Games and information: an introduction to game theory
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Malden, Mass. [u.a.]
Blackwell Publ.
2009
|
Ausgabe: | 4. ed., [Nachdr.] |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | XXIX, 528 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 1405136669 9781405136662 |
Internformat
MARC
LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | BV035685306 | ||
003 | DE-604 | ||
005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
007 | t | ||
008 | 090819s2009 ad|| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
020 | |a 1405136669 |9 1-4051-3666-9 | ||
020 | |a 9781405136662 |9 978-1-4051-3666-2 | ||
035 | |a (OCoLC)552256800 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV035685306 | ||
040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
041 | 0 | |a eng | |
049 | |a DE-945 |a DE-19 | ||
084 | |a QH 430 |0 (DE-625)141581: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a SK 860 |0 (DE-625)143264: |2 rvk | ||
084 | |a MAT 920f |2 stub | ||
084 | |a WIR 023f |2 stub | ||
100 | 1 | |a Rasmusen, Eric |d 1958- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)137116632 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Games and information |b an introduction to game theory |c Eric Rasmusen |
250 | |a 4. ed., [Nachdr.] | ||
264 | 1 | |a Malden, Mass. [u.a.] |b Blackwell Publ. |c 2009 | |
300 | |a XXIX, 528 S. |b Ill., graph. Darst. | ||
336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Wirtschaftstheorie |0 (DE-588)4079351-5 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Information |0 (DE-588)4026899-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Unvollkommene Information |0 (DE-588)4140474-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
650 | 0 | 7 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
655 | 7 | |8 1\p |0 (DE-588)4151278-9 |a Einführung |2 gnd-content | |
655 | 7 | |8 2\p |0 (DE-588)4123623-3 |a Lehrbuch |2 gnd-content | |
689 | 0 | 0 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
689 | 0 | 1 | |a Wirtschaftstheorie |0 (DE-588)4079351-5 |D s |
689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
689 | 1 | 0 | |a Spieltheorie |0 (DE-588)4056243-8 |D s |
689 | 1 | 1 | |a Information |0 (DE-588)4026899-8 |D s |
689 | 1 | |5 DE-604 | |
689 | 2 | 0 | |a Unvollkommene Information |0 (DE-588)4140474-9 |D s |
689 | 2 | |8 3\p |5 DE-604 | |
856 | 4 | 2 | |m HBZ Datenaustausch |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017739498&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017739498 | ||
883 | 1 | |8 1\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
883 | 1 | |8 2\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk | |
883 | 1 | |8 3\p |a cgwrk |d 20201028 |q DE-101 |u https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
Datensatz im Suchindex
_version_ | 1804139394212298752 |
---|---|
adam_text | Titel: Games and information
Autor: Rasmusen, Eric
Jahr: 2009
*Sections that are starred are less important
List of Figures x
List of Tables ¦ xiii
List of Games xv
Preface xviii
Contents and Purpose xviii
Changes in the Second Edition, 1994 xviii
Changes in the Third Edition, 2001 xix
Changes in the Fourth Edition, 2006 xx
Using the Book xxii
The Level of Mathematics xxii
Other Books xxiii
Contact Information xxviii
Acknowledgements xxviii
Introduction 1
History 1
Game Theory s Method 2
Exemplifying Theory 2
This Book s Style 4
Notes 6
Part 1: Game Theory 9
1 The Rules of the Game 11
1.1 Definitions 11
1.2 Dominated and Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner s Dilemma 19
1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 22
vi Contents
1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, the Battle of the Sexes, and
Ranked Coordination 26
1.5 Focal Points 32
Notes 33
Problems 36
Classroom Game: Fisheries (polished) 39
2 Information 40
2.1 The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game 40
2.2 Information Sets 45
2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information 49
2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games 52
2.5 An Example: The Png Settlement Game 61
Notes 64
Problems 66
Classroom Game: Bayes Rule at the Bar (in between) 68
3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies 69
3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game 69
3.2 The Payoff-equating Method and Games of Timing 74
*3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players:
The Civic Duty Game 81
*3.4 Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game 85
3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game 87
3.6 Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and
Strategic Substitutes 90
*3.7 Existence of Equilibrium 95
Notes 98
Problems 103
Classroom Game: The War of Attrition (polished) 107
4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information 108
4.1 Subgame Perfectness 108
4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I 111
4.3 Credible Threats, Sunks Costs, and the Open-set Problem in the Game of
Nuisance Suits 113
4.4 Recoordination to Pareto-dominant Equilibria in Subgames:
Pareto Perfection 120
Notes 122
Problems 123
