat activity, and other causes;1 an assessment is made of the casualties that were
probably suffered by the mixed military/civilian column estimated at about
12,000
to
15,000
which left the enclave on foot, attempting a breakout through
difficult mountainous terrain. Their goal was to reach Moslem-controlled terri¬
tory in
Tuzla,
about
60
km. to the northeast. Along the way, the column had sev¬
eral military clashes with Serbian forces and survivor statements are consistent
that it suffered severe casualties. Based on information in dozens of such state¬
ments, the losses inflicted on the column-due mainly to minefields, fighting be¬
tween different factions within the column, and ambushes set by Serbian
forces-are reconstructed. Also, based on witness statements, points of contact
with Serbian forces ambushing the column are indicated. Statements about col¬
umn losses by international observers in the area who had insight into the local
152
Сребреница: Деконструкција једног виртуелног
геноцида
situation
are presented. It is concluded that while no exact figures are available,
or perhaps even possible, column losses were ascertainably substantial and in the
thousands. Under international law, combat losses suffered by a mixed mili¬
tary/civilian column are legitimate, yet in most reconstructions of Srebrenica
these casualties are not treated as a separate category and as a rule they are im¬
plicitly conflated with execution victims. Due weight must be given to this major
source of casualties on the Moslem side, which cannot be considered as indica¬
tive of either massacre or genocide.
In Chapter
VII,
Г/ге
balance sheet an attempt is made to reach some
broad conclusions, in light of the preceding analysis, what Moslem Srebrenica
losses in July of
1995
might have been. This is accomplished, first, by reviewing
sources offering relatively reliable data about the population of the Srebrenica
enclave immediately prior to the takeover on July
11, 1995.
It is put at about
40,000.
Evidence is then considered of how many of them had subsequently
reached safety. UN and WHO headcounts converge on the conclusion that by
August
4, 1995,
at least
35,632
residents of Srebrenica enclave had been ac¬
counted for. That means that the maximum that combined casualties could have
been is just over
4,000.
In light of the evidence that there were at least two major
sources of casualties, executions and combat activity during the retreat of the
28th Division column, the thesis of
8,000
executed war prisoners appears com¬
pletely untenable. Furthermore, of the slightly more than
4,000
who might have
perished, forensic analysis of the number of femur bones shows the demonstra¬
ble presence of about
1,920
bodies in the mass graves. The conclusion that the
pattern of injury breakdown supports is that
947
victims could have been exe¬
cuted, if those found with blindfolds and/or ligatures are combined with those
with injuries caused by conventional bullets.
The available data, in particular the forensic evidence over fifteen years af¬
ter the fact, lend no support to the claim of
8,000
executions. While the Geno¬
cide convention does not require a minimum number, its focus being on special
intent, the relevant jurisprudence and common sense both nurture the expecta¬
tion that the number of victims ought to be substantial before the hypothesis of
genocide can be meaningfully considered. In the case of Srebrenica, the presence
of special intent to commit genocide is negated by a number of factors. The im¬
pression that genocide occurred in Srebrenica in July of
1995
is unsupported by
any substantive evidence offered so far. Hence the conclusion that, while real
war crimes did occur, what is claimed to have been genocide was a virtual event.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Karganović, Stefan Simić, Ljubiša 1979- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1046552392 |
| author_facet | Karganović, Stefan Simić, Ljubiša 1979- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Karganović, Stefan |
| author_variant | s k sk l s ls |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV037485688 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)734086445 (DE-599)BVBBV037485688 |
| edition | 2. izd. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV037485688 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:25:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788688135085 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022637159 |
| oclc_num | 734086445 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 239 S. |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Fond Istorijski Projekat Srebrenica |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Karganović, Stefan Verfasser aut Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida Stefan Karganović ; Ljubiša Simić 2. izd. Beograd Fond Istorijski Projekat Srebrenica 2010 239 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier PST in engl. Sprache. - In kyrill. Schr., serb. - Zsfassung in engl. und franz. Sprache Massaker von Srebrenica (DE-588)4462420-7 gnd rswk-swf Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit (DE-588)4124385-7 gnd rswk-swf Massaker von Srebrenica (DE-588)4462420-7 s Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit (DE-588)4124385-7 s DE-604 Simić, Ljubiša 1979- Verfasser (DE-588)1046552392 aut Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022637159&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022637159&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Karganović, Stefan Simić, Ljubiša 1979- Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida Massaker von Srebrenica (DE-588)4462420-7 gnd Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit (DE-588)4124385-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4462420-7 (DE-588)4124385-7 |
| title | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida |
| title_auth | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida |
| title_exact_search | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida |
| title_full | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida Stefan Karganović ; Ljubiša Simić |
| title_fullStr | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida Stefan Karganović ; Ljubiša Simić |
| title_full_unstemmed | Srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida Stefan Karganović ; Ljubiša Simić |
| title_short | Srebrenica |
| title_sort | srebrenica dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida |
| title_sub | dekonstrukcija jednog virtuelnog genocida |
| topic | Massaker von Srebrenica (DE-588)4462420-7 gnd Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit (DE-588)4124385-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Massaker von Srebrenica Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022637159&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022637159&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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