Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Kraków
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej <Kraków> / Prace Monograficzne
561 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The Baltic fleet of the Russian navy in 1905 - 1917 |
| Beschreibung: | 623, [2] s., [20] s. tabl., [1] k. tabl. il. (w tym kolor.). - Ill., Kt. 24 cm. |
| ISBN: | 9788372716064 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804143551862276096 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis treści
Wstęp
7
CZĘŚĆ I PRZED WYBUCHEM WIELKIEJ WOJNY
1905-1914
Rozdział I Cuszima
-
krajobraz po bitwie
20
Bunty we flocie
27
Rola floty w zapewnieniu bezpieczeństwa stolicy cesarstwa
32
Rozdział
II
Reorganizacja naczelnych władz rosyjskiej marynarki wojennej
oraz systemu dowodzenia flotami
43
Rozdział III Programy rozbudowy rosyjskiej Floty Bałtyckiej
74
Rozdział
IV
Rosyjskie plany wojny na Bałtyku w latach
1907-1914 102
Charakterystyka bałtyckiego teatru operacyjnego
102
Plany strategiczno-operacyjne Floty Bałtyckiej
110
Rosyjska doktryna wojenna
127
Rozdział
V
Flota Bałtycka w przededniu wybuchu wojny
131
Rozdział
VI
Potencjalni przeciwnicy rosyjskiej Floty Bałtyckiej
-
siły morskie Niemiec i Szwecji
163
Niemcy
164
Szwecja
187
CZĘŚĆ
II
WIELKA WOJNA
Rozdział I Pierwsza kampania wojenna na Bałtyku
-
rok
1914 196
Mobilizacja Floty Bałtyckiej i wybuch wojny
196
Dowodzenie Flotą Bałtycką po wybuchu wojny
209
Działania Floty Bałtyckiej w okresie
od sierpnia
1914
roku do lutego
1915
roku
220
Początki współpracy rosyjsko-brytyjskiej na Bałtyku
262
Bilans pierwszych miesięcy wojny
271
Rozdziału Druga kampania wojenna na Bałtyku- rok
1915 275
Przygotowania floty rosyjskiej do drugiej kampanii wojennej
275
W przededniu nowej kampanii
289
Działania Floty Bałtyckiej w okresie
od maja
1915
roku do stycznia
1916
roku
293
Bilans drugiej kampanii wojennej
355
Rozdział III Trzecia kampania wojenna na Bałtyku
-
rok
1916 359
Przygotowania do nowej kampanii
359
W przededniu trzeciej kampanii wojennej na Bałtyku
369
Działania Floty Bałtyckiej w okresie od maja do grudnia
1916
roku
374
Bilans trzeciej kampanii wojennej
417
Rozdział
IV
Czwarta kampania wojenna na Bałtyku-rok
1917 423
Przygotowania floty rosyjskiej do czwartej kampanii wojennej
423
Rewolucja w Rosji i jej wpływ na gotowość bojową Floty Bałtyckiej
426
W przededniu czwartej kampanii wojennej na Bałtyku
439
Działania Floty Bałtyckiej w okresie od maja do listopada
1917
roku
445
Bilans czwartej kampanii wojennej na Bałtyku
485
Zakończenie
488
Summary
496
Załączniki
503
Bibliografia selektywna
552
Indeks nazwisk
565
Indeks okrętów i statków
579
Indeks nazw geograficznych
606
Spis tabel i schematów
621
Spis ilustracji
622
Summary
The Baltic Fleet of the Russian Navy in
1905-1917
The defeat of the
1st
and
2nd
Squadron of the Pacific Fleet by the Japanese Combined
Fleet during the war of
1904-1905
diminished the military potential of the Russian Imperial
Navy by around
30%.
In the classification of the world s sea-powers, Russia was pushed from
the third place to the sixth. In
1906,
the Russian navy was preceded by the navies of Great
Britain, France, the USA, Germany and Japan. A significant change also affected the balance
of power on the Baltic Sea. As a result of the absence of battleships detached from the Baltic
Fleet to the Far East waters, the rule of the Baltic Sea was unquestionably won by
Kaiserliche
Marine.
