Imperialna rozgrywka: Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Kraków
Wydawnictwo "Arcana"
2009
|
| Ausgabe: | Wyd. 1. |
| Schriftenreihe: | Arkana Historii
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Imperial poker |
| Beschreibung: | 247 s. il. 22 cm. |
| ISBN: | 9788360940884 |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | Spis
tresei
WSTĘP: IMPERIALNY POKER
9
IMPERIA I SRA PERCEPCJI
23
Goliat, Kolos, Słońce: Czy Stany Zjednoczone są imperium?
23
Trudna niepodległość: Dziedzictwo rosyjskiego i sowieckiego imperium
na Ukrainie
44
Pokolenie
Putina:
Przyszłość rosyjskiej polityki
59
STOSUNKI MA UNII KIJÓW
-
WASZYNGTON
OD
1991
ROKU DO POMARAŃCZOWEJ REWOLUCJI
71
Niepodległość i
likwidaqa
ukraińskiego arsenału nuklearnego
72
Cenzura Kuczmy: Zabójstwo Georgija Gongadze
80
Kolczugagate: Afera wokół systemów radarowych Kolczuga
81
Bliżej Rosji
84
Show Me the Money!
Amerykańska pomoc gospodarcza dla
Ukrainy
87
Waszyngton i Pomarańczowa
Rewoluqa
99
řOE)NOS2HN!£
STAWKI
t
RYWALIZACJA I PARTNERSTWO
РОМЕЯТ
NATO, ROSJĄ I UKRAINA 103
Przyjaciele czy wrogowie? Skomplikowane relacje NATO-Rosja
105
Quo
vadis
Ukraino? Partnerstwo NATO-Ukraina
115
Dychotomia w ukraińskiej polityce bezpieczeństwa: NATO czy Rosja?
Wybór „proszku do prania marki NATO
116
8
Imperialna rozgrywka
bezpieczeństwo na obszarze morza czarnego
ізз
Mroczne wody: Podział Floty Czarnomorskiej w latach
1992-1997 134
Wujek Sam w
Pontos
Axeinos:
Amerykańskie interesy
na Morzu Czarnym
143
Osetia Południowa.
.
.Abchazja.
.
.Krym?
153
AMERYKAŃSKO-UKRAIŃSKA WSPÓŁPRACA
W DZIEDZINIE WOJSKOWOŚCI I BEZPIECZEŃSTWA 161
Reformy wojskowe na Ukrainie i bezpieczeństwo granic
164
Piłka w grze: Spełnianie natowskich i amerykańskich standardów
174
Amerykańsko-ukraińska współpraca wojskowa
i antyterrorystyczna
180
WNIOSKI KOŃCOWE*
RELACJE NA UNII KUOW-WASZYNGTON
-
CO KRYJĄ KARTY?
189
IMPERIAL
POKER*
SUMMARY Of IMPERIAL GAMSSi
UKRAINE IN THE UNITSD
STATES
GEOPOLITICAL
STRATEGY
197
SECURITY IN THE BLACK SEA
211
Dark Waters: The Division of the Black Sea Fleet
1992-1997 212
Uncle Sam in
Pontos
Axeinos: U.S. Interest in the Black Sea
220
South Ossetia....Abkhazia...Crimea?
230
Bibliografía
236
Imperial
Poker: Summary of Imperial Games
-
Ukraine in the United States
Geopolitical Strategy
All this was perplexing and upsetting. For at that time
1
had
already made up my mind that imperialism was an evil thing
and the sooner I chucked up my job and got out of it the better.
. .1
hated it more bitterly than I can perhaps make clear. In a job like
that you see the dirty work of Empire at close quarters.
George Orwell, Shooting an Elephant
In
1997,
Zbigniew Brzeziński
referred to Eurasia as the grand
chessboard on which the geopolitical contest for global influence is
played. Today, a decade later, it seems more appropriate to compare
this competition to a game of poker: the stakes are higher and, more
importantly, certain players that previously lost all their chips are back
for another round and are determined to win. Furthermore, this impe¬
rial game is played less with the cards that are dealt, and more with
the money in me pot. Imperial Games: Ukraine in the United States Geo¬
political Strategy takes a closer look at the dirty work of empire with
emphasis on the United States relations with Ukraine in the wake of an
increasingly unpredictable and neo-imperial Russian Federation.
