Principles of conflict economics: a primer for social scientists
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge [u.a.]
Cambridge Univ. Press
2009
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Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-306) and index |
Beschreibung: | XXI, 321 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm |
ISBN: | 9780521875578 0521875579 9780521698658 0521698650 |
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Titel: Principles of conflict economics
Autor: Anderton, Charles H.
Jahr: 2009
Contents
List of Figures page xi
List of Tables xvii
Preface xix
1 Introduction: Definition and Scope of Conflict
Economics 1
1.1. What Is Conflict Economics? 1
1.2. A Look at Conflict Large and Small 2
1.3. Methodology of Conflict Economics 10
1.4. Organization of Book 13
1.5. Bibliographie Notes 13
2 Production Possibilities and the Guns versus Butter
Trade-Off 15
2.1. Production Possibilities Model 15
2.2. Applications 21
2.3. Bibliographie Notes 27
3 Rational Choice and Equilibrium 28
3.1. Rational Choice Model 28
3.2. Supply, Demand, and Market
Equilibrium 43
3.3. A Taxonomy of Goods 50
3.4. Bibliographie Notes 52
4 Fundamentals of Game Theory 53
4.1. Basic Concepts 53
4.2. Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma Games 59
4.3. Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 63
4.4. Bibliographie Notes 66
viii Contents
5 A Bargaining Model of Conflict 67
5.1. Elements of Conflict 67
5.2. Sources of Violent Conflict 69
5.3. Third-Party Intervention 78
5.4. Bibliographic Notes 81
6 Conflict between States 83
6.1. The Conflict Cycle 83
6.2. Patterns of Armed Interstate Conflict 85
6.3. Hirshleifer's Bargaining Model and
Interstate War 87
6.4. Selected Empirical Studies of Interstate Conflict 92
6.5. Bibliographic Notes 101
7 Civil War and Genocide 104
7.1. Definitions 104
7.2. Patterns of Armed Civil Conflict and Genocide 105
7.3. Theoretical Perspectives on Civil War 113
7.4. Selected Empirical Studies of Civil War and
Genocide 118
7.5. Bibliographic Notes 124
8 Terrorism 126
8.1. Defining Terrorism 126
8.2. Patterns of Terrorism 127
8.3. A Rational Choice Model of Terrorism 132
8.4. Game Theoretic Perspectives of Terrorism 139
8.5. Selected Empirical Studies of Terrorism 146
8.6. Bibliographic Notes 153
9 Geography and Technology of Conflict 155
9.1. Boulding's Model of Spatial Conflict 155
9.2. O'Sullivan's Three-Dimensional Model of Spatial
Conflict 164
9.3. Schelling's Inherent Propensity toward Peace or War 168
9.4. Number and Size of Nations 174
9.5. Selected Empirical Studies 179
9.6. Bibliographic Notes 183
10 Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and Arms Control 185
10.1. Definitions 185
10.2. Patterns of Arms Rivalry, Proliferation, and
Arms Control 186
Contents ix
10.3. The Richardson Arms Race Model 197
10.4. The Intriligator-Brito Model 202
10.5. An Economic Choice Model of Arms
Rivalry 210
10.6. Selected Empirical Studies 217
10.7. Bibliographic Notes 220
11 Military Alliances 222
11.1. Definitions 223
11.2. Patterns of Interstate Alliances 226
11.3. Pure Public Good Model of Alliances 229
11.4. Joint Product Model of Alliances 237
11.5. Selected Empirical Studies 240
11.6. Bibliographic Notes 244
12 Conflict Success Functions and the Theory of
Appropriation Possibilities 246
12.1. Conflict Success Functions 246
12.2. A Model of Appropriation Possibilities 249
12.3. Appropriation Possibilities in a Production/
Exchange Economy 256
12.4. Bibliographic Notes 267
Appendix A: Statistical Methods 269
A.I. Populations and Samples 269
A.2. Probability and Sampling 270
A3. Expected Values and Unbiased Estimators 272
A.4. Statistical Inference 272
A.5. Regression Analysis 274
Appendix B: A More Formal Bargaining Model of Conflict 277
B.I. Basic Model of Resource Conflict 277
B.2. Selected Sources of Violence 280
References 285
Author Index 307
Subject Index 315
Figures
1.1. War onsets per decade by war type, 1820-2006. page 3
1.2. International and domestic terrorist incidents
combined, 1970-2004. 4
1.3. Real military spending in selected nations. 5
1.4. Destruction of human and physical assets during