The harsh lesson the Russian navy was taught in the Tsushima Battle, which sealed
Russian defeat in the Japanese war, made the authorities in Petersburg realize the significance
of the navy in conflicts between worlds powers. Popular Petersburg dailies heated the atmos¬
phere of anxiety that dominated the imperial court, and fed the fears of the Baltic provinces
inhabitants with suggestions that Germany and Sweden might use Russia s weakness after
the lost war to strengthen their political and economic influence in the Baltic region, and
that
Kaiserliche
Marine, growing in power, might threaten the security of the capital, Saint
Petersburg, located at the head of the Finnish Gulf.
In the national debate, which was started in Russia after the lost war with Japan, the
leading actors were the supporters of extended reforms in the naval department, ironically
nicknamed the Tsushimian department . The initiators of administrative reforms.were the
members of the Navy Society in Petersburg, which grouped the most talented navy officers of
the younger generation. The key points of the reform were elaborated by lieutenant
Aleksandr
Shcheglov, who based his ideas on the solutions applied previously in Japanese and German
navies. The core of his idea was decentralization of the navy s top authorities by establishing
three autonomous sections: the General Staff ( brain of the navy ), responsible for conceptual
tasks; the active fleet, realizing military tasks; and the administration (Ministry of the Navy),
responsible for the supply of equipment and arming of the fleet. Shcheglov s concept gained
the tsar s support, which was the decisive factor. In effect, by tsar s rescript, in
1906
the Navy
General Staff was created, which was a body of strategic planning, responsible, among oth¬
ers, for preparing sea-war plans and programmes for the development of the imperial navy.
In years
1906-1914,
the General Staff employed the most talented officers, which is proved
by the fact that during the World War I four of them were nominated chiefs of operation
units: Adrian Niepienin commanded the Baltic Fleet in
1916-1917,
Andrei Eberhardt and
Summary
________________________________________________________497
Aleksandr Kolchak
were consecutive commanders of the Black Sea Fleet, and
Ludwig
Körber
(Korwin) was the commander of the Arctic Ocean Flotilla. In fact, before taking the posts,
both Kolchak and
Körber
(Korwin) fulfilled important staff functions in the Baltic Fleet: the
former was the chief of the operational section of the Fleet in
1914-1916,
and the latter was
the chief of staff of the Fleet
(1913-1915).
Resulting from the organizational changes intro¬
duced in years
1906-1914,
a new structure of the top authorities of the Russian Imperial Navy
emerged, a structure corresponding to the organizational solutions adopted in the majority of
naval powers (e.g. in
Kaiserliche
Marine).
The greatest challenge that the Russian admiralty board faced after
1905
was quick re¬
construction of the military potential of the navy. This idea was received with complete un¬
derstanding at the imperial court, as well as by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which, owing
to the experience gained in the lost Japanese war, did realize that further Russian expansion
in many directions will require extension and modernization of both types of military forces:
the land forces and the navy. After the defeat in the Far East seas, the theory of sea power
gained more and more popularity in Russia. The theory was formulated by an American ad¬
miral, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and a British admiral, Philip Howard
Colomb,
at the turn of the
20th century. On the Neva, its propagator was general major Nicholas
Klado,
a well-known
theoretician and lecturer at the Maritime Academy. In one of his numerous elaborate articles,
in which he aimed at convincing the opinion-making spheres of the sense of Russia s becom¬
ing a sea power,
Klado
wrote:
Rule of the sea secures our country s shores from the enemy s sea landing, and at the same time
provides the possibility for our own troops to land on the enemy s grounds. Moreover, during
the war it guarantees maintaining communication with the whole world, with all states, both
allied and neutral ones, and deprives the enemy of possibilities of such communication1.
The attempts to work out a unified military policy of the state, made after the Japanese
war, did not bring any effects. Meetings of the State Defence Council saw unproductive argu¬
ments between the representatives of the admiralty, trying to force acceptance of their plans of
changing Russia into a sea power, and the representatives of the military circles, grouped around
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, who, as most of the generals, were ignorant of the matters of
the sea, and who intended to reduce the role of the fleet to defending the coast and supporting
the sea-shore wing of the front during the war. Eventually, the decisive factor was the tsar s view,
who was an eager supporter of the idea to make Russia a sea power. Nicholas II cut the prover¬
bial
Gordian
knot by dissolving the State Defence Council in
1906,
after which, using his special
position in the Russian state system, he led to the introduction of a fleet programme ( Small
programme ), the first after the Japanese war. As a result, in years
1909-1914,
the Petersburg
shipyards constructed four modern Sevastopol-class dreadnoughts, which entered the Baltic
Fleet after the outbreak of the World War I.