Tlie
outcome of this game may have a colossal effect on American and
European security.
Ukraine remains a focal point in developments between the U.S.,
NATO, and the Russian Federation because the direction of its inte¬
gration
-
East or West
-
will determine the nature of its foreign policy.
Ukraine s importance resides in its pivotal geostrategic location, access
to the Black Sea, and transit potential, which offers prospects for the di¬
versification of energy resource flow. In its efforts of fostering security
in Eurasia, it is in the interest of Washington to assist Ukraine s
integra-
198
Imperialna rozgrywka
tion
with NATO and stand firmly behind its eventual membership in
the Alliance. As summarized by Ronald D.
Asmus,
The challenge of securing Europe s eastern border from the Baltics to the
Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability
along the southern rim of the Euro-Atlantic community
-
from the Bal¬
kans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia, a region that connects
Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security interests,
including a critical energy corridor.
[...]
This strategy [of NATO expan¬
sion] presents an opportunity to redraw the strategic map of Europe and
Eurasia in a way that enhances the security of countries on Europe s peri¬
phery as well as that of the United States and Europe.1
In light of the dangers to mutual security that have become ap¬
parent in the 21st century, military and intelligence cooperation sho¬
uld be pursued by NATO, Ukraine, and Russia. Unfortunately, recent
developments display growing tensions that hinder this collaborative
effort. Russia s High Command continues to perceive NATO with di¬
strust while Moscow persists to identify the territories of the former
Soviet Union as an integral part of its sphere of interest and attempts
to dominate the Commonwealth of Independent States, or what it con¬
siders its near abroad. Closer ties between Ukraine s Armed Forces
and NATO forces result in immediate accusations from Russia, which
feels that its post-Soviet leadership role is being undermined. Today,
the Kremlin s policies and rhetoric are progressively anti-American
and anti-Ukrainian.
The Kremlin s foreign policy objectives under Putin are best sum¬
marized by
Janusz Bugajski.
They include;
restoring Russia s global presence, promoting and projecting Russia s
great power identity, undermining the United States as the sole super¬
power by inhibiting its range of maneuverability, creating alliances with
countries that were wary of U.S. influence, exploiting conflicts between
Washington and its European allies, and using strategic resources to gain
economic and political influence in Russia s former empire.2
1
Ronald D.
Asmus,
Europe s Eastern Promises, Foreign Affairs
87,
no.
1
(2008).
2
Janusz
Bugajski, Cold Peace: Russia s New imperialism
(Westport: Praeger,
2004), 22.
Imperial Poker: Summary of Imperial Games...
199
The year
2007
was marked by growing tensions between Wash¬
ington and Moscow. The pace was set with Putin s infamous Munich
speech in which he stated that the U.S. has overstepped its national
borders in every way and a few months later he implicitly compared
America to Hitler s Third Reich. Washington did not sit on its hands
and in April, the U.S. State Department issued a report which criticized
Russia s human rights violations. Unsurprisingly, the most contentious
issue was the potential installment of an American anti-missile shield
in Poland and the Czech Republic. This was also the year in which Rus¬
sia renewed flights of its strategic bombers and withdrew from the
Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. While the Kremlin continued
to flex its muscles, Putin revealed his strategy to remain in power by
recommending (designating, more appropriately) Deputy Prime Min¬
ister Dmitri Medvedev as his choice for Russia s next president. After
Russia s attack on Georgia in August
2008
and the January
2009
gas
offensive , the post-9/11 expectations of a pro-Western Putin
-
as he
was often referred to
-
united with the U.S. in the fight against global
terrorism should be long gone. Unfortunately, the danger remains that
Washington will sideline Kyiv and forgo its Euro-Atlantic integration
to gain closer cooperation with Russia on issues such as Iran s nuclear
ambitions and the war in Afghanistan. This would be detrimental both
to Ukraine and the U.S.
