A befejezetlen béke: a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947)
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Hungarian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Budapest
Püski
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 2., bőv. kiad. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: The unfinished peace : the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 |
| Beschreibung: | 386 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9789639592643 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a A befejezetlen béke |b a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) |c Fülöp Mihály |
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| 500 | |a Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: The unfinished peace : the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804145794097348608 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | TARTALOMJEGYZÉK
Szerzői bevezető az új kiadás elé
...................................7
Bevezető
.......................................................11
I.
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa genezise és a potsdami (berlini)
értekezlet. A magyar békeelőkészítés kezdetei
...................15
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának genezise
......................16
Az angol, amerikai és szovjet nézeteltérések a ,,volt ellenséges
államokkal kötendő békeszerződések előkészítéséről
.............22
A potsdami értekezlet és a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának
megalakítása
............................................28
A potsdami értekezlet és a béketárgyalások megkezdéséről
folytatott vita
............................................32
A magyar békeelőkészítés kezdetei
1945
nyarán
..................38
A nagyhatalmak és a magyar-román határvita
....................43
A csehszlovákiai magyarok és a magyarországi németek
kitelepítésének ügye a potsdami értekezleten. Kárpátalja cessziója.
.. .54
II.
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának első, londoni ülésszaka
és a nagyhatalmak magyar békeszerződés-tervezetei
..............65
A nagyhatalmak magyar békeszerződés-tervezetei
.................70
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának londoni Erdély-vitája
............81
Románia és Bulgária elismerésének kérdése és a londoni
értekezlet kudarca
........................................85
A londoni értekezlet hatása Romániában és Magyarországon
........90
III.
A moszkvai külügyminiszteri értekezlet és a prágai
magyar-csehszlovák tárgyalások
..............................97
Az amerikai közép- és dél-kelet-európai politika átértékelése
........98
A moszkvai értekezlet
......................................101
Az első prágai tárgyalások és a magyarországi
németek kitelepítése
.....................................104
A második prágai tárgyalások és az ún.
lakosságcsereegyezmény megkötése
.........................111
IV.
A londoni külügyminiszter-helyettesi értekezlet és az erdélyi kérdés
A magyar kormányküldöttség moszkvai látogatása
..............127
A londoni külügyminiszter-helyettesi értekezlet
(1946.
január
18 -
április
20)
és a nagyhatalmak első,
közös békeszerződés-tervezetei
.............................128
Az
1946.
április 10-i csehszlovák emlékirat
és
a Foreign
Office állásfoglalása
...........................137
A román béke előkészítése és a magyar Külügyminisztérium
területi jegyzéke
.........................................144
A nagyhatalmak álláspontjának megváltozása
az erdélyi határ kérdésében
................................151
A magyar kormányküldöttség moszkvai útja és a
Sebestyén-misszió
.......................................158
V.
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának párizsi ülésszakai.
A magyar kormányküldöttség nyugati útja
.....................171
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának első, párizsi ülésszaka
(1946.
április
25 -
május
16)
és a magyar békeszerződés¬
tervezet vitája
...........................................172
Az angol-amerikai politika valamint a magyar békecélok.
Nagy Ferenc miniszterelnök washingtoni, londoni
és párizsi tárgyalásai
.....................................178
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának második, párizsi ülésszaka
(1946.
június
15
-július
12)
és a nagyhatalmak magyar
békeszerződés-tervezetei
..................................197
VI.
A párizsi értekezlet és a magyar békedelegáció
.................211
A párizsi értekezlet eljárási vitái és a „volt ellenséges államok
képviselőinek meghallgatása
...............................214
A magyar békedelegáció meghallgatása és észrevételei a
békeszerződés-tervezetről. A szomszédos országok
módosító indítványai
.....................................221
A magyar-román határvita lezárása és a Kisebbségi Kódex
........237
A nagyhatalmak és a magyar-csehszlovák vita
...................247
A gazdasági és katonai rendelkezések vitája. A párizsi
értekezlet ajánlásai
.......................................276
VII.
A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsának New York-i ülésszaka
és a magyar békeszerződés. Zárszó
...........................289
A magyar békeszerződés vitáinak lezárása. A jóvátétel és a szovjet
csapatok visszavonása
......................................292
Zárszó: A Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a
magyar békeelőkészítés illúziói
..............................305
A forrásokról és a fontosabb irodalomról
..........................315
Függelék
.....................................................329
1945.
