The methodology of social sciences:
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
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New Brunswick
Transaction Publ.
2011
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| Beschreibung: | Text engl. |
| Beschreibung: | XLVI, 210 S. |
| ISBN: | 9781412813198 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a The methodology of social sciences |c Max Weber ; transl. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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Titel: Methodology of social sciences
Autor: Weber, Max
Jahr: 2011
Contents
Introduction to the Transaction Edition xiii
Foreword, Edward A. Shils xxxix
I. The Meaningof'EthicalNeutrality" in Sociology 1
and Economics
P. 1-3, Meaning of "value-judgment"-role of "value-judgment" within
science adifferent issue from desirability of espousing "value-judgments"
in teaching-critique of two points of view on the latter issue-Weber's
own view; P. 3-5, Waning of belief that ultimately only one point of view
on practical problems is correct-implications thereof for "professorial
prophets"-what the Student should obtain today from the university; P.
6, "Cult of personality" and pseudo ethical neutrality rejected; P. 6-8, Dif-
flculties in idea that university should be a forum for discussion of value
problems from all Standpoints; P. 9-10, The difficulties involved in respect-
ing the distinction between empirical Statements of fact and "value-judg-
ments"-dangers of pseudo-ethical neutrality-illusion of scientific Warrant
for truth of via media; P. 10-12, The mistaken objections to the distinction
between empirical Statements of fact and "value-judgments"-the real issue
concems the Separation of the investigator's own practical valuations from
the establishment of empirical facts-ambiguities of taking goals as facts; P.
12-13, Historical and individual variations in evaluations does not prove the
necessary subjectivity of ethics-deceptive self-evidence of widely accepted
"value-judgments"-science as a critic of self-evidence-realistic "science
of ethics" cannot determine what should happen; P. 14, Empirical-psycho-
logical and genetic analysis of evaluations leads only to "understanding
explanation," but it is not negligible-its definite use in regard to causal
analysis and clarification; P. 16, Schmoller wrong in contention that ethical
neutrality implies acknowledgment of only formal ethical rules-ethical
imperatives not identical with cultural values-normative ethics per se
cannot offer unambiguous directives for the Solution of certain social-
political problems-example of indeterminate implications of postulate of
Analytical Summary by Henry A. Finch.
justice-specific ethical problems, personal and social, which ethics cannot
settle by itself; P. 16-18, So-called strictly "formal" ethical maxims do have
Substantive meaning-an illustration-both empirical and non-empirical val-
ue-analysis of the illustration inadequate to solve the crucial issue involved-
human life a series of ultimate decisions by which the soul "chooses its own
fate"; P. 18-9, Three things can be contributed by an empirical discipline to
the Solution of policy issues-what it cannot supply-the distinction between
normative and scientific problems stated in terms of a series of contrasted ques-
tions; P. 20-1, Three functions of the discussion of "value-judgments"-such
discussion is emphatically not meaningless; P. 21-2, Selection of problems in
social science a matter of value-relevance-cultural interests and direction of
scientific work-the evaluative interests giving direction to scientific work can
be clarified and differentiated by analysis of "value-judgments"-distinction
between evaluation and value-interpretation; P. 22-5, "Value-judgments" can-
not be derived from factual trends-illustration of the syndicalist-ethical
and political limitations of policy of "adaptation to the possible"; P. 25-6,
Two meanings of "adaptation"--dispensibility of the term when it is used
evaluatively and not in its biological meaning; P. 26-27, Conflict in social life
cannot be excluded- its forms may vary-meaning of "peace"-evaluation
of any type of social order must be preceded by empirical study of its modes of
social selection, butthe evaluation is distinct from the study; P. 27-8, The problem
of the meaning of "progress"-whether mental and psychological "progressive
differentiation" is progress in sense of "inner richness" not scientifically deter-
minable-however the cost of such "progress" can be studied empirically-P.