Classroom Game: U.S. Air for Sale (polished) 126
5 Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information 128
5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox 128
5.2 Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk Theorem 130
5.3 Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner s Dilemma 136
5.4 Product Quality in an Infinitely Repeated Game 137
Contents vii
*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: Customer Switching
Costs 141
*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game 143
Notes 147
Problems 151
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma (in between) 155
6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information 156
6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III 156
6.2 Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the Entry Deterrence and PhD
Admissions Games 160
6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and V 164
6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma: The Gang of
Four Model 166
6.5 The Axelrod Tournament 169
*6.6 Credit and the Age of the Firm: The Diamond Model 170
Notes 172
Problems 175
Classroom Game: The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma under Incomplete
Information (improveable) 177
Part 2: Asymmetric Information 179
7 Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions 181
7.1 Categories of Asymmetric Information Models 181
7.2 A Principal-Agent Model: The Production Game 184
7.3 The Incentive Compatibility and Participation Constraints 194
7.4 Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game 195
Notes 201
Problems 204
Classroom Game: Moral Hazard Contracts Game (improveable) 210
8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard 211
8.1 Efficiency Wages 211
8.2 Tournaments 214
*8.3 Institutions and Agency Problems 216
*8.4 Renegotiation: The Repossession Game 219
*8.5 State-space Diagrams: Insurance Games I and II 222
*8.6 Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model 227
*8.7 The Multitask Agency Problem 230
Notes 236
Problems 239
Classroom Game: Lobbying Teams (polished) 242
9 Adverse Selection 243
9.1 Introduction: Production Game VI 243
9.2 Adverse Selection under Certainty: Lemons I and II 249
9.3 Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons III and IV 252
viii Contents
9.4 Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III 255
*9.5 Market Microstructure 259
*9.6 A Variety of Applications 263
9.7 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII 266
Notes 269
Problems 272
Classroom Game: Adverse Selection in Stock Sales (improveable) 275
10 Mechanism Design and Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge 276
10.1 Mechanisms, Unravelling, Cross Checking, and the Revelation Principle 276
10.2 Myerson Mechanism Design 287
10.3 An Example of Postcontractual Hidden Knowledge: The Salesman Game 289
*10.4 The Groves Mechanism 293
10.5 Price Discrimination 296
* 10.6 Rate-of-return Regulation and Government Procurement 304
Notes 314
Problems 316
Classroom Game: Regulatory Ratcheting (improveable) 319
11 Signalling 320
11.1 The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling 320
11.2 Variants on the Signalling Model of Education 324
11.3 General Comments on Signalling in Education 329
11.4 The Informed Player Moves Second: Screening 330
* 11.5 Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues 338
* 11.6 Signal Jamming and Limit Pricing 341
*11.7 Countersignalling 345
Notes 348
Problems 349
Classroom Game: Signalling Marriageability (improveable) 353
Part 3: Applications 355
12 Bargaining 357
12.1 The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie 357
12.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution 359
12.3 Alternating Offers over Finite Time 361
12.4 Alternating Offers over Infinite Time 362
12.5 Incomplete Information 365
* 12.6 Setting Up a Way to Bargain: The Myerson-Satterthwaite Model 369
Notes 380
Problems 381
Classroom Game: Labor Bargaining (polished) 384
13 Auctions 385
13.1 Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete 385
13.2 Optimal Strategies under Different Rules in Private-value Auctions 390
Contents ix
13.3 Revenue Equivalence, Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty 403
13.4 Reserve Prices and the Marginal Revenue Approach 409
13.5 Common-value Auctions and the Winner s Curse 414
13.6 Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game 423
Notes 428
Problems 430
Classroom Game: Auctions (polished) 432
14 Pricing 433
14.1 Quantities as Strategies: Cournot Equilibrium Revisited 433
14.2 Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox 436
14.3 Location Models 441
14.4 Comparative Statics and Supermodular Games 449
*14.5 Vertical Differentiation 454
*14.6 Durable Monopoly 461
Notes 467
Problems 469
Classroom Game: The Kleit Oligopoly Game (polished) 472
Mathematical Appendix 473
*A.l Notation 473
*A.2 The Greek Alphabet 475
*A.3 Glossary 475
*A.4 Formulas and Functions 479
*A.5 Probability Distributions 480
*A.6 Supermodularity 482
*A.7 Fixed Point Theorems 484
*A.8 Genericity 485
*A.9 Discounting 486
*A.1O Risk 487
References and Name Index 493
Subject Index 521
figures W.