évi
V.
törvény
-
A magyar fegyverszünet
.................331
1947.
évi
XVIII,
törvény
-
A magyar békeszerződés
.............339
Névmutató
............................................. 3^9
English
summary
.................................. 377
Mihály Fülöp:
THE UNFINISHED PEACE.
THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AND
THE HUNGARIAN PEACE TREATY OF
1947.
The Second World War was not followed by an overall settlement such as the
Versailles type peace conference. At the Potsdam Conference the United States,
Great Britain and the Soviet Union formed the Council of Foreign Ministers, a
forum for peace-making. The Council was responsible for the preparation of the
peace treaties for Germany s former allies and later for the drafting the final texts
of the treaties. Meanwhile, the discussion of the Austrian and German case, deter¬
mining the whole European peace settlement, was postponed till
1947.
The
Council s basic function apart from the thorough preparation of peace treaties
was, according to the U.S. State Department, to hinder the crystallization of
exclusive spheres of interest. Yet, at the Potsdam Conference, at the meeting of
the Foreign Ministers in Moscow, at the second session of the Council of Foreign
Ministers in Paris a hierarchical decision-making procedure was established with
the United States and United Kingdom dealing with Italy, and the Soviet Union
dealing with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. Each great power played
a determining role in formulating the peace terms within their sphere. Each draft
put forward in London in September
1945
by the armistice dictating Great Power
became the negotiating basis of the peace treaties. Due to the hectic procedure of
peace-making, the main parts of this document were adopted into the final text.
The Soviet Union wanted to have the slightly amended version of the armistice
conventions accepted, i.e. it wished to confirm the allied agreements concluded
during the war. The United States planned to reconsider the terms on the basis of
a complete examination of the matter offering large scope to the bilateral agree¬
ments of those states concerned. These two contrasting conceptions were harmo¬
nized during the one-and-a-half-year-long negotiations of the Council.
The Great Powers did not make a preliminary political decision according to
which they will conclude a dictated peace with the defeated countries. Yet, this
is what happened as a consequence of the agreements on the procedures of the
drafting of the peace treaties which were made by the Big Three at a later date.
The Potsdam
4-3-2
formula restrained the circle of the decision-makers or, to use
Byrnes term, the circle of Judges : the members of the Council were those
Great Powers that signed the capitulation document with the enemy country con-
377
cerned.
The Italian draft peace treaty and its final wording were prepared by the
British, American, Soviet and French members. The Romanian, Bulgarian and
Hungarian treaty was elaborated by the Soviet, American and British Ministers
of Foreign Affairs while the Finnish one was drafted by the Soviet and British
Foreign Ministers. At the sessions of the Council a certain peace treaty clause
could have been accepted on condition that a consensus between the involved
Great Powers was formed. The order of negotiations of the peace treaties, Italy,
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, made it possible for the Soviet Union
to induce its allies to compromise in the cases of the so-called Balkan treaties by
slowing down the Italian peace negotiations and inter-relating different matters.
The principle of Great Power consensus also meant that in the autumn of
1945
the United States and from the beginning of
1946,
the Soviet Union could, at the
same time, determine the extent of the progress for the negotiations and could
thus exploit the willingness of the others to negotiate to its own advantage.
The
4-3-2
formula accepted at Potsdam excluded France from the circle of
decision-makers, except for the Italian treaty, in which there was no place for the
other allied and associated powers. After the failure of the first session of the
Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September 11-October
2, 1945)
the
Soviet Union and the United States agreed at the Moscow meeting of the foreign
ministers (December
15-27, 1945)
to call the Paris Conference as a consulting
forum, which was subordinated to the Council. This agreement increased not
only the number of judges but the number of witnesses as well The Soviet
Union did everything in its power to limit the circle of the decision-makers and
to reserve the final decisions to the Big Three. The American Secretary of State
finally convinced Stalin by saying that, we will be the judges ...so we can allow
the small countries to speak without interfering with our interests .1 During the
second session of the Council (this session included the London meeting of the
Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs (January 18-April
20, 1946),
and the two
meetings of the CFM in Paris (April 25-May
16
and June 15-July
12, 1946),
there
was a strong struggle between Soviet diplomacy and American foreign policy
which threatened the whole peace settlement. The former wanted to restrict the
role of the small victorious countries to a considerable extent (to the strict mini¬
mum) and the latter wanted to promote a peace of the nations setting limits to
the Soviet Union, pushed into a minority position, by determining the convoca¬
tion and proceeding of the Paris conference. The two-third-voting procedure and
simple majority vote applied by the Paris Conference did not change the princi¬
ple of Great Powers consensus. In July
1946,
the members of the Council sub¬
mitted common peace treaty drafts to the
21
victorious powers and the members
of the Council entered into an obligation according to which they would not
move an amendment in the case of the already agreed articles. The Great Powers
See Chapter
ΠΙ. ρ
??crossreference!
