Jugoslávie a pražské jaro:
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | Czech |
| Published: |
Praha
Univ. Karlova, Filozofická Fak. [u.a.]
2008
|
| Edition: | Vyd. 1. |
| Series: | Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis
5 |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Item Description: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Yugoslavia and the Prague spring |
| Physical Description: | 377 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9788073082208 9788090358942 |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |c Jan Pelikán |
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| 264 | 1 | |a Praha |b Univ. Karlova, Filozofická Fak. [u.a.] |c 2008 | |
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| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis |v 5 | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Yugoslavia and the Prague spring | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Außenpolitik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Geschichte | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
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| 651 | 4 | |a Jugoslawien | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Sowjetunion | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Tschechoslowakei | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Czechoslovakia |x Foreign relations |z Yugoslavia | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Czechoslovakia |x History |y Intervention, 1968 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Czechoslovakia |x Politics and government |y 1945-1992 | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Soviet Union |x Foreign relations |z Yugoslavia | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia |x Foreign relations |z Czechoslovakia | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia |x Foreign relations |z Soviet Union | |
| 651 | 4 | |a Yugoslavia |x Politics and government |y 1945-1980 | |
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Record in the Search Index
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|---|---|
| adam_text |
OBSAH
Üvod
21
I. kapitola
Titova
Jugoslávie v
60.
letech, její vztahy
s
východním blokem
41
II.
kapitola
Českosíovensko-jagoslávské vztahy na počátku pražského
j
ara
(leden-březen
1968)
55
III.
kapitola
Rozhovory
Josipa
Broze
Tita
v Moskvě v dubnu ig6B
79
IV.
kapitola
Poměř-Jugoslávie
к
pražskému jaru v době stupňování sovětského nátlaku
na Dubčekovo vedení (květen-červen
1968)
109
V. kapitola
Přechodné
zintenzívnení
kontaktů Jugoslávie a Československa před rozhovory
v
Čierne nad Tisou
145
VI.
kapitola
Návštěva
Josipa
Broze
Tita
v Praze v srpnu ig68
i6i
VII.
kapitola
Reakce Jugoslávie na okupaci Československa vojsky pěti států Varšavské
smlouvy
191 VIII,
kapitola
Pokus o vytvořeníjádra československého exilu v Bělehradu
215
IX.
kapitola
Zhoršenísovětsko-jugošlávských vztahů po podpisu moskevského protokolu
(zár'ngôS)
245
X.
kapitola
Odvrácení hrozby otevřené roztržky mezi Moskvou
α
Bělehradem,
poměr Jugoslávie ke skomírání
obrodného
procesu (říjen-prosinec
1968)
273
XI.
kapitola
Oscilace ve vztazích Jugoslávie a Sovětského svazu počátkem roku
1969
(leden-březen
1969)
297
ХИ.
kapitola
Stabilizace spolupráce
Titova
a Brežněvova vedení (áuben-zářhg69)
323 XIII,
kapitola
Poměr Jugoslávie
к
Československu po dubnovém
plénuÜV
KSČ
335
Závěr
339
Prameny a literatura
347
Anglické resumé
365
Srbské resumé
371
Jmenný rejstřfo
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE PRAGUE SPRING
The complex of events linked with the developments in Czechoslovakia at the time
of the so called Prague Spring remains, even after
40
years, analyzed only partially.
The international conjunctions of the reform process and the resulting normaliza¬
tion represent one of the least explored aspects of this problem.
The relationship of Yugoslavia to the so called Prague Spring is impossible to
explore without parallel analysis of the then position and development of contacts
between Belgrade and Moscow. With respect to the complex spectrum of partial
and more serious problems, the book traces particularly the wider frame of inter¬
nal and international politics in the development of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav rela¬
tions from
1968
to
1969.
The other important questions connected with these prob¬
lems (echoes of the Prague Spring in particular parts of Yugoslav society, degree of
inspiration by the example of Tito's regime for the preparation of the post-January
reform program, Yugoslav support of Czechoslovakian citizens on her territory af¬
ter 21st August, economic and cultural relations of both countries etc.) the mono¬
graph either outlines or puts aside.
lhe
central line of interpretation is formed by a detailed analysis of political
relations both between Belgrade and Prague, and Belgrade and Moscow,
lhe
book
also deals in detail with the development of the approach of particular influenc¬
es acting within the frame of Yugoslav power elite, both towards the politics of
Dubček's
leadership and towards reforms carried out in post-January Czechoslova¬
kia. The chapter discussing the activities of four members of the Czechoslovak gov¬
ernment who tried to create in Belgrade immediately after 21st August
1968
the em¬
bryonic core of a government in exile has the form of a kind of thematic excursion
.
The book concentrates more on the events in Yugoslavia. The relations with
Belgrade did not have a significant effect on the course of the so-called Prague
Spring. Instead, the echo of the reformed process markedly (immediately and in
the long term) influenced the political and social processes at that time in progress
in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the development of the Tito regime from
1968
to
1969
has
so far remained entirely outside the interest of historiography.
Chronologically the book focuses on events from January
1968
to the end of
summer of
1969.
Although the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav contacts were regarding
their content empty as early as the autumn of
1968,
the relations of Belgrade and
Moscow were influenced by the so called Czechoslovakian question
-
as a symbol,
not a real problem
-
until the summer months of
1969.
The shadow of this problem
was definitely removed only during Gromyko's visit to Yugoslavia at the begin¬
ning of September
1969.
347
JAN PELIKAN
The book is based on a large sample of secondary sources, but above all on
the study of primary sources (memoirs of contemporaries, editions of documents,
memoirs and periodicals).
Tne
great majority of dates and information concern¬
ing the relations of Yugoslavia towards the Prague Spring is based on the study
of archive documents. I did my research both in the Czech Republic and Yugo¬
slavia, and have repeatedly visited the National Archives of the Czech Republic
(the Repository of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) and the Archives of
the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)
.
