Verfügbarkeit: România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia

România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia: 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol. 2

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Hauptverfasser:	Preda, Gavriil 1955- (VerfasserIn), Opriş, Petre (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	Romanian
Veröffentlicht:	Bucureşti Inst. Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului (2009)
Schriftenreihe:	Colecţia Documente
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract
Beschreibung:	Zsfassung in engl. Sprache
Beschreibung:	447 S.
ISBN:	9789737861498

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Datensatz im Suchindex

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adam_text	CUPRINS NOTĂ ASUPRA EDIŢIEI .25 LISTA ABREVIERILOR.* .32 1. 1962 ianuarie 23. Protocolul nr. 1 al şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC. al P.M.R. desfăşurate în ziua de 18 ianuarie 1962, în cadrul căreia s-au aprobat, printre altele, desfiinţarea Gărzilor Muncitoreşti, contopirea Asociaţiei Voluntare pentru Sprijinirea Apărării Patriei cu Uniunea de Cultură Fizică şi Sport, declararea ambasadorului Albaniei la Bucureşti „persona non grata" şi degradarea militară a lui Vasile Luca (extrase) .35 2. 1962 martie, Bucureşti. Nota nr. 10161 din 14 martie 1962 trimisă lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej de Aurel Mălnăşan, adjunctul ministrului Afacerilor Externe, şi traducerea copiei Memorandumului S.U. A. referitor la rezolvarea problemei germane (Moscova, 6 martie 1962).36 3. 1962 aprilie 20. Notă de informare (nesemnată) referitoare la discuţiile care au avut loc între Anatoli F. Dobrînin, ambasadorul URSS la Washington, şi Dean Rusk, secretar de stat al S.U. Α., în legătură cu rezolvarea problemei germane .43 4. 1962 septembrie 7. Raportul nr. 03446 din 7 septembrie 1962 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălaj an, adresat conducerii Partidului Muncitoresc Român, referitor la participarea a doi ofiţeri români la o consfătuire privind asigurarea pieselor de schimb pentru tancurile T-34 şi autotunurile SU-100 din dotarea armatelor statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (Budapesta, septembrie 1962).44 5. 1962 septembrie 8. Raportul nr. 03452 din 8 septembrie 1962 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălaj an, adresat conducerii P.M.R. , referitor la invitarea în Bulgaria a unor generali români pentru a asista la o aplicaţie cu trape organizată de Ministerul bulgar al Apărării Populare (17-21 septembrie 1962).45 6. 1962 septembrie 11. Raportul nr. 03468 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat conducerii Partidului Muncitoresc Român, referitor la participarea a doi ofiţeri români la simpozionul organizat de Institutul de cercetări ştiinţifice al Serviciului de alimente al armatei poloneze (27-29 noiembrie 1962).46 7. 1962 septembrie 22. Raportul nr. 03528 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat conducerii Partidului Muncitoresc Român, referitor la înfiinţarea unor secţii politice la Regimentul 15 A.A. Mixt (de la Hunedoara) şi Regimentul 17 A.A. (de la Mangalia). Adresa nr. 1200/1241 cu răspunsul Direcţiei Treburilor CC. al P.M.R. (27 septembrie 1962).47 8. 1962 septembrie 25. Raportul nr. F. S. 002893 din 25 septembrie 1962 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat conducerii P.M.R., referitor la desfăşurarea în România a unei aplicaţii operative a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia, cu participarea unor unităţi româneşti, sovietice şi bulgare (15-18 octombrie 1962).48 9. 1962 octombrie 4. Raportul nr. M. 003618 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat conducerii Partidului Muncitoresc Român, referitor la numirea colonelului Coman Petre Ion în funcţia de şef al Direcţiei organizatorice şi locţiitor al şefului Direcţiei Superioare Politice a Armatei .50 10. 1962 octombrie, Bucureşti. Raportul întocmit de generalul colonel Arhip Fioca, adresat ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, referitor la o aplicaţie militară a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (Polonia şi R.D.G., 5-Ю octombrie 1962).51 11. 1962 octombrie 16. Scrisoarea generalului de armată Bohumir Lomsky, ministrai Apărării Naţionale a R. S. Cehoslovacia, adresată generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate ale R. P. Române, prin care a fost anunţată participarea generalilor Smoldas Miroslav şi Mucha Alexander, precum şi a colonelului Brož Josef la aplicaţia din România a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (octombrie 1962). Traducere din limba cehă .58 12. 1962 octombrie. Liste nominale cu participanţii la activităţile organizate cu prilejul aplicaţiei militare a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia desfăşurate în România şi Bulgaria. .59 13. 1962 octombrie. Meniuri şi modele de invitaţii pentru participanţii la activităţile organizate cu prilejul aplicaţiei militare a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia desfăşurate în România .74 14. 1962 octombrie 18, Constanţa. Discursul generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate, rostit în faţa trupelor române, sovietice şi bulgare care au participat la manevrele militare din România şi Bulgaria ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia .76 15. 1962 octombrie 18, Constanţa. Discurs rostit de reprezentantul Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român în faţa trupelor române, sovietice şi bulgare care au participat la manevrele militare din România şi Bulgaria ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia .82 16. 1962 octombrie. Lista de cadouri propuse a fi oferite de reprezentanţii Ministerului Forţelor Armate ale R. P. Române membrilor delegaţiilor străine care participau la manevrele militare din România şi Bulgaria ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia .84 17. 1962 octombrie. Liste nominale cu o parte dintre participanţii la adunarea festivă prezidată de generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan (24 octombrie 1962). Discursul generalului-locotenent Ion Ioniţă, membra supleant al CC. al P.M.R. şi comandant al Apărării Antiaeriene a Teritoriului, rostit la sala Teatralul CCS. din Bucureşti cu prilejul sărbătoririi Zilei Forţelor Armate ale R. P. Române (extrase) .86 18. 1962 octombrie 30. Informarea prezentată membrilor Biroului Politic al CC al P.M.R. de către Corneliu Mănescu, ministrai Afacerilor Externe, referitoare la discuţiile care au avut loc între membrii unei delegaţii guvernamentale române şi câţiva membri din conducerea Partidului Comunist al U.R.S.S. (Moscova, 23 octombrie 1962).91 19. 1962 noiembrie 20. Protocolul nr. 13 al şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC. al P.M.R. din ziua de 13 noiembrie 1962, în cadrai căreia a fost aprobată activitatea unor membri din conducerea partidului şi statului la aplicaţia operativă cu trupe a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia, desfăşurată în Dobrogea în luna octombrie 1962 (extrase) .98 20. 1962 decembrie 25, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 04206 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat conducerii P.M.R., referitor la deplasarea unei comisii de ofiţeri români în Bulgaria, Polonia şi Cehoslovacia, în scopul stabilirii stării tehnice a unor tancuri Τ 34-85 ce urmau să fie primite în schimbul a 6 tancuri T-54 A aflate în dotarea armatei române .100 21. 1963 iunie 8. Adresa nr. 155/661 din 8 iunie 1963 a Direcţiei Treburilor CC. al P.M.R., referitoare la predarea către Arhiva CC al P.M.R. a tuturor dosarelor membrilor P.C.R. / P.C. din România (ilegalişti) şi ale membrilor de partid care au avut legături cu mişcarea muncitorească înainte de 23 august 1944 şi care decedaseră până la data emiterii adresei respective .101 22. 1963 august 29. Protocolul nr. 15 şi stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC al P.M.R. din ziua de 18 iulie 1963, în cadrai căreia s -а propus, printre altele, amânarea primirii R. P. Mongole în Organizaţia Tratatului de la Varşovia şi adoptarea unei poziţii echilibrate şi conciliante în divergenţele dintre URSS şi China (extrase) .101 23. 1964 februarie 1. Raportul nr. N.G. 0096 din 1 februarie 1964 al generalului, de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrai Forţelor Armate, referitor la desfăşurarea unui joc de război al Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia, pe hartă (Budapesta, 24-29 ianuarie 1964). 113 24. 1964 februarie 8. Propuneri privind numirea locotenentului-colonel Mihai Die în funcţia de locţiitor al şefului Direcţiei Generale, în cadrul Direcţiei Generale de Informaţii, precum şi a locotenentului-colonel Ion Mihai Pacepa în funcţia de şef de direcţie, în cadrai Direcţiei Generale de Informaţii . 25. 1964 februarie 17. Raportul nr. M 001252 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la înfiinţarea Secţiei politice la Brigada 29 Vedete, subordonată Comandamentului Marinei Militare .119 26. 1964 februarie 18. Protocolul nr. 3 şi stenograma şedinţei Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.M.R. din 18 februarie 1964, în cadrai căreia s -а hotărât, printre altele, reprimirea lui Iacob Coţoveanu, Gheorghe Pricop şi Leonte Tismăneanu în P.M.R., precum şi excluderea tuturor primilor-secretari ai comitetelor regionale ale P.M.R. din consiliile militare ale armatei (extrase) .120 27. 1964 martie 5, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 002137 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la componenţa delegaţiilor militare române care urmau să participe în luna aprilie 1964 la consfătuirile militare de la Sofia şi Bucureşti pentru creşterea, respectiv asigurarea stabilităţii căilor de comunicaţii în timp de război, în cadrul Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia .125 28. 1964 aprilie 10, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 001556 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la trimiterea într-un poligon din URSS a unor divizioane româneşti de rachete antiaeriene, pentru a executa tragerile de luptă planificate pentru anul 1964.126 29. 1964 aprilie 22, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 01604 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R. , cu privire la efectuarea de către două baterii de artilerie antiaeriană ungare a unor trageri de luptă în poligonul de la Capul Midia, în perioada 1-25 iunie 1964.127 30. 1964 aprilie 30, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 001684 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat C.C. al P.M.R., referitor la pregătirea unei trageri de luptă ce urma să se execute de către echipajul unei vedete purtătoare de rachete a Marinei Militare a R. P. Române într-un poligon din URSS .128 31. 1964 aprilie 30. Tabel nominal cu şefii de direcţii din Marele Stat Major, locţiitorii acestora, şefii de secţii, 9 precum şi secretarii comitetelor şi birourilor organizaţiilor de bază partid convocaţi la adunarea activului de partid pe armată (Bucureşti, 4-6 mai 1964).129 32. 1964 mai 7, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 01718 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la traversarea de către o subunitate sovietică de transmisiuni a teritoriului R. P. Române, pentru a participa la o aplicaţie operativă în teren, organizată în R. P. Bulgaria .134 33. 1964 'mai 11. Nota nr. D.S. 0242 din 11 mai 1964, întocmită de colonelul Coroian Grigore, şeful Secţiei a 12-a a Marelui Stat Major, şi trimisă generalului-maior Ion Dincă, şeful D.S.P.A., referitoare la vizita efectuată la Moscova de trei ofiţeri români în scopul definitivării lucrărilor de elaborare a unui cifru de cooperare între armatele României, URSS, Cehoslovaciei, Ungariei şi Bulgariei (13 februarie - 29 aprilie 1964).134 34. 1964 mai 22. Propuneri privind eliberarea din funcţie a colonelului Vasile M. Dinescu şi numirea colonelului Emanoil E. Rusu în funcţia de şef al Direcţiei a Vil-a din Ministerul Afacerilor Interne .140 35. 1964 iunie 11, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 01868 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la executarea de către Detaşamentul nave şcoală al Marinei Militare a R. P. Române a unui marş pentru cunoaşterea teatrului maritim de navigaţie din bazinul de vest şi nord- vest al Mării Negre .141 36. 1964 iunie 22. Memoriul adresat lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej de generalul-maior (în rezervă) Dumitru Petrescu, fost inspector general E.C.P. şi, apoi, ministru de Finanţe .142 37. 1964 iunie 27. Raportul nr. M 001960 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la desfiinţarea Direcţiei Superioare Politice a Armatei şi înfiinţarea Consiliului Politic Superior al Armatei .159 38. 1964 iunie 27. Raportul nr. M 001962 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la 10 desfiinţarea direcţiilor şi secţiilor politice din armată şi înfiinţarea consiliilor politice la o serie de comandamente, mari unităţi şi unităţi ale armatei române .161 39. 1964 iulie 11. Raportul nr. M 20596 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălaj an, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., prin care solicita să fie aprobată perioada în care să se desfăşoare vizita oficială a ministrului Apărării URSS, mareşalul Rodion I. Malinovskí, în R. P. Română .166 40. 1964 iulie 25, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 02072 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la participarea unor unităţi române la aplicaţia de cooperare din luna septembrie 1964, organizată şi condusă de ministrul Apărării Populare a R. P. Bulgaria .166 41. 1964 august, Bucureşti. Raportul ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., prin care solicita să fie aprobate vizite reciproce ale navelor militare ale URSS şi R.P. Române .168 42. 1964 august 28, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 02210 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la invitaţia adresată unor generali români de comandantul suprem al Forţelor Armate Unite şi de ministrul Apărării Populare a R. P. Bulgaria, în vederea participării la o aplicaţie de cooperare în R. P. Bulgaria, în perioada 15-20 septembrie 1964.169 43. 