Coalition politics and economic development: credibility and the strength of weak governments
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory; 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics; 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms; 5. Coalition dharma and India shining; 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Sp...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2011
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Zusammenfassung: | Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory; 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics; 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms; 5. Coalition dharma and India shining; 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana; 7. Conclusion; Appendices "Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics"-- |
| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references and index |
| Beschreibung: | XV, 249 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780521191401 0521191408 9780521138758 0521138752 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV037336398 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20110624 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 110413s2011 d||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 010 | |a 2010035946 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780521191401 |c hardback |9 978-0-521-19140-1 | ||
| 020 | |a 0521191408 |c hardback |9 0-521-19140-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 9780521138758 |c pbk. |9 978-0-521-13875-8 | ||
| 020 | |a 0521138752 |c pbk. |9 0-521-13875-2 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)656771012 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BSZ330677055 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 082 | 0 | |a 338.9 |2 22 | |
| 084 | |a MF 6200 |0 (DE-625)122761: |2 rvk | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Nooruddin, Irfan |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)1011890143 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Coalition politics and economic development |b credibility and the strength of weak governments |c Irfan Nooruddin |
| 250 | |a 1. publ. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge [u.a.] |b Cambridge Univ. Press |c 2011 | |
| 300 | |a XV, 249 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index | ||
| 520 | |a Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory; 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics; 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms; 5. Coalition dharma and India shining; 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana; 7. Conclusion; Appendices | ||
| 520 | |a "Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics"-- | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Entwicklungsländer | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Wirtschaft | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Developing countries / Economic conditions | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Coalition governments / Developing countries | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Koalition |0 (DE-588)4135668-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftsentwicklung |0 (DE-588)4066438-7 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Koalition |0 (DE-588)4135668-8 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Wirtschaftsentwicklung |0 (DE-588)4066438-7 |D s |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022490200 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804145621057142784 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Nooruddin, Irfan |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1011890143 |
| author_facet | Nooruddin, Irfan |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Nooruddin, Irfan |
| author_variant | i n in |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV037336398 |
| classification_rvk | MF 6200 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)656771012 (DE-599)BSZ330677055 |
| dewey-full | 338.9 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 338 - Production |
| dewey-raw | 338.9 |
| dewey-search | 338.9 |
| dewey-sort | 3338.9 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Politologie Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03066nam a2200481 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV037336398</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20110624 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">110413s2011 d||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="010" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">2010035946</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780521191401</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-521-19140-1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0521191408</subfield><subfield code="c">hardback</subfield><subfield code="9">0-521-19140-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9780521138758</subfield><subfield code="c">pbk.</subfield><subfield code="9">978-0-521-13875-8</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">0521138752</subfield><subfield code="c">pbk.</subfield><subfield code="9">0-521-13875-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)656771012</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BSZ330677055</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="082" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">338.9</subfield><subfield code="2">22</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MF 6200</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)122761:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Nooruddin, Irfan</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)1011890143</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Coalition politics and economic development</subfield><subfield code="b">credibility and the strength of weak governments</subfield><subfield code="c">Irfan Nooruddin</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1. publ.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Cambridge Univ. Press</subfield><subfield code="c">2011</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XV, 249 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references and index</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory; 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics; 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms; 5. Coalition dharma and India shining; 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana; 7. Conclusion; Appendices</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics"--</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Entwicklungsländer</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaft</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Developing countries / Economic conditions</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Coalition governments / Developing countries</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Koalition</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4135668-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftsentwicklung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066438-7</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Koalition</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4135668-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftsentwicklung</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4066438-7</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022490200</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV037336398 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:22:21Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780521191401 0521191408 9780521138758 0521138752 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2010035946 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-022490200 |
| oclc_num | 656771012 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | XV, 249 S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateSearch | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Nooruddin, Irfan Verfasser (DE-588)1011890143 aut Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments Irfan Nooruddin 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2011 XV, 249 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references and index Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction; 2. Coalition politics and economic development: theory; 3. Coalition politics and economic development: empirics; 4. Coalition politics and economic development: mechanisms; 5. Coalition dharma and India shining; 6. Developing coalitions in Italy, Spain, Brazil, and Botswana; 7. Conclusion; Appendices "Coalition Politics and Economic Development challenges the conventional wisdom that coalition government hinders necessary policy reform in developing countries. Irfan Nooruddin presents a fresh theory that institutionalized gridlock, by reducing policy volatility and stabilizing investor expectations, is actually good for economic growth. Successful national economic performance, he argues, is the consequence of having the right configuration of national political institutions. Countries in which leaders must compromise to form policy are better able to commit credibly to investors and therefore enjoy higher and more stable rates of economic development. Quantitative analysis of business surveys and national economic data together with historical case studies of five countries provide evidence for these claims. This is an original analysis of the relationship between political institutions and national economic performance in the developing world and will appeal to scholars and advanced students of political economy, economic development and comparative politics"-- Entwicklungsländer Wirtschaft Developing countries / Economic conditions Coalition governments / Developing countries Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaftsentwicklung (DE-588)4066438-7 gnd rswk-swf Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 s Wirtschaftsentwicklung (DE-588)4066438-7 s DE-604 |
| spellingShingle | Nooruddin, Irfan Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments Entwicklungsländer Wirtschaft Developing countries / Economic conditions Coalition governments / Developing countries Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd Wirtschaftsentwicklung (DE-588)4066438-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4135668-8 (DE-588)4066438-7 |
| title | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments |
| title_auth | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments |
| title_exact_search | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments |
| title_full | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments Irfan Nooruddin |
| title_fullStr | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments Irfan Nooruddin |
| title_full_unstemmed | Coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments Irfan Nooruddin |
| title_short | Coalition politics and economic development |
| title_sort | coalition politics and economic development credibility and the strength of weak governments |
| title_sub | credibility and the strength of weak governments |
| topic | Entwicklungsländer Wirtschaft Developing countries / Economic conditions Coalition governments / Developing countries Koalition (DE-588)4135668-8 gnd Wirtschaftsentwicklung (DE-588)4066438-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Entwicklungsländer Wirtschaft Developing countries / Economic conditions Coalition governments / Developing countries Koalition Wirtschaftsentwicklung |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nooruddinirfan coalitionpoliticsandeconomicdevelopmentcredibilityandthestrengthofweakgovernments |