Ramzan Kadyrov: rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | Russian |
Veröffentlicht: |
Moskva
ROSSPĖN
2009
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Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
Beschreibung: | PST: chechen version of russian authoritarism. - In kyrill. Schr., russ. - Inh.-Verz. und Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
Beschreibung: | 150 S. |
ISBN: | 9785824312126 |
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adam_text |
ОГЛАВЛЕНИЕ
Об авторе
7
Предисловие
9
Глава
1.
Как закалялся президент
11
Глава
2.
Между Чечней и Москвой
29
Глава
3.
Рамзан начинает и выигрывает
51
Глава
4.
Штрихи к портрету
85
Глава
5.
Рамзан и ислам
93
Глава
6.
На Кавказе и в мусульманском мире
119
Заключение. Что день грядущий готовит Рамзану?
133
Библиография
139
Summary
143
О Фонде Карнеги
149
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
About Author
7
Forward
9
Chapter
1.
The Making of a President
11
Chapter
2.
Between Chechnya and Moscow
29
Chapter
3.
Ramzan Starts and Wins
51
Chapter
4.
Some Strokes to the Portrait
85
Chapter
5.
Ramzan and Islam
93
Chapter
6.
In the Caucasus and in the Muslim World
119
Conclusion: What Does Tomorrow Hold for Ramzan?
133
Bibliography
139
Summary (in English)
143
About the Carnegie Endowment
149
SUMMARY
Ramzan Kadyrov is the strongest and most charismatic politician in
the North Caucasus. He is typical for Russia, and his activities reflect,
in their own peculiar way, the country's dominant political trends.
Using the terminology of American scholar Margaret J. Herman,
Ramzan has the qualities of a "fireman leader," good at dealing with
crises, the "standard-bearer" who enjoys authority in society, and, to a
lesser degree, the "trader," able to convince people, to mobilize them to
carry out his plans, and to make concessions to that end. Using another
taxonomy, Ramzan is above all a careerist leader, interested primarily
in his own personal success
—
and not just political success, but also in
his own personal material prosperity.
Ramzan is a clear example of an ethno-nationalist leader, whose
aim is to preserve and raise the status of his ethnic group using all pos¬
sible means. He is a pragmatic nationalist, a mindset that determines
his actions and brings him success both within Chechen society and in
his relations with the federal authorities. It is hard not to contrast him
with the Chechen separatist leader of 1990's and first president of the
self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Djokhar Dudayev, who
was also an ethno-nationalist, but who, having chosen the course of
separatism, failed to achieve his main goal.
Ramzan's fate reflects the complex history of the Chechen people
over the last
70
years. He is a product of the disintegration of both So¬
viet and traditional society. His worldview was shaped by situations and
processes that once seemed unimaginable: the downfall of the Soviet
Union and the almost spontaneous emergence of the idea of Chechen
statehood, the reformation of Chechen identity, the resurgence of tra-
143
ditional
Islam and its synthesis with other currents that made their way
into Russia from Muslim countries abroad. He witnessed and took part
in Russia's collapse and the start of its revival. He was a witness to and
participant in two wars. He saw the conclusion of what was, for the
separatists, the honorable Agreement on Peace and the Principles for
Peaceful Relations in Khasavyurt in
1997,
and saw his father, Akhmat
Kadyrov, join the federal side, which amounted to an admission that
the struggle for independence had been lost. Akhmat Kadyrov was ap¬
pointed head of the Chechen administration in
2000
and became presi¬
dent of Chechnya in
2003.
Ramzan Kadyrov can thus be seen as successor to Dudayev and
Maskhadov, as well as heir to his father.
.
The whirlwind of events, combined with his lack of political expe¬
rience and insufficient education, taught Kadyrov to rely on his instincts
and emotions, feeling out the sentiments of his partners and opponents
and playing on their weaknesses. At times he has acted on hunches and
taken risks that have almost always turned out to be justified and fruit¬
ful. At times his good fortune was determined less by sharp instincts
than by chance. One such 'chance' was his meeting with Vladimir Pu¬
tin, now cited as a classic political stroke, after the death of his father in
2004.