Introduction of the Small programme of navy development, in tsar Nicholas s opinion,
was merely a minimum plan, the realization of which could
-
at the most
-
ensure security of
the imperial sea-side capital. The tsar
s
ambitions were much greater, as they assumed conduct¬
ing global politics, which, according to Mahans doctrine, required Russia to enter the group of
1
Translated from Polish. For the full text, see
N.
Ł. Kłado, Znaczenije flota w
riadu
wojennych
srieãstw
gosudarstwa,
„MS
1906,
no.
7,
pp.
1-34.
498________________________________________________________________
sea powers. The monarch s approval inspired the admiralty board to prepare The bill on the
Russian Imperial Navy (the Great programme of navy development), which determined
both the speed of ship building and the necessary financial support. The Russian project was
modelled on the German Naval Laws
(Flottengesetze),
which was forced by admiral Alfred
von Tirpitz
in Reichstag in
1898.
The assumptions of the long-term fleet programmes were
presented to the tsar by the Minister of the Navy, Ivan Grigorovich, in the spring of
1911,
and
were received with enthusiasm. The Great programme sketched the developmental plans for
the navy in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific for the next
20
years. According to the
programme assumptions, in
1930
the Baltic Fleet was supposed to have two active squadrons
and one squadron in reserve; the Black Sea Fleet
-
one active squadron and one in reserve;
the Siberian Flotilla was intended to be reinforced with light ships only. The analysis of the
assumptions of the Great programme shows that Russians aimed at building an oceanic fleet,
which would be an important instrument in the realization of the Empires foreign policy.
A strong navy was to serve the purpose of breaking Russia s geographical isolation, by fight¬
ing the way to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific. Following the example of
Kaiserliche
Marine, Russians planned to strengthen both operational fleets (the Baltic and the
Black Sea Fleets) with whole squadrons, with heavy artillery ships as their cores. According
to the assumptions of the Great programme , the Baltic Fleet was to become the strongest.
Adopting this assumption resulted from two factors: firstly, the greatest shipyards were located
on the Baltic shores (St. Petersburg,
Kronstadt,
and
Reval),
and so were the cooperating facto¬
ries (e.g. Putilov or Isorha Plants); secondly, the Baltic straits, unlike the Black Sea straits, had
not been closed for sea transport by international treaties.
The rock against which admiralty s plans could crash was the State Dumas unwillingness
to allow gigantic expenditure on the construction of strong navy. This obstacle was success¬
fully overcome owing to the smart tactics of the government, who decided that the Great
programme of navy development would be realized in stages. Before the outbreak of the
World War I, the Duma passed two fleet programmes (for the Baltic fleet in
1912
and for the
Black Sea Fleet in
1914),
which were an inherent part of the Great programme . According
to the governments clever tactics, the project of The bill on the Russian Imperial Navy was
to be submitted to the Duma at the end of
1914,
when the works on the realization of the
Programme for accelerated development of the Baltic Fleet for years
1912-1916
would be
advanced enough to provide the admiralty with a strong argument for the continuation of
the initiated task. The careful tactics of the government was annihilated by the outbreak of
the First World War, which prevented Russia from carrying on the great naval armament.
After the war broke out, the Russian ship industry experienced considerable difficulties due
to breach of cooperation with the German shipyards and limited possibilities of cooperation
with the British and French companies. Russia, isolated from the West in the Baltic Sea and
the Black Sea, was forced to maintain sea communication via seas distant from its shipyard
centre (the White Sea, and the Far East seas), which caused additional complications and
delays in shipyards operation.
When the World War I began, tsar and admiralty s plans concerning the use of the navy
in the realization of imperial aims on the sea had to be postponed ad Kalendas Graecas. In
1914,
strong squadrons of the Russian Baltic Fleet existed only on paper. On the day the war
Summary
_________________________________________________________499
broke out, the Baltic shipyards were conducting finishing works on four Sevastopol-class
dreadnoughts, built under the Little programme . The realization of the Great programme
of navy development only entered the preliminary stage. Admiralty s plans assumed that the
Baltic Fleet would command a complete squadron of modern ships first in
1918
or
1919.