378
character of the peace
settlement
was strengthened by the procedure according to
which the treaties could only come into force if the members of the Council, sign¬
ing the capitulation document, had deposited the ratification documents. This
meant that the peace treaties drafted by the Council of Foreign Ministers were
enforced independently of the willingness and approval of the other victorious or
defeated states. In this way, the participants of the Paris Conference could
express their proposals solely in questions which were considered to be non-
basic by the Great Powers. Consequently, the emergence of the Slavic bloc
voting contributed to the formation of the Western bloc . In elaborating the
peace agreements, the views of the small allied nations were considered only
when they were supported by one of the Great Powers and were accepted only
when they met the approval of all of the members of the Council. The witness¬
es proposals, regarding the defeated states in Paris tended towards hardening the
conditions of judgments . At the third session of the Council in New York
(November 4-December
12, 1946)
the Soviet Union, using it veto power, reject¬
ed
al!
recommendations contrary to its interests or had them modified according
to its original, pre-Paris Conference position.
The procedural rules drafted by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United
States in Potsdam, Moscow and Paris did not allow the defendants to partici¬
pate in their own proceedings . According to the original conception of the State
Department the terms of peace should have been discussed with Italy, and pre¬
sumably with the other defeated states, prior the positions of the victorious states
had been crystallized. In this way the ex-enemy states could not have refused
the execution of the terms, claiming that the peace treaty was dictated. Until the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs sent the Three Great Powers his proposal at
the beginning of
1946,
no consideration was given at all to give the former enemy
states representatives a hearing, except in the Trieste affair. At the Paris
Conference the leaders of the Italian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian and
Finnish delegations submitted written proposals but they participated neither in
the work of the Conference, nor in the activity of the Commissions. These coun¬
tries were invited to present their views only if it was directly initiated by one of
the victorious powers The drafting procedure of the peace treaties made it impos¬
sible for the defeated countries to participate in the discussions of the recom¬
mendations of the Paris Conference as parties enjoying equal rights.
The consequence of the procedures of the Council, as opposed to American
intentions, could not be anything else but a dictated peace determined by the
Great Powers, reflecting the interests of the victorious states and enforced upon
the defeated. The principles of the peace making process did not arise from the
original intents of the Allied Great Powers but from the contingency of the
Council of Foreign Ministers negotiations and from the difficulties in harmoniz¬
ing the peace aims of the Big Three. On the Contrary: had any politically moti-
379
vated
intentions
existed, they could have represented the plan to avoid a
Versailles-like peace conference, a punitive and dictated peace. Frequently
changing procedures restricted the opportunities to interfere for even the victori¬
ous great powers. The Soviet Union considered it a major concession when, in
order to continue the war-time cooperation into peace-time, it allowed Great
Britain and the United States some influence in the course of drafting the peace
terms concerning the countries defeated by the Soviet Union, for the sake of
maintaining co-operation between the three great powers after the war. However,
in the case of Italy, Yugoslav interests represented by the Soviet Union, conflict¬
ed with American and British ones. The hierarchy of the peace settlement,
judges , witnesses and accused gradually emerged from the negotiations. It
was only within this framework that the individual questions could be discussed
at the peace negotiations conducted in the Council.
The order of the peace negotiations was instrumental in the drafting of the
peace treaties. Nobody disputed Bidault s statement that The German question
was at the center of all peace settlement but in the absence of a central German
government, able to conclude a peace treaty, the logical order of peace-making
was reversed. It was not the main criminal whose case was never tried but the
secondary importance questions were given precedence. The course of events
in
1943-44
already separated the preparation of the armistice agreements with the
satellites from the German capitulation and the Potsdam decisions formally sep¬
arated their peace treaties from the German one. The secondary importance
peace treaties, assumed to be ready in a few months were supposed to serve as
examples, acceptable or not, on the eve of the German and Austrian peace nego¬
tiations.