28-30, Applicability of "progress" in the empirical history of art-in this use the
concept of "progress" means "rational," "technical" progress-illustration of
Gothic architecture; P. 31-2, Another illustration from the historic development
of music in Europe; P. 32, Technical progress in art does not necessarily imply
aesthetic improvement, although changes in technique are causally speaking,
the most important factors in the development of art; P. 32-3, Historians are apt to
confuse causal analysis and "value-judgments"-causal analysis, aesthetic valu-
ation and value Interpretation are all distinct procedures; P. 33-5, The meaning of
"rational progress"-three senses thereof which are generally confused-distinc-
tion between subjectively "rational" action and rationally "conect" actiort-where
technical progress exists-conditions for legitimate use of term "economic prog-
ress"; P. 36-7, An illustration of debatable presuppositions of an action claimed
to be "objectively evaluated" as "economically correct"; P. 37-8, Meaning of
technical evaluations of pure economics-they are unambiguous only when
economic and social context are given-when technical evaluations are made
this does not settle questions of ultimate evaluations; P. 39-40, The normative
validity of objects of empirical investigation is disregarded during the empirical
investigation-example from mathematics-but this disregard does not affect
the normative validity of normatively valid truths as an a priori basis of all
empirical science-and yet "understanding" of human conduct is not in terms
ofthat which is normatively correct as an a priori condition of all scientific
investigations-the "understanding" knowledge of human conduct and cul-
ture involves conventional rather than normative validity; P. 41-2, The truth
value of ideas is the guiding value in the writing of intellectual history-an
illustration from military history of the possible study of causal effects of
erroneous thoughts and calculation-ideal types even of incorrect and self-
defeating thought necessary for the determining of causation of empirical
events; P. 43, The normative correctness of the ideal type not necessary for
its use-the function of ideal-types vis-ä-vis empirical reality; P. 43-6, Nature
of pure economic theory-its ideal-typical character-it is apolitical, asserts
no moral evaluations but is indispensible for analysis-critique of theses
of opponents of pure economics-relationship of mean-end propositions
to cause-effect propositions which economic science can supply-other
problems of economics; P. 46, Factual importance of the State in the modern
social scene does not establish the State as an ultimate value-the view that
the State is a means to value is defensible.
II. "Objectivity" in Social Science and Social Policy 49
P. 49, Introductory note on the responsibility for and content of the essay; P.
50-1, Problem of relationship of practical social criticism to scientific social
research; P. 51-2, Points of view hampering logical formulation of differ-
ence between "existential" and "normative" knowledge in social-economic
science; P. 52, Rejection of view that empirical science provides norms and
ideals-however, criticism vis-ä-vis "value-judgments" is not to be suspended;
P. 52-3, Appropriateness of means to, and chance of achieving, a given end are
accessible to scientific analysis; P. 53, Scientific analysis can predict "costs" of
unintended or incidental consequences of action; P. 53-4, Scientific treatment
of "value-judgment" can reveal "ideas" and ideals underlying concrete ends; P.