World War II. 6
1.5. United States' real merchandise trade with Germany
and Japan. 7
1.6. Annual cost of selected multilateral peace missions,
reporting year 2007. 8
1.7. Real expenditures on defense against crime and lost
value from property crimes. 9
1.8. Worldwide pirate attacks against merchant ships,
1998-2007. 9
2.1. Production possibilities frontier. 18
2.2. Specialized production and trade. 20
2.3. Economic diversion, destruction, and disruption
from violent conflict. 22
2.4. Channels by which defense spending can impact
economic growth. 23
3.1. Indifference curves for two goods. 29
3.2. Comparatively steeper indifference curves. 32
3.3. Consumption optimum. 33
3.4. Income response and income-consumption curve. 35
3.5. Price response and price-consumption curve. 36
3.6. Individual demand curve. 37
3.7. Income and substitution effects. 38
3.8. Fungibility of foreign aid. 40
xii List of figures
3.9. Land mines and the substitution principle. 42
3.10. Market supply, demand, and equilibrium. 43
3.11. Market response to an increase in supply. 46
3.12. Small arms control. 47
3.13. Trade and the liberal peace hypothesis. 48
4.1. Aggression game shown in extensive form. 54
4.2. Aggression game shown in normal form. 55
4.3. Aggression game with Nash equilibriums. 57
4.4. Aggression game solved by backward induction. 59
4.5. Chicken game with simultaneous moves. 60
4.6. Chicken game with sequential moves. 61
4.7. Prisoner's dilemma game with simultaneous moves. 63
4.8. Stage game for repeated prisoner's dilemma game. 64
5.1. Bargaining model with peaceful settlement. 68
5.2. Inconsistent expectations with fighting. 70
5.3. Two-player commitment problem. 71
5.4. Commitment problem and indivisibilities. 72
5.5. Commitment problem and preemptive war. 73
5.6. Commitment problem and preventive war. 74
5.7. Malevolent preferences with fighting. 75
5.8. Malevolent preferences with peaceful settlement. 76
5.9. Possible fighting when player B is subject to
political bias. 77
5.10. Third-party economic intervention. 79
5.11. Third-party mediation or military intervention. 80
5.12. Third-party intervention favoring player A. 80
6.1. Lund's conflict life cycle. 84
6.2. Selected interstate conflict datasets. 85
6.3. MID Onsets, MIDs-Use-Force, and MIDs-to-War,
1816-2000. 88
6.4. Bargaining model with complete information and
no commitment problems. 90
6.5. Bargaining model with incomplete information and
increased cost of war. 91
6.6. Diversion, destruction, and disruption costs of
World War I. 101
7.1. Selected intrastate conflict datasets. 106
7.2. Stock of armed civil conflicts, 1946-2006. 108
7.3. Armed civil conflict onsets, terminations, and durations,
1940s-2000s. 108
List of figures xiii
7.4. Stock of armed civil conflicts by region, 1975-2005. 109
7.5. Range of battle-related deaths from armed civil
conflicts, 1946-2005. 110
7.6. Number of refugees and internally displaced persons
for selected countries of origin, provisional data, end
of year 2007. 111
7.7. Estimated fatalities for selected genocides and
politicides, 1965-2006. 112
7.8. Net revenue model of rebellion. 117
8.1. Terrorism incidents worldwide. 129
8.2. Casualties per incident from terrorism, 1970-2004. 130
8.3. Terrorism by region, 1970-2004. 131
8.4. Terrorists'modes of attack, 1970-2004. 132
8.5. Terrorists' optimal choice of terrorist activity
and composite good. 133
8.6. Changes in terrorists' budget constraint. 134
8.7. Deterrence and benevolence price policies. 136
8.8. Hostage game. 140
8.9. Offensive counterterrorism games between governments. 144
8.10. Supply and demand of suicide bombers. 149
9.1. Boulding's basic model of spatial conflict. 156
9.2. Conditional viability of player B. 157
9.3. Protection of Tutsis in soccer stadiums during
1994 Rwandan genocide. 159
9.4. Offensive technological innovation by player A. 160
9.5. Installation of a military base. 161
9.6. Effect of a buffer zone. 162
9.7. Strategic depth. 163
9.8. Pyramid model of spatial distribution of military
power. 165
9.9. Rebel concentration of military power and conquest
of the state. 167
9.10. Lanchester attack/defend model. 171