It was the avoidance of the central issue that brought the preparation of the
Italian treaty to the fore in Potsdam. Great Britain and the United States consid¬
ered it a primary task to conclude a peace treaty as soon as possible because, Italy
was the first of the Axis powers to broke off from Germany and materially con¬
tributed to its defeat. The first test of the tripartite European cooperation of the
Great Powers was the control of the Italian armistices. This is what gave it a char¬
acteristic of a model. The negotiation order adopted in Potsdam, Italy, Romania,
Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, meant that the Italian treaty was always first in
the discussion with Romania being the first of the Balkan ones. In spite of the dis¬
similarity of their war-records, the five states were judged uniformly, and the
determination of their peace terms inextricably interwoven. The Allied Great
Powers wanted to create a comprehensive peace system which was manifest also
: MAE A.D.Y. Vol.134. Bidauh s staicmcnt to the Council and the September
26, 1945
session in London. Sec also: Ward: op.cit. p.
177.
P.R.O. F.O.
371.40730
Preparation of armistice terms for Axis satellites. In a note of January
6, 1944,
Lord Hood wrote, Germany is the main criminal .
Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, op.cit. p.415.
380
in their insistence that the defeated states recognize all the other peace treaties,
already concluded or to be concluded. Preeminence of the Italian treaty meant not
only that it gave the Soviet Union a great bargaining position but also that due to
the order of negotiations, but also, as the negotiations progressed, the Great
Powers applied more and more frequently, the clauses of the Italian and
Romanian treaties, accepted by the common agreement of the Council, to all the
other cases. Thus, the Hungarian treaty was not even discussed in the autumn of
1945.
At the second session of the Council, at the critical juncture of the peace
negotiations, there was only one independent discussion of the Hungarian peace
treaty. On the whole, the definitions of the Hungarian peace terms were given
short shrift at the Council peace negotiations and there was scant opportunity to
consider them on their merits because of the application of the Italian and
Romanian precedents.
Postponement of the debate of the Austrian treaty proved to be tragic Hungary
and Romania. It was late, only in the early spring of
1946
that American diplo¬
macy took measure of the importance of the clause accepted at the session of the
Council in London, regarding the stationing of liaison troops in Austrian zones.
Starting in April
1946,
and ever since Great Britain and the United States raised
the matter, the Soviet Union did everything to keep the Austrian peace negotia¬
tions off the agenda and to prevent the simultaneous settlement of the five peace
treaties and of the Austrian treaty. The Soviet Union preferred to delay the
removal of the Red Army units from the Eastern half of Europe rather than to
exclude this eventuality. On December
1, 1945
the Soviet and American troops
were removed from Czechoslovakia at the same time. There were signs during
the summer of
1946
and again in December that the Soviet Union was getting
ready for the possibility of having an Austrian treaty in place and for the removal
of Allied troops from Austria, Italy, Romania and Hungary and for the reduction
of the European occupation forces. When the negotiation order of peace treaties
was determined in Potsdam it was still possible to link the Austrian question to
the overall European settlement. At this time, however, Great Britain and the
United States did not consider the procedures of the Council of Foreign Ministers
in the function of the elimination of the Soviet military presence in Eastern
Europe. It would be improper
lo
reflect the recognition that came several months
later back to the events of the summer of 1945.4 The Austrian treaty and espe¬
cially the question of the German peace treaty, involved a conflict which led to
the disintegration of co-operation between great powers and to the cold war con¬
frontation. The postponement of the Austrian settlement, with British and
American concurrence, legalized the stationing of Red Army units in Hungary
and Romania for almost a decade, later in the case of Hungary until mid
1991. .
J
Kertész:
Diplomacy...op.cit. p.
186.
381
The major illusion7 of the Hungarian peace preparations and of the leader¬
ship of the Smallholders was that they based all their political calculations on the
imminent withdrawal of the Soviet troops. It would be unfair, however, to
attribute this to the ignorance or naivety of the Hungarian foreign policy leader¬
ship of that time. It was the Foreign Office, in the summer of
1945
that formu¬
lated its plans for a peace treaty at the earliest possible moment, to achieve the
withdrawal of the Soviet forces and to reestablish the independence and sover¬
eignty of the Central and South-East European states. It is the irony of history that
it was precisely because of this British proposal that the Soviet forces remained
in Romania until
1958
and in Hungary until
1991.