I studied also the collection of
documents created at the beginning of the 1990s by the committee of historians
which is at this time deposited in the Institute of Contemporary History, Academy
of Sciences, Czech Republic. I also researched frequently in the Yugoslav archives,
where the repository of the Central panels of the League of Communists of Yugo¬
slavia is located. Similarly important for the research of consequences concerning
the relations of Yugoslavia towards the Prague Spring was a study of papers in
existence in the civil section of the Office of the President of the Republic depos¬
ited in the Archives of the Yugoslav History Museum. Many essential observations
were acquired through research of relevant archive materials deposited in the Ar¬
chives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.
From the end of the first third of the
1960s,
relations between Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union began to improve consistently. The so called second split between
Belgrade and Moscow which broke out in
1958
was slowly ending. The Kremlin
leadership, as early as several years before the end of Khrushchev era understood
the pointlessness of the effort to re-embody Yugoslavia into its sphere of inter¬
est. Additionally, Tito's group gave up attempts to become an alternative centre of
the association of socialist countries, which had been intended to establish specific rela¬
tions with chosen states of the Eastern block and to force them into the Yugoslav
ideological doctrine.
After the accession of Leonid Brezhnev to the office of
Cenerai
Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the political rela¬
tionships between both parties improved steadily. Both countries had the same
or very similar attitude towards the conflict in Vietnam, to the tensions in the
Middle East, and to the course of events in China. During the so called Six-day War
in the Middle East in
1967,
Tito made an unprecedented decision. He left without
consulting with the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
-
for the first time since
1948 -
for a multilateral meeting of the Soviet block leaders
.
Moscow simultaneously manifested her respect towards Yugoslavia as an equal
348
JUCOSLÄVIE
A PRAŽSKÉ JARO
partner, not one of the satellite countries of her power sphere.
1ће
co-operation of
both countries in economic and military spheres showed dynamic development.
However, the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was not
ideal, even at the end of
1967.
In addition to the residuum of distrust that had
accumulated in previous decades and due to the distant attitude towards the inter¬
national communist movement, mutual relations were burdened by several substantial
or more or less banal complications. Belgrade expressed its dissatisfaction with a
problem linked to the existence of approximately
500
Yugoslavs living in Soviet
exile
-
these people had stayed in the Soviet Union after the Tito-Stalin split. For
her part, Moscow articulated her utmost reserved attitude towards some kind of
liberalization of economic and social life in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo¬
slavia (SFRY).
The typical feature of internal conditions in Yugoslavia in
1968
was increas¬
ing instability, not only in many spheres of social and economic relations but also
at the highest levels of the ruling oligarchy. The unstable mood gave rise to a wide
spectrum of impulses: the growing sense of uncertainty resulting from fears and
doubts how the evolving Yugoslavia would be able to deal with the inevitable de¬
parture of the then seventy-six years old
Josip Broz
Tito·; with long-term economic
difficulties and frequent failures of economic reforms; and with increasing dif¬
ferences in living conditions of particular groups of inhabitants. Some regions
showed sharp deterioration of national relations
.
The instability was at that time
caused by the permanently occurring modification of the mechanisms of power,
particularly in the translation of real influence from the centre to the particu¬
lar republics of the Yugoslavian Federation and to the autonomous districts of
Kosovo and
Vojvodina.
Moreover, in the 1960s the moral ethos of Tito's regime
evaporated.
The authoritarian system was also disturbed by real, while in no way distinc¬
tive, liberalization of internal conditions
-
particularly by substantial but not un¬
limited subjection of news media to executive power. In the
1960s,
the restraint
of increased liberty on Yugoslav citizens by comparison with the liberty permit¬
ted to inhabitants in the Soviet sphere of influence was reduced. Under these cir¬
cumstances, when the members of the younger functionary generation entered
the highest offices, the profiling process towards more conservative and liberal
streams and groups in the party leadership accelerated. Nevertheless, in compar¬
ison with a majority of other European socialist countries the more favourable
349
JAN PELIKAN
conditions for social-economic development were not created the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Soon after the general assembly of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in January
1968,
the more liberally oriented repre¬
sentatives of the LCY began to hope to look forward to the changes that were in
progress in Czechoslovakia.
The main reason was due to the caution of the leading representatives of both
countries.
Josip
Broz Tito and even more so the members of
Dubček's
leadership
were afraid that Moscow would interpret their more intensive co-operation as an
aspiration to disrupt the Soviet sphere of power. Even several weeks after the Janu¬
ary general assembly of the CPCz, the Belgrade leadership was not able to appreci¬
ate the seriousness of the changes established in Czechoslovakia. For some time
they assessed the course of events in Czechoslovakia, not as a fundamental shift,
but rather as an acceleration of changes that had been in progress from the begin¬
ning of the second third of the
1960s.
In Prague, the discreetness of the Yugoslavia leadership was understood as
the best chosen policy. This attitude fitted into the tactics of the majority of mem¬
bers of the
Dubček's
group
-
their aim was to prevent any disturbance of Moscow
and a possible repetition of the Hungarian events
12
years previously,
lhe
pro-
reform members of the CPCz leadership believed, on the one hand in support by
Yugoslavia, and on the other hand were alarmed by the consequences of eventual
revelation of sympathies from Belgrade. Moreover, until the definitive removal of
Antonín Novotný
in April
1968
they were afraid that their internal political oppo¬
nents could employ similarly aimed criticism.
During March and April the interest of some elements of the oligarchy ruling
in Yugoslavia concerning about the situation in Prague grew up. Liberally orien¬
tated officers of the LCY began to regard the Czechoslovakian development as an
example of how from the initiative of the Communist party, with the support of
the greater part of society, could liberalize conditions in the socialist state with¬
out the return of capitalism.
Ihat
part of the Belgrade political elite that knew
well the Marxist thesis that a socially fair society can originate only in an eco¬
nomic advanced country, revived in Yugoslavia a deeply rooted understanding of
Czechoslovakia as an economically developed state with a long democratic tradi¬
tion and an educated and culturally advanced population. With regard to the ab¬
sence of their own conception of real reform, the Czechoslovakian development
suddenly offered them a suitable model. They were encouraged by the optimistic
350
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
statements of some Czechoslovak politicians about future co-operation between
both countries in the creation of a new type of socially fair society. However, their
viewpoints were not shared by Tito, who kept a clear distance from the Prague
reform process.