1.1 The Dry Cleaners Game as a decision tree 15
1.2 The Dry Cleaners Game as a game tree 16
2.1 Follow-the-Leader I in extensive form 42
2.2 Ranked Coordination in extensive form 44
2.3 The time line for stock underpricing: (a) a good time line (b) a bad time line 45
2.4 Information sets and information partitions 46
2.5 Follow-the-Leader II 50
2.6 Follow-the-Leader III: original 54
2.7 Follow-the-Leader III: after the Harsanyi transformation 55
2.8 Bayes Rule 58
2.9 The game tree for the Png Settlement Game 63
3.1 The payoffs in Patent Race for a New Market 79
3.2 Reaction curves in the Cournot Game 88
3.3 Stackelberg equilibrium 90
3.4 Bertrand reaction functions with differentiated products 93
3.5 Cournot versus Differentiated Bertrand reaction functions
(strategic substitutes versus strategic complements) 94
3.6 Continuous and discontinuous reaction functions 97
4.1 Follow-the-Leader I 110
4.2 The tremble game: trembling hand versus subgame perfectness 111
4.3 Entry deterrence I 112
4.4 The extensive form for Nuisance Suits 114
4.5 The Pareto Perfection Puzzle 121
5.1 The dimensionality condition 133
5.2 Evolutionary Dynamics in the Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois game 147
6.1 Entry Deterrence II, III, and IV 157
6.2 The PhD Admissions Game 162
6.3 Entry Deterrence V 166
6.4 The interest rate over time 171
6.5 The Beer-Quiche Game 174
List of Figures xi
7.1 Categories of asymmetric information models 183
7.2 The efficient effort level in Production Game I 186
7.3 Three contracts that induce effort e* for wage w* 187
7.4 Shifting Supports in an Agency Model 199
8.1 Insurance Game I 222
8.2 Insurance Game II with full and partial insurance 225
8.3 More on partial insurance in Insurance Game II 226
8.4 Contracts in the Holmstrom Teams Model 228
9.1 An extensive form for Lemons I 250
9.2 Lemons II: identical tastes 251
9.3 Buyers value cars more than sellers: Lemons III 252
9.4 Lemons IV: sellers valuations differ 253
9.5 Insurance Game III: nonexistence of a pooling equilibrium 257
9.6 A separating equilibrium for Insurance Game III 258
9.7 Curves for which there is no equilibrium in Insurance Game III 259
9.8 Lemons III when buyers value cars more and the minimum quality is zero 271
10.1 The Salesman Game with curves for pooling equilibria 291
10.2 Indifference curves for a separating equilibrium 292
10.3 Linear and nonlinear pricing 297
10.4 Perfect price discrimination 298
10.5 The Varian Nonlinear Pricing Game 302
10.6 Marginal versus average demand 303
10.7 Two depictions of the single-crossing property 303
10.8 Why the expensive firm s incentive compatibility constraint is nonbinding 310
11.1 Education VI: no pooling equilibrium in a screening game 321
11.2 Education VII: neither separating nor pooling pure-strategy equilibria in a
screening game 334
11.3 How the signal changes with the variance 340
11.4 Different ways to signal a given company value 340
12.1 (a) Nash Bargaining Game (b) Splitting a Pie 359
12.2 Trades in Bilateral Trading II 372
12.3 Trade in the one-price equilibrium 374
12.4 Trade in the linear equilibrium 375
13.1 Smoothing a discrete distribution 397
13.2 The bid function in an all-pay auction with identical bidders 400
13.3 Auctions and marginal revenue: (a) reserve price needed and (b) no reserve
price needed 412
13.4 Extracting information from uniformly distributed signals 418