55, The judgment of the validity of values is a matter for faith or possibly for
speculative philosophy, but not within province of empirical science-the
distinction between empirical and normative not obliterated by the fact
of cultural change; P. 55-7, Illusory self-evidence of consensus on certain
goals-problems of social policy are not merely technical-naive belief in the
scientific deducibility of normatively desirable cultural values-cultural val-
ues are ethical imperatives only for dogmatically bound religious sects; P. 57-8,
The via media of the practical politician or syncretic relativism is not warranted
as correct by science; P. 58, The inexpugnable difference between arguments ap-
pealing to (I) enthusiasm and feeling (2) ethical conscience (3) capacity as a sci-
entific knower; P. 58-9, Scientifically valid social science analysis can strive for
supra-cultural validity; P. 59-60, Reasons for expressing "value-judgments"
if they are clearly formulated as such and distinguished from scientific
Statements; P. 61-2, The recognition of social problems is value-oriented-
character of the Archiv in the past, in the future; P. 63, What is the meaning
of objectively valid truth in the social sciences; P. 63-4, Scarcity of means is
the basic characteristic of socio-economic subject matter-what a social sci-
ence problem is; P. 64-6, Distinction between "economic," "economically rele-
vant" and "economically conditioned" phenomena; P. 66, Condition for
the existence of social-economic problems-extent of the ränge of social-
economics; P. 66-7, Past concerns and central present aim of the Archiv;
P. 67, Study of society from the economic point of view "one-sided" but
intentionally so-the "social" as subject of study needs specification; P. 68-
71, Cultural phenomena not deducible from material interests-difference
between crude monistic materialistic conception of history and useful critical
use of the economic point of view-analogous dogmatic excesses on the
part of other sciences; P. 72, "Onesided" viewpoints necessary to realize
cognitive goal of empirical social science inquiring into selected segments
of concrete reality; P. 72-3, Criteria of historian's selection not solely from
requirements of discovery of laws or ultimate psychological factors-these
are at most preliminary to the desired type of knowledge-characterization
of the latter; P. 75-6, Four tasks of the desired type of social science knowl-
edge; P. 76, The decisive feature of the method of the cultural sciences-the
significance of cultural configurations rooted in value-conditioned interest; P.
77, Two types of analysis are logically distinct, in terms of laws and general
concepts and in terms of value-rooted meaning-analysis of generic general
features of phenomena a preliminary task to analysis of cultural significance
of concrete historical fact; P. 78-9, The "historical" is "the significant in its
individuality"-impossibility of causal analysis of culture without selection
of "essential" features-in the study of "historical individuals" it is a ques-
tion of concrete causal relationships, not laws; P. 80, But causal imputation
of concrete causal effects to concrete cultural causes presupposes knowl-
edge of recurrent causal sequences, i.e. of "adequate" causes-meaning
thereof-certainty of imputation a function of comprehensiveness of general
knowledge-why it is a meaningless ideal for social science to seek the
reduction of empirical reality to laws; P. 81, Non-equivalence of cultural
significance with positive cultural value; P. 82, Why the view persists that
evaluative ideas are derivable from the "facts themselves"-the personal
dement in research; P. 82, The necessity of "subjective" evaluative ideas
does not mean causal knowledge is absent in cultural science-nor can causal
knowledge be supplanted by "teleology"; P. 83-4, Evaluative ideas are "sub-
jective," but the results of research are not subjective in the sense of being
valid for one person and not for others; P. 84-5, Meaninglessness of the idea
of a closed System of concepts from which reality is deducible-shifts and
movements in cultural problems; P. 85, A basic question, the role of theory
in the knowledge of cultural reality; P. 85, Effect of natural law, rationalis-
tic Weltanschauung, natural-science conceptualization on practical "arts"
and on economics-seeming triumph of law-oriented analysis in historical
study under the influence of evolutionary biology-the present confused
Situation and its origin; P. 87-88, Meaning and contentions of "abstract"
theoretical method in economics-fruitlessness of debate conceming these
contentions-social institutions not deducible from psychological laws;
P. 89-90, A kind of concept construction peculiar to and, to a certain
extent, indispensible to the cultural sciences-an illustration; P. 90, The
ideal-typical concept distinguished from an hypothesis, a description,
an average-it is useful for both heuristic and expository purposes; P. 90-1,
Illustrations; P. 91 -2, "Ideal" in logical sense to be distinguished from "ideal
in ethical sense; P. 92-3, The sole criterion justifying the use of the ideal
type-illustrations of idea-type concepts-they are not to be found accord-
ing to a scheme of genus proximum, differentia specifica-characteristics of
ideal-type concepts-their relationship to category of objective possibility;
P. 93-4, Elaboration of ideal-type concepts of "church" and "sect"-cultural
significance and ideal-type concepts; P. 94-6, Three naturalistic misconcep-
tions concerning ideal-typical concepts-the ideal-typical concept of an ep-
och's features and the ideas actually governing men-the latter is indeed itself
to be clearly formulated only in an ideal-type-an illustration; P. 96-7, Varying
relationship between ideal-type of ideas of an epoch and empirical reality;
P. 98, Ideal-types often used not in a logical but in an evaluative sense-an
illustration-these senses frequently confused in historical writing; P. 99, Ideal
typical concept of the State discussed; P. 100-1, The ideal-typical concept in its
relationship to class, generic or average concepts; P. 101 -3, Distinction between
history and ideal-typical constructs of developmental sequences-why it is
difficult to maintain this distinction; P. 103, Marxian "laws" are ideal-typical;
P. 103, A list of mental and conceptual constructs indicating ramifications of
mefhodological problems in the cultural sciences; P. 104-5, Sense in which
maturing social science transcends its ideal-types-the tension between the
possibility of new knowledge and old integrations the source of progress in
the cultural sciences; P. 105, interdependence of concept construction, prob-
lem setting and content of culture; P. 106, Incompatibility of goal of social
sciences as viewed by the Historical School and modern, Kantian theory of
knowledge-the function of concepts is not the reproduction of reality; P.