Following the April general assembly of the Central committee of the CPCz,
in which many well-known Stalinists were removed from important posts, the
actual establishment of bilateral contacts became untenable. The ruling group in
Prague understood that distance from SFRY brought no positives them in terms of
the Kremlin's attitude towards the Prague reform movement. The Foreign Min¬
ister of Czechoslovakia
Hájek
asked his departmental counterpart for an urgent
meeting. Moreover, the more radical proponents of the Prague Spring began to
investigate the prospects of a treaty contract with Yugoslavia. However, this idea
was unambiguously rejected by Belgrade.
The situation in Czechoslovakia became the main point of dialogue between
Tito and Brezhnev at the end of April
1968
in Moscow. The Soviet representatives
unambiguously supported the attitude that the leadership of the CPCz was no
longer able to control developments in the country and that the initiative had
transferred to the counter-revolutionary powers. They warned against the dan¬
ger of the execution of Czechoslovak communists if such a development were to
continue, and they fiercely refused all Tito's attempts to polemize with their in¬
terpretation. This was all the more remarkable because Tito referred to no posi¬
tive trends (even indirectly) of the Czechoslovak development during the whole
course of the Moscow dialogues. He always spoke only about the ability of the new
Prague leadership to manage the negative tendencies of the then developments.
Tito pretended not to notice Brezhnev's not very well concealed references to
the necessity of the power intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, he irritably
responded to the comment that developments in Czechoslovakia could negatively
influence not only the internal situation in neighbouring socialist countries, but
also in Yugoslavia. The passions diminished when Tito mentioned the Yugoslav
opposition towards Stalin, and in this way indirectly reminded the Russians that
there were other alternatives than their co-operation with Moscow. Despite the
very strong style of the discussions, Tito had to pay attention to the fact that there
was no allusion on the part of Soviet delegation or accusation against Yugoslavia
of a direct or indirect share in the unfavourable development of the situation in
Czechoslovakia.
351
JAN PELIKAN
Tito's responses to the dialogues were ambiguous. The tirade of the Soviet
leaders should warn him not to intervene independently in the events in Czecho¬
slovakia. Moreover, the meeting confirmed his feeling that the Kremlin did not
intend to permit Czechoslovakia gain a special position similar to SFRY. On the
other hand, the Belgrade dictator was asked to influence stabilization of the
course of events in Czechoslovakia. He considered this request as an expression of
personal appreciation for him, and as a proof that Moscow respected the Yugoslav
position. The results of the Moscow discussions, despite their inconsistent course,
reassured him in his opinion that bilateral relations between the two countries
were progressing in the right direction. He concluded that Kremlin had always
regarded
SERY
as the potential troublesome element on the frontier of its interest
sphere, but on the other hand that Soviet politics essentially needed his help to
solve problems within the scope of the Communist movement and the Eastern
block. Nevertheless he did not underestimate Brezhnev's constraint supported
by his closest collaborators. During his Moscow visit he obviously attempted to
preserve the existing level of relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader
showed quite clearly that he would in no case support such reforms in Czecho¬
slovakia that exceeded a framework defined by the limits of liberalized Stalinism.
The Yugoslav leader dramatically underestimated the degree of the Soviet leader¬
ship's nervousness resulting from events in Prague. Although Tito did not ignore
the possibility of Soviet military intervention, he did not realize that Brezhnev as
early as the beginning of April had ordered a speedy commencement of prepara¬
tions for eventual military occupation of Czechoslovakia. He believed that his at¬
tempt to calm down and persuade the Kremlin leadership that developments in
Czechoslovakia would not endanger the Soviet interests had been a success.
In April, and as well as in August
1968,
Tito disagreed with Brezhnev's view
of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav leader supported some kind of softening of the
Stalinist system, but at the same time he believed that
Dubček
and other Prague
leaders would be able to eliminate the counter-revolutionary powers. He considered the
nervousness of the CPSS leaders resulting from the Czechoslovak development as
exaggerated, though not entirely groundless.
The attitude of the Yugoslav leader towards the course of events in Czecho¬
slovakia was ambiguous, careful and rather passive. He usually referred to the
Prague Spring in brief words and intentionally vaguely. His assessment was dif¬
ferent in private and in public.
352
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
In May
1968,
Prague was visited by the Foreign minister M.
Nikezić
and the
member of the presidium of the LCY
S
.
Milosavlevski
.
During their visits the opin¬
ion of the CPCz leadership that the events in Czechoslovakia had a full support of Yu¬
goslavia had been heightened. Nevertheless the approach of the highest leadership
to the relations with Yugoslavia characterized from August
1968
by the distinctive
amplitudes was again changed during May. Their declared interest concerning the
all-embracing development of the co-operation with Yugoslavia manifested in the
end of April was changed to hesitation and wariness. Such a change meant, with¬
in the scope of the reform process, nothing extraordinary. It corresponded with
rises and falls of particular influences in the Czechoslovak leadership struggling
for distinctive changes. During the Prague Spring the majority of its protagonists
were characterized by hesitation resulting from both a non-developed approach
towards the fundamental conceptual questions
,
and towards the solution of actual
political problems, and naturally the fears about their carriers. The Czechoslovak
leadership showed no real interest in the realization of plans leading towards the
marked advancement of contacts between the representatives of Czechoslovakia
and SFRY and to more frequent bilateral consultation and co-ordination of their at¬
titudes. The change in attitudes of
Dubček's
leadership was influenced by activity
resulting from a still more complicated internal situation and from the increasing¬
ly unscrupulous Moscow press. At the same time, it was a preventative measure
implemented by Prague with the intention of avoiding possible criticism by the
Kremlin accusing the proponents of the Prague Spring of repeating the Yugoslav
model and of the creation of inadmissible bonds with Belgrade.