14.1 Different demand curves 435
14.2 Multiple Cournot-Nash equilibria 435
14.3 Rationing rules when pt, — 30, pa 30, and K — 70 438
14.4 Location models 441
14.5 Numerical examples for Hotelling pricing 444
14.6 Payoffs in the Hotelling Location Game 446
14.7 Nonexistence of pure strategies with three players 447
14.8 An equilibrium mixed-strategy density in the three-player location game 447
14.9 The equilibrium mixing density for location 448
xii List of Figures
14.10 Equilibrium versus efficiency in location 448
14.11 The buyer s marginal benefit per period in durable monopoly 464
A. 1 Concavity and convexity 476
A.2 Upper semicontinuity 477
A.3 A mapping with three fixed points 484
A.4 Discounting 488
A.5 Mean-preserving spreads 490
A.6 Three densities to illustrate hazard rates 490
!
tables w.
1.1 The Dry Cleaners Game 14
1.2 The Prisoner s Dilemma 21
1.3 The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 23
1.4 The Iteration Path Game 25
1.5 Boxed Pigs 26
1.6 The Modeller s Dilemma 28
1.7 The Battle of the Sexes 29
1.8 Ranked Coordination 30
1.9 Dangerous Coordination 30
1.10 A general Prisoner s Dilemma 34
1.11 An abstract game 37
1.12 Flavor and texture 37
1.13 Which game? 38
1.14 A three-by-three game 38
2.1 Ranked Coordination 41
2.2 Follow-the-Leader I 42
2.3 Information partitions 47
2.4 Information categories 49
2.5 Bayesian terminology 57
2.6 Payoffs (A), The Prisoner s Dilemma 68
2.7 Payoffs (B), A Confession Game 68
3.1 The Welfare Game 70
3.2 Pure strategies dominated by a mixed strategy 73
3.3 Chicken 74
3.4 Grab the Dollar 77
3.5 The General 2-by-2 Game 81
3.6 2-by-2 Games with mixed-strategy equilibria 83
3.7 The Civic Duty Game 84
3.8 Auditing Game I 85
3.9 A meaningless game 104
xiv List of Tables
3.10 A Takeover Game 105
3.11 IMF Aid 106
4.1 Entry Deterrence I 112
4.2 Payoffs from different policies 125
5.1 The Minimax Illustration Game 135
5.2 Prisoner s Dilemmas 137
5.3 Some repeated games in which reputation is important 137
5.4 The Utopian exchange economy game 144
5.5 Hawk-Dove: economics notation 145
5.6 Hawk-Dove: biology notation 145
5.7 A Benoit-Krishna Game 152
5.8 Evolutionarily stable strategies 153
5.9 Conversation dynamics 153
5.10 Grab the Dollar 153
5.11 Grab the Dollar dynamics 154
5.12 Mixed Minimaxing 154
5.13 The Prisoner s Dilemma 155
6.1 The Prisoner s Dilemma 167
6.2 Subgame payoffs in the Expensive-Talk Game 176
6.3 The Prisoner s Dilemma 177
7.1 Applications of the principal-agent model 184
7.2 Profits in Broadway Game I 196
7.3 Probabilities of Profits in Broadway Game I 197
7.4 Profits in Broadway Game II 200
7.5 A moral hazard game 204
7.6 Output from low and high effort 204
7.7 Entrepreneurs selling out 205
7.8 Output probabilities 207
7.9 Output and effort 207
7.10 Output function I 208
7.11 Output function II 209
8.1 Output in the Lucky Executive Game 212
8.2 Monitoring with error 239
8.3 Crime 239
8.4 More crime 240
8.5 Bankruptcy 240
8.6 Team output 241
9.1 Insurance Game III payoffs 256
9.2 Two-time losers 273
10.1 The right to silence game payoffs 317
11.1 Marriage values 353
12.1 Alternating offers over finite time 362
12.2 Alternating offers over infinite time 364
13.1 Bids by serious competitors in oil auctions 416
13.2 The Tai-Pan Game 430
A.I Some useful functional forms 481
A.2 Discounting 488
games W.