The hand has been dealt. Now, there are two critical questions that
Washington needs to ask itself: How should the United States respond if
the Russian government continues to become a growing security threat
and persists in its neo-imperial policies toward its neighbors
-
especial¬
ly Ukraine? Why should the U.S. consider Ukraine a strategic partner
and in what ways is it vital to Washington s interests?
Samuel
Huntington
stated that in terms of the global power struc¬
ture
-
from the American perspective
-
Ukraine is an important secon¬
dary regional state. According to
Huntington,
both Washington and
Kyiv have an interest in ensuring that Russia does not expand and
once again become a superpower, dominating its neighbors. 3 Unfortu-
n
Samuel Huntington,
The New World Order in the 21st Century: Global
Strategic Involvement and Its Implications for Ukraine, National Security
&
Dc-
fena no.7(2Q00):lQ.
200
Imperialna rozgrywka
nately, this is easier said than done. By providing a historical overview
of U.S.-Ukraine relations and incorporating scholarly analysis from the
field of imperiology, Imperial Games attempts to outline the opportu¬
nities and benefits that enhanced security cooperation may have for
America, Ukraine, and their partners in Europe. As Russia regresses
into the phantom of empire, which it so desperately longs for, the Uni¬
ted States will increasingly rely on Ukraine and Kyiv, in turn, will need
Washington more than ever.
The year
1990
was marked by an unprecedented dusk of an em¬
pire: Russia had declared its independence and subsequently engaged
in the demise of the USSR, which although officially under a different
name, was in fact Russia but under a red banner
-
not the tsar s. 4 As
noted by Alexander
Motyl,
In contrast to the non-Russian republics, however, Russia inherited the
bulk of the imperial-totalitarian state
-
in particular, the central ministries,
the army, and the secret police
-
and the legacy of the Soviet core s cultural
domination. To put the difference in especially stark but not inaccurate
terms, Ukraine and the other non-Baltic republics emerged from Soviet
collapse without
bona fide
states, powerful elites, civil societies, markets,
democracy, rule of law, and genuine cultures and hence without genuine
nations. Russia had a state, and it possessed a sense of cultural superiority
and historical destiny that underpinned both nationhood and empire.5
To some extent, this historical destiny was strengthened by Rus¬
sia s former Cold War rivals. After the collapse of the USSR, Washing¬
ton s priority was to ensure that post-Soviet Russia would not pose
a threat to American interest around the world and to contain poten¬
tial global fallout from Russia s weakness. 6 Finding the best balance
between containment and engagement was a challenging task and the
Clinton administration initiated a dual strategy of supporting trans-
4
Roman Szporluk,
Pożegnanie z imperium: O historycznych związkach
Rosji i ZSRR, Europa
122, (2006).
5
Alexander
Motyl,
Structural Constraints and Starting Points: The Logic of
Systemic Change in Ukraine and Russia, Comparative Politics
29,
no.
4 (1997): 435.
6
Angela E. Stent, America and Russia: Paradoxes of Partnership, in Rus¬
sia s Engagement with the West,
ed,
Alexander J.
Motyl,
Blair A. Ruble, and
Lilia
Shevtsova (Armonk: M.E.
Sharpe,
2005), 260.
Imperial Poker: Summary of Imperial Games...
201
formation and integration that, by end of its tenure, had not achieved
either goal. 7 As noted by Angela E. Stent, among the premises that
guided Clinton s policy toward Russia was the concern that Russia s
weakness and unresolved questions of post-imperial identity meant
that it had the potential to destabilize the post-Soviet space. The ad¬
ministration thus believed that American policy should support the
independence of the post-Soviet states and contain Russia s ability to
undermine their security. At the same time, however, as compensa¬
tion for Russia adapting to its new, reduced international role, the Unit¬
ed States would offer Russia some of the trappings of a major power,
for instance, membership in the G8 and later on a partnership with
NATO. 8 The problem with this strategy was that it attempted to unify
two contradictory policies: Limit Russia s imperial tendencies by sup¬
porting the sovereignty of countries like Ukraine, and simultaneously
appease its ambitions by allowing it to feel like a power that needs
to be informed, consulted, and brought onboard when dealing with
global politics. It is not surprising that Russians believe they deserve
this superpower status since the absurd procedure of compensating
the inheritor of the evil empire for losing the Cold War was meticu¬
lously carried out by the United States and its European partners. It is
tempting to ask, What has Russia given back? So far, it specializes in
making demands.