The reduction of interest in the deepening of relations with Belgrade was
reflected in an indefinite postponement of
Dubček's
SFRY visit, to which he had
been invited as early as the end of February. Following Tito's discussions in Mos¬
cow, the Yugoslavs began to encourage the meeting of the chief proponents of
both countries still more. The Czechoslovak representatives simply gave them
false assurances that
Dubček
would come to Belgrade immediately that his work¬
ing engagements would permit such a visit, but advance dates promised were
frequently postponed. The Yugoslav elite were probably rightly persuaded that
the date with Tito had been intentionally delayed by the highest leadership of
the CPCz. On the Czechoslovak part, there was no interest in meeting other im¬
portant proponents of the new leadership of the CPCz in Yugoslavia. The over¬
cautious policy of
Dubček's
leadership served the purpose of Yugoslavs because
ЗЅЗ
JAN PELIKAN
Tito
preferred to maintain harmonious relations with Moscow concerning sup¬
port for the Prague Spring.
The evident passivity of the highest leadership of the SFRY towards events
in Czechoslovakia deepened still more during June
1968.
The unconcealed and
markedly unquiet development of the internal situation in the then Yugoslavia
led for the first time since the end of the World War II in a mass eruption of some
elements of society. For an entire week in Belgrade a mass student revolt was in
progress and the authorities displayed an inability to stop it. Only after Tito's pub¬
lic promises did the university students decide to finish their protest.
The direct influence of the developments in Czechoslovakia on the student
revolt in Belgrade was small. Nevertheless, at that time the chiefs of the most im¬
portant news media in Yugoslavia were influenced to limit their reports concern¬
ing the events in Prague. The Yugoslav leadership began to be afraid that informa¬
tion about rapid progress of Czechoslovak liberalization could, from their point of
view, unfavourably influence the demands of the students.
The ruling elite in SFRY following the Belgrade unrest changed their atti¬
tude towards the Prague Spring. The student storm strengthened doubtfulness
about the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak development. The evaluation of causes
behind the protests finding no sympathy at all groups among the LCY leadership
was explained among other things by the fact that the LCY dampened activities at
the universities and by the infiltration of some party organizations at particular
universities with hostile elements. Weakening of the authoritative character of the
regime, implementing of civil rights, and systematic restraint of influence of the
party bureaucracy and its effect on society represented the fundamental trends
of the reform process in Czechoslovakia. The student revolt in Belgrade indicated
where the development of events which began in January in Prague could lead.
The student storms confirmed what could happen in a Leninist-Stalinist system if
the development of society escaped from party bureaucracy control. Therefore the
Yugoslav leadership from June intensified calls for strong measures to be imple¬
mented by Yugoslavian government
Even the majority of liberally orientated representatives of the LCY perceived
the student unrests as a possible prologue to chaos and anarchy. Even the elements
in the leadership of the LCY supporting reforms considered such a development
in light of their conceptions as a greater danger than partial restrictive measures
and confinement of discussion within the party elite. On the other hand, it did
not mean that all liberals would immediately cease to lay hopes on possible success
354
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Undoubtedly their fears of the inter¬
national and internal complications which could have an impact on the Prague
Spring were heightened. K. Crvenkovski, M. Tripalo, M.
Nikezić
and other person¬
alities of the inconsistent reform stream in the LCY leadership did not cease to have
a liking for the Prague Spring and the reform process, and found there for Yugoslavia
much inspiration. Nevertheless, following the June student revolt they started
slowly to criticize the spontaneous and by the party little controlled development in Czecho¬
slovakia. These reservations were deepened still more after August
1968,
and par¬
ticularly from April
1969.
Even the liberal leaders of the LCY advocated the position
that the process of change had to come from above. The enlargement of democratic
mechanisms should, according to them, be related only to the limited structures
of the Communist party. The liberalization of the life of society should, according
to their opinion, have given limits which should be controlled and guided by the
enlightened party leadership. The majority of these people were unable to imagine
other alternatives than a softened appearance of the Tito (i.e. Leninist-Stalinist)
system capable of dealing vigorously with all anti-socialist excesses.
The wide, vague and often contradictory envisaged program of the Prague
Spring failed to engage broad social support. Moreover the viewpoints and atti¬
tudes of ordinary members of the CPCz and the non-party men became the motive
power accelerating and radicalizing the reform processes. The liberal stream in
the LCY had no social anchorage, and the attitudes of a majority of Yugoslav citi¬
zens towards Tito's regime were largely positive. In
1968,
the desire to change the
regime in Yugoslavia was quite small.
In July, Tito ordered the dissolution of the party organizations at the Philo¬
sophical and Philological faculties of the Belgrade University. He launched the
campaign by criticizing the incorrect attitudes of some leading representatives
of the intelligentsia. It was not possible at all to take similar steps in the then
Czechoslovakia. Rather, such measures marked the normalization steps during
Husák's
regime, approximately two years later.
The character of political relations between the two states began transform¬
ing dramatically from the first and second July weeks. The ruling elite in SFRY
were alarmed by the reports of verbal assaults of the Warsaw Agreement states
against
Dubček's
leaderships and by the information about the real threat of a
Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs decided to express
clearly their attitude towards the crisis originated by the Soviet pressure against
Czechoslovakia. Belgrade again invited
A. Dubček
and early offered an immediate
355
JAN PELIKAN
visit by Tito to Prague. The Yugoslavs also publicly criticized the Soviet interfer¬
ence into the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.
The essential reason for the change of the SFRY attitude lies in the fact that
the Czechoslovak crisis ceased to be just a limited controversy within the scope of
the Eastern block and raised memories of Stalin's pressure towards Yugoslavia. At
that moment when there was a threat that tension between Moscow and Prague
would grow into an open split, the ruling group in SFRY had to abandon their
reserved approach. If they did not act in this way there would be the real threat of
losing the great prestige they had justifiably gained in
1948.
The particular steps of the Czechoslovak leadership towards Yugoslavia were
stigmatized by the development during the two July weeks that ended with the
meeting of the leading representatives of the CPSU in
Čierna nad Tisou.