1964 septembrie 8, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. 02256 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la traversarea teritoriului R. P. Române de către unităţi sovietice de transmisiuni şi de deservire, pentru a participa la o aplicaţie de cooperare ce urma să se desfăşoare în R. P. Bulgaria, în perioada 15-20 septembrie 1964.170 44. 1964 octombrie 5, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 002396 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la componenţa grupelor militare române care examinau 11 problemele privind reînnoirea documentelor de planificare, respectiv încheiau elaborarea planurilor privind dezvoltarea de perspectivă până în anul 1970 a trupelor române care intrau în compunerea Forţelor Armate Unite .172 45. 1964 decembrie 7. Raportul special nr. 288 al lui Alexandru Draghici, vicepreşedintele Consiliului de Miniştri şi ministru al Afacerilor Interne, referitor la informaţiile obţinute despre Sistemul NATO de infrastructură electronică la sol, pentru apărarea aeriană (extrase) .174 46. 1964 decembrie 29. Raportul colonelului Ion Mediánu, secretarul Comitetului de partid al Academiei Militare, adresat generalului-maior Ion Dincă, secretarul Consiliului Politic Superior al Armatei, referitor la starea de spirit a ofiţerilor români din Academia Militară căsătoriţi cu cetăţene sovietice .175 47. 1965 ianuarie 12. Notă referitoare la incidentul care a avut loc la şedinţa Comitetului Politic Consultativ al statelor membre O.T.V. (Moscova, 3-5 august 1961), în urma căruia delegaţia albaneză a fost nevoită să părăsească reuniunea şi să se înapoieze în ţară .176 48. 1965 ianuarie 18. Protocolul nr. 1 al şedinţei Biroului Politic al CC. al P.M.R. din ziua de 15 ianuarie 1965, în cadrul căreia s -а aprobat, printre altele, componenţa delegaţiei care participa la sesiunea Comitetului Politic Consultativ al Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (19- 20 ianuarie 1965, Varşovia), bugetul Partidului Muncitoresc Român şi al organizaţiilor subvenţionate de partid (pentru anul 1965) (extrase). Bugetul de venituri şi cheltuieli al Sălii Palatului (1965).180 49. 1965 ianuarie 29. Referatul nr. P.S. 07009 al Secretariatului general al Consiliului de Miniştri, referitor la aprobarea noii componenţe a Colegiului Ministerului Forţelor Armate (extrase) .182 50. 1965 februarie 23. Raportul nr. A.B. 038 al secretarului Consiliului politic al Comandamentului Marinei militare, cpt.rg. 1 Marin Vasile, adresat secretarului Consiliului Politic Superior al Forţelor Armate, general-maior Ion Dincă, referitor la discuţiile purtate de ofiţerii români cu 12 militarii sovietici şi bulgari la Sevastopol, în cursul operaţiunii de întocmire a documentelor unei aplicaţii de cooperare cu transmisiuni ce urma să se desfăşoare în luna martie 1965 pe Marea Neagră .183 51. 1965 martie 4. Raportul nr. M 00794 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la organizarea la Miskolc a unui antrenament comun al unor unităţi de apărare antiaeriană a teritoriului din R. P. Română, R. P. Ungară şi URSS .187 52. 1965 martie 10. Raportul nr. M. 10252 din 10 martie 1965 al generalului de armată Ion Tutoveanu, adjunctul ministrului Forţelor Armate şi şef al Marelui Stat Major, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la trimiterea în Ungaria a unui reprezentant al Ministerului Forţelor Armate pentru a participa la prima parte a Campionatului de şah al armatelor statelor socialiste (Budapesta, 14-20 martie 1965).188 53. 1965 martie 11. Raportul nr. M. 00846 din 11 martie 1965 al generalului de armată Ion Tutoveanu, adjunctul ministrului Forţelor Armate şi şef al Marelui Stat Major, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la trimiterea în URSS a unei delegaţii militare în scopul obţinerii unor informaţii despre modul de funcţionare a unor tipuri de staţii radio şi radio-releu de campanie (20- 30 martie 1965). Adresa cu răspunsul trimis de Direcţia Treburilor CC. alP.M.R. (16 martie 1965).189 54. 1965 martie 11. Raportul nr. M. 0836 din 11 martie 1965 al generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la participarea unei delegaţii a M.F.A. la discuţiile de la Praga privind regulile de zbor ale aviaţiei deasupra teritoriului statelor participante la Organizaţia Tratatului de la Varşovia (22-27 martie 1965).191 55. 1965 martie 15. Raportul nr. A.B. 044 al secretarului Consiliului politic al Comandamentului Marinei militare, cpt.rg. 1 Marin Vasile, adresat secretarului Consiliului Politic Superior al Forţelor Armate, general-maior Ion Dincă, referitor la discuţiile purtate de ofiţerii români, sovietici şi bulgari pe durata aplicaţiei de cooperare cu 13 transmisiuni ce s-a desfăşurat pe Marea Neagră (8-11 martie 1965).192 56. 1965 martie 15. Raportul nr. M. 00854 din 15 martie 1965 al generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la reorganizarea Regimentului 17 Artilerie Antiaeriană, care asigura protecţia Bazei Maritime Mangalia .203 57. 1965 martie 16. Nota nr. 10254 din 16 martie 1965 a generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate, adresată Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitoare la organizarea unei vizite oficiale în Cehoslovacia a unei delegaţii militare din România (aprilie 1965).204 58. 1965 martie 17. Raportul nr. 10274 din 17 martie 1965 al generalului de armată Leontin Sălăjan, ministrul Forţelor Armate, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R., referitor la desfăşurarea celei de-a IV -а Consfătuiri a şefilor serviciilor medico-militare ale ţărilor participante la Tratatul de la Varşovia (Rügen, 9-15 septembrie 1965).206 59. 1965 martie 17. Hotărârea Consiliului de Miniştri nr. 157, referitoare la aprobarea noii componenţe a Colegiului Ministerului Forţelor Armate .207 60. 1965 martie 25. Protocolul nr. 3 al şedinţei Secretariatului CC. al P.M.R. din 17 martie 1965, în care s-au aprobat propunerile de reorganizare a Regimentului 17 Artilerie Antiaeriană, care asigura protecţia Bazei Maritime Mangalia; participarea unei delegaţii a M.F.A. la discuţiile de la Praga privind regulile de zbor ale aviaţiei deasupra teritoriului statelor OTV (22-27 martie 1965); participarea unei delegaţii la cea de-a IV-a Consfătuire a şefilor serviciilor medico-militare ale ţărilor OTV (9-15 septembrie 1965, Rügen - RDG); vizita oficială în Cehoslovacia a unei delegaţii a M.F.A. (extrase). Răspunsurile Direcţiei Treburilor CC. al P.M.R. (29 martie 1965).208 61. 1965 aprilie 1. Raportul nr. M 0952 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat Comitetului Central al P.M.R. , referitor la pregătirea şi desfăşurarea unei aplicaţii sovieto-româno- 14 bulgare de cooperare, de transmisiuni, pe Marea Neagră, în perioada 15 februarie - 11 martie 1965.210 62. 1965 aprilie 22. Protocolul nr. 22 al şedinţei Biroului Politic al C.C. al P.M.R. din ziua de 22 aprilie 1965, în cadrul căreia au fost aprobate, printre altele, o serie de privilegii ale membrilor Biroului Politic şi Secretariatului C.C. al P.M.R., ale vicepreşedinţilor Consiliului de Miniştri, ale membrilor CC al P.M.R. şi ale miniştrilor (extrase). Adresa Direcţiei Treburilor CC. al P.M.R. din 29 aprilie 1965 referitoare la acordarea unor privilegii membrilor nomenclaturii CC al P.M.R .216 63. 1965 mai 26, Bucureşti. Informarea nr. T.A. 01662 a adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresată lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitoare la unele aspecte ale relaţiilor dintre Turcia şi SUA .221 64. 1965 iunie 24. Raportul nr. 01544 al adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la solicitarea şefului de stat major al C.F.A.U., generalul de armată sovietic P. I. Batov, de a se aproba traversarea teritoriului R. P. Române de către două coloane motorizate sovietice şi survolarea spaţiului aerian al R. P. Române de către avioane şi elicoptere sovietice, în vederea participării acestora la o aplicaţie ce urma să se desfăşoare pe teritoriul R. P. Bulgaria .224 65. 1966 februarie 10. Protocolul nr. 5 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. desfăşurate în ziua de 10 februarie 1966, în cadrai căreia s -а discutat, printre altele, despre acordarea unui nou ajutor financiar Frontului Naţional de Eliberare din Vietnamul de Sud .225 66. 1966 martie. Anexa nr. 5 din „Studiul preliminar privind posibilităţile realizării de centrale nuclearo-electrice în România" (extrase) .229 67. 1966 martie 22. Raportul nr. A.B. 050 al secretarului Consiliului politic al Comandamentului Marinei militare, cpt. rg. 1 Marin Vasile, adresat generalului-maior Ion Coman, referitor la o aplicaţie sovieto-româno-bulgară de cooperare, care a avut loc pe Marea Neagră (1966).232 15 68. 1966 martie 24. Notă semnată de Manea Mănescu, referitoare la posibilităţile de construire a unei centrale nuclearo-electrice în România .235 69. 1966 aprilie 2. Raportul nr. P. P. 015924 al adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate şi secretar al Consiliului Politic Superior, general-maior Ion Coman, adresat ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, referitor la aplicaţia sovieto-româno-bulgare de cooperare care a avut loc în prima parte a lunii martie 1966 pe Marea Neagră .238 70. 1966 mai 14. Protocolul nr. 23 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 9 mai 1966, în cadrul căreia s -а aprobat, printre altele, acordarea unui ajutor românesc în materiale sportive Comitetului de Educaţie Fizică şi Sport din R.D. Vietnam, la solicitarea acestuia, precum şi solicitarea unor oferte din străinătate pentru construirea unei centrale nuclearo-electrice în România .241 71. 1966 mai 24. Raportul nr. O. K. 00245 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general de armată Leontin Sălăjan, adresat preşedintelui Consiliului de Miniştri, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, referitor la participarea unei grupe de generali şi ofiţeri români la o călătorie de studii organizată de C.F.A.U. în R. S. România şi R. P. Bulgaria, în perioada 14-22 iunie 1966.249 72. 1966 mai 24. Protocolul nr. 25 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.CR. din 24 mai 1966, în cadrul căreia s -а aprobat, printre altele, participarea unor generali şi ofiţeri români la o călătorie de studii organizată de C.F.A.U. în R. S. România şi R. P. Bulgaria (extrase) .253 73. 1966 mai 28, Moscova. Protocolul Consfătuirii miniştrilor Apărării ai statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (Moscova, 27-28 mai 1966), cu privire la problema elaborării proiectului Statutului şi îmbunătăţirii structurii organelor de conducere ale Forţelor Armate Unite. Anexa Protocolului, care cuprindea părerea diferită exprimată de delegaţia română condusă de generalul de armată Leontin Sălăjan .254 74. 1966 mai. Proiectul de Statut privind Forţele Armate Unite ale statelor participante la Organizaţia Tratatului de 16 la Varşovia, discutat în cadrul Consfătuirii miniştrilor Apărării ai statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (Moscova, 27-28 mai 1966).257 75. 1966 septembrie 26. Raportul nr. N.G. 00662 din 26 septembrie 1966 al generalului colonel Ion Ioniţă, ministrul Forţelor Armate, referitor la desfăşurarea în Cehoslovacia a unei aplicaţii militare a Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (20-25 septembrie 1966).262 76. 1966 noiembrie 5. Informarea nr. P. P. 021259 a instructorului Consiliului Politic Superior, lt.col. Iosif Szilaghi, adresată adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate şi secretar al Consiliului Politic Superior, general- locotenent Ion Coman, referitoare la o aplicaţie militară sovieto-româno-bulgară (26 octombrie - 3 noiembrie 1966).265 77. 1966 noiembrie 18, Bucureşti. Informarea nr. P. P. 0017850 a adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate şi secretar al Consiliului Politic Superior, general-locotenent Ion Coman, adresată lui Vasile Patilineţ, secretar al CC. al P.C.R, referitoare la o aplicaţie militară sovieto- româno-bulgară (26 octombrie -3 noiembrie 1966).271 78. 1967 ianuarie 25. Nota ambasadorului U.R.S.S. la Bucureşti, A. V. Basov, înmânată lui Nicolae Ceauşescu în cursul unei audienţe acordate de liderul Partidului Comunist Român, referitoare la poziţia sovietică în legătură cu o posibilă stabilire a relaţiilor diplomatice între România şi R.F.G .275 79. 1967 ianuarie 26. Protocolul nr. 3 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 26 ianuarie 1967, în cadrul căreia a fost respinsă propunerea sovietică în legătură cu convocarea unei conferinţe a miniştrilor Afacerilor Externe ai ţărilor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia, care avea ca scop analizarea politicii externe a guvernului R.F.G. şi situaţia creată de o posibilă stabilire a relaţiilor diplomatice între România şi R.F.G .276 80. 1967 februarie 4. Textul celor două convorbirii telefonice dintre Nicolae Ceauşescu şi Aleksei N. Kosâghin (4 februarie 1967) şi protocolul nr. 7 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al P.C.R. din ziua de 4 februarie 1967, 17 în cadrul căreia a fost acceptată propunerea sovietică privind convocarea unei conferinţe a miniştrilor afacerilor externe ai ţărilor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia, care avea ca scop analizarea situaţiei create de stabilirea de relaţii diplomatice între România şi R.F.G. (extrase) .278 81. 1967 februarie 6, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. G. D. 004002 din 6 februarie 1967, întocmit la Marele Stat Major român, care cuprinde o copie a convenţiei încheiate în anul 1957 între guvernele R. P. Română şi URSS, pentru dislocarea temporară a unei părţi a forţelor Flotei maritime militare a URSS în bazele maritime militare, porturile şi aerodromurile din R. P. Română, dacă acel lucru era impus de situaţia politico-militară internaţională .281 82. 