Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group:
We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
CESifo
2009
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working papers
2763 : Category 2, Public choice |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice. -- voting ; punishment ; voluntary contributions ; heterogeneity ; experiment |
| Beschreibung: | [29] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
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| id | DE-604.BV035816073 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:05:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-018674913 |
| oclc_num | 643435489 |
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| physical | [29] S. graph. Darst. |
| psigel | ebook |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | CESifo |
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| series | CESifo working papers |
| series2 | CESifo working papers |
| spelling | Noussair, Charles Verfasser aut Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group Charles Noussair ; Fangfang Tan Munich CESifo 2009 [29] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier CESifo working papers 2763 : Category 2, Public choice We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice. -- voting ; punishment ; voluntary contributions ; heterogeneity ; experiment Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd rswk-swf Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd rswk-swf Strafe (DE-588)4057785-5 gnd rswk-swf Strafe (DE-588)4057785-5 s Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 s Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 s DE-604 Tan, Fangfang Verfasser (DE-588)137099037 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe CESifo working papers 2763 : Category 2, Public choice (DE-604)BV013978326 2763 application/pdf http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2763.pdf Verlag kostenfrei Volltext https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2009/working-paper/voting-punishment-systems-within-heterogeneous-group Verlag kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Noussair, Charles Tan, Fangfang Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group CESifo working papers Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd Strafe (DE-588)4057785-5 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4201195-4 (DE-588)4015999-1 (DE-588)4057785-5 |
| title | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group |
| title_auth | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group |
| title_exact_search | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group |
| title_full | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group Charles Noussair ; Fangfang Tan |
| title_fullStr | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group Charles Noussair ; Fangfang Tan |
| title_full_unstemmed | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group Charles Noussair ; Fangfang Tan |
| title_short | Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group |
| title_sort | voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group |
| topic | Dilemma (DE-588)4201195-4 gnd Experiment (DE-588)4015999-1 gnd Strafe (DE-588)4057785-5 gnd |
| topic_facet | Dilemma Experiment Strafe |
| url | http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp2763.pdf https://www.cesifo.org/en/publikationen/2009/working-paper/voting-punishment-systems-within-heterogeneous-group |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV013978326 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT noussaircharles votingonpunishmentsystemswithinaheterogeneousgroup AT tanfangfang votingonpunishmentsystemswithinaheterogeneousgroup |