In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a natural...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Balaguer, Mark (VerfasserIn)
Format:	Buch
Sprache:	English
Veröffentlicht:	Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.] MIT Press 2010
Schriftenreihe:	A Bradford book
Schlagworte:	Free will and determinism Libertinismus Willensfreiheit Determinismus
Online-Zugang:	Inhaltsverzeichnis
Zusammenfassung:	In this largely antimetaphysical treatment of free will and determinism, Mark Balaguer argues that the philosophical problem of free will boils down to an open scientific question about the causal histories of certain kinds of neural events. In the course of his argument, Balaguer provides a naturalistic defense of the libertarian view of free will. Balaguer claims that the compatibilism debate (the question of whether free will is compatible with determinism) is essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human freedom, most notably "Do humans have free will?" Likewise, the questions "What is free will?" and "Which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility?" are argued to be irrelevant to substantive questions about the metaphysics of human free will. The metaphysical component of the problem of free will, Balaguer argues, essentially boils down to the question of whether humans possess libertarian free will. Furthermore, he argues that, contrary to the traditional wisdom, the libertarian question reduces to a question about indeterminacy - in particular, to a straightforward empirical question about whether certain neural events in our heads are causally undetermined in a certain specific way.
Beschreibung:	VIII, 202 S.
ISBN:	9780262013543