1967 februarie 6, Bucureşti. Raportul G.D. 004008 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general Ion loniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la obligaţiile ce reveneau celor două părţi semnatare ale convenţiei încheiate în anul 1957 între guvernele R. P. Române şi URSS, pentru dislocarea temporară a unei părţi a forţelor Flotei maritime militare a URSS în bazele maritime militare, porturile şi aerodromurile din R.P. Română, dacă acel lucru era impus de situaţia politico-militară internaţională, precum şi propunerile ministrului Forţelor Armate pentru încheierea unui nou protocol .286 83. 1967 februarie 7, Varşovia. Nota însărcinatului cu Afaceri ad-interim al României la Varşovia, referitoare la poziţia Republicii Populare Polone în problema securităţii europene şi în problema germană .293 84. 1967 februarie 15. Protocolul nr. 8 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 15 februarie 1967, în cadrul căreia au fost analizate, printre altele, propunerile M.F.A. privind reînnoirea convenţiei încheiate în anul 1957 între guvernele R. P. Română şi U.R.S.S., pentru dislocarea temporară a unei părţi a forţelor Flotei maritime militare a U.R.S.S. în bazele maritime militare, porturile şi aerodromurile din R. P. Română, dacă acel lucru era impus de situaţia politico- militară internaţională (extrase) .299 18 85. 1967 mai 22. Articolul intitulat „Deficitul înregistrat de R. S. România în schimburile economice cu R. F. a Germaniei", publicat în ziarul vest-german „Handelsblatt" şi prezentat de Manea Mănescu lui Nicolae Ceauşescu. Traducere din limba germană .301 86. 1967 mai 24. Aide-mémoire-ul înmânat ambasadorului României la Berlin de către un reprezentant al guvernului Republicii Democrate Germane, ca urmare a stabilirii de relaţii diplomatice între R. S. România şi Republica Federală Germania .302 87. 1967 mai 26. Nota Secţiei Relaţiilor Externe a CC. al P.C.R. referitoare la propunerile făcute de Ministerul Afacerilor Externe în legătură cu poziţia guvernului României în relaţiile cu Republica Democrată Germană, în contextul stabilirii de relaţii diplomatice între România şi Republica Federală Germania. Nota Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (24 mai 1967).304 88. 1967 mai 30, Bucureşti. Protocolul nr. 30 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.CR. din ziua de 30 mai 1967, în cadrai căreia au fost discutate noile raporturi create între România şi Republica Federală Germania, precum şi poziţia României faţă de situaţia din Orientul Mijlociu .308 89. 1967 septembrie. Recomandarea lui Ion Gheorghe Maurer, preşedintele Consiliului de Miniştri, privind aprobarea structurii organizatorice a Departamentului Securităţii Statului şi expunerea de motive a lui Ion Stănescu, preşedintele Consiliului Securităţii Statului .310 90. 1967 septembrie 9. Raportul întocmit de generalul- locotenent Vasile Negrea, prim-vicepreşedintele Consiliului Securităţii Statului, referitor la rezultatele Consfătuirii reprezentanţilor organelor de securitate din ţările socialiste (Moscova, 15-16 august 1967). Copia hotărârii adoptate de adjuncţii conducerilor organelor securităţii statului din R. P. Bulgaria, R. P. Ungară, R. G. Germană, R.P. Polonă, U.R.S.S. şi R. S. Cehoslovacă (Moscova, 16 august 1967).313 91. 1967 septembrie 9. Nota de informare întocmită de Ion Stănescu, preşedintele Consiliului Securităţii Statului, referitoare la rezultatele Consfătuirii reprezentanţilor 19 organelor de securitate din ţările socialiste (Moscova, 15- 16 august 1967).'.323 92. 1967 septembrie 12. Raportul nr. M 002696 al prim- adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate şi şef al Marelui Stat Major, general-colonel Ion Gheorghe, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la participarea ministrului Forţelor. Armate şi a secretarului Consiliului Politic Superior la o aplicaţie în URSS. Adresa nr. 2888 cu răspunsul Cancelariei CC. al P.C.R .326 93. 1967 septembrie 12. Protocolul nr. 44 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 12 septembrie 1967, în cadrul căreia au fost aprobate propunerile cuprinse în informarea Consiliului Securităţii Statului privind Consfătuirea reprezentanţilor organelor de securitate din ţările socialiste (Moscova, 15-17 august 1967), structura organizatorică a Departamentului Securităţii Statului şi participarea ministrului Forţelor Armate şi a secretarului Consiliului Politic Superior la aplicaţia militară denumită codificat „Nipru" (URSS, 25 septembrie - 2 octombrie 1967).327 94. 1967 septembrie 27, Bucureşti. Raportul nr. M 002832 al adjunctului ministrului Forţelor Armate şi şef al Serviciilor Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Mihail Burcă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la proiectul planului cu activităţile comune de pregătire operativă şi de luptă pe anii 1968-1969, trimis de Comandamentul Forţelor Armate Unite .328 95. 1967 octombrie 10. Protocolul nr. 48 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 10 octombrie 1967, în cadrai căreia au fost aprobate, printre altele, propunerile Ministerului Forţelor Armate referitoare la proiectul planului activităţilor comune de pregătire operativă şi de luptă pe anii 1968-1969, proiect primit de la Comandamentul Forţelor Armate Unite .334 96. 1968 februarie 14. Stenograma şedinţei plenare a CC al P.C.R. din ziua de 14 februarie 1968, în cadrul căreia s-a discutat despre linia politică independentă adoptată de anumite partide comuniste - în special de Partidul Comunist Chinez - care contestau deschis sau în mod 20 voalat autoritatea supremă a Moscovei în cadrul mişcării comuniste şi muncitoreşti internaţionale (extrase) .336 97. 1968 aprilie 30. Protocolul nr. 23 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. desfăşurată în ziua de 29 aprilie 1968, în cadrai căreia s-au aprobat propunerile referitoare la mesajul ce urma să fie transmis guvernului R. D. Vietnam de către ambasadorul României la Hanoi, din partea SUA, şi proiectul de scrisoare ce urma să fie trimisă Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncii din Albania (extrase) .344 98. 1968 iunie 17. Protocolul nr. 31 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. desfăşurată în ziua de 17 iunie 1968, în cadrul căreia s-au aprobat propunerile referitoare la înfiinţarea Centralei Industriale de Mecanică Fină şi Aeronautică şi a unor institute de cercetări şi proiectări de tehnică de luptă şi echipamente militare (extrase) .348 99. 1968 august 14. Protocolul nr. 22, ordinea de zi şi stenograma şedinţei Secretariatului CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 8 august 1968, în cadrai căreia s-au aprobat, printre altele, propunerile ministrului Forţelor Armate privind organizarea şi funcţionarea instituţiilor militare de învăţământ pentra pregătirea ofiţerilor (extrase) .353 100. 1968 septembrie 11. Protocolul nr. 45 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al P.C.R. din ziua de 11 septembrie 1968, în cadrai căreia au fost aprobate unele completări la textul proiectului de statut al Comandamentului Unificat al Forţelor Armate ale statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (problema condiţiilor de dislocare, staţionare şi a oricărei activităţi a trapelor statelor membre ale O.T.V. destinate a acţiona în comun, pe teritoriul unuia din statele membre ale O.T.V.) .361 101. 1968 septembrie 21. Raportul nr. M 02114 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la organizarea la Bucureşti a consfătuirii cadrelor de conducere din forţele armate ale statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (12-16 noiembrie 1968).363 21 102. 1968 septembrie 23. Protocolul nr. 48 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 23 septembrie 1968, în cadrai căreia s -а aprobat, printre altele, organizarea la Bucureşti a consfătuirii cadrelor de conducere din forţele armate ale statelor membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia (12-16 noiembrie 1968).365 103. 1968 septembrie 25. Raportul nr. M. 002138 din 25 septembrie 1968 al generalului-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la propunerile cu privire la antrenamentele de cooperare tactică ce urmau să se execute în anul 1969 între marile unităţi româneşti de apărare antiaeriană a teritoriului şi cele ale statelor vecine, participante la Tratatul de la Varşovia. Nota întocmită de Vasile Patilineţ, şeful Secţiei pentru controlul muncii la M.F.A., M.A.L, C.S.S. şi Justiţie, referitoare la propunerile ministrului Forţelor Armate (5 octombrie 1968).'.366 104. 1968 septembrie 26. Protocolul nr. 50 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.CR. din ziua de 25 septembrie 1968, în cadrai căreia s -а aprobat îmbunătăţirea textului proiectului de statut al Comandamentului Forţelor Armate Unite (problema condiţiilor de dislocare, staţionare şi a oricărei activităţi a trupelor statelor membre ale alianţei destinate a acţiona în comun, pe teritoriul unuia din statele membre ale Ó.T.V.), precum şi prelungirea duratei serviciului militar pentra anumite contingente .368 105. 1968 septembrie 26. Raportul nr. M 002150 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la menţinerea peste durata serviciului militar a 55000 de militari în termen, ca urmare a evenimentelor din luna august 1968, din Cehoslovacia. Proiectul de Hotărâre al Consiliului de Miniştri, prin care ministerele economice erau obligate să pună la dispoziţia Ministerului Forţelor Armate, cu prioritate, produsele şi materialele solicitate suplimentar din economia naţională .369 106. 1968 octombrie 14. Raportul nr. M 002242 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui 22 Nicolae Ceauşescu, cu privire la proiectul planului activităţilor Comandamentului Forţelor Armate Unite referitoare la pregătirea operativă şi de luptă pentru Forţele Armate ale R. S. România pe anul 1969.371 107. 1968 octombrie 21. Raportul nr. M 002288 al ministrului Forţelor Armate, general-colonel Ion Ioniţă, adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la unele modificări propuse de Marele Stat Major al Armatei Populare a R. P. Bulgaria la proiectul planului cu activităţile C.F.A.U. privind pregătirea operativă şi de luptă pe anul 1969.378 108. 1968 octombrie 21. Protocolul nr. 54 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 21 octombrie 1968, în cadrul căreia s -а aprobat, printre altele, proiectul planului activităţilor Comandamentului Forţelor Armate Unite referitoare la pregătirea operativă şi de luptă pentru Forţele Armate ale R. S. România pe anul 1969 (extrase). Nota cu problemele militare discutate în cadrul reuniunii .382 109. 1968 octombrie 21. Nota nr. O. K. 00541 întocmită de locţiitorul şefului Marelui Stat Major, general-locotenent Gheorghe Logofătu, referitoare la problemele militare discutate în şedinţa Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din 21 octombrie 1968 (executarea unei aplicaţii operativ-tactice a Forţelor Armate Unite, cu forţarea fluviului Dunărea, în anul 1969 s.a.).385 110. 1968 octombrie 29. Protocolul nr. 55 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC al P.C.R. desfăşurate în ziua de 28 octombrie 1968, în cadrul căreia au fost aprobate, printre altele, antrenamentele de cooperare ce urmau să fie executate în anul 1969 între marile unităţi româneşti de apărare antiaeriană a teritoriului şi cele bulgare, ungare şi sovietice, precum şi zborurile de recunoaştere a aerodromurilor de cooperare din statele membre ale Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia vecine cu România .386 111. 1968 noiembrie 4. Raportul nr. 0160.417, întocmit de Maxim Berghianu, preşedintele Comitetului de Stat al Planificării, şi adresat lui Nicolae Ceauşescu, referitor la punctul de vedere al delegaţiei române la consfătuirea bilaterală ce urma să aibă loc la Budapesta în perioada 18- 23 23 noiembrie 1968, pentru actualizarea unor prevederi ale protocolului privind corelarea activităţii transporturilor la mobilizare între Republica Socialistă România şi Republica Populară Ungară. Schema legăturilor feroviare şi rutiere dintre România şi Ungaria în zona de frontieră .388 112. 1968 noiembrie 11. Protocolul nr. 57 al şedinţei Prezidiului Permanent al CC. al P.C.R. din ziua de 11 noiembrie 1968, în cadrul căreia a fost aprobat, printre altele, punctul de vedere al delegaţiei române la consfătuirea bilaterală ce urma să aibă loc la Budapesta în perioada 18-23 noiembrie 1968, pentru actualizarea unor prevederi ale protocolului privind corelarea activităţii transporturilor la mobilizare între Republica Socialistă România şi Republica Populară Ungară (extrase) .392 AUTORI .393 BIBLIOGRAFIE. .394 SUMMARY .411 INDICE DE NUME DE PERSOANE .431 24 SUMMARY The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) on 14 May 1955 represented a highly significant event in the dynamic of the Cold War. Following the official emergence of a USSR-led political-military alliance on the European continent, the existing tensions between the superpowers of the time, the USA and the USSR, as well as between the European states divided by the Iron Curtain deepened. For the political and military leaders of the states within the socialist camp, the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization was not a surprise. The organizational, doctrinal and logistical standardisation of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian armed forces began as early as 1951. The Soviet military model imposed by Josef Stalin at "The Conference of representatives of the people's democratic states" (Moscow, 9-12 January 1951) was enforced in all those countries between 1951 and 1954. The Preliminaries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization The formation of the Western European Union on March 17, 1948, followed by the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (April 4, 1949) and the division of Germany into two states - the Federal Republic of Germany (May 24, 1949) and the German Democratic Republic (October 7, 1949) - were considered by Josef Stalin to be two extremely significant actions, which suggested that a number of states in Western Europe - along with the USA - were assiduously preparing for setting up a powerful coalition against the Soviet Union and triggering a new World War. The political leader in Kremlin rushed, therefore, the process of Sovietization of