This pe¬
riod was characterized by the dramatically unconcealed even chaotic development
of the international and internal situation, by the ominous Soviet intervention,
by the different attitudes of particular high representatives of the CPCz, and un¬
doubtedly also by the insufficient decisiveness of
A. Dubček
and his closest col¬
laborators. Relations in the political sphere fell into a number of partial contacts
having no clearly defined frame. Despite the indisputable revival the mutual rela¬
tions remained even in this short phase of the Prague Spring period without atten¬
tion, and influenced the crisis only partially.
The Belgrade leader knew very well how markedly different was the situation
concerning the present crisis of the Prague Spring from when Yugoslavia had been
exposed to Soviet pressure. Twenty years earlier, Stalin's steps had been without
rational warrant. At that time Tito's oligarchy remained in every way the loyal ally,
strengthened its power and copied devoutly and thoroughly the Soviet conditions.
On the other hand, in
1968
there was a real threat that the situation in Czechoslo¬
vakia could get out of
Dubček's
control and the development could lead not merely
to a modification, but directly to overthrow, of the left-authoritative system of the
Lenin type. The menaces from Kremlin against these processes accelerated still
more. Thereupon Tito, who did not wish for the disintegration of the existing po¬
litical and economic system in Czechoslovakia, accepted legitimacy of the CPCz and
Czechoslovak workers intervention against powers struggling for removal of the left-
authoritative regime. He was not content with
Dubček's
strategy. Therefore at a
time of real threat of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav
oligarchy remained surprisingly inactive.
3S6
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
Tito and his closest associates were particularly interested in the fact that
processes which started at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPCz could raise these serious commotions in the Eastern bloc and threaten the
internal stability of Yugoslavia. Vaguely defined favourable outcomes of the re¬
form process played only secondary role in their consideration of the Czechoslovak
events. For this reason, Belgrade welcomed with relief an agreement to bilateral
negotiations between leading representatives of the CPCz and CPSU. Even the Yu¬
goslav president willingly advanced the date of his visit in Czechoslovakia.
After repeated postponements, Tito arrived in Prague on the 9th August, and
his visit taking place in an extremely difficult social atmosphere had a number of
objectives
.
The emotional aspect of this visit was supplemented by the diplomatic
calculus. The exaggerated and often false echo of the calculated as well as unwant¬
ed guests was mingled with manoeuvring, rational political debates
,
hypothetical
considerations, and pragmatic recommendations. Czechoslovak society naturally
perceived
Josip
Broz Tito as a symbol of opposition against the Soviet constraint.
In dramatic days of uncertainty, crowds in the Prague streets welcomed him not
only as the representative of a friendly state but also as a hero very much needed.
Czechoslovak society spontaneously identified itself with the myth connected
with Tito's personality.
The prevailing enthusiasm, and often wholly uncritical expectations that the
maj
ori
ty
of Czechoslovak society linked to Tito's visit
,
contrasted with the careful
,
even reserved, approach of some members of the CPCz leadership.
Tito came to Prague with no clear idea about the aims of negotiations. He
realized that his visit would be perceived as an unambiguous expression of his
sympathies for the reform process. As a pragmatic politician maintaining particu¬
larly the interests of his state, Tito did not wish for Moscow to assess his negotia¬
tions in Prague in this way. He wanted to present his visit in Czechoslovakia to the
Soviet leaders
-
and he probably considered it in this way
-
as a fulfilment of his
promise given at the end of April to Brezhnev, when he then committed himself
to help the Kremlin to stabilize the situation in Czechoslovakia.
The dialogues took for long time place in a confused atmosphere. At the gen¬
eral meetings
,
Dubček
avoided politically delicate topics
.
Only during the separate
meeting with Tito did
Dubček
provide him with more confidential information.
However,
Dubček
did not mention the promises given to Brezhnev in
Čierna nad
Tisou.
Tito made plain to his partners not to underestimate the Soviet threat, to
357
JAN PELIKAN
try finding a modus Vivendi, consolidate the internal situation, to strengthen their
own power position, and to deal fiercely with 'anti-socialistic elements'.
The Yugoslav top leadership was taken by surprise by the military inter¬
vention of the states of the Warsaw Pact on 21st August
1968.
Immediately after
the leadership of the LCY received the information about the military interven¬
tion in Czechoslovakia they met to discuss the consequences for Yugoslavia. The
tone of the dealings and the main principles of the resolutions were formulated
by Tito. In his speeches it is possible to discern clearly the minimal interest in
the future fate of the reform process in Czechoslovakia, and considerable fears of
a threat to the internal and external stability of Yugoslavia. The highest repre¬
sentative of the SFRY unambiguously rejected the reasons for the occupation of
Czechoslovakia presented by the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, in com¬
parison to his attitudes taken twelve years earlier to the events in Hungary and
Poland, he immediately on the 21st August withdrew all support for the reform
group in the CPCz.
Immediately following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito was evi¬
dently unable to evaluate where Brezhnev's intentions laid. He was even afraid of
a Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia, and his fears included also the threat
of sudden outbreaks of internal unrest. Yet he unambiguously demonstrated that
he would resist any external attack and that he was ready to deal fiercely with
internal opposition. The police preventively arrested some people and brought ac¬
cusations of seditious activities against more than
2,500
others.
Tito decided to face the expected complications by an essentially simple tac¬
tic. In no case did he want to give to Moscow a pretext for raising pressure against
Yugoslavia. Therefore he made an effort to avoid any steps that would needlessly
provoke the Brezhnev group, and sought to secure internal stability. Tito's ap¬
proach towards the new phase of the Czechoslovak crisis continuously concurred
with his actual attitude towards the Prague Spring.
Immediately following the events of 21st August, Moscow tried to continue
with the development of her co-operation with Yugoslavia. Although the Krem¬
lin made clear to Belgrade that the events in Czechoslovakia were exclusively the
business of the Soviet sphere of interest, Tito should at the same time understand
that Brezhnev was concerned to preserve good relations with Yugoslavia.
After the first shock of the new Yugoslav policy had subsided, the new policy
towards Czechoslovakia speedily crystallized. This process was not unambiguous
and included several conflicting factors. The external form of this approach varied
358
JUGOSLÁVIE A PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
greatly from its essence
;
outwardly declared principles did not correspond by far to
the real aims which the Belgrade leadership wanted to achieve.