9.11. Number of states in the international system,
1820-2004. 174
9.12. Determination of the number and average size
of nations. 176
10.1. World real military spending, 1988-2007. 187
10.2. Real military-spending patterns in selected
interstate arms rivalries. 188
xiv List of figures
10.3. Number of states suspected of nuclear weapons
research and possession. 191
10.4. Richardson arms race model. 201
10.5. Intriligator-Brito model. 204
10.6. Iranian nuclear weapons proliferation in the
Intriligator-Brito model. 206
10.7. One-sided antiballistic missile defense in the
Intriligator-Brito model. 207
10.8. Inherent propensity toward war with high attack
effectiveness. 209
10.9. Player A's optimal allocation of resources to civilian
and military goods. 211
10.10. Arms rivalry equilibrium in the economic choice
model. 212
10.11. Effect of economic growth in A on arms rivalry
equilibrium. 213
10.12. Arms control in the economic choice model. 215
11.1. Number of interstate alliances as reported by ATOP
and COW. 226
11.2. Number of interstate alliances with pledges of
active military support. 227
11.3. Number of multilateral alliances. 228
11.4. Alliance commitments of the major powers in 2003. 228
11.5. Ally A's optimal allocation of resources to civilian
and military goods. 230
11.6. Reaction functions and alliance equilibrium. 232
11.7. Free riding by ally B. 233
11.8. Alliance suboptimality. 234
11.9. Disproportionate burden for wealthier ally B. 236
11.10. Reaction functions for a pure versus impure
public good. 239
12.1. Ratio form conflict success functions for player A. 247
12.2. Logistic form conflict success functions for player A. 248
12.3. A's optimal allocation of resources to military goods. 250
12.4. Resource conflict in Hirshleifer's bargaining model. 255
12.5. Optimal production and consumption in autarky. 257
12.6. Gains from exchange in an Edgeworth box. 258
12.7. Gains from specialized production and exchange. 259
12.8. Effects of diversion of resources to military goods. 261
12.9. Effects of destruction and trade disruption. 262
List of figures xv
12.10. Predator/prey game. 264
12.11. Equilibrium economies in the predator/prey game. 265
A. 1. Probability distribution of sample proportion
P when 71 = 0.50 and sample size is four. 271
Tables
1.1. Victims of human trafficking worldwide. page 10
2.1. Economic and military data for North Korea,
South Korea, and the United States, 2007. 25
3.1. Utilities assigned by the function U=xy. 31
3.2. Taxonomy of goods with examples. 50
6.1. Interstate war duration, severity, and intensity,
1816-2006. 89
8.1. Selected terrorism datasets. 128
8.2. International terrorist hijackings, 1968-1977. 138
10.1. Estimated effects of large-scale weapons of mass
destruction attacks. 191
10.2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for
selected nations, 2007. 193
10.3. Selected US-Russia (USSR) arms control treaties. 194
10.4. Selected nonproliferation treaties and programs. 196
10.5. Selected SALW control organizations and protocols. 198
11.1. Selected military alliances. 224
11.2. Burden sharing in NATO, 1964 and 1971. 241
12.1. Numerical example of resource conflict model. 253
A.l. Possible samples and the corresponding proportions
answering Yes. 271
A.2. Regression results for military spending as a function
of democracy and income. 275 |
any_adam_object | 1 |
author | Anderton, Charles H. 1957- Carter, John R. |
author_GND | (DE-588)140109862 |
author_facet | Anderton, Charles H. 1957- Carter, John R. |
author_role | aut aut |
author_sort | Anderton, Charles H. 1957- |
author_variant | c h a ch cha j r c jr jrc |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV035680982 |
callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
callnumber-label | HM1121 |
callnumber-raw | HM1121 |
callnumber-search | HM1121 |
callnumber-sort | HM 41121 |
callnumber-subject | HM - Sociology |
classification_rvk | MK 3100 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)277472106 (DE-599)BVBBV035680982 |
dewey-full | 303.6/6 |
dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
dewey-ones | 303 - Social processes |
dewey-raw | 303.6/6 |
dewey-search | 303.6/6 |