Without a doubt, Washington had the best intentions in giving Rus¬
sia a voice in Western clubs and the international community. It had
done so even at the cost of post-Soviet states, including Ukraine. Russia
did not make the best of this generosity. The fact of the matter is that
America had not lost Russia.9 Russia lost itself
-
or never found itself to
begin with. With this in mind, certain contemporary questions require
careful deliberation: Has Russia contributed to democratic and market
reforms in what it perceives as its sphere of interest? Has it contributed
7 Ibid., 264.
s
Ibid., 264-265.
4
Peter W. Rodman notes, This is not a matter of Who lost Russia? since
Russia was never ours to lose. : Russia: The Challenge of a Failing Power in Pre¬
sent Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy,
ed.
Rob¬
ert
Kagan
and William Kristol (San Francisco: Encounter Books,
2000), 81.
202 ___________
Imperialna rozgrywka
to
regional and international
security? Is it a reliable ally in conflict re¬
solution? Unfortunately, today, especially after Russia s attack on Geo¬
rgia, it seems appropriate to say that Russia is progressively more part
of the problem than part of the solution.10 For this reason, Washington s
focus should be directed toward Ukraine.
Because Russian imperial identity was shaped before a national
one could take hold, imperial continuity is too hard for Moscow to re¬
sist and despite its defeat in the Cold War, regardless of the collapse
of the Communist block, and irrespective of the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, political and military elites did not acknowledge their
postimperial
status. 11 They also failed to accept Ukraine s indepen¬
dence, which Putin confirmed in April
2008
when told George W. Bush
that Ukraine isn t even a state. Moscow uses this approach to justify
its claims to Ukraine and its accusations directed toward Washington,
an attitude perfectly exemplified by Sergei Markov, a Kremlin advisor
and Duma deputy from the United Russia party:
American ideas are completely crazy
-
they want Russian influence to
be limited to Russian territory. But how can one expect this from a great
power? Russia is a great power and will not hide within its borders. The
U.S. denies us not only the status of a super-power but even a power. This
is sheer madness. How can you even come up with the idea that Ukra¬
inians who have lived with us for thousands of years (Kyiv was in fact the
first capital of
Rus)
could be our enemies and not our friends. And then
attempt to make Ukraine Washington s colony... 12
10
The background of the Kremlin s political elites probably has a lot to do
with this.
Arme Applebaum
points out that a recent survey reported that more
than a quarter of Russia s leaders in the presidential administration, government
and parliament had served in the KGB or another intelligence service. A whop¬
ping
78
per cent appear to have had some relationship with intelligence services,
clandestine or otherwise.
Anne Applebaum,
Why Putin Will Stop at Nothing to
Smash the New Russian Revolution, The Spectator, April
21,2007.
For an account
of the KGB s presence in the Russian government, administration, security appa¬
ratus, media, and state-connected corporations (especially in the energy sector),
consult: Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and
the West (London: Bloomsbury,
2008).
11
Bugajski, Cold Peace,
15.
12
„McCain
to katastrofa, Europa
239,2008.
Imperial Poker: Summary of
Imperial
Games...
203
Statements such as this display that a great number of Russian
politicians fail to accept the fall of the U.S.S.R. Nor have they come to
terms with a sovereign Ukraine. Ilya
Prizei
noted in the early 90 s that
the emergence of an independent Ukraine is a blow to the Russian na¬
tional self-image, and, indeed, perhaps the largest single contributor to
the crisis of identity that is befalling Russia. 13 Although many people
had hoped that Russia would abandon its imperial identity, currently,
almost two decades later, it is clear that the Kremlin is back to the game
of empire.
After empires formally expire, collapse and end are not equivalent;
although the networks between peripheries and the center may disap¬
pear, formal independence does not necessarily mean the disappe¬
arance of empire as a system. 14 In addition, a state may acquire (or
reacquire) an empire through
nonimperialist
means.15 Economic de¬
pendence is a vital instrument in this form of reasserting an empire
and Russia is politically exploiting its natural resources to subdue its
neighbors. Ukraine has experienced Moscow s energy blackmail and
pipeline politics 16 more than once.