The Belgrade leader soon recognized with relief that Yugoslavia was not cur¬
rently threatened by Soviet military intervention. He was also calmed by the un¬
derstanding that the Czechoslovak occupation was not connected with a redistri¬
bution of the sphere of influence in the bipolar world or with the power constraint
of the West on Yugoslavia with silent assent.
The public proclamations of the Yugoslav representatives condemning reso¬
lutely the aggression against Czechoslovakia revived the dusty colours of the por¬
trait of Tito's Yugoslavia as a liberal-minded, independent and principled state.
Thus uni-dimensionally and then largely obscurely the greater part of the world
public perceived the policy of Belgrade. Following the Czechoslovak occupation
and thanks to these clever steps the sympathies of the Yugoslav population to¬
wards the Communist regime were markedly heightened. The propagandist main¬
tenance of Czechoslovak sovereignty and the right of its citizens to decide matters
concerning their own state paradoxically weakened the position of those streams
in the LCY demanding the realization of fundamental internal reforms in Yugosla¬
via. The events linked to the events of 21st August caused that public forgot about
the recent revolt of the Belgrade students. Thanks to his decisive public presence
during the August days, the Yugoslav leader created a favourable position for the
suppression of the potential liberal opposition, which was crushed from
1971
to
1973.
The changed international situation effectively challenged the creation of
a strong allied axis between Yugoslavia and Romania
.
Both states were minimally
threatened by the Brezhnev regime, yet from the beginning Tito rejected this idea.
At a critical moment he did not want to relate to the north-eastern neighbour and
to give Moscow a pretext to interpret a rapprochement of both countries as the
creation of an anti-Soviet alliance. On the other hand he promised Ceausescu dur¬
ing their meeting on the 24th August that in the event of Soviet aggression against
Romania he would not permit the Soviet state or its allies the passage through Yu¬
goslav territory and he would not close borders with Romania. However, he stated
that in such a case Yugoslavia would not support Romania militarily and would
disarm Romanian soldiers entering its territory. By these means, Tito influenced
Ceausescu to expeditiously consolidate his relations with Moscow.
From 24th August the Soviet approach towards Yugoslavia began to change.
Brezhnev's group was outraged at the news service in Yugoslav media. The Soviet
representatives were also exasperated by the Yugoslav moves at the meeting of the
359
JAN PELIKAN
United Nations Security
Council
where the Yugoslavs condemned the military ac¬
tion of the Warsaw pact. Thus the Yugoslav ruling group did not conform to the
tactical targets set by Tito. The Soviet leadership did not properly understand the
complex signals coming from Belgrade 'in code'. Tito made an effort to convince
Moscow that Yugoslavia must preserve her appearance (and therefore condemn
publicly the military action of five Warsaw Pact countries), but on the other hand
the Yugoslav politicians were not particularly interested in the further destiny of
Czechoslovakia, and their key foreign priorities lay in the preservation of the ex¬
isting
moăusvivendi
of relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow did not understand
that public condemnation of the Czechoslovak occupation was just the propa¬
gandist part of the so called seesaw policy long practised as a tactic in balancing on
the frontier of the East and West blocks. The Soviet politicians also incorrectly
assumed that critical comments of the Yugoslav media expressed the official posi¬
tion of Tito's group.
After the signature of the Moscow protocol and the cessation of the first wave
of international outrage in connection with the Czechoslovakian occupation, the
Brezhnev's group decided to fiercely challenge Yugoslavia to change its approach
towards the Soviet policy. On the 30th August in a verbal note they accused Tito
of supporting anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces and that he "derogates the Sovi¬
et-Yugoslavian relations and socialism in Yugoslavia". The Yugoslav leader indig¬
nantly rejected these statements, recited by the Soviet ambassador. However, at
the following session of the LCY leadership on the
2nd
September he fiercely urged
the necessity to improve relations with Kremlin. At the same time he criticized
some liberally orientated representatives of the Party, who were demanding an in¬
crease of the distancing from the Soviet Union. Within the scope of this tactic,
Tito distanced himself through diplomatic channels from the activities of four
Czechoslovak ministers, who were on the 21st August coincidently visiting SFRY
and who were unsuccessfully attempting to create in Belgrade the core of an exile
government with the silent consent of the Yugoslav offices.
In response to the Soviet verbal note conveyed in Moscow on the 12th Septem¬
ber, Tito unambiguously protested against the Soviet criticism. Moreover, the text
criticized the occupation of Czechoslovakia and emphasized the inadmissibility of
the intervention by force in another socialist country, even though motivated by
the intention to save socialism. They protested against the Soviet criticism of the
news media. At the same time Tito's group signalled that they were prepared to
respect the Moscow protocol. Tito clearly claimed in his message that he consid-
360
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
ered
the prospective public disputation to be counter-productive, and he offered
Brezhnev a personal meeting.
Tito knew that he must not show weakness in contacts with the Kremlin or to
submit immediately. In tactical games with the Soviet leader he was always able
to manoeuvre skilfully, and this was the reason why he alternated compromises
with firmness over short intervals
.
He feinted also in the beginning of autumn
1968
when he combined promises and critical invectives. Also, he tolerated and
possibly initiated the presence of the high ranking officers of the LCY, starkly criti¬
cizing the Soviet policy. On the other hand he signalled to Moscow that he was
in no way responsible for the outbreak of tension in bilateral relations
,
and that
he intended to exert significant effort to convince his collaborators of the need to
improve contacts with Moscow.
The Kremlin did not recognize the real intentions of the Yugoslav leader.
Therefore the Brezhnev group behaved towards Yugoslavia with wariness, suspi¬
cion and disquiet. In the middle of October, the Soviet leadership sent another
despatch to Belgrade. The letter was formulated in a conciliatory although quite
condescending tone, which contrasted with the irritable and almost hysterical
tone of the note read for Tito on the 30th August. Moscow probably wanted by way
of this latest mission to end the polemic which was begun by Kremlin politicians
at the end of August. Moscow wished to return relations between the two states
to what they had been before the occupation of Czechoslovakia. At the same time,
the Soviet politicians indirectly reserved the right of the superpower to have the
last word.
