A companion to ethics:
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Format: | Buch |
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Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Blackwell
2008
|
Ausgabe: | 1. publ. (with corr.) in paperback, [Nachdr.] |
Schriftenreihe: | Blackwell companions to philosophy
|
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XXII, 565 S. |
ISBN: | 9780631187851 |
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Contents
Introduction
v
PETER SINGER
Acknowledgements
vii
List of contributors
xviii
PART I: THE ROOTS
ι
The origin of ethics
3
MARY MIDGLEY
Where did ethics come from? Is it a human invention, or something we
owe to our pre-human ancestors? We need to put aside some myths that
still obscure our thinking on these matters: the myth that society is an
artificial construct and the myth that nature is red in tooth and claw.
Then we can look at what we now know about the social lives of other
animals, especially other mammals, and by this means find clues to the
origins of human ethics.
2
Ethics in small-scale societies
14
GEORGE SILBERBAUER
Early human beings lived in small nomadic groups. Examining the ethical
systems of contemporary small-scale societies, such as the Bushmen of
the Kalahari Desert, helps us to grasp the elements of ethical systems
suited for societies that live in this manner. Anthropological accounts can
help us to understand why and to what extent some ethical values and
principles are universal, or nearly so, among human beings, while others
are subject to wide variation.
3
Ancient ethics
29
GERALD A. LARUE
The earliest surviving documents with an ethical content were written by
inhabitants of Mesopotamia, some five thousand years ago. They shed
light on the initial development of ethics in settled societies. Other early
ethical writings show the nature of ethics in ancient Egypt and in early
Hebrew civilization.
ix
CONTENTS
PART II: THE GREAT ETHICAL TRADITIONS
There are many distinct ethical traditions. The essays in this part outline
some of the major ones: Indian, Buddhist, Chinese, Jewish, Christian and
Islamic. (Western philosophical, as distinct from Christian, ethics is the
subject of Part III.) These ethical traditions are, for much of the world's
population, the living ethical systems to which they look for guidance.
The essays present, for each tradition, the answers to such questions
as: how did this tradition arise? What is distinctive about it? How does it
answer such basic questions as: Where does ethics come from? How can
I know what is right? What is the ultimate criterion of right action? Why
should I do what is right? The essays also indicate what each tradition
shares with other ethical traditions, especially with contemporary
Western ethics.
4
Indian ethics
43
PURUŞOTTAMA
BILIMORIA
5
Buddhist ethics
58
PADMASIRI
DE SILVA
6
Classical Chinese ethics
69
CHAD
HANSEN
7
Jewish ethics
82
MENACHEM
KELLNER
8
Christian ethics
91
RONALD PRESTON
9
Islamic ethics
106
AZIM NANJI
PART III: WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS: A SHORT HISTORY
The dominant position of Western civilization today means that the
Western tradition of philosophical thinking about ethics exerts a strong
influence on all contemporary discussions of ethics. The three articles that
follow cover the history of Western philosophical ethics from ancient
Greece to the present day.
10
Ethics in ancient Greece
121
CHRISTOPHER ROWE
CONTENTS
її
Medieval
and Renaissance ethics
133
JOHN HALDANE
12
Modern moral philosophy
147
J. B.
SCHNEEWIND
PART IV: HOW OUGHT I TO LIVE?
The articles in this part discuss ethical theories that attempt to answer
the fundamental practical questions of ethics: What ought I to do? How
ought I to live? These theories make up the more abstract part of what is
known as normative ethics
-
that is, the part of ethics concerned with
guiding action.
13
Natural law
161
STEPHEN BUCKLE
One ancient answer to the question 'How ought I to live?' is: 'In accordance
with human nature'. In tracing the changes in the meaning of this answer
since Greek and Roman times, this essay provides a background to many
later ethical theories. At the same time it indicates some problems for
subsequent attempts to appeal to natural law in order to argue that
specific kinds of conduct (for example, the use of contraception) are wrong.