Initially, throughout the 1990 s, American policy toward Ukraine
was implemented through the prism of dealing with the Soviet Union
and Washington s priority was for Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear arse¬
nal. Having done so, it seemed that a closer partnership was under way.
Unfortunately, Leonid Kuchma s corrupt regime feverishly adhered to
the policy of multi-vectorism which, according to
Taras
Kuzio was a
reflection of an amorphous and confused national identity and hence
of an inability to choose between Europe and Eurasia, a desire for the
best of both worlds. Ukraine s government could not decide whether
to go west or east because to go to Eurasia would be to lose sovereignty
13
Uya
Prizei,
Ethnicity and Foreign Policy in Ukraine in National Identity
and Ethnicity in Russia and the New States of Eurasia,
ed.
Roman Szporluk (Armonk:
M.E.
Sharpe,
1994), 118.
14
Motyl,
Imperial Ends:
Tlie
Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires (New
York: Columbia University Press,
2001), 87.
15
Motyl,
Revolutions, Nations, Empires, (New York: Columbia University
Press,
1999), 161.
111
As referred to by Edward Lucas in The New Cold War: How the Kremlin
Menaces both Russia and the West (London: Bloomsbury,
2008).
204
Imperialna rozgrywka
to Russia while to go to Europe would require them to undertake the
reforms that would undercut their control of the economy and, by de¬
fault, society. 17 The regime s undemocratic nature placed it at great
odds with the United States. Tensions deteriorated with the revelations
of Melnychenko s tape recordings concerning the murdered journalist
Hryhorii Gongadze and came to a head with allegations of Ukraine s
sale of Kolchuga radar systems to Iraq. Fortunately, there was a light at
the end of the tunnel and it was orange.
Thanks to the Orange Revolution the world was reminded of Ukra¬
ine s existence. During those cold November days in
2004,
Ukrainian ci¬
vil society won a real victory. Today, Ukrainians enjoy independent me¬
dia and democratic and fair elections. But is this enough? As in the case
of many Ukrainians, the West feels a sense of disillusionment caused
by the lack of progress following the Orange Revolution. The failure
to introduce crucial reforms, the enduring and widespread corruption,
the lack of cooperation between political elites (especially those once
considered orange ), and the business-oligarchic style of politics have
made it difficult for Washington to integrate Ukraine into the Euro-
Atlantic community. Nevertheless, Yulia Tymoshenko s government,
which formed in late
2007,
displayed a pro-Western attitude and in Ja¬
nuary
2008
President Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko,
and Parliament Chairman
Arseny
Yatsenyuk sent a letter to Brussels in
which they declared Ukraine s readiness to partake in NATO s Mem¬
bership Action Plan.18 Regrettably, the MAP was not granted to Ukraine
17
Taras
Kuzio, National Identities and Virtual Foreign Policies among
Eastern Slavs, Nationalities Papers
31,
no.
4 (2003): 448.
18
In January
2008,
Barack
Obama
stated, I welcome the decision by Presi¬
dent Viktor Yushchenko, Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, and Parliament
Chairman
Arseny
Yatsenyuk to declare Ukraine s readiness to advance a Mem¬
bership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO. The extension of NATO membership
to new democracies in Europe has helped create a zone of peace and prosperity
across Europe and enhanced NATO s military capability by facilitating contribu¬
tions from new members. I therefore applaud the Ukrainian leaders commitment
to deepening the democratic reforms required of all NATO members and to un¬
dertaking new responsibilities in their relationship with the Alliance. The Ukrain¬
ian leadership s determination to foster national unity and consult the Ukrainian
people on the question of Ukraine s future in NATO demonstrates the importance
they place on national unity and open, democratic debate. NATO s upcoming
Imperial Poker: Summary of Imperial Games...
205
neither during the April
2008
NATO summit in Bucharest, nor during
NATO s 60th anniversary summit in Strasbourg-Kehl in
2009.