107-110, Dangers of neglect of clear cut concept construction-two illus-
trations; P. 110-11, Recapitulation ofthe argument; P. 112, "Subject matter
specialists," "interpretive specialists," their excesses-genuine artistry of
the research which avoids these excesses-and yet change of evaluative
viewpoint occurs even in an age of necessary speculation.
III. Critical Studies in the Logic ofthe Cultural Sciences 113
I. A critique of Eduard Meyer's methodological views.
P. 113-4, Value of Meyer's book as a focus of discussion; P. 115-6, The role of
methodology in the advance of science-methodological interest of present
Situation in history; P. 116-7, List of theses concerning history attacked by
Meyer; P. 117-9, Meyer's analysis of "chance" and its relationship to "free
will"; P. 119, Meyer on "freedom" and "Necessity"; P. 119, Examination of
Meyer's conception of "free will"-his tendency to fuse ethical and causal
analysis; P. 122-4, Meyer's error in blumng the distinction between historical
knowledge and ethics, and in equating freedom with irrationality of action;
P. 124-5, Rationality and freedom; P. 126-7, Contradictions in Meyer's
conception of historical causality-Meyer's discussion of "freedom" and
"necessity" in their relation to "general," "particular," "individual," "collec-
tivity"-confusion therein; P. 129-30, What is historically significant cannot
be reached by subtracting the common from unique traits; P. 130-1, Meyer's
right instinct but poor formulation concerning the role of the general, i.e.
rules and concepts in history-the logical problems ofthe ordering of histori-
cal phenomena by concepts-the meaning ofthe category of possibility; P.
131-2, Meyer's definition of "historical"-what determines the historian's
selection of events; P. 132-3, Instances of confusion of ratio essendi with
ratio cognoscendi in historical study P. 134-6, Two distinct logical uses of
data of cultural reality-illustrations; P. 136, Meyer's confusion of heuristic
device with fact-his narrow view ofthe interest governing the historian's
selection; P. 137-8, What is the meaning ofthe effectiveness of cultures or
their components; P. 138-42, Meaning ofthe "significant" and its relation-
ship to historical effectiveness-the illustration of Goethe's letters; P. 143,
A type of significance which is neither heuristic nor causal-the object of
Interpretation-two kinds of interpretation; P. 143-5, Meaning of "value-
interpretation-its distinction from linguistic-textual analysis- which
"value-interpretations" can claim to be scientific; P. 145-7, How value
interpretation is dealt with by Hey er; P. 147-9, The relationship of facts of
value analysis to facts of history-analysis of illustrative cases-Goethe's
letters and Marx's Kapital-relevance of historical facts for value-interpreta-
tions; P. 149-152, Nature of value analysis; P. 152-6, Difficulties in Meyer's
discussion of the historical interest governing historian's selection -role
ofthe contemporaneity ofthe interest-confusion of historical individual
and historical cause; P. 156-8, Historical interest determined by values, not
by objective causal relationships-confusion of "valuable" with "causally
important"; P. 158, Why the present is no subject matter for history; P. 158-
160, Summary Statement on Meyer's inadequate equating of "effective" with
"historical"-summary on meaning of interpretation; P. 160, Relationships
between the philosophy of history, value-analysis and historical work; P.