Ramzan and Putin established an informal relationship of trust
after that occasion, paving the way for Ramzan's political ascent.
Ramzan imitates the federal authorities in Moscow in his policies
at home. His is a less refined version of course, but this is inevitable in
a post-war situation. "The use of force to resolve conflict has predeter¬
mined the specific ways in which legal institutions are organized and
legal norms function." In the course of a sociological survey carried
out in Grozny, "The State of Legal Order," which assessed judges' and
prosecutors' work according to a five-point scale, respondents gave one
point to
47.7%
of judges and prosecutors, two points to
22.1%
of judges
and
25.3%
of prosecutors.1 In other words, the law-enforcement institu¬
tions act not in accordance with the law, but by following instructions
from Kadyrov's executive authorities.
Ramzan Kadyrov fits ideally into the Russian political landscape.
He is completely congruent with the phenomenon that political scientist
Andrei Ryabov has called the revival of "feudal archaism," which has
144
infected the entire Russian political system. This phenomenon is char¬
acterized by weak political institutions, the wide-scale use of strong-
armed administrative methods, the existence of a system of privileges,
and an overgrowth of personal "informal ties." Whether in Moscow
or in Grozny, political relations are built on the principle of personal
loyalty. Ramzan has made this principle an absolute imperative: any
dissident opinion in Chechnya virtually constitutes a crime against the
authorities. Ramzan has turned into a dictator.
This spreading feudalism is even more obvious in the North Cau¬
casus, inasmuch as Caucasian society itself has remained semi-tradi¬
tional and relations both within society and between society and the
authorities are managed with reference to traditional norms. Today,
this return to traditionalism contributes to the collapse of modern eco¬
nomic activity, falling education standards, and the out-migration of
the ethnic Russian population. The resurgence of Islam is an integral
part of this traditionalist revival.
Having obtained
clientelisi
legitimacy from Putin, Ramzan is
now trying to build on it, give it greater substance, and gain recogni¬
tion from the Russian elite (and not just the political elite). His actions
betray an unconscious desire for a broader geographical and political
space and a wish to break out of Chechen provincialism. Ramzan may
not necessarily be popular, but he is certainly well-known and thus
informally legitimate on the Russian national stage. He has marked in
his political calendar Russia's new national holiday on November
4,
commemorating the events of
1612.
In
2008,
he decided to celebrate
on October
5
the 420th anniversary of "the establishment of good-
neighborly relations with Russia," and set up an entire organizing
committee for the purpose.
He has won for himself recognition as a politician of national scale.
His name is mentioned in the media, including the broadcast media,
more than that of any other regional leader. In various contexts, positive
and negative, his name is a talking point in Russian society and in the
wider post-Soviet space. He is the most intriguing in the line of Chechen
politicians that began with Djokhar Dudayev.
He has achieved much in his efforts to rebuild Chechnya: roads
are being built, infrastructure is up and running, and the crime rate
145
has come down. It is unlikely that all of these results could have been
achieved without tough leadership.
He has forced the rebels to come out of the forests and has turned
them into Chechnya's main military and political force. Such is the
post-conflict paradox: it is the former opposition that runs Chechnya
today. Such is the result of Putin's "Chechenization." As one well-
known politician, the former head of the Russian parliament Rus-
lan Khasbulatov, said, "federal policy has driven the pro-Russian
Chechens into a corner."2
But not everyone has come out of the forests. There is still an un¬
known number out there. Their ranks are swelling and they carry out
attacks with enviable regularity. On the one hand, this is evidence of
Ramzan's weakness, while on the other hand it gives him the oppor¬
tunity to demonstrate to the authorities in Moscow just how difficult a
situation he faces in the republic that has been "entrusted" to him.
Putin, now prime minister, continues to believe in Ramzan, un¬
like the Russian establishment's security and law-enforcement officials.
The personal understanding between Putin and Ramzan is of huge
importance, but Ramzan has also succeeded in convincing other Rus¬
sian politicians over these years that only he can maintain stability in
Chechnya and effectively continue the reconstruction effort. It is hard
to predict how relations between Ramzan and Medvedev will develop,
although it is unlikely that they will be deeply personal.