all the countries in Eastern and Central Europe, which he controlled according to the agreement on sharing out political control of the said countries signed with Winston Churchill in Moscow in October 1944. The only exception, Yugoslavia, freed itself in 1948 from the USSR influence and took a path to building socialism, which Josef Stalin not only disliked, but also condemned and, as a consequence, made every effort to remove Tito from the leadership of Yugoslavia. Being included in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, and consequently under the control of the latter, Romania took in foreign policy the political and diplomatic steps dictated by Moscow, inclusively on the occasion of the signature of the Paris Peace Treaty in 1947. The consequences ofthat document for the national security of Romania were excessively tough. Besides the fact that some Romanian territories (Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Hertza region) continued to remain under foreign (Soviet) occupation, the Bucharest authorities committed themselves to observe a number of restrictive military, naval and air clauses that 411 impaired the defense capability of the Romanian armed forces. At the same time, the Bucharest authorities committed themselves not to possess, manufacture or test „any nuclear weapon, self-propelled or guided missile and device used to launch such missiles [.], any marine mine or torpedo activated not by contact with the target but by an influence mechanism, human torpedo, submarine or other type of submersible vessel, torpedo boat and special type of assault craft"154. One year and a half after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, the Petru Groza government decided to put again into operation some armament and ammunition factories shut down at the end of the Second World War.155 Concurrently, the Bucharest authorities harshened the political and social repression system (consisting of abusive and mass arrests, internments, and forced labor), started the compulsory setting up of agricultural cooperatives in the whole country, and initiated the building works for the Danube-Black Sea Canal. Furthermore, in the summer of 1949 the Petru Groza government took the first steps as regards the 154 Documente privind istoria militară a poporului român: 13 mai 1945 - 31 decembrie 1947 [Documents Regarding the Military History of the Romanian People: May 13, 1945 - December 31, 1947]. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1988, p. 359. 155 At the end of 1949, the governments of USA and Great Britain sent the Romanian authorities some notes of protest in connection with Romania's infringement of the stipulations of the Paris Peace Treaty and required the intervention of the International Court of Justice (at Hague). In conformity with proposal of Ana Pauker, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on January 13 and February 11, 1950, the Petru Groza government rejected all of the charges brought against him. Opriş, Petre. "Aspecte privind relaţiile politico-militare ale României în cadrul blocului comunist (1948-1954) [Some Aspects of the Military and Political Relations of Romania within the Framework of the Communist Block (1948-1954)]." In In Honorem Viorel Faur: Oradea University Press, 2006, p. 485. The same problem was debated in the meeting of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party (February 8, 1950) and Ana Pauker's proposal was the same. The discussion between the participants in the meeting was the following: "Comrade Ana [Pauker]: The British and the Americans let us know that they propose the creation of a common commission for judging our sins [that is to say, the infringements by us of the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty]. They appointed [some members in that commission] and we should appoint members, too. We propose the following answer (she reads). Comrade [Iosif] Chişinevschi: I agree with the text. In one place the words «artificial diversions» are used; these are not the proper words to use. At the end of the text the same improper words appear, and they ought to be changed. Comrade [Vasile] Luca: We agree [with the text]". Stenogramele şedinţelor Biroului Politic si ale Secretariatului Comitetului Central al P.M.R. - 1950-1951 [The Shorthand Records of the Meetings of the Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee ofŔWP -1950-1951], vol. 3. Romanian National Archives, Bucharest: 2004, pp. 100,107. Romania was not the only country within the framework of the communist block to be accused, by the governments of USA and Great Britain, of not abiding by the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty. In a similar situation were, in the same period, Hungary and Bulgaria. As a result of the requests put forward by the representatives of the USA and Great Britain, this problem was discussed within the framework of United Nation in the fall of 1950. For details, see also Central Historical National Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as ANIC, for Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale) (this source will hereafter be referred to as CHNA), the Presidency of the Council of Ministers - Minutes Collection, file 13/1950: 1, 7; Boştinaru, V., ed. Romania-Israel: 50 de ani de relaţii diplomatice, 1948-1969 [Romania-Israel: 50 Years of Diplomatic Relations, 1948-1969], vol. 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romanian Diplomatic Archives, Bucharest: Sylvi Publishing House, 2000, p. 75. 412 sending to the USSR - for study purposes - the Romanian officers selected by the Romanian Workers' Party leadership.156 From January 1951 onwards, the military provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty were obviously infringed by the government of Romania as a result of the orders given by Joseph Stalin at the Conference of the people's republics of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria and of the USSR (January 9-12, 1951, Moscow). At that conference, the necessary framework was decided for the organizational, doctrinal, and logistic standardization of the armies of the states making up the socialist camp, including the Romanian Army, in compliance with the model imposed by the Soviets.157 Thus, the provisions in the Paris Peace Treaty (February 10, 1947) limiting the number of troops of the Romanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian armed forces were manifestly infringed at the order of one of the Four Great Powers that had signed the Paris documents. Ь Romania's case, the peacetime military personnel was to be increased from 125,000 (army and air defense) to 210,000, while for the air force an increase from 8,000 to 20,000 was foreseen, and for the navy - from 5,000 to 17,000. At the same time, in 1951 the Romanian state was to get from USSR, among other things, 6 torpedo boats, б armored gun boats, and two small-size submarines, and until July 1952 - an air division equipped with 62 Tupolev (Tu-2) bombers. In addition, the Soviets established to deliver 6 Tupolev bombers provided with reconnaissance equipment (Tu-6).158 The Kremlin plan to 156 Opriş, Petre. "Gheorghiu-Dej şi soţiile sovietice ale militarilor români [Gheorghiu-Dej and the Soviet Wives of the Romanian Officers]." Dosarele Istoriei [The Files of History], no. 3 (2005): 12-13, 15; Opriş, Petre "Soţiile sovietice ale generalilor români: spionaj cu parfum de femeie? [The Soviet Wives of the Romanian Generals: Espionage with a Scent of Woman?]." In România şi consolidarea rolului acesteia ca furnizor de securitate. Secţiunea: Securitate şi siguranţă naţională [Romania and the Consolidation of its Role as Security Provider. Section: Security and National Safety], vol. 2. Bucharest: National Intelligence Academy Press, 2005, pp. 236-243. 157 Practically, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were compelled to modify their heavy industry development plans by increasing them significantly, and new ceilings were set up - among other things - for peacetime and wartime personnel. At the same time, the way the above-mentioned countries were to equip their armed forces with jet fighters and bombers and radar stations, the level of their war production, and the way of granting manufacturing licenses for military matériel were decided. See, e.g., Mastný, V. NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56. CWIHP Working Paper no. 35 (March 2002), pp. 29-32; Holloway, D. Stalin şi bomba atomică. Uniunea Sovietică şi Energia Atomică, 1939-1956 [Stalin and the Atom Bomb. The Soviet Union and the Atomic Energy, 1939-1956]. European Institute, Jassy: TYPEWRITER Publishing House, 1998, p. 274. '5* In conformity with the measures established at the Moscow Conference in January, 1951, the 23rd and 66й1 Romanian Air Force Divisions (each composed of three wings) were wholly equipped with Lavochkin La-9 fighters, the öS"' Assault Air Division was equipped with Ilyushin ground attack aircraft (two wings equipped with 11-10 aircraft), and the two wings of the 87th Mixed Air Force Division were equipped with Tupolev Tu-2 and Tu-6 aircraft. Subsequently, Romania was also offered new types of Soviet aircraft: Yakovlev Yak-17 UTI „Magnet" (trainer jet aircraft), Yak-23 „Flora" (jet fighter), Mikoyan-Gurevich MIG-15 „Fagot" (jet fighter), S-102 (Czechoslovak MIG-15), and MIG-15 Bis, with which the Romanian Air Force was equipped in the 1951-1954 period. All three wings of the 97th Air Force Division were fully equipped with Yakovlev Yak-23 jet fighters and Yak-17 UTI during 1952. Istoria aviaţiei române [The History of the Romanian Aviation]. Bucharest: Scientific & 413 create a strong Romanian air force was permanently improved, so that - in the beginning of 1953 - all of the large Romanian fighter units were completely equipped with Soviet jet planes. However, by possessing these bombers, armored gunboats and submarines, Romania infringed the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty. j On the other hand, at a conference in Moscow (January, 1951), the setting-up was proposed of a Coordination Committee under the permanent leadership of the Minister of the Armed Forces of USSR (at the time, marshal A. M. Vasilevskii). The ccţmmittee was composed of two delegates from each country (one representing the government, and the other - the national Armed Forces). This Committee was to deal exclusively with the issues the people's democracy states faced as regards their technical and military equipment. It had a consultative character, met periodically, and created a technical secretariat for the committee chairman. Analyzing the data we have about that Coordination Committee, we can state that, on January 1951, a powerful, full-fledged military structure was created in Moscow. And one cannot help wondering whether the persons that conceived the setting up of the Coordination Committee did not perhaps intend to implement, in the following two-three years, the Soviet model (that is to say, the principles of organization, operation, training, equipping with military combat means and other means useful to the military field, as well as the doctrine) in all of the armed forces belonging to the countries making up the Eastern Block, so that afterwards the Warsaw Treaty Organization - based on the coordination nucleus already created in January 1951 - can make an appearance.159 What were the consequences of the Moscow Conference for Romania? Firstly, a substantial part of the Romanian material and financial resources was used for importing armament, combat technical means, and ammunition from the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and also for importing machine-tools and equipment Encyclopedic Publishing House, 1984, pp. 375, 380-381; Opriş, Constantin. Interviu acordat lui Petre Opriş [Confessions. Interview given to Petre Opriş], Craiova, December 24,1999. 159 In our opinion, that Coordination Committee fully proved the usefulness for which it had been established. In a secret report on the evolution of the Romanian army's combat capability dated May 1, 1951, the Soviets emphasized the negative fact that the Romanian armed forces were not prepared to cope with a military mobilization, and the level of political and military training was poor. In that document it was mentioned that: "As a consequence of the poor military and political training of the military units, the significant presence of reactionary elements amid the officer personnel, of the low discipline level, as well as the poor technical-material bases, the [Romanian] army's level of mobilization and combat readiness remains at the same low level as before". A similar document has also been drawn up for the situation of the Bulgarian army, its combat capability being considered to be "not very good" due to the lack of qualified personnel for the technical weapons (tanks, artillery, air defense, and navy). In their turn, on March 28, 1950, the NATO military evaluators also pointed out the fact that "the Romanian and Hungarian armies considerably increased their effectives", but "they still cannot be deemed efficient for waging combat actions in some of the following years". Vasilieva, N. V. "Războiul Rece şi formarea blocurilor militare [The Cold War and the Formation of Military Coalitions]." Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române (Document. The Bulletin of the Romanian Military Archives], no. 4 (2005): 29. 