if *
The Dry Cleaners Game 13
The Prisoner s Dilemma 19
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea 25
The Iteration Path Game 24
Boxed Pigs 26
The Modeller s Dilemma 27
The Battle of the Sexes 28
Ranked Coordination 30
Dangerous Coordination 30
A Sequential Prisoner s Dilemma 38
Follow-the-leader I 41
Follow-the-leader II 50
Follow-the-leader III 52
The Png Settlement Game 61
Joint Ventures 66
The Welfare Game 70
Chicken 74
The War of Attrition 75
Grab the Dollar 77
The Patent Race for a New Market 78
The Civic Duty Game 81
Auditing Game I 85
Auditing Game II 85
Auditing Game III 86
The Swiss Cheese Game 82
The Cournot Game 87
The Stackelberg Game 89
The Bertrand Game 90
The Differentiated Bertrand Game 92
Matching Pennies 103
xvi List of Games
A Voting Paradox 104
Alba and Rome 105
Risky Skating 105
The Tremble Game 110
Entry Deterrence I 111
Nuisance Suits I 113
Nuisance Suits II 115
Nuisance Suits III 118
The Pareto Perfection Puzzle 121
Repeated Entry Deterrence 123
The Three-way Duel 124
Heresthetics in Pliny and the Freedmen s Trial 124
The Garbage Entry Game 125
Voting Cycles 125
The Chainstore Paradox 128
The Repeated Prisoner s Dilemma 129
Product Quality 137
Customer Switching Costs 141
Hawk-Dove 143
The Utopian Exchange Economy Game 144
The Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois Game 147
Overlapping Generations 150
Product Quality with Lawsuits 151
A Benoit-Krishna Game 152
Repeated Entry Deterrence 152
Entry Deterrence II 156
Entry Deterrence III 156
The PhD Admissions Game 162
Entry Deterrence IV 164
Entry Deterrence V 164
The Gang of Four Model 166
The Diamond Model 170
Production Game I 184
Production Game II 190
Production Game III 192
Production Game IV 193
Production Game V 193
Broadway Game I 196
Broadway Game II 200
The Lucky Executive Game 212
Repossession Game I 219
Repossession Game II 220
Insurance Game I 222
Insurance Game II 224
Multitasking I 230
Multitasking II 233
Production Game VI 243
List of Games xvii
Lemons I 249
Lemons II 250
Lemons III 252
Lemons IV 253
Insurance Game III 255
The Bagehot Model 260
The Kyle Model 261
Production Game VII 266
Production Game VIII 276
The Myerson Trading Game 287
The Salesman Game 289
The Streetlight Game 293
Varian s Nonlinear Pricing Game 297
Procurement I 305
Procurement II 308
Procurement III 311
The Right To Silence Game 317
Underpricing New Stock Issues 338
Limit Pricing as Signal Jamming 341
Countersignalling 345
Splitting a Pie 358
One-period Bargaining with Incomplete Information 366
Two-period Bargaining with Incomplete Information 367
Bilateral Trading I 370
Bilateral Trading II 371
Bilateral Trading III 373
Bilateral Trading IV 377
The Ten-sixteen Auction 388
The Continuous-value Auction 389
The Dollar Auction 402
The Uniform-signal Common-value Auction 419
The Wallet Game 423
The Bertrand Game with Capacity Constraints 439
The Edgeworth Paradox 436
The Hotelling Pricing Game 442
Vertical Differentiation I 454
Vertical Differentiation II 455
Vertical Differentiation III 457
Durable Monopoly 461
Differentiated Bertrand with Advertising 469
Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly 470
|
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Rasmusen, Eric 1958- |
author_GND | (DE-588)137116632 |
author_facet | Rasmusen, Eric 1958- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Rasmusen, Eric 1958- |
author_variant | e r er |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV035685306 |
classification_rvk | QH 430 SK 860 |
classification_tum | MAT 920f WIR 023f |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)552256800 (DE-599)BVBBV035685306 |
discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
edition | 4. ed., [Nachdr.] |
format | Book |
fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02258nam a2200541 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV035685306</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">090819s2009 ad|| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1405136669</subfield><subfield code="9">1-4051-3666-9</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9781405136662</subfield><subfield code="9">978-1-4051-3666-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)552256800</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV035685306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-945</subfield><subfield code="a">DE-19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">QH 430</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)141581:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">SK 860</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-625)143264:</subfield><subfield code="2">rvk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">MAT 920f</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">WIR 023f</subfield><subfield code="2">stub</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rasmusen, Eric</subfield><subfield code="d">1958-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)137116632</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Games and information</subfield><subfield code="b">an introduction to game theory</subfield><subfield code="c">Eric Rasmusen</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">4. ed., [Nachdr.]