From the spring of
1946,
the
United States desperately tried to remedy its earlier mistake and even at the
beginning of September
1946,
in Paris, they promised Prime Minister
Ferenc
Nagy
that the occupation forces would be withdrawn/1 There was some uncer¬
tainty on Soviet and Hungarian Communist side as well.
Rákosi told
the
American envoy Schoenfeld on November
30, 1946
that he hoped that the
Hungarian peace treaty could be signed soon and that this would make it possi¬
ble to free Hungary from the burden of the occupying forces and from the
expense of the Allied Control Commission.7 As a result, until the winter of
1946,
therefore, hope that the Red Army would be withdrawn was shared by Hungary
and outside Hungary by the members of the Council. The Hungarian Communists
also believed the withdrawal was likely and feared it.
The Hungarian peace preparations suffered from another illusion, based on the
war-time declaration of the Allies and on the
1945
Istria
precedent. This illusion
was about the establishment of ethnic borders and national self-determination.
During World War II, Great Britain and the United States4 considered the appro¬
priateness of ethnic equity principles even in the case of enemy Hungary.
However, the victorious Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia rejected any border
adjustment in Hungary s favor. The adjustment of the Hungarian-Romanian bor¬
der in Hungary s favor was initiated on September
20, 1945
in London by the
American Secretary of State and this was supported by Great Britain and France.
The latter two were actually responsible for the Trianon peace treaty of June,
4,
1920.
The Soviet Union, however, wanted to reestablish the January
1, 1938
bor¬
der citing the Romanian ethnic majority, and the political impossibility of main-
■
Kertész
used this term in the title of his last book. See:
Kertész:
Between Russia.
.
.op.cit.
h Chapter VI. Pp. crossference???)
7
F.R.U.S.
1946.
Vol.VI. p.346. Schoenfeld telegram No
2244,
on November
30, 1946.
s See:
A Magyar-brit titkos lárgyalások 1943-ban
(The Secret Hungarian-British Negotiations
in
1943).
Collected, edited and introduced by
Gyula Juhász,
Budapest,
Kossuth
Könyvkiadó,
1978.
p.321.
4
See:
Az Amerikai Egyesült Allamok külügyminisztériumának titkos iratai
1942-1944.
(The
Secret Documents of the Uniied States Department of State
1942-1944)
Edited, introduced
and annotated by
Ignác Romsics. Gödöllő,
Typovent,
1992.
382
taining the second Vienna Award. The Soviet position that until June
23, 1941
considered the possibility of a border adjustment in Hungary s favor became
unambiguous during the war and became final when the
Groza
regime was forced
by the Soviets on Romania in March
1945.
Because of the unilateral Soviet
action, contrary to the Yalta declaration, the Hungarian-Romanian territorial set¬
tlement became subordinated to the debate between the Great Powers about the
representative character and the diplomatic recognition by the Allies of the
Groza
government. This led to the failure of the first session of the Council London. The
Tripartite agreement reached in Moscow by the foreign ministers on Romania
and Bulgaria made the reorganization of the
Groza
government and its partial
diplomatic recognition possible. Consequently, Great Britain and the United
States gave up the possibility of the adjustment of the borders of the Trianon
treaty with an American reservation that left the possibility of smaller border
adjustments by bilateral negotiation open. Harmonization of the position of the
Three Great Powers meant that the Hungarian-Romanian territorial settlement
became final and this could not be changed by the Moscow and Washington-
London-Paris visits of the Hungarian government delegation and by the
Hungarian territorial memoranda submitted to the Council and to the Paris
Conference.
The American proposal was put on the agenda in London, not as gesture
toward Hungary or to implement the ethnic equity principle developed during the
war, but to weaken the
Groza
government and because it fit well into the scheme
of American-Soviet struggle for influence in South-East Europe. The Hungarian
peace diplomacy could not know about the Transylvania debate of the Council
London. The Hungarian proposal on the equilibrium between nationalities, elab¬
orated in April
1946,
was based on the Istrian precedent and the border adjust¬
ment proposal submitted to the Paris Conference at the end of August was based
on an earlier American suggestion. On advice from Moscow, bilateral negotia¬
tions were attempted but the April
27, 1946
Sebestyén
mission to Bucharest was
unsuccessful because
Groza,
relying on Soviet support and having been informed
about the Anglo-American position refused to discuss territorial adjustments.