414 necessary to the defense industry.160 At the same time, the works at the Danube- Black Sea Canal161 and the forced setting up of co-operativives in agriculture continued unabated. All these contributed in a decisive manner to the fast exhaustion of Romanian economy and to the sale, on a large scale, of the Romanian gold in the reserve of the National В ank of Romania.! ω 160 See, e.g., Opriş, Petre. "Industria românească de apărare înainte de înfiinţarea Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia [The Romanian Defense Industry before the Foundation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization}." In Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «George Barit» din Cluj-Napoca [The Yearbook of the «George Barit» Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca], Historica Series, vol. XLIV. Bucharest: Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2005, pp. 463-482. According to the declaration of A. I. Mikoian, First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Commerce, made in Moscow on February 1, 1954, before a Romanian delegation led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Romania spent 9.2 billion lei (lei was the Romanian currency at the time - Author's note) in 1953 (the equivalent of 3,102.4 million roubles or 729.9 tons fine gold) for the „investments of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as well as the total expenses of the Special Sector (Romanian weaponry and ammunition factories - Author's note)". On that occasion, the Soviet minister appreciated that amount to be huge for the Romanian state. At the same time, A. I. Mikoian also knew the fact that the external debt of Romania, accumulated in its trade relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and GDR, amounted to 260 million roubles (the equivalent of 61.2 tons of fine gold), of which 50 million roubles to USSR (11.8 tons of fine gold), 155 million roubles to Czechoslovakia (36.5 tons of fine gold), 15 million roubles to Poland (3.5 tons of fine gold), and 40 million roubles to GDR (9.4 tons of fine gold). Volokitina, Tatiana. "Convorbirile sovieto-române de Ia Moscova (ianuarie-februarie 1954) în lumina noilor documente din arhivele ruseşti [Soviet-Romanian Talks (Moscow, January-February, 1954) in light of new documents discovered in Russian archives].", paper presented at the 7th Session of the Romanian-Russian Joint History Commission, Ploieşti, November 11-15, 2002; Buga, Vasile. "Convorbirile romàno-sovietice din ianuarie-februarie 1954 [Romanian-Soviet Talks January-February, 1954]." Arhivele Totalitarismului [Archives of Totalitarianism], no. 3-4 (2002): 140-143,150. 161 The construction of the Danube-Black Sea Canal was discontinued in August 1953 after the Soviets called the attention of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej to the fact that the relevant project was not necessary at that moment. 162 Until March 1954, the Romanian authorities spent 952,434,000 lei for the Romanian defense industry (the equivalent of 75,571.828 kg of fine gold), but the results were far less than expected because the looses incurred by Romanian weaponry and ammunition factories reached only 196,706,533 lei (the equivalent of 15,607.876 kg of fine gold), that is to say only 20.65% of the invested sum. In the same period (1951-1954), the gold stock in the reserve of the National Bank of Romania decreased with about 160 tons, from 209.4 tons (gold ingots and different Romanian and foreign gold coins) at the end of 1951 (148.3 tons in Romania and 61.1 tons abroad), to 80.1 tons at the end of 1952 (72.6 tons in Romania and 7.5 tons abroad), to 53 tons at the end of 1953 (50 tons in Romania and 3 tons abroad), and to 49.7 tons at the end of 1954 (46.7 tons in Romania and 3 tons abroad). Central Historical National Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as ANIC, for Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale), Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party - Chancellery Collection (abbreviated in Romanian as CC al PCR - Cancelarie, for Comitetul Central al Partidului Comunist Român ~ Cancelarie), file 165/1954:38,41,75; file 21/1966: 342. (This source will hereafter be referred to as CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection). Other historical sources indicated that the gold stock in the reserve of the National Bank of Romania decreased by 77 tons in the beginning of the 1950's, from 139 tons in 1951 to 62 tons on May 1, 1953. For differing interpretations, see Volokitina, Tatiana. "Convorbirile sovieto-române de la Moscova (ianuarie-februarie 1954) ín lumina noilor documente din arhivele ruseşti [Soviet-Romanian Talks (Moscow, January-February, 1954) in light of new documents discovered in Russian archives].", paper presented at the 7th Session of the Romanian-Russian Joint History Commission, Ploieşti, 415 Secondly, the fight of the communist authorities against religion and the internal enemies, as well as against those who were „waiting for the Americans to come" entered a new stage. In January 1951 a wave of arrests took place, the victims of which were around 400 Greek-catholic and orthodox priests.163 That measure was followed very fast by others of the same kind, the number of persons arrested by the Security organs increasing to 6,635 in 1950, to 19,236 in 1951, and to 24,826 in 1952.164 In addition, in June 1951, there were also deported to the Bărăgan Plain, with the agreement of Moscow, 40,320 persons (12,721 families)165 that lived in 297 villages in Banat and Western Oltenia regions, due to the fact that the Bucharest authorities looked upon these individuals as „dangerous elements" for the state security, both in peacetime and - mainly - in case the western countries and Yugoslavia start fighting a war against Romania. The deported people reached the Bărăgan Plain, where they set up eighteen new villages. They were either Romanians or Romanian citizens of German (around 10,000 persons), Serbian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Croatian nationality. The Soviets and the Romanian Communist Party leadership did not any longer tolerate the „pro-Tito elements" in a Romanian region neighboring on the right „the reactionary Yugoslavian state", seeing that Stalin contemplated the outbreak of a large-scale military conflict in Europe in 1954-1955. November 11-15, 2002; Buga, Vasile. "Relaţiile politice româno-sovietice, 1953-1958 [Romanian- Soviet Political Relations, 1953-1958], part I.", Arhivele Totalitarismului [Archives of Totalitarianism], no. 1-2 (2004): 101. The historian Liviu Ţăranii emphasized, in his turn, that the very large imports of Soviet military technology and the substantial purchases of equipment and raw materials for the Romanian heavy industry (which obviously included the defense industry) brought about „the sale of «the largest part of the country's gold reserve» in the mentioned period". Tarami, Liviu. "«Noul curs» în politica economică a României comuniste. August 1953 [«The New Course» in the Economic Policy of Communist Romania, August 1953], part I." Arhivele Totalitarismului [Archives of Totalitarianism], no. 1-2 (2004): 144. New Romanian evidence reveals that on May 6, 1959, the reserve of the National Bank of Romania amounted to 37,645 kg of fine gold (2,617.2 kg of Romanian gold ingots, 8 tons of Soviet gold ingots, and 27,027.8 kg of different Romanian and foreign coins, of which 18,828.5 kg of vendible foreign gold coins). CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 19/1959: 53. '63 Nichita, A. Pacepa versus Pacepa [Pacepa vs. Pacepa]. TESS EXPRES Publishing House, 1996, p. 36. 164 Romanian Intelligence Service Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as ASRI, for Arhivele Serviciului Român de Informaţii), Documentary Collection, volume 61, file 9572: 1. The document quoted here is has the title Dinamica arestărilor efectuate de către organele Securităţii Statului în anii 1950 - 31.111.1968 [The Dynamics of Arrests made by the organs of the State Security in the years 1950 - 31.1111968], and was registered at/with the Office of the President of the State Security Council on April 17,1968. 165 Chiriţoiu, M. între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa Războiului Rece [Between David and Goliath. Romania and Yugoslavia in the Balance of the Cold War], introduction by Silviu В. Moldovan, Gheorghe Buzatu (ed.), Jassy: „Demiurg" Publishing House, 2005, pp. 247- 248; Sălăvastru, Irina. "Bărăgan 1951-1956. O deportare în vremuri de pace [Bărăgan 1951-1956: A Deportation in Peacetime]." Magazin istoric [Historical Magazine], no. 5 (2003): 75. 416 The year 1951 was also marked by the political and military decisions referring to the carrying out of vast fortification works in the very proximity of the border with Yugoslavia that generated new tensions in the relations between the Bucharest and Belgrade authorities.166 On the one hand, during the meeting of the Political Bureau of Central Committee of Romanian Workers' Party (September 2, 1952), the Minister of Armed Forces, Army General Emil Bodnăraş, stated: 'The fortification works [near the Romanian-Yugoslav common border] are being carried out in accordance with the project devised last year with the help of the Soviet comrades. This spring, after being warned by the Minister of Internal Affairs that there are deficiencies in the execution of the works which could become serious unless we take measures, we decided to assign to a party and state committee the task of controlling the execution of the works, and we also ordered that an examination of the system proper be conducted by the Ministry of Armed Forces together with our advisers. The analysis of the results of this examination, effected together with the Soviet comrades led by [Lieutenant General] K. S. Melnik [a Soviet adviser for the Ministry of Armed Forces], resulted in a series of improvements which, without affecting the quality of the works (they only avoid the useless and too expensive ones), maintain those works that are military strictly necessary from a military viewpoint. These improvements of the system throughout the working area have been approved by the competent authorities of the USSR".167 On the other hand, Major General Ion Eremia, chief of the General Directorate for Constructions and Quartering and Deputy Minister of the Romanian Armed Forces (1952-1955), mentioned in his novel The Underground Tower the fact that: „In the beginning of March 1951, the communist government of Romania started «defense construction works» at the Yugoslav border"168. At the same time, he spoke about a secret operation that took place in Romania in 1952-1953, by means of which the Soviets supervised the way the Romanians were building at Buziaş (in Timiş county) a group of reinforced concrete ramps for launching missiles - though the Romanian 166 After fleeing his native country in the fall of the 1956 year, the Hungarian General Béla Király said that Red Army's preparations to invade Yugoslavia had reached the phase „war games". The offensive actions were to be started by the Hungarian, Romanian and Bulgarian armies, and in the second phase of the military operations a powerful Soviet shock force was to intervene. This confirms, once more, that in January 1951 Josef Stalin laid the foundation of a multinational military cooperation of European states under the hegemony of USSR. Chiriţoiu, Mircea. "Cum s -а impus modelul stalinist [How the Stalinist Model Was Imposed]." Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române (Document. The Bulletin of the Romanian Military Archives], no. 2-3 (1998): 70. 167 Oroian, Teofil. "Scurtă «cronică» a consilierilor (1948/1949 - 1959/1960) [A Short «Chronicle» of the Soviet Advisers (1948/1949 - 1959/1960)]." Dosarele Istoriei [The Files of History], no. 12 (2003): 31. 168 Vartic, Gheorghe. "1951-1953. Ani fierbinţi din istoria Războiului Rece în relatarea generalului (r) Ion Eremia, opozant al regimului stalinist din România [1951-1953: Hot Years in the History of the Cold War as told by General (ret.) Ion Eremia, who opposed the Stalinist regime in Romania]." In Geopolitică şi istorie militară în perioada Războiului Rece (Geopolitics and Military History during the Cold War], Bucharest: Military Academy Press, 2002, p. 85. 417 armed forces did not possess this type of weapons, but they existed in the arsenal of the Red Army - and a number of surveillance towers. It is well known that Iosip Broz Tito was forced by the circumstances to contact the American and British leaders in 1951 to deter Stalin's warlike intentions towards Yugoslavia, and Tito got military and - obviously - political and diplomatic support from the Americans and the British in the summer and fall of the same year.169 This could be one of the principal reasons why the Soviet leader gave up attacking Yugoslavia with a view of removing Tito from power. For Romania, the negative outcome of the anti- Yugoslavia policy promoted by the Bucharest communist authorities in the period 1949-1953 was revealed many years later by Emil Bodnăraş: „Our economy spent billions of lei (lei is the Romanian currency - Author's note) to build border fortifications and barbed-wire fences and to keep six divisions in a state of permanent alert"170. In the beginning of the 1950s, those military units took permanently part in ample military maneuver programs in the Oltenia and Banat regions, for the purpose of intimidating the Belgrade authorities; each time, these maneuvers ended with military parades in Timişoara or Craiova, the capitals of the Banat region and the Oltenia region, respectively, depending on the region in which the military exercises took place. In addition, to build the fortifications system at the Romanian-Yugoslav common border and to the South-Eastern side of it, in the Danube river valley, up to the Cetate village (in Dolj county), extremely high financial resources were allocated until 1954, with which we could have built a 550-km long highway between Bucharest and Timişoara.171 169 In June 1951, an official document concerning the supply of arms to the Yugoslav military units was signed in Washington. On 14 November 1951, a long-term agreement between Yugoslavia and United States of America was signed in Belgrade dealing with the delivery of US military equipment to the Yugoslav army. Fontaine, André. Istoria Războiului Rece. De la Războiul din Coreea la criza alianţelor. 1950-1967 [The History of the Cold War. From the Korean War to the Crisis of Alliances. 1950-1967], vol. 3. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1993, p. 48; Fontaine, André. Istoria Războiului Rece. De la Războiul din Coreea la criza alianţelor. 