Ramzan's guiding principle in his relations with Russia is recogni¬
tion of a de-facto exceptional status for Chechnya among Russia's re¬
gions. He has three weighty arguments in this respect. First, having
lived through two wars, the Chechens have suffered more than any
other constituent ethnic group since the collapse of the Soviet Union;
second, having stood firm in their war against Russia, they have earned
the right to an "exceptional relationship;" and third, in obtaining ex¬
ceptional status for his republic, Ramzan strengthens his authority in
the eyes of the Chechen public, and this is what the Kremlin wants.
In Chechnya, one can hear words along the lines of, "We do not
realize it, but perhaps we have today achieved precisely the independ¬
ence that we fought for all these years," or that, "sooner or later Chech¬
nya will become an independent state. But this is still a long way off and
146
today we can't get by without Russia." Thus, the Chechen public has
come to see Ramzan's loyalty to Moscow as a continuation of the fight
for independence.
Ramzan could be called a zealous Muslim. He does not conceive
of himself outside of Islam. But at the same time, he treats Islam as an
instrument he can use to help him reach his political goals and a tool
for consolidating society. Ramzan is no stranger to high-society life,
however, for which he developed a taste during his frequent visits to
Moscow. In Moscow, he spends time with friends from the Chechen
Diaspora and attends events far removed from Islamic ideals of be¬
havior. He is similar to the wealthy Muslims from the Persian Gulf
region, who enjoy spending time in Paris and London, far away from
strict Islamic codes of conduct.
For Moscow, it is extremely important to have a strong president
in Chechnya. For perhaps a long time to come, the federal authorities
will remain willing to close their eyes to whatever methods the Chechen
president uses to maintain his personal power, as well as to the way he
deals with his opponents, who are also loyal to Moscow. It is particu¬
larly important to have a strong and loyal person in place at a time when
economic crisis is threatening to turn into political crisis. It is easy to
imagine what this means for the North Caucasus.
But what is less clear is whether the federal budget will have
enough money to continue rebuilding Chechnya at such an energetic
pace. More importantly, how will the Chechen president react to losing
the most important source of his success?
There is reason to believe that, sooner or later, anti-Ramzan feel¬
ings in Chechnya could achieve critical mass. Such feelings are likely
to grow as the crisis takes hold, and this threatens the republic with
further destabilization.
Does Ramzan plan to remain head of Chechnya forever, or will he
grow tired of politics and retire from the limelight, and possibly go into
serious business? Or will he get a promotion? According to Ramzan's
own words, he "does not plan to get into politics at the federal level, and
there have been no such offers as yet."3 Yet.
Experience shows that Chechen politicians' lives are full of dan¬
gers. Ramzan is constantly in the "danger zone." Chechnya without
147
Ramzan
is another issue. Conversations in Grozny and Moscow about
a post-Ramzan Chechnya converge around three scenarios. The first
is that nothing would happen if Kadyrov left. Moscow would easily
find a new protege, someone else from the Kadyrov clan. The second
is that social upheaval would set
off a
fierce struggle, which would
bring a new pro-Russian group into power. And the third is that eve¬
rything would go back to the old ways, and Chechnya would find itself
dragged into another war.
Does Ramzan himself think about all this as he drives along in
cheap, dirty Zhiguli cars, risking becoming victim to a traffic accident,
or an attack by Wahhabis or simply some unknown avenger?
I notes |
1
Юсупов
M.
«Постконфликтный» период: состояние правопорядка
//
Бюллетень Сети этнологического мониторинга и раннего предупрежде¬
ния конфликтов.
— 2007. — № 74. —
Июль-авг.
—
С.
67.
2
Хасбулатов Р. Кремль и российско-чеченская война: Размышления о
войне и мире.
-
М.,
2002. -
С.
133.
3
Кадыров о России: Нам не уйти друг от друга
//
http://www.rosbalt.
ru/2008/10/27/53451
1 .html.
