Moral hazard and ambiguity:
We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measu...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Bonn
Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2010,39 |
| Online-Zugang: | http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2514 Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are empirically of high relevance. -- Moral Hazard, Ambiguity Aversion, Principal-Agent Model, Informativeness Principle |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S. |
| Format: | . - Acrobat Reader |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 cb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV036893224 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20110601 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 110110s2010 |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV63680948X | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 049 | |a DE-M382 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Weinschenk, Philipp |d 1979- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)140643796 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Moral hazard and ambiguity |c Philipp Weinschenk |
| 264 | 1 | |a Bonn |b Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |c 2010 | |
| 300 | |a 30 S. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |v 2010,39 | |
| 520 | 8 | |a We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are empirically of high relevance. -- Moral Hazard, Ambiguity Aversion, Principal-Agent Model, Informativeness Principle | |
| 533 | |a Online-Ausgabe |e Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 46 S., 688 KB) | ||
| 538 | |a . - Acrobat Reader | ||
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Reproduktion von |a Weinschenk, Philipp, 1979- |t Moral hazard and ambiguity |d 2010 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |v 2010,39 |w (DE-604)BV021465097 |9 2010,39 | |
| 856 | 4 | |u http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2514 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_39online.pdf |z Kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 912 | |a ebook | ||
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020808373 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804143606744743936 |
|---|---|
| any_adam_object | |
| author | Weinschenk, Philipp 1979- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)140643796 |
| author_facet | Weinschenk, Philipp 1979- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Weinschenk, Philipp 1979- |
| author_variant | p w pw |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV036893224 |
| collection | ebook |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)GBV63680948X |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>01831nam a2200337 cb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV036893224</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20110601 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">110110s2010 |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV63680948X</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-M382</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Weinschenk, Philipp</subfield><subfield code="d">1979-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)140643796</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Moral hazard and ambiguity</subfield><subfield code="c">Philipp Weinschenk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Bonn</subfield><subfield code="b">Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods</subfield><subfield code="c">2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">30 S.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods</subfield><subfield code="v">2010,39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent&#x2019;s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are empirically of high relevance. -- Moral Hazard, Ambiguity Aversion, Principal-Agent Model, Informativeness Principle</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="533" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Online-Ausgabe</subfield><subfield code="e">Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 46 S., 688 KB)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="538" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">. - Acrobat Reader</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Reproduktion von</subfield><subfield code="a">Weinschenk, Philipp, 1979-</subfield><subfield code="t">Moral hazard and ambiguity</subfield><subfield code="d">2010</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods</subfield><subfield code="v">2010,39</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV021465097</subfield><subfield code="9">2010,39</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2=" "><subfield code="u">http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2514</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_39online.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">Kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="912" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ebook</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020808373</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV036893224 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:50:20Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020808373 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-M382 |
| owner_facet | DE-M382 |
| physical | 30 S. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| series2 | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| spelling | Weinschenk, Philipp 1979- Verfasser (DE-588)140643796 aut Moral hazard and ambiguity Philipp Weinschenk Bonn Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods 2010 30 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,39 We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the agent’s knowledge about the performance measure is ambiguous and he is averse towards ambiguity. We show that the principal may optimally provide no incentives or contract only on a subset of all informative performance measures. That is, the Informativeness Principle does not hold in our model. These results stand in stark contrast to the ones of the orthodox theory, but are empirically of high relevance. -- Moral Hazard, Ambiguity Aversion, Principal-Agent Model, Informativeness Principle Online-Ausgabe Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 46 S., 688 KB) . - Acrobat Reader Reproduktion von Weinschenk, Philipp, 1979- Moral hazard and ambiguity 2010 Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,39 (DE-604)BV021465097 2010,39 http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2514 http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_39online.pdf Kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Weinschenk, Philipp 1979- Moral hazard and ambiguity Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| title | Moral hazard and ambiguity |
| title_auth | Moral hazard and ambiguity |
| title_exact_search | Moral hazard and ambiguity |
| title_full | Moral hazard and ambiguity Philipp Weinschenk |
| title_fullStr | Moral hazard and ambiguity Philipp Weinschenk |
| title_full_unstemmed | Moral hazard and ambiguity Philipp Weinschenk |
| title_short | Moral hazard and ambiguity |
| title_sort | moral hazard and ambiguity |
| url | http://www.coll.mpg.de/?q=node/2514 http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_39online.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV021465097 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT weinschenkphilipp moralhazardandambiguity |