1950-1967 [The History of the Cold War. From the Korean War to the Crisis of Alliances. 1950-1967], vol. 4. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1994, p. 347. [Original edition: Fontaine, André. Histoire de la Guerre Froide. De la Guerre de Corée à la crise des alliances. 1950-1967,2 vols. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1965]. 170 Chiriţoiu, Mircea. "Sabotorii centurii antititoiste [Saboteurs of the Anti-Tito Belt]." Document. Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române [Document. The Bulletin of the Romanian Military Archives], no. 2 (1999): 53. 171 Chiriţoiu, M. între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa Războiului Rece [Between David and Goliath. Romania and Yugoslavia in the Balance of the Cold War], pp. 132, 135, 138-141; Osca, Alexandru. "Poziţia României faţă de sistemul de gestionare a crizelor din interiorul Tratatului de la Varşovia [Romania's Position on the System of Crisis Management in the Countries of the Warsaw Treaty]." Revista de Istorie Militară [Review of Military History], no. 5-6 (2002): 28. Regarding the system of fortifications built by Romania at the common border with Yugoslavia, the historian Mircea Chiriţoiu said: "The strategic and tactical-operational idea of these fortification works belonged to the Soviet army's General Staff. This idea was communicated and implemented by a group of [Soviet] officers led by General Afanasiev. At the end of the field reconnaissance activities and consultations with the Romanian General Staff, the latter presented the relevant plan to the leadership of the Romanian state for approval. The construction works of these 418 The direct damages inflicted on Yugoslavia during the 1948-1954 period as a result of the measures taken against it by USSR and the European countries under its domination were considerable: Eduard Kardelj mentioned the amount of 429 million US dollars. Concomitantly, the Yugoslav communist leader reminded the fact that - during the 1948-1952 period - Belgrade had spent, in addition to a normal military budget, the amount of 1,408 million dollars.172 These expenses were made to boost the country's defense capability since the danger existed of a large-scale Soviet offensive being launched from the territories of the communist countries neighboring Yugoslavia: Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Only after the unexpected physical disappearance of Josef Stalin (March 5, 1953) and the reconsideration by Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet foreign policy towards the Yugoslav state led by Iosip Broz Tito173, the Bucharest communist authorities dared to gradually adopt a position totally opposed to their previous one existing in the period 1949-1953. 174 The relationships between Romania and Yugoslavia were regulated at the initiative of both parties after the Romanian officials got the approval from Moscow, and a new type of collaboration was tried, based mainly on the continuous improvement of the economic relationships between the two countries, a fact that led - during the 1960s - to the realization of an fortifications started in the summer of 1950 and involved the efforts of 375 military and civil engineers, and more than 27,000 military workers. The works were temporarily interrupted in 1952 when, allegedly, serious attempts at "sabotaging" these works [of a group formed of 17 Romanian generals and officers led by Major General Hie Grigore Ionescu] were discovered, and they were completely stopped in 1955 [.]. During this period (1950-1955), in the three mentioned areas (on the Black Sea seaside, in Banat and Oltenia regions - Author's note) almost 10,000 different [fortification] objectives were built, located on a 500-km front, a totaling 1 million cubic meters of reinforced concrete, for which 1.5 billion lei were spent (our underlining)". Chiriţoiu, M. între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa Războiului Rece [Between David and Goliath. Romania and Yugoslavia in the Balance of the Cold War], pp. 84,146. For details, see also Zaharia, P., Б. Ene, and F. Pavlov. Istoria armei geniu din armata română [A History of the Engineer Corps of the Romanian Army], vol. 2. Bucharest: Military Publishing House, pp. 344,373-378. In his report (no. 0258/23.03.1955), Major General Ion Eremia stated that the Romanian Special Buildings Direction had realized five military objectives on the Black Sea seaside (artillery batteries) during the August 1952 - December 1954 period, together with eight Soviet technicians (Sokolov Vladimir Andreevici, Badrikov Alexei Gavrilovici, Smirnov Nikolai Mihailovici, Egorov Vladimir Feodorovici, Gavrilov Vasili Mihailovici, Kalpakov Vasili Vasilievici, Dokuceaev Vitali Mihailovici, and Karpov Boris Alexandrovici). Romanian Military Archives (abbreviated in Romanian as AMR, for Arhivele Militare Române), Collection 3226, file 69/1955: 125-134; 140-145. (This source will hereafter be referred to as RMA.) 172 Chiriţoiu, M. între David şi Goliath. România şi Iugoslavia în balanţa Războiului Rece [Between David and Goliath. Romania and Yugoslavia in the Balance of the Cold War], p. 62. 173 For details about the conflict between USSR and Yugoslavia after 1948, see Vostočnaia Evropa v documentali rossiskih arhivov, 1944-1953 [Eastern Europe in the Documents in Russian Archives], vol. 1 -1944-1948. Moscow-Novosibirsk: 1997; Ghibianski, Leonid. "The Beginning of the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict and the Cominform." In The Cominform Minutes of the Three Conferences 1947/1948/1949, Milano: Giuliano Procucci Publishing House, 1995, pp. 465-467. 174 In 1954, the Romanian authorities decided to cancel the entire military program of building the system of fortifications at the Romanian-Yugoslav common border. 419 important economie objective, the Iron Gates hydroelectric power system on the Danube river. To conclude, the Moscow Conference in January 1951 had negative influences on Romania. In the following years, the Bucharest authorities made the political and social repression system harsher, reorganized the institutions the tasks of which were to gather information both inside the country and outside it, and gave the Romanian Armed Forces a typically Soviet shape so that they might be accepted in a political-military structure named by Josef Stalin, in January 1951, Coordination Committee, and by Nikita Khrushchev, in May 1955, Warsaw Treaty Organization. Although the Romanian expenses for armament increased very much175, the results were far from what the Romanian Government had expected, a fact also noticed by A. I. Lavrentiev, the USSR Ambassador in Bucharest, who - in a document sent to his superiors in July 1953 - mentioned the fact that "in keeping with the information the Embassy had acquired from the dialogs with the [Soviet] military advisers, the Romanian army can fulfill defense tasks in a passive area, but not in the main direction"176. 175 In August 1953, the authorities in Bucharest had a debt of over 250 million roubles (approximately 700 million lei or 55,542.2 kg of fine gold) for the special imports from Czechoslovakia, especially for the MIG- 15 "Fagot" fighters manufactured in that country and delivered to the Romanian army. For the purpose of obtaining funds to pay this debt, the Romanian representatives exported 2,026 million tons of cereals in 1953 (900,000 tons to GDR; 875,000 tons to Czechoslovakia; and 100,000 tons each to Poland and Hungary). Simultaneously, the Romanian authorities exported large quantities of meat and meat products, especially to Czechoslovakia and GDR, but for the 1954-1955 period they decided to reduce the exports by half (approximately 17,000 tons). In July 1953, the Soviet authorities insisted on maintaining GDR on the list of countries to which Romania exported meat, the main reason being, probably, the improvement of the meat supply in GDR, in order to eliminate the stress caused by the bloody suppression of the East Berlin workers' insurgence (June 1953). To calculate in lei the value of the Romanian imports of special products we used the exchange rate valid on August 5, 1953 (1 convertible rouble = 2.8 lei). For details, see Cătănuş, D. între Beijing şi Moscova. România şi conflictul sovieto-chinez, 1957-1965 [Between Beijing and Moscow. Romania and the Soviet-Chinese Conflict: 1957-1965], vol. 1. The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, Bucharest: 2004, p. 292; Ţăranu, Liviu. "«Noul curs» în politica economică a României comuniste. August 1953 [The «New Course» in the Economic Policy of Communist Romania, August 1953], part I.", Arhivele Totalitarismului ¡Archives of Totalitarianism], no. 1-2 (2004): 166-167; Opriş, Petre. "Industria românească de apărare înainte de înfiinţarea Organizaţiei Tratatului de la Varşovia [The Romanian Defense Industry before the Foundation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization]." In Anuarul Institutului de Istorie «George Bariţ» din Cluj-Napoca (The Yearbook of the «George Bariţ» Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca], Series Historica, vol. XLIV. Bucharest: Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2005, p. 479. 176 Buga, Vasile. "Relaţiile politice romàno-sovietice, 1953-1958 [The Romanian-Soviet Political Relations: 1953-1958], part 1." Arhivele Totalitarismului [Archives of Totalitarianism], no. 1- 2 (2004): 101. 420 Romania in the Warsaw Treaty Organization As soon as the Warsaw Treaty Organization was officially established in May 1955, the plan of creating Soviet-like armed forces in every member state of that alliance entered a new phase. Romania's inclusion on the list of WTO' s founding states was not a surprise. Soviet troops had been stationed in Romania since 1944, and in 1951 the Romanian political and military leaders were enforcing the Soviet standards in the Romanian armed forces, according to the program which Josef Stalin had imposed. The chances which occurred within the Romanian armed forces immediately after the departure of the Soviet troops from Romania in 1958 did not affect the essence of the relations between the authorities in Bucharest and the signatory states to the Warsaw Treaty. We can notice that the Romanian Communist leaders never declared publicly and officially their intention to withdraw Romania from the structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Their interest in being members of the organisation did not necessarily lie in maintaining "the monolithic unity of the socialist states" - an ideal which was known to be unreachable -, but in keeping their own power. The heated debates between the Romania communists and the Soviet leaders - politicians, diplomats, militaries or economists - were not over changing the political-ideological system in Romania. This might have been one of the main reasons why the Kremlin did not intervene brutally in Romania in the 1960s, as it had done, for example, in Hungary in autumn 1956. However, the importance of the Warsaw Treaty Organization for Romania is not reduced to maintaining certain political leaders in power. In the early 1960s, Marshal Vasilii Danilovich Sokolovsku (b. 1897 - d. 1968), together with a group of Soviet theorists, defined the type of strategic action which was to be taken by the Red Army if an international military conflict burst. The Soviet Marshal promoted the strategic offensive as the main course of action for the USSR's army. The offensive was to be unleashed at the very beginning of the generalised conflict in order to avoid the damage which the military operations at home (including here the territories of the WTO members, allies of the Soviet Union) were likely to cause. Moreover, the Soviet Marshal stated the new means to be used by the Red Army in order to carry out the objectives of their military strategy: "Now, the main role will be played by the troops of strategic destination missiles, the long-range aircraft and the nuclear submarines equipped with missiles. All these structures will use the nuclear weapon if the Soviet Union is forced to resort to it. On the other hand, it is difficult to call the strikes of the missiles offensive or defence actions. The actions of the missile troops will always be decisive and on no account defensive, no matter if the troops attack or defend themselves on the land front". In other words, the offensive unleashed with nuclear vectors was followed by the occupation of the enemy states' territories by the Soviet conventional forces. At the same time, Marshal V. D. Sokolovsku declared against carrying out defensive strategic actions, as follows: "The Soviet army has to study defence, to know how to put it into practice in order to master all the forms of military action. However, what we have 421 in mind is the operational and tactical defence. As regards the strategic defence and the defensive strategy, they must be firmly rejected as being extremely dangerous for the country"177. It was the authorities in Moscow who initiated the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and was its supreme leaders. As a direct consequence, the WTO military maneuvers in the early 1960s were carried out in accordance with the global military strategy of the Soviet Union, drawn up by Marshal V. D. Sokolovsku. The first examples in this respect are the double-action troop's maneuvers, led by the Polish Minister of People's Defence, Colonel-General Marian Spychalski (b. 1906 - d. ШО).178 Bearing the code name "BALTIC-ODER"179, the military exercise took place on 5-Ю October 1962 on Poland's territory, on the Baltic Sea, and, partially, on East Germany's territory, in Copenhagen - Magdeburg - Poznań - Słupsk area. The theme of the military exercise - Organising and waging a combined operation of descent and anti-descent, in which marines and paratroops units - and its general concept were obviously in accordance with the "Sokolovsku doctrine". Thus, "the Western Forces, secretly concentrating their troops under the pretext of military exercises, carry out the first strike against the Eastern Forces and proceed with the offensive, giving the main strike on WITTENBERG - North BERLIN direction. [.] The Eastern Forces (the Sea-shore Front and the Berlin Front), carrying out the nuclear strike against the Western Forces, regroup their troops, simultaneously neutralising the effects of the nuclear strike by the Western Forces, in order to stop the latter' s offensive and start their own offensive on the main direction BRESLAU - HAMBURG"180. Altogether, approximately 32,000 troops, 250 tanks, 300 armoured carriers, 250 aircraft, 5,000 vehicles and 105 vessels participated in the "BALTIC-ODER" military exercise; 5,000 military personnel and 1,000 vehicles were involved in conducting the exercise.181 177 Marshal V. D. Sokolovsku (ed.), Strategia militară [The Military Strategy], (Bucharest: Military Publishing House, 1972), 353-54. 