When the war broke out, Russians possessed only one weak squadron on the Baltic Sea, and
its core were four pre-dreadnoughts, while the enemy s forces evoked respect. In July
1914
the German navy possessed a powerful fleet of ships-of-the-line, based on
13
dreadnoughts,
5
cruisers and
22
pre-dreadnoughts in operational readiness. These forces were concentrat¬
ed in the North Sea bases, since
Kaiserliche
Marine authorities considered the Royal Navy
to be the chief opponent; however, owing to the construction of the Kaiser
Wilhelm
Canal,
Germans had the possibility of quick shifting of considerable forces of
Hochseeflotte
to the
Baltic Sea bases.
The crashing advantage of
Kaiserliche
Marine in the class of heavy artillery ships, which
before the First World War were generally believed to be predestined to play the dominant
role in the struggle for the rule of the sea, affected the Russian plans of waging war on the
Baltic Sea. Taking into account the disproportion of power between the Baltic Fleet and the
sea forces of the enemies (Germany and Sweden), the Russian Navy General Staff worked
out plans of a defensive battle on the waters of the Finnish Gulf, on a mine-artillery position,
prepared in advance. The main goal was to protect the capital from the attack from the sea.
After the war began, Russian preparations to defend the Finnish Gulf gained speed. The main
defence line was built in the narrowest part of the Gulf, between the Porkkala peninsula and
the
Nargön
island (the central mine-artillery post). To make it difficult for the enemy s fleet
to reach the central position, in
1914-1917
Russians built several additional fortified items:
a skerry-flanked one, a forward one and one between
Åbo
and the Aland Islands, and one
in the Moon Sound. Each of them was a combination of mine-barriers and coast artillery
batteries, defended by water and underwater fleets, land units of coastal defence, and naval
aviation. The defence system, created during the war, successfully protected the capital and
considerably broadened the operational basis of the Russian fleet, enabling conducting mine-
operations in the South Baltic Sea. The fact that Germans crushed the southern flank of the
integrated system of the Russian fortified positions in a land and naval operation conducted
in October
1917
(operation Albion ) does not, according to the author, allow a reliable evalu¬
ation of the system. Although the operation was perfectly organized and conducted with the use
of considerable forces of
Kaiserliche
Marine and a strong landing corps, its success was chiefly
determined by the lamentable state of the morale of Russian soldiers and sailors, who did not
want to carry on fighting in defence of a state that was falling apart.
The analysis of the Baltic Fleet strategic-operational plan, prepared before the World War
I and then modified yearly, allows a conclusion that the operational unit of the Russian navy
in the Baltic Sea was forced to realize tasks typical of coastal defence fleet. The author believes
that the situation was determined by two factors. Firstly, the imperial court would react with
panic fear to the very thought of German or German-Swedish fleet s attack on the capital;
the attack was additionally connected with the threat of landings on the Finnish Gulf shores,
hence the decision to leave the 6th Army to defend Petersburg and to make it operationally
subject to the Baltic Fleet, as well as the decision to subject operational use of battleships to
500 ______________________________________________________________
the tsar s personal agreement. Secondly, until February
1916
the navy did not have a per¬
manent commanding unit, the Field Staff, in the Commander-in-Chief
s
Headquarters. The
Commander-in-Chief s Staff was dominated by land-forces officers, while the naval forces
were merely represented by one of the section managements (Management of the Navy).
Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich, in
1914-1915
the Commander-in-Chief of the Military
Forces of the Russian Empire, being ignorant in naval subjects, tried to limit the role of the
Fleet in the operation sea-areas (the Baltic and the Black Sea) to supplementary tasks, sup¬
porting the activities of the land forces.
The limitations imposed by the Headquarters made the commanders of the Baltic
Fleet conduct a small war . Before
1914,
the idea was not popular among the officers of the
Operation Section of the Navy s General Staff, who were responsible for strategic-operational
planning. To a large extent, it resulted from the fact that the General Staff voted for the option
of preparing a big war , which was reflected in fleet programmes assuming the construc¬
tion of a strong line-of-battle fleet in the Baltic Sea. Parallel realization of the two concepts
was not taken into account, as Russian shipyards would not be able to build simultaneously
heavy artillery ships and a great number of modern light cruisers, destroyers and submarines,
indispensable in running a successful small war . In effect, after the start of military opera¬
tions, Russians possessed only one modern destroyer (Nowik), fully prepared to wage small
war , in the Baltic Sea. The situation improved slightly first in
1915,
when modern destroyers
( nowiki ) and Bars-class submarines were launched on duty.