14
Kantian ethics
175
ONORA
O'NEILL
Many modern ethical theorists invoke ideas that have their origins in the
ethical writings of Kant. Kant's claim that all rational beings ought to
obey a 'categorical imperative' derived from a universal law of reason has
been much acclaimed, but also much criticized. Here Kant's position is
explained, and the common charges against it are considered.
15
The social contract tradition
186
WILL KYMLICKA
Can morality be thought of as an implicit agreement we make with our
fellow human beings in order to gain the benefits of a co-operative social
life? This initially attractive view must face several objections: attempts
to meet these lead to distinctive modern variations on the idea of a social
contract as it was developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
16
Egoism
197
KURT BAIER
Egoism tells us to live so as to further our own interests. Psychological
egoists think that we all do this anyway, and so it scarcely needs to be
advocated. Other philosophical egoists advocate the pursuit of one's own
interest as the rational, and even the ethical, way to live. Despite doubts
xi
CONTENTS
about whether egoism is properly classified as an ethical theory, it does
provide a challenging answer to the fundamental practical question of
how we ought to live.
17
Contemporary deontology
205
NANCY (ANN) DAVIS
Deontological theories of ethics tell us that the most important aspects of
how we ought to live are governed by moral rules that ought not to be
broken, even when breaking them might have better consequences. To
assess such a view we need to understand how the rules are to be framed
and what acts are to count as a breach of them. Exploring these questions
leads to a need to distinguish between intention and foresight, and raises
doubts about the coherence of the common notion of obedience to a rule.
18
An ethic of
prima
facie duties
219
JONATHAN DANCY
An ethic of
prima
facie duties is based on a distinctive notion of what it
is to have a duty.
Prima
facie duties may, in particular circumstances,
yield to other duties. Thus they avoid some of the harsher consequences
of a more rigid deontological ethic; but they encounter other objections.
19
Consequen
tialism
230
PHILIP PETTIT
Utilitarianism is an example of a consequentialist theory: it tells us that
we ought always to do whatever has the best consequences. In the case
of classical utilitarianism, 'best consequences' is understood in terms of
the greatest possible increase of pleasure over pain; but other theories
may share the view that we ought to do what has the best consequences,
while dissenting from the classical utilitarian view that pleasure is the
sole intrinsic good, and pain the only intrinsic evil. This article sharpens
the distinction between such consequentialist theories and their non-
consequentialist rivals, finding the consequentialist approach more per¬
suasive.
20
Utility and the good
241
ROBERT E. GOODIN
What things are good in themselves? Consequentialist theories obviously
need an answer to this question, but so will any ethic that under some
conditions advocates doing good. Classical utilitarianism suggests that
only pleasure is good in itself; but subsequent versions of utilitarianism
have suggested different, and perhaps more convincing, answers. In con¬
trast to the preceding essay, therefore, this essay focuses on the content,
rather than the structure, of consequentialist theories, and of any duty or
obligation to promote the good.
xu
CONTENTS
21
Virtue theory
249
GREG PENCE
Perhaps 'What ought I to do?' is the wrong question to ask. We might
ask instead: 'What kind of person should I be?' Virtue theory focuses on
this latter question, and on the virtues that make up good character. But
can a theory of the virtues replace alternative approaches to ethics?
22
Rights
259
BRENDA ALMOND
Some hold that a morality can be based on rights; others regard them as
derivative from a more fundamental moral principle or principles. What¬
ever the view taken on this question, it is widely thought that at least a
partial answer to the question of how we ought to live is given by the
injunction to respect the rights of others.
PART V: APPLICATIONS
The application of ethical reasoning to specific issues or areas of practical
concern
-
sometimes known as applied ethics
-
is the practical counterpart
of the more abstract theories of normative ethics discussed in Part IV. In
the last two decades the development of applied ethics has been so great
that it is impossible to cover it here in any systematic way. Instead, this
Part consists of articles on issues selected on the basis of the practical
importance of the issue, and the extent to which the issue is amenable to
ethical reasoning. (Ethical reasoning can do little to resolve an issue if the
parties are at one on all the value-questions, and differ only in their yiews
of the facts.) The titles of the articles indicate their subject-matter clearly
enough to make further description unnecessary.