dewey-sort | 3303.6 16 |
dewey-tens | 300 - Social sciences |
discipline | Soziologie Politologie |
edition | 1. publ. |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV035680982 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-11-27T11:05:24Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 9780521875578 0521875579 9780521698658 0521698650 |
language | English |
lccn | 2008052036 |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-017735252 |
oclc_num | 277472106 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-634 DE-1049 |
owner_facet | DE-M382 DE-12 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-634 DE-1049 |
physical | XXI, 321 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm |
publishDate | 2009 |
publishDateSearch | 2009 |
publishDateSort | 2009 |
publisher | Cambridge Univ. Press |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Anderton, Charles H. 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)140109862 aut Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists Charles H. Anderton, John R. Carter 1. publ. Cambridge [u.a.] Cambridge Univ. Press 2009 XXI, 321 S. graph. Darst. 23 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references (p. 285-306) and index Social conflict Arms control Economic aspects Disarmament Economic aspects Peace Bewaffneter Konflikt (DE-588)4137568-3 gnd rswk-swf Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd rswk-swf Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd rswk-swf Konfliktforschung (DE-588)4073678-7 gnd rswk-swf Friede (DE-588)4071465-2 gnd rswk-swf Sozialer Konflikt (DE-588)4055747-9 gnd rswk-swf Abrüstung (DE-588)4000197-0 gnd rswk-swf Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 s Bewaffneter Konflikt (DE-588)4137568-3 s Abrüstung (DE-588)4000197-0 s Sozialer Konflikt (DE-588)4055747-9 s Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 s Friede (DE-588)4071465-2 s DE-604 Konfliktforschung (DE-588)4073678-7 s Carter, John R. Verfasser aut HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017735252&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Anderton, Charles H. 1957- Carter, John R. Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists Social conflict Arms control Economic aspects Disarmament Economic aspects Peace Bewaffneter Konflikt (DE-588)4137568-3 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Konfliktforschung (DE-588)4073678-7 gnd Friede (DE-588)4071465-2 gnd Sozialer Konflikt (DE-588)4055747-9 gnd Abrüstung (DE-588)4000197-0 gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)4137568-3 (DE-588)4066399-1 (DE-588)4115586-5 (DE-588)4073678-7 (DE-588)4071465-2 (DE-588)4055747-9 (DE-588)4000197-0 |
title | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists |
title_auth | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists |
title_exact_search | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists |
title_full | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists Charles H. Anderton, John R. Carter |
title_fullStr | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists Charles H. Anderton, John R. Carter |
title_full_unstemmed | Principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists Charles H. Anderton, John R. Carter |
title_short | Principles of conflict economics |
title_sort | principles of conflict economics a primer for social scientists |
title_sub | a primer for social scientists |
topic | Social conflict Arms control Economic aspects Disarmament Economic aspects Peace Bewaffneter Konflikt (DE-588)4137568-3 gnd Wirtschaft (DE-588)4066399-1 gnd Politische Ökonomie (DE-588)4115586-5 gnd Konfliktforschung (DE-588)4073678-7 gnd Friede (DE-588)4071465-2 gnd Sozialer Konflikt (DE-588)4055747-9 gnd Abrüstung (DE-588)4000197-0 gnd |
topic_facet | Social conflict Arms control Economic aspects Disarmament Economic aspects Peace Bewaffneter Konflikt Wirtschaft Politische Ökonomie Konfliktforschung Friede Sozialer Konflikt Abrüstung |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017735252&sequence=000004&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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