No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: a model of percentage limits and collusion
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Bonn
Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods
2010
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2010,15 |
| Beschreibung: | 15 Bl. |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| author | Grechenig, Kristoffel 1970- Sekyra, Michael |
| author_GND | (DE-588)130363456 |
| author_facet | Grechenig, Kristoffel 1970- Sekyra, Michael |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Grechenig, Kristoffel 1970- |
| author_variant | k g kg m s ms |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV036520268 |
| ctrlnum | (DE-599)BVBBV036520268 |
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| id | DE-604.BV036520268 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:42:10Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| owner | DE-M382 |
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| physical | 15 Bl. |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateSearch | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| series2 | Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| spelling | Grechenig, Kristoffel 1970- Verfasser (DE-588)130363456 aut No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion Kristoffel Grechenig ; Michael Sekyra Bonn Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods 2010 15 Bl. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,15 Sekyra, Michael Verfasser aut Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010,15 (DE-604)BV021465097 2010,15 |
| spellingShingle | Grechenig, Kristoffel 1970- Sekyra, Michael No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| title | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion |
| title_auth | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion |
| title_exact_search | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion |
| title_full | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion Kristoffel Grechenig ; Michael Sekyra |
| title_fullStr | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion Kristoffel Grechenig ; Michael Sekyra |
| title_full_unstemmed | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe a model of percentage limits and collusion Kristoffel Grechenig ; Michael Sekyra |
| title_short | No derivative shareholder suits in Europe |
| title_sort | no derivative shareholder suits in europe a model of percentage limits and collusion |
| title_sub | a model of percentage limits and collusion |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV021465097 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT grechenigkristoffel noderivativeshareholdersuitsineuropeamodelofpercentagelimitsandcollusion AT sekyramichael noderivativeshareholdersuitsineuropeamodelofpercentagelimitsandcollusion |