The major
obstacles to Ukraine s membership in the Alliance include the oppo¬
sition of some of its members (especially France, Germany, and Italy)
who do not want to irritate Russia, and the low level of Ukrainian public
support for membership
-
a fact often cited by opponents of Ukraine s
accession to NATO. Why is this status quo not beneficial to the U.S.?
Clearly, it is not in the interest of the United States to allow Ukraine
to fall back into Russia s imperial orbit. Both the U.S. and Russia have
very divergent interests: One concerns liberal-democracy, the other im¬
perial authoritarianism. To a similar extent, the same is true for Ukraine
and Russia. Addressing the highly esteemed notions of liberal or enlight¬
ened empire that is increasingly advocated and supported by certain
Russian intellectuals, public opinion, and above all, the regime,
Andrzej
Nowak
states that, Sooner of later the empire will have to confront the
fact that it is not perceived as good, but as evil
-
it will have to have to
face the challenge of those groups or communities that see themselves
as its victims: past, present, or potential. In the case that imperial poli¬
tics are not abandoned, the size of empire and its interests become the
goal in whose name categories of good and evil may be abandoned. All
that counts is force. 19 The Russian defense of empire justifies its unre¬
strained exercise of power. If they choose, the great and strong may
decide on the fate of the small and weak according to their own will and
interests. When convenient for them, they may and should crash the
small. They can take their independence away, dictate arbitrary prices on
summit in Bucharest in April
2008
is a critical opportunity to continue to build
the Europe whole and free that has been the goal of all recent U.S. presidents.
I call on President Bush and all of NATO s leaders to seize that opportunity.
Barack
Obama, Obama
Statement on Ukraine s Commitment to Join NATO,
Barack
Obama:
U.S. Senator for Illinois,
http^/obama.senate.gov/press/OSOlže-
obama_statement_118/ (accessed January
29,2008).
w
Andrzej
Nowak,
Metamorfozy imperium: Budowanie nowej Rosji,
Eu¬
ropa 132 (2006).
For a discussion of the Russian elite s positive discourse of em¬
pire from the 19lh century to the present, see:
Andrzej
Nowak,
Russia, Empire
and Evil, in History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Polish
Institute of International Affairs,
2008).
For an example of a recent defense of em¬
pire, see the commentary of
Siergiej Marków, Rosja chce odbudować imperium,
Dziennik,
February
27,2007.
206
Imperialna rozgrywka
gas (as Russia attempted in its relations with Ukraine and Georgia on the
eve of
2006),
level their homes, whole cities and villages to the ground (as
Russia has been systematically doing in Chechnya since 1995).20
The project of imperial revival undertaken by Putin s Russia is a di¬
rect threat to Ukraine, undermines stability in Eurasia, and is contrary
to American security interests. How should Kyiv and Washington deal
with this rising
perü -
or, more bluntly
-
what factors can undercut the
Kremlin s ambitions of empire? According to Alexander
Motyl,
If relative state capacity and economic autonomy hold the key to the po¬
ssibility of a post-Soviet imperial revival, it is hard to imagine how the
east-central European states could be brought back into a Russian empi¬
re. They are independent, they are comparatively rich, they are economi¬
cally independent, they are strategically important to the United States
and Europe
-
and, as members of NATO and the European Union
(EU),
they will be part of Western Europe
-
and they are geographically distant
from the former core.21
Aside from the element of proximity, can Motyl s argument con¬
cerning Central and Eastern European countries ability to withstand
imperial revival be applicable to Ukraine?22 If so, to make sure that im¬
perial revival does not consume Ukraine, the United States is required
to show greater involvement in Ukraine s economic, political, and mili¬
tary transformation and take a firm stance on its entry into NATO.
The six sections of Imperial Games examine the importance of the
Ukrainian-American strategic partnership, look at the difficulties that
this cooperation has encountered (and may encounter in the future),
and provide recommendations on ways to enhance this relationship.
There is much to gain and even more to lose. In tackling the complex
and multidimensional relations of U.S-Ukraine-Russia-NATO, theories
from the field of imperiology were applied to give the subject structure
within the framework of empire.
Upon examining various definitions of empire, the first portion of
this book looks at the United States role in maintaining global security.
20 Nowak,
Russia, Empire and Evil,
300.
21
Motyl,
Revolutions, Nations, Empires,
159.