23
World poverty
273
NIGEL DOWER
24
Environmental ethics
284
ROBERT ELLIOT
25
Euthanasia
294
HELGA KÜHSE
26
Abortion
303
MARY ANNE WARREN
27
Sex
315
RAYMOND A. BELLIOTTI
28
Personal relationships
327
HUGH LAFOLLBTTE
xiii
CONTENTS
29
Equality, discrimination and preferential treatment
333
BERNARD R. BOXILL
30
Animals
343
LORI GRUEN
31
Business ethics
354
ROBERT
С
SOLOMON
32
Crime and punishment
366
C. L. TEN
33
Politics and the problem of dirty hands
373
C. A. J. COADY
34
War and peace
384
JEFF MCMAHAN
PART VI: THE NATURE OF ETHICS
Despite the many ethical theories that have been developed with a view
to guiding our conduct, and the considerable body of writing on the
application of these theories to practical issues, there is uncertainty about
what exactly we are doing
-
and are justified in doing
-
when we make
ethical judgements, or engage in ethical argument. Are we trying to get
the facts right, as a scientist might do? Or simply expressing our feelings,
or perhaps the feelings of our society as a whole? In what sense, if any,
can moral judgements be true or false? The study of these questions has
led to the development of theories that differ from the normative theories
discussed in Part IV, because they are not intended to guide conduct.
They are not so much theories of ethics, as theories about ethics. For that
reason this branch of moral philosophy is known as meta-ethicS; a term
that suggests that we are not engaged in ethics, but are looking at it, and
considering what exactly ethics is, what rules of argument can apply to
it, in what way it is possible for ethical judgements to be true or false, and
what (if anything) can provide a grounding for them.
35
Realism
399
MICHAEL SMITH
Moral realism is the view that in some sense there is an objective moral
reality; realism thus asserts that morality is objective. It also seems unde¬
niable, however, that morality provides us with reasons for action. But
the standard picture of human psychology suggests that to have a reason
for action we must have a desire; and desires seem to be subjective, in
xiv
CONTENTS
that one person's desire may not resemble the desires of another. That
difficulty for realism is the theme of this article.
36
Intuiţionism
411
JONATHAN DANCY
Intuiţionism
holds that claims about morality can be objectively true or
false, and that we can come to know what moral principles are right in
a special way, by a kind of intuition or direct awareness of their moral
properties.
37
Naturalism
421
CHARLES R. PIGDEN
Like intuitionists, naturalists believe that moral judgements can be true
or false, and can be known; but unlike intuitionists, they do not think
there are any special moral facts or properties, to be known by intuition.
Instead, they think that goodness or Tightness can be identified with, or
reduced to, some other property (happiness, perhaps, or maybe the will
of God, to take two very different examples). In defending their views,
naturalists must take account of the claim that it is a fallacy (the natu¬
ralistic fallacy) to derive values from facts.
38
Subjectivism
432
JAMES RACHELS
There is now a widely held, if often unreflective, view that morality is
'subjective'. By this, people often mean that any moral opinion is as good
as any other. Among philosophers, the term 'subjectivism' is usually
applied to a range of ethical theories that deny that moral inquiry can
yield objective truths. This essay discusses both popular subjectivism and
the philosophical theories to which the term is often applied.
39
Relativism
442
DAVID WONG
Meta-ethical relativism is the view that in moral matters there are no
universal truths; instead morality is relative to one's particular society or
culture. This essay defends a moderate version of that position. It also
considers what many believe to be an implication of it, namely normative
relativism, or the view that we should not pass judgement on, or attempt
to change, the values of people from other cultures.