148
О ФОНДЕ КАРНЕГИ
Фонд Карнеги за Международный Мир является неправитель¬
ственной, внепартийной, некоммерческой организацией со штаб-
квартирой в Вашингтоне (США). Фонд был основан в
1910
г. из¬
вестным предпринимателем и общественным деятелем Эндрю
Карнеги для проведения независимых исследований в области
международных отношений. Фонд не занимается предоставлени¬
ем грантов (стипендий) или иных видов финансирования. Дея¬
тельность Фонда Карнеги заключается в выполнении намеченных
его специалистами программ исследований, организации дискус¬
сий, подготовке и выпуске тематических изданий, информирова¬
нии широкой общественности по различным вопросам внешней
политики и международных отношений.
Сотрудниками Фонда Карнеги за Международный Мир яв¬
ляются эксперты мирового уровня, которые используют свой
богатый опыт в различных областях, накопленный ими за годы
работы в государственных учреждениях, средствах массовой ин¬
формации, университетах и научно-исследовательских институ¬
тах, международных организа-циях. Фонд не представляет точ¬
ку зрения какого-либо правительства, не стоит на какой-либо
идеологической или политической платформе, и его сотрудники
имеют самые различные позиции и взгляды.
Решение создать Московский Центр Карнеги было приня¬
то весной
1992
г. с целью реализации широких перспектив со¬
трудничества, которые открылись перед научными и обществен¬
ными кругами США, России и новых независимых государств
после окончания периода «холодной войны». С
1994
г. в рамках
программы по России и Евразии, реализуемой одновременно в
149
Вашингтоне
и Москве, Центр Карнеги осуществляет широкий
спектр общественно-политических и социально-экономических
исследований, организует открытые дискуссии, ведет издатель¬
скую деятельность.
Основу деятельности Московского Центра Карнеги состав¬
ляют публикации и циклы семинаров по внутренней и внешней
политике России, по проблемам нераспространения ядерных и
обычных вооружений, российско-американских отношений, без¬
опасности, гражданского общества, а также политических и эко¬
номических преобразований на постсоветском пространстве.
CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
1779
Massachusetts
Ave., NW,
Washington, DC
20036,
USA
Tel.: +1 (202) 483-7600;
Fax:
+1 (202) 483-1840
E-mail: infoOCarnegieEndowment.org
http://www.CarnegieEndowment.org
МОСКОВСКИЙ ЦЕНТР КАРНЕГИ
Россия,
125009,
Москва, Тверская ул.,
16/2
Тел.:
+7 (495) 935-8904;
Факс:
+7 (495) 935-8906
E-mail: infoíS'carnegie.ru
http^/www.carnegie.ru
150 |
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publisher | ROSSPĖN |
record_format | marc |
spelling | Malašenko, Aleksej Vsevolodovič 1951-2023 Verfasser (DE-588)129179590 aut Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti Aleksej Malašenko The chechen version of russian authoritarism Moskva ROSSPĖN 2009 150 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier PST: chechen version of russian authoritarism. - In kyrill. Schr., russ. - Inh.-Verz. und Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Kadyrov, Ramzan A. 1976- (DE-588)13582026X gnd rswk-swf Kadyrov, Ramzan A. 1976- (DE-588)13582026X p DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017704384&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017704384&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
spellingShingle | Malašenko, Aleksej Vsevolodovič 1951-2023 Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti Kadyrov, Ramzan A. 1976- (DE-588)13582026X gnd |
subject_GND | (DE-588)13582026X |
title | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti |
title_alt | The chechen version of russian authoritarism |
title_auth | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti |
title_exact_search | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti |
title_full | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti Aleksej Malašenko |
title_fullStr | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti Aleksej Malašenko |
title_full_unstemmed | Ramzan Kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti Aleksej Malašenko |
title_short | Ramzan Kadyrov |
title_sort | ramzan kadyrov rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti |
title_sub | rossijskij politik kavkazskoj nacionalʹnosti |
topic | Kadyrov, Ramzan A. 1976- (DE-588)13582026X gnd |
topic_facet | Kadyrov, Ramzan A. 1976- |
url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017704384&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=017704384&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT malasenkoaleksejvsevolodovic ramzankadyrovrossijskijpolitikkavkazskojnacionalʹnosti AT malasenkoaleksejvsevolodovic thechechenversionofrussianauthoritarism |