Auction theory:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Amsterdam [u.a.]
Academic Press
2010
|
| Ausgabe: | 2. ed. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Klappentext Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XI, 323 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780123745071 |
Internformat
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804140664462508032 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | AUCTION THEORY
VIJAY KRISHNA
Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
SECOND EDITION
On its publication in
2002,
Vijay Krishna s book immediately became a central
reference in auction theory. But the subject has continued to develop, and so
we re very fortunate that Krishna has now updated the text.
-
Eric
Maskin,
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, NJ
Krishna s superb Auction Theory is an ideal text and reference because his clear
and precise exposition distills the vast literature and provides excellent motiva¬
tion, examples, exercises, and connections to commercial applications.
-
Robert Wilson, Stanford University
η
his Second Edition of Auction The. Vijay Krishna expands his
2002
best
seller by adding a new chapter on combinatorial auctions, learning aids, and
-
teaching supplements, increasing its value to both students and researchers.
New sections on applications of theory to real-world problems provide motivations
that are unavailable in other books. Complete proofs and new material about
collusion complement Krishna s ability to reveal the basic facts of each theory.
Building upon the First Editions clarity and directness, the Second Edition of
Auction Theory provides clear access to auction theory that remains objective,
comprehensive, and concise.
Companion Web site:
http:,
•elsevierdirect.com/companions/978012374507
CONTENTS PREFACE IX 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 SOME COMMON AUCTION FORMS 2 1.2
VALUATIONS 2 1.3 EQUIVALENT AUCTIONS 4 1.4 REVENUE VERSUS EFFICIENCY 5
1.5 WHAT IS AN AUCTION? 6 1.6 OUTLINE OF PART I 6 1 SINGLE-OBJECT
AUCTIONS 9 2 PRIVATE VALUE AUCTIONS: A FIRST LOOK 11 2.1 THE SYMMETRIC
MODEL 11 2.2 SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 12 2.3 FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 13 2.4
REVENUE COMPARISON 17 2.5 RESERVE PRICES 21 3 THE REVENUE EQUIVALENCE
PRINCIPLE 27 3.1 MAIN RESULT 27 3.2 SOME APPLICATIONS OF THE REVENUE
EQUIVALENCE PRINCIPLE 29 3.2.1 UNUSUAL AUCTIONS 29 3.2.2 UNCERTAIN
NUMBER OF BIDDERS 32 4 QUALIFICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS 37 4.1 RISK-AVERSE
BIDDERS 38 4.2 BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 42 4.2.1 SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 42
4.2.2 FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 44 4.2.3 REVENUE COMPARISON 45 4.3
ASYMMETRIES AMONG BIDDERS 46 4.3.1 ASYMMETRIC FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH
TWO BIDDERS 46 4.3.2 REVENUE COMPARISON 51 4.3.3 EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
53 4.4 RESALE AND EFFICIENCY 54 VI CONTENTS 5 MECHANISM DESIGN 61 5.1
MECHANISMS 61 5.1.1 THE REVELATION PRINCIPLE 62 5.1.2 INCENTIVE
COMPATIBILITY 63 5.1.3 INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY 66 5.2 OPTIMAL MECHANISMS
67 5.2.1 SETUP 67 5.2.2 SOLUTION 68 5.2.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
71 5.2.4 AUCTIONS VERSUS MECHANISMS 74 5.3 EFFICIENT MECHANISMS 75 5.3.1
THE VCG MECHANISM 75 5.3.2 BUDGET BALANCE 77 5.3.3 AN APPLICATION TO
BILATERAL TRADE 79 6 AUCTIONS WITH INTERDEPENDENT VALUES 85 6.1 THE
SYMMETRIC MODEL 88 6.2 SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 89 6.3 ENGLISH AUCTIONS 91
6.4 FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 94 6.5 REVENUE COMPARISONS 97 6.5.1 ENGLISH
VERSUS SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 97 6.5.2 SECOND-PRICE VERSUS FIRST-PRICE
AUCTIONS 98 6.6 EFFICIENCY 101 7 THE REVENUE RANKING ( LINKAGE )
PRINCIPLE 105 7.1 THE MAIN RESULT 105 7.2 PUBLIC INFORMATION 108 7.3 AN
ALTERNATIVE LINKAGE PRINCIPLE 110 8 ASYMMETRIES AND OTHER COMPLICATIONS
113 8.1 FAILURES OF THE LINKAGE PRINCIPLE 113 8.2 ASYMMETRIC EQUILIBRIA
IN SYMMETRIC SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS .. 118 8.3 ASYMMETRICALLY INFORMED
BIDDERS 120 8.4 RESERVE PRICES AND ENTRY FEES 122 9 EFFICIENCY AND THE
ENGLISH AUCTION 129 9.1 THE SINGLE CROSSING CONDITION 130 9.2 TWO-BIDDER
AUCTIONS 131 9.3 THE AVERAGE CROSSING CONDITION 134 9.4 THREE OR MORE
BIDDERS 135 9.5 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9.2 136 9.6 MISCELLANY 141 CONTENTS
VII 10 MECHANISM DESIGN WITH INTERDEPENDENT VALUES 145 10.1 EFFICIENT
MECHANISMS 146 10.2 OPTIMAL MECHANISMS 150 11 BIDDING RINGS 157 11.1
COLLUSION IN SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 158 11.1.1 EFFICIENT COLLUSION 160
11.1.2 RESERVE PRICES IN THE FACE OF COLLUSION 163 11.2 COLLUSION IN
FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 166 11 MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS 171 12 AN
INTRODUCTION TO MULTIPLE-OBJECT AUCTIONS 173 12.1 SEALED-BID AUCTIONS