However Tito came to a conclusion that neither the position of Belgrade in its
relations with Moscow nor his internal position would have been strengthened if
he had accepted Brezhnev's message without reserve
.
Although he did not change
his attitude that there was a need to improve relations with the Soviets
,
he never¬
theless concluded that it was necessary at that moment to manifest strength and
firmness once more to the Kremlin. He did not want to permit Moscow politicians
to conclude that they could force acquiescence from Yugoslavia. He was also ap¬
parently irritated by the fact that the Soviet Union refused to confirm explicitly
respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the SFRY. He
felt that the Kremlin rulers should realize that there for them there was a possible
worst outcome in terms of an economic, political and eventually military-strate¬
gic swing of Yugoslavia to the West. Tito aimed to remind Brezhnev that at the
361
JAN PELIKAN
beginning of
1953,
in a time of peak Stalinist compulsion, he had already begun to
navigate his country in that direction.
The content of the letter given on the 12th November differed diametrically
from Tito's previously conciliatory expressions. He condemned the occupation of
Czechoslovakia and emphasized equality in relations between the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia. He accused the Kremlin of pressurising the SFRY with the final
objective of forcing his country to renounce its independent policy.
Immediately following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito tried to
conceal the growing tension in relations with Moscow. However, at the turn of
October and November he chose a different approach. He decided that the Brezh¬
nev letter and the Yugoslav answer would be revealed to the wider party body. At
the same time he ordered that information about the internal polemics with Mos¬
cow should be provided to foreign countries.
Tne
unfriendly, deliberately irritable tone of the letter handed over on the 12th
November indirectly but quite clearly warning Kremlin against the unpleasant con¬
sequences of further exasperation of relations with Yugoslavia proved to be a suc¬
cessful tactic. Although Tito's move strengthened the long-term suspicion of the
Soviet leaders towards Yugoslavia, on the other hand it persuaded them to take a
friendlier stand towards Belgrade and to look for an acceptable modus
vivendi
with
Tito's regime
.
The Kremlin leaders decided to demonstrate publicly their pleasure in
developing bilateral co-operation with the SFRY. At the end of November they took
advantage of the oncoming 25th anniversary of the second creation of Yugoslavia.
They expressed to Tito in salutatory telegram their will to develop friendly relations
with Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav leader reacted positively to this favourable step.
Following the 21st August and in the ensuing months and years, the rela¬
tions of Yugoslavia towards the Soviet Union remained the subject of internal
discussions among the Belgrade political elite. The agreement confirmed their
opinion concerning the uselessness of support for the Czechoslovak reform process.
One of the reasons was the understanding that Yugoslavia could not help Czecho¬
slovakia at all. In Belgrade they knew that such an attempt would evoke an exas¬
perated reaction from the Kremlin. An almost general lack of interest concerning
the further developments in Czechoslovakia was determined particularly by the
disillusion of the leading representatives of the CPCz and of the mild reaction of
the Czechoslovak population to the occupation of their country. The above men¬
tioned approach by Yugoslavia was essentially welcomed by all groups participat¬
ing in power in Prague.
Tne
body of opinion trying in conditions of the Soviet oc-
362
JUGOSLÁVIE A PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
cupation
to defend the results of the reform process did not endeavour at all to
find support in Yugoslavia. In the context of their passive tactics they considered
the need for temporary limitation of their relations with Belgrade as rational. The
supporters of the neo-Stalinist regime perceived Yugoslavia as a symbol of danger¬
ous revisionism. In principle unobtrusively and without the great interest of pub¬
lic the bilateral contacts in the political sphere were interrupted. In the context
of this approach, Belgrade accepted in April the accession of neo-Stalinists to the
the leadership of the CPCz without great interest. The prevailing opinion of the
Czechoslovak population in assessing Yugoslavia as the only sincere, confidential
and reliable ally was in no case changed. Tito's regime became for Czechoslovak
society still more the pattern of the attractive socially correct state.
By December
1968
the tension originated after the occupation of Czechoslova¬
kia was overcome. In an atmosphere of calm, the new and in principle the last stage
of relations between the Communist regimes in Moscow and Belgrade began; the
period being characterized by mutual recognition of the status quo and by an absence
of more seriously mentioned attempts to change it. Over the following twenty years
,
the relations between the two states remained more or less constant. It cannot be
denied that there were periods of considerable rapprochement and on the other
hand periods of distrust and alarm, and both of these tendencies remained con¬
stantly present in bilateral relations
.
These disturbances were not generally caused
by real antagonism but by moments of minor importance resulting very often from
insufficient foreknowledge or from distrust accumulated in previous years.
This characteristic is fully applicable for the whole period after
1969.
Both
states had no more serious controversies related to their concrete internal or for¬
eign policy. Most problems were external or were connected with some nuances in
the ideological sphere; these disagreements although both sides reacted to them
too sensitively often had the nature of purely academic disputations.
Relatively quiet relations between Belgrade and Moscow were briefly and not
seriously impaired by the decision of Kremlin to boycott the congress of the LCY
in March
1969.
This step was motivated by the fear of expected public criticism
of the Soviet policy at this forum. The Kremlin recognized that Tito's regime was
socialist and at the same time accepted that Yugoslavia did not belong to the East¬
ern block. The Brezhnev group was compliant with the need to present on the
international scene harmonious relations with SFRY as an example of its tolerant
,
liberal and peaceful approach towards smaller independent states. At the same
time however the Soviet leadership did not know how it should react to public
363
JAN PELIKAN
disapproval to its internal or foreign policy presented in the very same socialist
Yugoslavia. Criticism reported at the party congress in country considered by the
Soviet Union as socialist would be for Moscow extremely unacceptable, and the
Soviet delegation could not disguise this. Any kind of public reaction would lead
immediately to a deterioration of relations, and moreover would damage the im¬
age of the Soviet Union. It was for this reason that Brezhnev organized a boycott
of the IX Congress of the LCY.