Despite the presented difficulties, at the end of the first war campaign the Russian Baltic
fleet, in the beginning of the war commanded by energetic admiral Nicholas
von
Essen, con¬
ducted mine operations in the waters controlled by
Kaiserliche
Marine. In years
1914-1916
the Russians conducted over ten successful mine operations in the Southern and Middle Baltic
Sea, during which they set up a total number of
4186
mines2. The effect of the mine offensive
was limiting the sea area of the enemies military actions and creating a stable threat to their
transport routes, especially in the approach to bases and ports. Mine weapons turned out to
be extremely effective as a military tool. The Russian mine barriers (offensive and defensive)
sank or seriously damaged several dozen German battleships and supporting units. In fact,
mine weapons were used in the Baltic Theatre by both parties involved. In years
1914-1917,
the Russian Baltic Fleet set up
38.932
mines, including
34.746
mines in defensive barriers and
4186
in offensive ones. The number of mines used by the German navy was almost three times
smaller
(13.964
mines)3.
Another important military tool used by the Russian fleet during the small war in
the Baltic Sea were submarines. Before the outbreak of the First World War, in the Imperial
Fleet, as in other powers fleets, the prevailing conviction was that submarines would be used
exclusively in operations off the coast or in small distances from their own bases. These origi¬
nal assumptions were changed under the influence of the spectacular success of the German
U
9,
which on September
22, 1914,
within a few hours sank three British cruisers off the
Dutch coast. Almost a month later, the Russian Baltic Fleet received a painful demonstration
2
Ł.G.
Gonczarow, B.A. Dienisow, Ispolzowanije
min w mirowuju impierialisticzeskuju wojnu
1914-1918 gg., Moskwa-Leningrad 1940,
p.
28,
table
3.
3 Ibidem;
pp.
73-74,
table
13.
Summary
501
of offensive abilities of the U-Boots, losing the cruiser
Pallada,
torpedoed on the approach
to the Finnish Gulf by
U
26.
Russian submarines started military reconnaissance on waters
controlled by
Kaiserliche
Marine only during the second campaign in the Baltic Sea. It became
possible owing to the launching of the first modern Bars-class units. Since autumn
1914,
the
German communication routes were also patrolled by British submarines (by a division, and
since
1915 -
by a flotilla), which were operationally subject to the commanders of the Russian
Baltic Fleet. Sending this small tactical unit was the only form of cooperation with the Eastern
ally in the Baltic Theatre that Great Britain decided on. The submarines sent to undertake ac¬
tions against the German navy and ship transport several times achieved spectacular success.
This encouraged the Baltic Fleet command to increase the number of patrols off the Swedish
east coast, along which ran the enemy s important communication route. German freight
ships used that route to transport Swedish iron ore from the mines around
Gällivare;
without
it, the Reich s arms industry could not function. The result of the British-Russian underwater
offensive was partial disorganization of the German transport across the Baltic Sea. It made
Kaiserliche
Marine introduce a convoy system and shift a considerable number of escort ships
from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea. However, the effective use of all military possibilities of
submarines in fighting the German ship transport was prevented by political issues. Under
the pressure from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, fearing that trespassing on the Swedish ter¬
ritorial waters by Russian (British) submarines might convince Sweden that it should join the
war activities on the side of the Central Powers,
Stavka
gave the order to stop patrolling the
coast-waters of the Scandinavian neighbour. Establishing patrolling regions only in the ap¬
proach areas to German Middle Baltic bases, as well as strengthening anti-submarine warfare
by
Kaiserliche
Marine, prevented the Russian and British submarines from achieving any vis¬
ible success until the end of the war.
The World War I in the Baltic Sea was also waged in the third dimension , as both sides
introduced naval aviation into the action. The Russian Baltic Fleet systematically increased
both the number of machines and the number of land and sea airfields. Since
1915,
the air¬
craft carrier
Orlica,
carrying four seaplanes, participated in the operations in the Gulf of Riga.
The main task of the naval aviation was operation and tactical reconnaissance in the area.
Moreover, from
1915
on the forces were used in bombing the sea and air bases of the enemy,
correcting the naval artillery fire, providing the air cover to protect the ships participating
in operations or staying in bases, or even conducting air bombing of the enemy s ships and
submarines. The dynamic development of the Russian naval aviation resulted in its being ex¬
cluded from under the command of the Chief of Communication Service and subjected di¬
rectly to the Commander of the Fleet in December
1916.