40
Universal prescriptivism
451
R. M. HARE
Universal prescriptivism attempts to avoid well-known objections to such
'objectivist' theories as naturalism and
intuiţionism;
yet in contrast to
standard 'subjectivist' theories, it allows a prominent place for reasoning
about ethical judgements. The outcome, it is claimed, is a way of making
xv
CONTENTS
moral decisions that combine elements of Kantian and utilitarian thinking.
Unlike the other meta-ethical theories discussed in this Part, universal
prescriptivism is of relatively recent origin; it is here outlined by its creator
and leading exponent.
41
Morality and psychological development
464
LAURENCE THOMAS
Do we develop morally, as we develop psychologically? This may not seem
to be a question about the nature of ethics, but the answer we give is
directly relevant to central issues about the nature of ethics. If human
beings generally pass through stages of moral development corresponding
to their psychological development, and if it could be shown that these
stages are the same for all of us, this would be persuasive evidence that
morality is not purely subjective or culturally relative.
42
Method and moral theory
476
DALE JAMIESON
The final essay in this section differs from the others, in that its topic is
not the nature of ethics, but the nature of moral theory: that is, of the
kinds of theories of ethics put forward in Part IV of this volume. How can
we construct such theories, and argue that one is better than another?
Two different models are proposed and discussed. The widespread use of
hypothetical and imaginary examples in deciding between theories is also
addressed.
PART
VII:
CHALLENGE AND CRITIQUE
Subjectivism and relativism, discussed in Part VI, deny that ethics has
any objective or universal validity; but these are not the only challenges
that defenders of ethics have had
tó
meet. There have been other attempts,
based on specific philosophical positions, to show that morality is merely
the instrument of the dominant group in society, or is all an illusion, or
is meaningless in the absence of religion. The articles in this Part take up
some of these challenges.
43
The idea of a female ethic
491
JEAN
GÍUMSHAW
Is there something distinctively male about ethics, or about the way in
which we currently understand ethics? The suggestion that there is has
been made by recent feminist writers; but what would a 'female ethic' be
like? Is ethics really something that can properly take forms that differ
according to gender?
xvi
CONTENTS
44
The significance of evolution
500
MICHAEL RUSE
Darwin's theory of evolution tells us that we owe our existence to millions
of years of evolution in which organisms that left more descendants
survived, and those that did not perished. Can we reconcile ethics with
such a process? Does evolution imply that our morality should allow the
weak to go under? Or more drastically, that we should reject morality
altogether?
45
Marx against morality
511
ALLEN WOOD
According to Marx, the morality of a society reflects its economic basis,
and serves the interests of the ruling class. At the same time Marx
condemned capitalism in terms that suggest strongly-held values. Is Marx
inconsistent? If not, what substance is there in the Marxist challenge to
morality?
46
How could ethics depend on religion?
525
JONATHAN BERG
It is often said that without God, there can be no morality. This essay
examines different grounds for holding that belief: that the very meaning
of 'good' and 'bad' stem from God's will; that only through God can we
come to know what is good; and that only belief in God can serve to
motivate us to act morally.
47
The implications of determinism
534
ROBERT YOUNG
The entire apparatus of moral decision-making, praise and blame, reward
and punishment, seems to be premised on the assumption that in normal
circumstances we are responsible for what we freely choose to do. Deter-
minists maintain that there is a causal explanation for everything that
happens in the universe, human behaviour included. This seems to suggest
that we do not freely choose to do anything, and this in turn appears to
imply that we are not morally responsible for anything we do. Are ethics
and determinism incompatible?
Afterword
543
PETER SINGER
Index
547
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title | A companion to ethics |
title_auth | A companion to ethics |
title_exact_search | A companion to ethics |
title_full | A companion to ethics ed. by Peter Singer |
title_fullStr | A companion to ethics ed. by Peter Singer |
title_full_unstemmed | A companion to ethics ed. by Peter Singer |
title_short | A companion to ethics |
title_sort | a companion to ethics |
topic | Ethik (DE-588)4015602-3 gnd Sozialethik (DE-588)4055765-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Ethik Sozialethik Aufsatzsammlung |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020440627&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT singerpeter acompaniontoethics |