FOR SELLING IDENTICAL UNITS 174 12.1.1 DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS 176
12.1.2 UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTIONS 177 12.1.3 VICKREY AUCTIONS 178 12.2 SOME
OPEN AUCTIONS 179 12.2.1 DUTCH AUCTIONS 179 12.2.2 ENGLISH AUCTIONS 180
12.2.3 AUSUBEL AUCTIONS 180 13 EQUILIBRIUM AND EFFICIENCY WITH PRIVATE
VALUES 185 13.1 THE BASIC MODEL 185 13.2 VICKREY AUCTIONS 187 13.3
EFFICIENCY IN MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS 189 13.4 UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTIONS 190
13.4.1 DEMAND REDUCTION 192 13.4.2 SINGLE-UNIT DEMAND 196 13.5
DISCRIMINATORY AUCTIONS 196 13.5.1 STRUCTURE OF EQUILIBRIA 197 13.5.2
SINGLE-UNIT DEMAND 200 14 SOME REVENUE CONSIDERATIONS 203 14.1 REVENUE
EQUIVALENCE IN MULTIUNIT AUCTIONS 204 14.2 REVENUE EQUIVALENCE WITH
MULTIUNIT DEMAND: AN EXAMPLE .. 206 15 SEQUENTIAL SALES 213 15.1
SEQUENTIAL FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS 213 15.1.1 TWO UNITS 214 15.1.2 MORE
THAN TWO UNITS 217 15.1.3 EQUILIBRIUM BIDS AND PRICES 219 VIII CONTENTS
15.2 SEQUENTIAL SECOND-PRICE AUCTIONS 221 15.2.1 REVENUE EQUIVALENCE 221
15.2.2 EQUILIBRIUM BIDS 222 16 NONIDENTICAL OBJECTS 227 16.1 THE MODEL
227 16.2 EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS 229 16.3 SUBSTITUTES AND COMPLEMENTS 230
16.4 BUNDLING 231 16.5 SOME COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES 233 16.6 BUDGET
CONSTRAINTS 235 17 PACKAGES AND POSITIONS 239 17.1 PACKAGE AUCTIONS 240
17.1.1 THE ASCENDING AUCTION 240 17.1.2 GROSS SUBSTITUTES 241 17.1.3
EQUILIBRIUM OF THE PROXY AUCTION 243 17.2 POSITION AUCTIONS 244 18
MULTIPLE OBJECTS AND INTERDEPENDENT VALUES. 251 18.1 ONE-DIMENSIONAL
SIGNALS 251 18.1.1 AN EFFICIENT DIRECT MECHANISM 252 18.1.2 EFFICIENCY
VIA OPEN AUCTIONS 255 18.2 MULTIDIMENSIONAL SIGNALS 259 18.2.1 SINGLE
OBJECT 260 18.2.2 MULTIPLE OBJECTS 263 III APPENDICES 267 A CONTINUOUS
DISTRIBUTIONS 269 B STOCHASTIC ORDERS 275 C ORDER STATISTICS 281 D
AFFILIATED RANDOM VARIABLES 285 E SOME LINEAR ALGEBRA 289 F GAMES OF
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 295 G EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN FIRST-PRICE
AUCTIONS 299 BIBLIOGRAPHY 305 INDEX : 315 THE PASSWORD-PROTECTED
COMPANION WEB SITE FOR INSTRUCTORS CONTAINING SOLUTIONS TO
END-OF-CHAPTER QUESTIONS AND SLIDES FOR CLASS USE TO COMPLEMENT THE TEXT
CAN BE FOUND AT HTTP://ELSEVIERDIRECT.COM/COMPANIONS/9780123745071.
|
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| author | Krishna, Vijay |
| author_GND | (DE-588)104268255 |
| author_facet | Krishna, Vijay |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Krishna, Vijay |
| author_variant | v k vk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035748225 |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 |
| classification_tum | MAT 920f WIR 527f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)845563467 (DE-599)BVBBV035748225 |
| dewey-full | 381.1701 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 381 - Commerce (Trade) |
| dewey-raw | 381.1701 |
| dewey-search | 381.1701 |
| dewey-sort | 3381.1701 |
| dewey-tens | 380 - Commerce, communications, transportation |
| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 2. ed. |
| format | Book |
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| language | English |
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| spelling | Krishna, Vijay Verfasser (DE-588)104268255 aut Auction theory Vijay Krishna 2. ed. Amsterdam [u.a.] Academic Press 2010 XI, 323 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Mathematisches Modell Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd rswk-swf Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 s Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-188 Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 s 1\p DE-604 Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe 978-0-08-092293-5 (DE-604)BV039827197 Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018608316&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext SWBplus Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=018608316&sequence=000003&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
| spellingShingle | Krishna, Vijay Auction theory Mathematisches Modell Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4732699-2 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4125859-9 |
| title | Auction theory |
| title_auth | Auction theory |
| title_exact_search | Auction theory |
| title_full | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_fullStr | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_full_unstemmed | Auction theory Vijay Krishna |
| title_short | Auction theory |
| title_sort | auction theory |
| topic | Mathematisches Modell Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Auktionstheorie (DE-588)4732699-2 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Auktion (DE-588)4125859-9 gnd |
| topic_facet | Mathematisches Modell Auctions Mathematical models Game theory Auktionstheorie Unvollkommene Information Spieltheorie Auktion |
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