In both the Baltic and the Black Sea
naval air force divisions were formed, and air forces gained the status of an independent type
of naval forces.
During the war, the Baltic Fleet was greatly indebted to the efficient radio-intelligence
service, which conducted operation and tactical reconnaissance on the sea. Capturing the
radio signals sent by German ships enabled monitoring of the moves of
Kaiserliche
Marine
units, and decoding cryptograms made it possible to comprehend the plans of the German
military authorities. In the reports by ship commanders and chiefs of tactical units of the
Baltic fleet, it was frequently mentioned that the information received from the radio intel¬
ligence allowed them to avoid encounters with prevailing enemy forces, or to take advantage
502________________________________________________________________
of tactical surprise. This issue has not been investigated exhaustively in the subject literature
and requires deepened examination.
Summing up, the Baltic Fleet, the operational unit of the Russian navy, occupied an
important position in the defence system of the whole north-east flank of the eastern front
ІПІ914-1917.
Apart from defending the capital, which was its main goal, it received a number
of additional tasks. In the first days of the war, it was to secure the process of mobilisation of
the Petersburg Military District forces and to prevent enemy s forces landing on the coasts of
the Finnish Gulf. At the further stages of the conflict, the tactical units of the Fleet received
the task of conducting mine operations and providing tactical support (artillery fire, tactical
landings) to the army units fighting on the coast. The cooperation of the Baltic Fleet with
land forces became especially significant after the German military plans were modified due
to the deadlock situation in the Western Front, when the threat to the sea-coast front (North-
West Front, since
1915 -
the North Front), protecting approach to the capital and the Fleet
bases, grew rapidly. The cooperation of both types of forces until
1917
efficiently prevented
the Germans from achieving significant military success in the North-East. The situation was
changed diametrically by the outbreak of the Revolution in March
1917.
The breakdown of
morale and discipline among sailors and soldiers made doubtful the possibility of further re¬
alization of tasks by the Army and the Fleet, which to a large extent determined the defeat of
Russia in the First World War.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Herma, Marek |
| author_facet | Herma, Marek |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Herma, Marek |
| author_variant | m h mh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV036855200 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)706042988 (DE-599)BVBBV036855200 |
| era | Geschichte 1905-1917 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1905-1917 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Ostsee (DE-588)4044107-6 gnd Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Ostsee Russland |
| id | DE-604.BV036855200 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:49:28Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788372716064 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-020771088 |
| oclc_num | 706042988 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 623, [2] s., [20] s. tabl., [1] k. tabl. il. (w tym kolor.). - Ill., Kt. 24 cm. |
| psigel | BSBWK1 DHB_JDG_ISBN_1 |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej <Kraków> / Prace Monograficzne |
| spelling | Herma, Marek Verfasser aut Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 Marek Herma Kraków Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej 2010 623, [2] s., [20] s. tabl., [1] k. tabl. il. (w tym kolor.). - Ill., Kt. 24 cm. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej <Kraków> / Prace Monograficzne 561 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: The Baltic fleet of the Russian navy in 1905 - 1917 Geschichte 1905-1917 gnd rswk-swf Marine (DE-588)4074570-3 gnd rswk-swf Ostsee (DE-588)4044107-6 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 gnd rswk-swf Russland (DE-588)4076899-5 g Marine (DE-588)4074570-3 s Ostsee (DE-588)4044107-6 g Geschichte 1905-1917 z DE-604 Prace Monograficzne Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny Imienia Komisji Edukacji Narodowej <Kraków> 561 (DE-604)BV035740942 561 Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020771088&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen 2 application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020771088&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Herma, Marek Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 Marine (DE-588)4074570-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4074570-3 (DE-588)4044107-6 (DE-588)4076899-5 |
| title | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 |
| title_auth | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 |
| title_exact_search | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 |
| title_full | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 Marek Herma |
| title_fullStr | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 Marek Herma |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 Marek Herma |
| title_short | Rosyjska flota wojenna na Bałtyku w latach 1905 - 1917 |
| title_sort | rosyjska flota wojenna na baltyku w latach 1905 1917 |
| topic | Marine (DE-588)4074570-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Marine Ostsee Russland |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020771088&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020771088&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV035740942 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hermamarek rosyjskaflotawojennanabałtykuwlatach19051917 |