Nevertheless, till the statement of the Council s position in Paris on May
7, 1946,
there was some expectation in Hungary, false as it turned out, about the Soviet
position. After the April
1946
discussions in Moscow, Prime Minister
Nagy
cher¬
ished an illusion that in the matter of the Hungarian-Romanian territorial adjust¬
ment and in protection of the minority rights of the Hungarians in Slovakia, the
Soviet Union was siding with Hungary. Until the spring of
1946,
the Soviet
Union, jointly with American and British policies, supported bilateral negotia¬
tions but when the peace negotiations of the Council and the Paris Conference
made it inevitable to take a stand, the Soviet Union endorsed the Romanian and
Czechoslovak positions.
383
The Hungarian peace preparation was imbued with the intention to make peace
with the neighboring countries, particularly Czechoslovakia and to assure the
rights of the Hungarian minorities by multilateral international agreements. This
illusion was rapidly dispelled by Benes s presidential and Slovak National
Council s decrees enacted in Slovakia depriving the Hungarians of their elemen¬
tary human rights and by the Czechoslovak submission to the Council which
asked the victorious Great Powers approval for the compulsory transfer, or sheer
expulsion of an additional
200,000
Hungarians above and beyond the number
agreed upon in the population exchange agreement, on February
27, 1946.
Of all
of Hungary s neighbors, Czechoslovakia was the one that worked most consis¬
tently to exercise the rights of the victors, to harmonize the political and ethnic
borders by compulsory transfers of Hungarians and by incorporating excessive
economic, military and cultural claims into the peace treaty text. In this instance
the Council procedures and the principle of Great Power unanimity worked
toward moderating the excessive demands of the minor victor. At the Paris
Conference, the United States and Great Britain prevented the forced transfer of
200,000
Hungarians to be included in the Hungarian peace treaty and reduced the
Czechoslovak territorial claim as well. The Soviet Union supported the
Czechoslovak proposals but, respecting the principle of Three Power decision-
making, did not insist on their acceptance.
The Hungarian government submitted the Minority Codex, the draft of the
minority protection treaty to be concluded between Hungary, its neighbors and
the Great Powers, to the Council and also, during the summer of
1946
to the Paris
Conference. During his Western visits Prime Minister
Nagy
asked both the
Foreign Office and the Department of State to support the minority protection
endeavors of the Hungarian government in order also to strengthen the position
of the Smallholder party. At last, due to the Soviet Union s negative attitude and
the American confidence in the implementation of the human rights Articles, the
Minority Codex was not accepted. The Hungarian minority protective position
was weakened by the implementation of the transfer of the Germans from
Hungary and by the acceptance of the Hungarian-Slovakian population
exchange agreement that was based on voluntary resettlement of Slovaks and
the expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia. Initially the Hungarian peace prepa¬
ration was under the illusion that the peace treaty negotiation principles of the
victorious Great Powers would allow for a negotiated peace settlement. Hungary
based its entire argument on the principles allegedly accepted by the Allies. Until
May
1946,
when
Kertész
and Auer arrived in Paris, Hungarian peace prepara¬
tions moved in parallel with the activities of the Council but independently of
them.
Kertész
realized only in Paris the procedural rules of the Council excluded
the vanquished from presenting their views.1 To some extent this deficiency was
Kertész:
Between...op.cit. p.
184.
384
made up during the Moscow and Washington-London-Paris visits of the
Hungarian government delegation.
The Hungarian government hoped for a lenient peace. The Soviet Union,
however, gave to its reparation claims the character of punishment for aggres¬
sion and, in spite of American opposition, succeeded in having the reparation
sum of
300,000,000
dollars accepted. Great Britain shared the view that the
defeated countries had to be punished by the reparation and territorial settlement.
Even the lenient American attitude did not extend to the point where former
enemy states were favored over the victorious ones.
Hungarian peace preparatory diplomacy endeavored to start out from the fun¬
damentals of political realism and tried to gain the support of the Soviet Union
for the Hungarian peace goals. The punitive Soviet attitude and the preference
given to the claims of the counter-interested neighboring states, Czechoslovakia
and Romania left no other choice but an orientation toward the United States and
Great Britain. Other than economic concessions, British and American foreign
policy could not counterbalance the realities of power (the Soviet military, polit¬
ical and economic presence) in the Central European area. Pushkin, the Soviet
Envoy in Budapest, prior to the Western visits of the Hungarian government del¬
egation
toíd Nagy
and
Gyöngyösi
to remember that, Hungary is occupied by the
Red Army and surrounded by Slav neighbors .12 (e.a.).