22
Ibid.
156-161.
____________
Imperial Poker: Summary of Imperial Games...
___________207
With regard to formal and informal, continuous and discontinuous as¬
pects of empire, Chapter
2
outlines the different (often contradictory)
categorizations of the United States and sorts out discrepancies of defi¬
nition by taking a closer look at the heatedly debated question: Is the
U.S. an empire? Because of Ukraine s long experience with empires, the
answer to this predicament is key because the Ukrainians perception
of the U.S. in terms of empire,
hegemon,
or global leader affects their
attitudes toward Washington and NATO. By providing an introduction
to the post-imperial and post-Soviet challenges faced by the Ukraini¬
ans, this section also displays the legacy of Russian and Soviet imperial
domination and the detrimental implications that this experience has
had on the newly independent Ukrainian state and its citizens. As an
example of the Russian state s reaction to what it perceives as a threat to
its imperial project, this section portrays the Kremlin s current strategy
of mobilizing Russian youth and analyzes Russia s imperial identity in
the context of the pro-Kremlin group called Nashi. These revolutionar¬
ies legitimization of empire revival (and the rehabilitation of its Soviet
phase) is clearly dangerous to Ukraine s security.23 Following the portion
dedicated to the legacy of empire, Chapter
3
outlines the erratic U.S.¬
Ukraine relations from Kyiv s independence to the Orange Revolution.
This analysis grants better insight into current and future prospects of
the Kyiv-Washington partnership. The central issues which had
-
and
will continue to have
-
a tremendous impact on their relations is the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
NATO is not only a vital pillar in the United States foreign po¬
licy, it is a keystone in transatlantic relations and the most effective
instrument of collective security in the world. While Putin portrays
23
For Russian perceptions of Ukraine and its proper relationship to Rus¬
sia, see chapters entitled Russia Imagining Ukraine: Nationalist Visions and
Russia Imagining Ukraine: Moderate Voices in Andrew Wilson s
Tlie
Ukrain¬
ians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven: Yale
Nota Bene,
2002).
Concerning Russian
discourse on geopolitics and empire, consult chapters entitled
Pokusy Rosyjskiej
Geopolityki (po
1991
roku)
in
Andrzej
Nowak,
Od Imperium do Imperium: Spo¬
jrzenie na Historię Europy Wschodniej (Kraków:
Arcana,
2004)
and Poor
Empire
or a Second Rome: Temptations of Imperial Discourse in Contemporary Russian
Thinking, in History and Geopolitics: A Contest for Eastern Europe (Warsaw: Polish
Institute of International Affairs,
2008).
208
Imperialna rozgrywka
NATO as a leftover of the past, Ukraine s potential membership in
the Alliance continues to be a thorn in Moscow s side. Chapter
4
di¬
splays an overview of relations between NATO, Russia, and Ukraine
from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present. Emphasis is placed
on their contemporary relations and their common and divergent in¬
terests. Examining these contacts is necessary to get a more in-depth
understanding of current developments and their potential implica¬
tions to international security. Although NATO expansion poses no
threat to the Russian Federation, the Kremlin fails to realize that as
long as it insists on seeing NATO as an enemy, it strengthens the case
for bringing vulnerable ex-communist countries into the alliance. 2*
When it comes to national security, Ukraine should not bet on Russia.
The greatest potential for peace and security for Ukraine, resides in
its integration with the United States and its NATO Allies who sho¬
uld be firm and determined in their policies toward Moscow s frequ¬
ent misconducts. Because the Black Sea region
-
the channel between
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Central and Western Europe
-
is stra¬
tegically vital in safeguarding global and regional security, it is a sub¬
ject discussed in detail in Chapter
5,
along with issues concerning the
Black Sea Fleet.
The final section focuses on U.S.-Ukraine military cooperation.
Following the collapse of empires, a key challenge in transformation is
the issue of security because as central control over the armed forces,
police, and other institutions enforcing imperial order begins to unra¬
vel, people s most immediate problem is that of security and physical
survival. 25 In the case of Ukraine, the immediate formation of the Ar¬
med Forces was vital to its security and helped guarantee its indepen¬
dence. Nevertheless, Ukraine s military was
-
and still is
-
plagued by
the remnants of the Soviet empire and the communist state. This has
a very damaging effect to its security and ability to attain enhanced
cooperation with its Western partners such as the United States and
24
Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and
the West (London: Bloomsbury,
2008) 260.