178 In certain Romanian documents, the name of the Polish General also appears as "Spîhalski". 179 In Polish documents, the code name of military maneuver appears as „BALTYK-ODRA", and in Romanian documents as „BALTICA-ODER". 180 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 194-95. 181 RMA, Collection D, file W /2, volume 3 b: 193-94. The armed forces engaged by Poland, the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic in the "BALTIC-ODER" exercise were the following: 1. The Polish military forces: an Army command; a section as "Baltic Army Group" (belonging to the Western Forces, NATO); a tank division command; a manned tank regiment; a mechanised division command; a manned mechanised regiment; an airborne division command; a manned paratroopers battalion; a bridges' regiment; an air division (fighters); two naval air wings; descent vessel units; logistic units. 2. The Soviet military forces: a tank division command; a manned mechanised regiment; a motorised infantry battalion (marines); three air divisions; a helicopter regiment; bridges' units; descent vessels; logistic units. 422 Analysing the report drawn up by the Romanian Colonel-General Arhip Fioca182 on the exercise which he witnessed, we can notice that the overall maneuver concept makes no reference to organising and waging defence actions. The Western Forces (fictitiously considered as belonging to NATO) carried out a surprise attack using nuclear means, and the Eastern Forces (belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization) regrouped and proceeded with the offensive. In all likelihood, the military personnel who drew up the general concept of the exercise deliberately avoided the words "defence" and "defensive" in order to comply with the "Sokolovsku doctrine". According to the general concept of the exercise, the enemy military forces carried out the offensive by surprise, massively using the nuclear weapon. Their main strike was given on the WITTENBERG - North BERLIN direction. In order to ensure the left flank of NATO's main group, "Baltic Army Group" - made up of two mechanised infantry divisions, a motorised infantry division and an airborne division (the 16* Airborne Division) - disembarked on the enemy seashore in Mielno-Unieście - Dziwnów sector and articulated its combat group with two echelons, having the 11th and 13th Mechanised Infantry Divisions in the first echelon, and the 6th Motorised Infantry Division in the second echelon. The "Baltic Army Group" sector was 70 km wide.183 In order to attract and fix the reserves of the Eastern Forces (belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization), it was assumed that the 16th Airborne Division had been parachuted in Ińsko district (in Poland). Thus, the freedom of action of NATO's main group was ensured. At the same time, the ones in charge of conceiving the exercise also provided for the launch of the 1st Airborne Division in Cedynia district (in Poland). The main objectives of this unit were to conquer the passes over the Oder River and to prevent the WTO forces from passing towards the front line. According to the overall concept of the exercise, the Polish - Soviet - East German troops within the Eastern Forces (the WTO) were to take the following actions: the Berlin Front - against NATO's main army group; the Seashore Front - against "Baltic Army Group"; the WTO Reserves - against the 16* and 1st Airborne Divisions, in Ińsko and Cedynia districts. In the beginning of the exercise, the Polish General who was leading "Baltic Army Group" suggested the fictitious setting on fire of an area of approximately 13000 m2. For this purpose, he requested the assistance of the superior echelon in order to be provided with the necessary means for launching 432 napalm bombs. Furthermore, the commander of that group advanced the idea of fictitiously establishing a radioactively contaminated area, 200 km long and 30 km wide, with a 3. The East German military forces: a mechanised division command; a manned regiment; descent vessels; an infantry company (marines); logistic units. 182 At that moment, Colonel-General Arhip Fioca had been Deputy Minister of the Romanian Armed Forces and Chief of the Combat Training Directorate (in MoD). 183 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 194-95. 423 view to backing up the combat actions of his maritime descent. The two suggestions were not approved, being considered that "taking such measures would have rendered the combat actions of our own troops more difficult"184. As his initial decisions had not been accepted, the commander of "Baltic Army Group" used 6 Soviet Mil 'Hook' Mi-6 and 33 Mil 'Hound' Mi-4 helicopters (nicknames in the NATO's code) in order to back up the combat actions of the maritime descent, also carrying out the tactical launch of a battalion in the depth of the enemy territory. It took an extremely short time to disembark the troops from the helicopters and to proceed with the combat missions. "Baltic Army Group" performed a maritime descent in the real mode, of the value of a marines' regiment. After a fictitious preparation fire training — in which nuclear weapons were also used - 1,200 troops, 10 T-54 tanks and 8 amphibious tanks disembarked in four waves on the seashore. The first two waves were made up of reconnaissance platoons and engineer squads, amphibious tanks and T-54 tanks. The third wave comprised the infantry companies, and the last one, the regiment staff. Simultaneously, three torpedo boats carried out a joint operation in order to occupy a harbour. In order to mark the entry into combat of the 16th Paratroopers Division, in Ińsko district were parachuted in three waves a division staff, the strengths of a paratroopers battalion, two battalion steering structures and logistic subunits.185 With a view to countering the airborne actions, the commander of the Eastern Forces (WTO) fictitiously engaged a tank division, which immediately proceeded with obliterating the foeman. That action was really marked by the maneuvers of a tank regiment in the Polish fire range at Drawsko Pomorskie. On that occasion, a part of the artillery engaged in the "Baltic-Oder" exercise executed direct-aiming shootings and shootings from covert fire positions. At the same time, a tank company opened fire against targets set at the maximum range limit of the board weapons, and the air force carried out a series of bombardments with live ammunition. During the next stage of the exercise, a Soviet mechanised regiment (which also comprised a tank battalion) forced the Oder River from the West to the East, in a single wave. That action was carried out in close co-operation with the 1st Airborne Division, which had been fictitiously launched in Cedynia district in order to occupy the passage points over the Oder River. It took 25 minutes to force the crossing and the operation was carried with modern descent means: amphibious tanks, BTR-50 Ρ armoured personnel carriers, and tanks that had been prepared to cross underwater. Regarding this moment of the exercise, Colonel-General Arhip Fioca wrote in his report that "the tank battalion of the regiment forced the river underwater on three routes (each company on a route)"186; 27 Soviet Mil 'Hound' Mi-4 and 6 Mil 'Hook' Mi-6 helicopters backed up the Soviet mechanised regiment while forcing the Oder 184 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 195. 185 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 196. 186 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 197. 424 River, launching a battalion-level tactical descent in the depth of the enemy's defence. The First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, Władysław Gomułka, together with Prime-Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz attended the parachuting in Ińsko district and the forcing of the Oder River.187 The military maneuvers were completed on 7 October 1962, after the East German army had presented "the deployment and moving attack of a motorised infantry division"188. However, the real combat exercises had been executed by a single regiment. The post-mission critique of the double-action "BALTIC-ODER" military exercise with troops was performed on 10 October 1962, in Poland. The reunion was attended by the following participants: Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko (b. 1903 - d. 1976), Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces; Colonel- General Marian Spychalski, the Polish Minister of People's Defence, together with the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Army; the Soviet Army Generals Piotr I. Batov and Ivan I. Iakubovskii (b. 1912 - d. 1976); the Soviet Vice-Admiral Oriol; generals and officers from the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization who trade been invited to attend the military maneuvers. The Polish, Soviet and East German commanders of the units and subunits that had been directly involved in the exercise also attended the meeting. In the beginning of the reunion, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army delivered a 30 minute presentation about the concept and the course of action of the exercise. Then, Colonel-General Marian Spychalski delivered a two-hour presentation on the most important results of his analysis and assessed the participants' performance. The most important problem underlined by the Polish Minister of People's Defence was the leadership of the troops. The participation by units from three distinct national armies, the lack of homogeneity within the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the long distances separating the allied troops affected the command system during the "BALTIC-ODER" military exercise. Additional problems were caused by the difficulty of the exercise scenario, which provided far a surprise initial strike by the enemy who also used the nuclear weapon on a massive scale. Regrouping the Eastern Forces (WTO) and putting them at the same time to neutralise the consequences of the nuclear strikes also proved problematic. Consequently, the commanders of all echelons were hindered to a large extent from carrying out their missions. The conclusions reached by Colonel-General M. Spychalski were in accordance with Marshal A. A. Grechko' s desires: creating a unified leadership system within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and extending the knowledge of foreign languages (especially Russian).189 Both the Polish Defence Minister and the Supreme 187 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 194. 188 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 197. 189 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 200. Commander of the Unified Armed Forces noticed how ineffectual the co-operation between the WTO member states was due to the incompatibility existing among the national military structures of states within the alliance: the lower military structure, from the level of national commands to the level of units or subunits, the more obvious the discrepancies regarding the collaboration between the allies. In such circumstances, if no proactive measures were taken, the military incompatibility of the WTO member states could become a heavy burden for the Soviet Union.190 In May 1955, Moscow established a political-military organization for the obvious purpose of maintaining its dominance in Central and Eastern Europe, and not for being destroyed by its own creation. This might be one of the reasons why Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, an advocate of the "Sokolovsku doctrine", did not accept that the Warsaw Treaty Organization should have weak points. Colonel- General Arhip Fioca referred to the stance expressed by the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces during the post-mission critique of the "BALTIC-ODER" exercise, as follows: 'The armed forces of the countries participating in the Warsaw Treaty Organization must continuously strengthen their combat capacity in order to be able to provide any aggressor with the appropriate response, not on their territory but on the territory of the aggressor". The Soviet Marshal also emphasised "the necessity to thoroughly analyse the theatre of operations in North-Western Europe; this theatre is extremely important as carrying out a firm offensive on this direction and destroying the NATO troops in the left flank would enable the destruction of NATO bloc's main group in Central Europe"191. Making reference to these actions of the 16th Airborne Division launched in Ińsko district, the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces criticised the fact that the paratroopers organised the defence against a tank division of the Eastern Forces, having practically no chance to resist the advance of the enemy. In his opinion, the paratroopers should have been assigned "active combat missions", such as destroying the nuclear missiles and conquering important objectives (check and passage points, command posts, headquarters etc.).192 Marshal Andrei Grechko also criticised the pilots for their poor performance during the joint exercise, especially in Drawsko Pomorskie fire range. The pilots executed the bombardments flying horizontally and not while elevating or diving aircraft, to the discontent of the Supreme Commander of the Unified Armed Forces. Colonel-General Arhip Fioca agreed with the Soviet Marshal's conclusion and mentioned the following in his report: "The actions of the [Romanian] air force will be led by air groups and the bombardments will be executed while elevating or diving the aircraft"193. 