In Hungary the Soviet Union was the only power factor because it controlled
the armistice agreement limiting Hungarian sovereignty and, to use Stalin s
words, in actual fact the Soviet Union could do pretty much what it wanted
here .1* The only limitation on the Soviet freedom of action was the peace-time
preservation of Three Power cooperation. It was for this reason alone that Stalin
permitted free elections and multi-party systems in the countries occupied by the
Soviet Union and promised that the Red Army would be withdrawn.14 In
1945-46
Hungary did not fit into the Soviet Union s ideas about a cordon
sanitaire
against
Germany, Between
1943
and
1947
the Soviet Union s policies relied on the vic¬
torious Slav states, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Poland. This system of
alliances, cemented by bilateral agreements between Moscow and each other,
could be joined by the defeated countries, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, only
between
1947
and
1949.
Romania and Bulgaria were more important strategical¬
ly to the Soviet Union than Hungary because they provided a route to reach the
Eastern basin of the Mediterranean. The territorial status and the military-eco¬
nomic restrictions of the future allies of the Soviet Union were regulated by the
peace treaties that the United States and Great Britain had accepted.
Ibid,
рр.бб-б?.
12
N.A.711
. 64/6-746.
Schoenfeld telegram
N0.1080,
on June
7, 1947
cites a report by Arthur
Kárász.
11
See Chapter III p.??
N See Chapter I. p.?? and Chapter II. P. .^crossrefcrences!!!
385
Hungary,
as a defeated country, could not influence the decisions of the Three
Great Powers about the Hungarian peace treaty. The illusions of the Hungarian
peace preparations were shared by the allied Great Powers and it was not the fault
of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the readiness of the Hungarian
peace delegation or the steps taken by Hungarian diplomacy, that the Hungarian
peace treaty terms could not be ameliorated. The peace negotiations of the
Council of Foreign Ministers did not only settled the fate of the defeated states,
but modified the interrelationship between the victorious Powers in Europe. The
Hungarian peace treaty brought to an end the state of war and thereby also to the
temporary armistice period. It dissolved the Allied Control Commission and
reestablished the country s independence and sovereignty. The country s territo¬
rial and political status were recognized, Hungary could reestablish its interna¬
tional relations and membership in the UN became possible. The Hungarian
peace treaty drafted by the Three Great Powers of the Council of Foreign
Ministers, the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain, proved to be a
solid pillar of European peace.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Fülöp, Mihály 1953- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)170525325 |
| author_facet | Fülöp, Mihály 1953- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Fülöp, Mihály 1953- |
| author_variant | m f mf |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV037482689 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)734083453 (DE-599)GBV635096757 |
| edition | 2., bőv. kiad. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV037482689 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:25:06Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9789639592643 |
| language | Hungarian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022634233 |
| oclc_num | 734083453 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 386 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Püski |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Fülöp, Mihály 1953- Verfasser (DE-588)170525325 aut A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) Fülöp Mihály 2., bőv. kiad. Budapest Püski 2008 386 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Engl. Zsfassung u.d.T.: The unfinished peace : the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 Außenministerrat (DE-588)133768-3 gnd rswk-swf Pariser Friede 1947 Februar 10 Ungarn (DE-588)1265140871 gnd rswk-swf Außenministerrat (DE-588)133768-3 b Pariser Friede 1947 Februar 10 Ungarn (DE-588)1265140871 u DE-604 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022634233&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022634233&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Fülöp, Mihály 1953- A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) Außenministerrat (DE-588)133768-3 gnd Pariser Friede 1947 Februar 10 Ungarn (DE-588)1265140871 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)133768-3 (DE-588)1265140871 |
| title | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) |
| title_auth | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) |
| title_exact_search | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) |
| title_full | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) Fülöp Mihály |
| title_fullStr | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) Fülöp Mihály |
| title_full_unstemmed | A befejezetlen béke a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) Fülöp Mihály |
| title_short | A befejezetlen béke |
| title_sort | a befejezetlen beke a kulugyminiszterek tanacsa es a magyar bekeszerzodes 1947 |
| title_sub | a Külügyminiszterek Tanácsa és a magyar békeszerződés (1947) |
| topic | Außenministerrat (DE-588)133768-3 gnd Pariser Friede 1947 Februar 10 Ungarn (DE-588)1265140871 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenministerrat Pariser Friede 1947 Februar 10 Ungarn |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022634233&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=022634233&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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