25
Jack Snyder, Reconstructing politics amidst the wreckage of empire in
Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building,
ed. Barnet
R.
Rubin and Jack
Snyder (New York: Routledge,
1998), 7.
Imperial Poker: Summary of Imperial Games...
209
NATO. In
1997,
U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen stated that
U.S. commitment toward Ukraine
stems not just from friendship, but from strategic self interest. As Presi¬
dent Clinton said two years ago in Kiev, Ukraine provide^] an essential
anchor of stability and freedom in a part of the world still reeling from
rapid change. That is why the United States seeks a deeper strategic part¬
nership with Ukraine.26
This kind of pragmatism must continue to guide assistance for the
Ukrainian Armed Forces that are undergoing the much-needed milita¬
ry reforms essential to achieving a higher level of interoperability with
U.S. and NATO forces. This transformation is imperative for Ukraine to
play an active role in fighting global terrorism.
This does not have to be a zero-sum game, unless Russia ma¬
kes it one. Ukraine, the United States, and Russia are in many ways
partners and should continue along this path. Acting on the convic¬
tion that Russia is
-
and always will be
-
an enemy will only sever
relations. Nevertheless, while avoiding self-fulfilling prophecies, the
Transatlantic community has to see reality for what it is and consider
the worst case scenario. The bottom line is that Putin s Russia is dan¬
gerous. Its project of imperial revival is also dangerous. The Kremlin
should not be afforded the benefit of the doubt among former sa¬
tellites as subterfuge and imperialist ambitions have formed the core
of Russian policy for generations. 27 Nor should it be allowed to use
bilateral dealings to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Europe. Puti¬
n s Russia is a threat because it masquerades as a democratic and free-
market state. The United States needs to make it clear that Moscow
isn t fooling anyone and this approach should guide Washington s
policies toward Ukraine. Although it is uncertain who will win this
showdown
-
if democratic freedoms and international security are to
prevail
-
losing is not an option.
26
William S. Cohen, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by U.S. Secretary of
Defense William S. Cohen Academy of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Kiev, Ukraine
July
12,1997,
U.S. Department of Defense, July
14,1997,
httpi/Avww.defenselink.
mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=1347
27
Bugajski, Cold Peace,
2.
|
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| spelling | Olchawa, Maciej Verfasser aut Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych Maciej Olchawa ; przeł. Jakub Piasecki Wyd. 1. Kraków Wydawnictwo "Arcana" 2009 247 s. il. 22 cm. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Arkana Historii Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Imperial poker Geschichte 1997-2009 gnd rswk-swf Außenpolitik Geopolitics Eurasia Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd rswk-swf USA Ukraine Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations Ukraine Ukraine (DE-588)4061496-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 gnd rswk-swf USA (DE-588)4078704-7 g Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 s Ukraine (DE-588)4061496-7 g Geschichte 1997-2009 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018701600&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018701600&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Olchawa, Maciej Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych Außenpolitik Geopolitics Eurasia Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4003846-4 (DE-588)4061496-7 (DE-588)4078704-7 |
| title | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych |
| title_auth | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych |
| title_exact_search | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych |
| title_full | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych Maciej Olchawa ; przeł. Jakub Piasecki |
| title_fullStr | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych Maciej Olchawa ; przeł. Jakub Piasecki |
| title_full_unstemmed | Imperialna rozgrywka Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych Maciej Olchawa ; przeł. Jakub Piasecki |
| title_short | Imperialna rozgrywka |
| title_sort | imperialna rozgrywka ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii stanow zjednoczonych |
| title_sub | Ukraina w geopolitycznej strategii Stanów Zjednoczonych |
| topic | Außenpolitik Geopolitics Eurasia Außenpolitik (DE-588)4003846-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Geopolitics Eurasia USA Ukraine Foreign relations United States United States Foreign relations Ukraine Ukraine |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018701600&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018701600&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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