161, Why historians are often not aware ofthe value-analysis implicit in
their work-Meyer's conect recognition ofthe difference between histori-
cal work and value-interpretation-problem of meaning of "systematics" in
historical, cultural science; P. 161-3, An illustration-three value oriented
points of view from which the classical culture of antiquity can be treated.
Objective possibility and adequate causation in historical explanation.
II. P. 164-66, No idle question for history to inquire into what con-
sequences were to be expected if certain conditions had been other than
they were-importance of such questions in determining historical signifi-
cance; P. 166-9, Sources for theory of "objective" possibility-origins in
juristic theory-history does not share jurisprudence's ethical interest in the
theory; P. 169, Causal historical explanation deals with selected aspects of
events having significance from general Standpoints; P. 171, A suffi-
cient condition establishing causal irrelevance of given circumstances
for an individual effect; P. 171-2, Account, with an illustration, of logical
Operations which establish historical causal relations; P. 172-3, Historians
ought not to be reluctant to admit objective possibility; P. 173-4, Isolations
and generalizations required to secure "judgment of possibility"-category
of objective possibility not an expression of ignorance or incomplete knowl-
edge-such judgments presuppose known empirical rules-instance ofthe
Battle ofthe Marathon; P. 175, Meaning of "adequate causes"; P. 175, The
simplest historical judgment is not simple registration of something found
and finished, rather does it presuppose the use of a forming category and
a whole body of empirical knowledge; P. 175-77, Psychological processes
of historical discovery not to be confused with its logical structure; P. 177-
80, The causal analysis of personal actions must also distinguish between
categorically formed constructs and immediate experience; P. 180, Recog-
nition of possibility in causal inquiry does not imply arbitrary historiography,
for category of objective possibility enables the assessment of the causal
significance of a historical fact; P. 181, The certainty of judgments of ob-
jective possibility may vary in degree-objective historical possibility is
an analogue, with important differences, ofthe kind of probability that is
determined from observed frequencies; P. 184-5, Definition of "adequate
causation"-application to Battle of Marathon, the March Revolution, the
unification of Germany-reiteration of constructive nature of historian's
conceptualization; P. 186-7, Binding's "anthropomorphic" misunderstand-
ing of objective possibility-real meaning of "favoring" and "obstructing"
conditions-the special character of causality when adequacy of causation
is concerned needs further study.
Name Index 189
Subject Index 191 |
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| spelling | Weber, Max 1864-1920 Verfasser (DE-588)118629743 aut The methodology of social sciences Max Weber ; transl. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch New Brunswick Transaction Publ. 2011 XLVI, 210 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Text engl. Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd rswk-swf Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 s DE-604 Shils, Edward 1910-1995 Sonstige (DE-588)120484528 oth Finch, Henry A. Sonstige oth HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020645638&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Weber, Max 1864-1920 The methodology of social sciences Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4055916-6 |
| title | The methodology of social sciences |
| title_auth | The methodology of social sciences |
| title_exact_search | The methodology of social sciences |
| title_full | The methodology of social sciences Max Weber ; transl. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch |
| title_fullStr | The methodology of social sciences Max Weber ; transl. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch |
| title_full_unstemmed | The methodology of social sciences Max Weber ; transl. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch |
| title_short | The methodology of social sciences |
| title_sort | the methodology of social sciences |
| topic | Sozialwissenschaften (DE-588)4055916-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Sozialwissenschaften |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020645638&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT webermax themethodologyofsocialsciences AT shilsedward themethodologyofsocialsciences AT finchhenrya themethodologyofsocialsciences |