190 The stances expressed by the Marshal Andrei A. Grechko and Colonel-General Marian Spychalski on the occasion of the "BALTIC-ODER" exercise critique obviously pertain to the line of proactive measures as they wanted to strengthen the political-military alliance to which the states they represented belonged. 191 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 201. 192 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 202. 193 RMA, Collection D, file V/2, volume 3 b: 201-02. 426 Only a few days after the completion of the "BALTIC-ODER" joint exercise, three armed forces of the WTO member states participated in another military exercise, in Romania (in Dobrogea district).194 The double-action maneuver had the following themes: "Waging combat actions by joint forces, in co-operation with the Navy and air forces, for the purpose of deterring the enemy's descent and obliterating the enemy on the Dobrogea seashore", and "The maritime and air descent in the initial stage of the war". By the themes and scenario of the military exercise, the Unified Command of the WTO again imposed compliance with the Soviet Union's global military strategy, drawn up by Marshal Vasilii D. Sokolovsku. The plan drawn up by the Unified Command in October 1961 stipulated that the Romanian Ministry of Armed Forces should provide the organisation and leadership of the joint exercise in collaboration with two groups made up of 8-10 Soviet and, respectively, Bulgarian officers and generals. Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu, Chief of the Romanian General Staff, specified in the plan he sent to Moscow in October 1961 that "the Armed Forces of 194 Bordered in Western and Northern by the Danube River and in Eastern by the Black Sea, Dobrogea district imposed amphibious descent operations on the Black Sea shore and the banks of the most important river in this region of Europe. Furthermore, in order to successfully complete the military operations, it is necessary to engage paratroopers units for occupying and maintaining the check and passage points over the Danube River. According to the Plan of the Unified Command regarding the operational and combat training in 1962 (for the Romanian Armed Forces), the command of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Mechanised Division were to participate in a double-action military exercise with troops, which involved forcing the Danube River between Ы0 October 1962. That plan (having the registration number 10/15903/23 October 1961) was drawn up in Russian and signed by the Soviet Colonel-General Gusev. The Chief of Staff of the Unified Armed Forces, Army General A. L Antonov, attached that plan to a letter (registration no. 1 172127) and sent them to Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu, the Romanian Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff. In the reply of document (registration no. 1693/28 October 1961), the Romanian Chief of the General Staff wrote that he agreed with the plan forwarded by Unified Command of the WTO and suggested that two new tactical lessons should be included in the same plan: The offensive of joint forces, including breaking the enemy's defence on the move and forcing a wide river and The defence of joint forces in modern conditions. Furthermore, Colonel-General Ion Tutoveanu requested that the wire and radio transmission materials and descent means (provided for in the import plan of the Romanian Army for 1962 year) should be delivered during the first half of 1962, together with 5 floating tanks and 10 K-61 amphibious vehicles, destined to carry troops. Thus, the Romanian military that were to participate in the exercise in October 1962 had enough time to learn how to handle the imported military equipment. The document written by the Chief of the General Staff was submitted to Gheorghe Gheorghiu- Dej before it was sent to Moscow. The Romanian political leader gave the decision "I agree" and signed it. In September 1962, Army General Leontin Sălăjan, Minister of the Armed Forces, informed the leaders of the Romanian Workers' Party that the starting date of the exercise had been changed. The exercise was to start on 15 October 1962 and to last for two days and a half. One more day was destined for drafting and presenting the post-exercise critique. CHNA, CC of RCP - Chancellery Collection, file 56/1960:19; file 46/1961:11-21; file 28/1962: 111. 195 CHNA, CC of RCP - Chancellery Collection, file 28/1962: 110. the People's Republic of Romania, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Odessa Military District were each to participate in the exercise with an Army command and a. division, with reinforcement means"196 (from Romania: the Command of the 2nd Army and the 2nd Mechanised Infantry Division). After almost a year, on 25 September 1962, Army General Leontin Sălaj an submitted a top secret report to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party.197 The report contained details about the military forces participating in "the first ample military exercise organised and carried out in our country, in which troops from the fraternal armed forces take part"198. At the same time, as commander of the exercise, the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces specified that 27,500 Romanian personnel, 7,500 Soviet troops and 2,000 Bulgarian military personnel were to participate in the exercise. The arsenal engaged in the WTO exercise in Dobrogea district comprised 310 tanks and armoured self-propelled cannons, 3,650 armoured personnel carriers, trucks and special vehicles, 60 air carriers and 120 aircraft (fighters and ground- attack fighters). In addition, 76 vessels from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies also participated in the maneuvers.199 During the maneuvers, the 2nd and 72nd Romanian Bridges' Regiments, as well as the Soviet bridges' regiment were assigned the mission to build three bridges over the Danube River.200 As the exercise was provided for in the combat training plan drawn up by the Unified Command of the WTO, Army General Leontin Sălăjan extended invitations 196 CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 46/1961:12. 197 That document was entitled Report on the maneuver including troops that will be carry on in October 1962 and was registered with no. F.S. 002893/25 September 1962 at the Cabinet of the Romanian Minister of the Armed Forces. 198 CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 28/1962: 110. 199 CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 28/1962: 110-12. The armed forces engaged by Romania, the Soviet Union and Bulgaria in the exercise in October 1962 were the following: 1. The Romanian military forces: the command of the 2nd Army with all the commands of army units and subunits; the fully manned 1st Mechanised "Tudor Vladimirescu" Division; the 9th Mechanised "Mărăşeşti" Division with all the commands of the mechanised, tank and artillery regiments (each of those regiments participated with a reinforced motorised infantry battalion, and a tank battalion and artillery division respectively); the 2nd and the 72nd Bridges' Regiments; the 52"d, 53ій and 54th Engineer Regiments; the 47th and 48th Signal Regiments; the 16th Air Defence Division with all subordinate units; the 36th Airborne Battalion; the entire Romanian Navy. 2. The Soviet military forces: the command of the 11 8th Motorised Infantry Division with a fully manned motorised infantry regiment (the other regiments of the division participated only with their staffs and company/battalion subunits, each staff having a tank platoon and an artillery battery in its subordination); a bridges' regiment; an airborne regiment; two wings of ground-attack fighters; 60 Soviet Antonov 'Camp' An-8 and Antonov 'Cat' An-10 air carriers; units and subunits of the Black Sea Red Fleet. 3. The Bulgarian military forces: the command of the 16th Motorised Infantry Division with a regiment staff and a reinforced motorised infantry battalion; 24 fighters and ground-attack fighters; most vessels of the Bulgarian Navy. 200 CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 28/1962:112. 428 to his counterparts within the alliance, except the Albanian Defence Minister, to attend the maneuvers. The Minister of the Romanian Armed Forces also invited "a few comrades from the leadership of the Romanian Workers' Party and the Government"201 to attend the exercise and the military parade that was to take place in Constanţa city after the maneuvers were completed.202 Both the military exercise in Romania in October 1962 and the "BALTIC- ODER" exercise were based upon the plans which the Soviets had drawn up and co¬ ordinated in advance through the Unified Command of the WTO, and the commanders who led those military maneuvers complied with the doctrine drawn up by Marshal Vasilii D. Sokolovsku. According to the Soviet theorist, it was essential for the success in war that the offensive should be unleashed very rapidly. The political leader Nikita Khrushchev understood this concept very well and in 1962 he tried to create a strategic advantage over the Americans by deploying medium-range missiles in Cuba. Thus, Cuba became a hot spot for the Soviet and American leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and John Fitzgerald Kennedy, and the crisis automatically extended to the European states. Reviewing the facts, we can notice that the WTO military exercises in October 1962 happened to take place only a few days before the crisis of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba. We can also notice that the authorities in Moscow did not schedule the military exercise in Poland, GDR and Romania so that they overlap. The Soviet leaders might have avoided this overlapping in order not to be suspected by the NATO military commander of preparing a surprise military strike in Europe. If the Soviets wanted to unleash a world war in October 1962 in Europe, among other things they should have maintained the Soviet, the Polish, the East German, the Romanian and Bulgarian forces that participated in the WTO maneuvers in the concentration area. At this stage of our research, we can state the fact that the "BALTIC-ODER" military exercise, as well as the exercise in Romania in mid-October 1962 had no direct connection with the crisis of the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba. NATO's military leaders are very likely to have monitored those military maneuvers and 201 The following persons attended the exercise and the military parade: Gheorghe Apostol. Prime Vice-President of the Minister's Council; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party; Alexandra Draghici, Minister of the Interior Affairs; Gaston Marin, President of the State Planning Committee; Simulescu Dumitru, Minister of Transport and Communications; Vflcu Vasile, Prime-Secretary of Dobrogea Regional Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party. CHNA, CC ofRCP - Chancellery Collection, file 28/1962: 1-4. 202 For the first time after the establishment of the WTO (May 1955), the Romanian authorities issued an official statement the national press (on the Bucharest radio station - 18 October 1962,11.00 p.m.) about the completion of the first WTO maneuver organised and carry out in Romania, in which troops from the USSR and People's Republic of Bulgaria. Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact. Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1973), 71. 429 analysed them more carefully during the last ten days of October, when the crisis of the missiles in Cuba reached its climax. Being aware of the fact that an open dispute with the leader in Moscow would not be to his advantage, the Romanian leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej did not officially protest against the Soviets' stance during the missiles crisis in Cuba.203 However, two years later, in April 1964, the Romanian political leader used 'The Statement by the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers' Party" as a lightning rod against the potential Soviet encroachments in Romania. In fact, that document was a corollary of the new stance adopted by the regime in Bucharest in its relations with the Soviet Union. Without denying the precepts of totalitarianism, the Romanian communists stated their own national ideas, although the political, military and economic framework in this region of Europe was obviously dominated by the Kremlin's decisions. 203 The Romanian political and military leaders were taken by surprise by the crisis of the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba. The first information was learned on the news bulletins of the foreign radio stations. 430
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spellingShingle	Preda, Gavriil 1955- Opriş, Petre România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol.
title	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol.
title_auth	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol.
title_exact_search	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol.
title_full	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol. 2 Garvil Preda ; Petre Opriş
title_fullStr	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol. 2 Garvil Preda ; Petre Opriş
title_full_unstemmed	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia 1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol. 2 Garvil Preda ; Petre Opriş
title_short	România în organizaţia tratatului de la Varşovia
title_sort	romania in organizatia tratatului de la varsovia 1954 1968 2 vol
title_sub	1954 - 1968 ; 2 vol.
url	http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018881419&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018881419&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA
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