</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Malden, Mass. [u.a.]</subfield><subfield code="b">Blackwell Publ.</subfield><subfield code="c">2009</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">XXIX, 528 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">Ill., graph. Darst.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4079351-5</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Information</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4026899-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Unvollkommene Information</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4140474-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="650" ind1="0" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4151278-9</subfield><subfield code="a">Einführung</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4123623-3</subfield><subfield code="a">Lehrbuch</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd-content</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Wirtschaftstheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4079351-5</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Spieltheorie</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4056243-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Information</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4026899-8</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Unvollkommene Information</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4140474-9</subfield><subfield code="D">s</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">HBZ Datenaustausch</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017739498&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017739498</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">1\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">2\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="883" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="8">3\p</subfield><subfield code="a">cgwrk</subfield><subfield code="d">20201028</subfield><subfield code="q">DE-101</subfield><subfield code="u">https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
genre | 1\p (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content 2\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content |
genre_facet | Einführung Lehrbuch |
id | DE-604.BV035685306 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:43:23Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 1405136669 9781405136662 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017739498 |
oclc_num | 552256800 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-945 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
owner_facet | DE-945 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM |
physical | XXIX, 528 S. Ill., graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 2009 |
publishDateSearch | 2009 |
publishDateSort | 2009 |
publisher | Blackwell Publ. |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Rasmusen, Eric 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)137116632 aut Games and information an introduction to game theory Eric Rasmusen 4. ed., [Nachdr.] Malden, Mass. [u.a.] Blackwell Publ. 2009 XXIX, 528 S. Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd rswk-swf Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd rswk-swf Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf 1\p (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content 2\p (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 s DE-604 Information (DE-588)4026899-8 s Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 s 3\p DE-604 HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017739498&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis 1\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 2\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk 3\p cgwrk 20201028 DE-101 https://d-nb.info/provenance/plan#cgwrk |
spellingShingle | Rasmusen, Eric 1958- Games and information an introduction to game theory Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4079351-5 (DE-588)4026899-8 (DE-588)4140474-9 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4151278-9 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
title | Games and information an introduction to game theory |
title_auth | Games and information an introduction to game theory |
title_exact_search | Games and information an introduction to game theory |
title_full | Games and information an introduction to game theory Eric Rasmusen |
title_fullStr | Games and information an introduction to game theory Eric Rasmusen |
title_full_unstemmed | Games and information an introduction to game theory Eric Rasmusen |
title_short | Games and information |
title_sort | games and information an introduction to game theory |
title_sub | an introduction to game theory |
topic | Wirtschaftstheorie (DE-588)4079351-5 gnd Information (DE-588)4026899-8 gnd Unvollkommene Information (DE-588)4140474-9 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
topic_facet | Wirtschaftstheorie Information Unvollkommene Information Spieltheorie Einführung Lehrbuch |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017739498&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT rasmuseneric gamesandinformationanintroductiontogametheory |