364 |
| adam_txt |
OBSAH
Üvod
21
I. kapitola
Titova
Jugoslávie v
60.
letech, její vztahy
s
východním blokem
41
II.
kapitola
Českosíovensko-jagoslávské vztahy na počátku pražského
j
ara
(leden-březen
1968)
55
III.
kapitola
Rozhovory
Josipa
Broze
Tita
v Moskvě v dubnu ig6B
79
IV.
kapitola
Poměř-Jugoslávie
к
pražskému jaru v době stupňování sovětského nátlaku
na Dubčekovo vedení (květen-červen
1968)
109
V. kapitola
Přechodné
zintenzívnení
kontaktů Jugoslávie a Československa před rozhovory
v
Čierne nad Tisou
145
VI.
kapitola
Návštěva
Josipa
Broze
Tita
v Praze v srpnu ig68
i6i
VII.
kapitola
Reakce Jugoslávie na okupaci Československa vojsky pěti států Varšavské
smlouvy
191 VIII,
kapitola
Pokus o vytvořeníjádra československého exilu v Bělehradu
215
IX.
kapitola
Zhoršenísovětsko-jugošlávských vztahů po podpisu moskevského protokolu
(zár'ngôS)
245
X.
kapitola
Odvrácení hrozby otevřené roztržky mezi Moskvou
α
Bělehradem,
poměr Jugoslávie ke skomírání
obrodného
procesu (říjen-prosinec
1968)
273
XI.
kapitola
Oscilace ve vztazích Jugoslávie a Sovětského svazu počátkem roku
1969
(leden-březen
1969)
297
ХИ.
kapitola
Stabilizace spolupráce
Titova
a Brežněvova vedení (áuben-zářhg69)
323 XIII,
kapitola
Poměr Jugoslávie
к
Československu po dubnovém
plénuÜV
KSČ
335
Závěr
339
Prameny a literatura
347
Anglické resumé
365
Srbské resumé
371
Jmenný rejstřfo
YUGOSLAVIA AND THE PRAGUE SPRING
The complex of events linked with the developments in Czechoslovakia at the time
of the so called Prague Spring remains, even after
40
years, analyzed only partially.
The international conjunctions of the reform process and the resulting normaliza¬
tion represent one of the least explored aspects of this problem.
The relationship of Yugoslavia to the so called Prague Spring is impossible to
explore without parallel analysis of the then position and development of contacts
between Belgrade and Moscow. With respect to the complex spectrum of partial
and more serious problems, the book traces particularly the wider frame of inter¬
nal and international politics in the development of Czechoslovak-Yugoslav rela¬
tions from
1968
to
1969.
The other important questions connected with these prob¬
lems (echoes of the Prague Spring in particular parts of Yugoslav society, degree of
inspiration by the example of Tito's regime for the preparation of the post-January
reform program, Yugoslav support of Czechoslovakian citizens on her territory af¬
ter 21st August, economic and cultural relations of both countries etc.) the mono¬
graph either outlines or puts aside.
lhe
central line of interpretation is formed by a detailed analysis of political
relations both between Belgrade and Prague, and Belgrade and Moscow,
lhe
book
also deals in detail with the development of the approach of particular influenc¬
es acting within the frame of Yugoslav power elite, both towards the politics of
Dubček's
leadership and towards reforms carried out in post-January Czechoslova¬
kia. The chapter discussing the activities of four members of the Czechoslovak gov¬
ernment who tried to create in Belgrade immediately after 21st August
1968
the em¬
bryonic core of a government in exile has the form of a kind of thematic excursion
.
The book concentrates more on the events in Yugoslavia. The relations with
Belgrade did not have a significant effect on the course of the so-called Prague
Spring. Instead, the echo of the reformed process markedly (immediately and in
the long term) influenced the political and social processes at that time in progress
in Yugoslavia. Moreover, the development of the Tito regime from
1968
to
1969
has
so far remained entirely outside the interest of historiography.
Chronologically the book focuses on events from January
1968
to the end of
summer of
1969.
Although the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav contacts were regarding
their content empty as early as the autumn of
1968,
the relations of Belgrade and
Moscow were influenced by the so called Czechoslovakian question
-
as a symbol,
not a real problem
-
until the summer months of
1969.
The shadow of this problem
was definitely removed only during Gromyko's visit to Yugoslavia at the begin¬
ning of September
1969.
347
JAN PELIKAN
The book is based on a large sample of secondary sources, but above all on
the study of primary sources (memoirs of contemporaries, editions of documents,
memoirs and periodicals).
Tne
great majority of dates and information concern¬
ing the relations of Yugoslavia towards the Prague Spring is based on the study
of archive documents. I did my research both in the Czech Republic and Yugo¬
slavia, and have repeatedly visited the National Archives of the Czech Republic
(the Repository of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) and the Archives of
the Ministry Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic)
.
I studied also the collection of
documents created at the beginning of the 1990s by the committee of historians
which is at this time deposited in the Institute of Contemporary History, Academy
of Sciences, Czech Republic. I also researched frequently in the Yugoslav archives,
where the repository of the Central panels of the League of Communists of Yugo¬
slavia is located. Similarly important for the research of consequences concerning
the relations of Yugoslavia towards the Prague Spring was a study of papers in
existence in the civil section of the Office of the President of the Republic depos¬
ited in the Archives of the Yugoslav History Museum. Many essential observations
were acquired through research of relevant archive materials deposited in the Ar¬
chives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia.
From the end of the first third of the
1960s,
relations between Yugoslavia and
the Soviet Union began to improve consistently. The so called second split between
Belgrade and Moscow which broke out in
1958
was slowly ending. The Kremlin
leadership, as early as several years before the end of Khrushchev era understood
the pointlessness of the effort to re-embody Yugoslavia into its sphere of inter¬
est. Additionally, Tito's group gave up attempts to become an alternative centre of
the association of socialist countries, which had been intended to establish specific rela¬
tions with chosen states of the Eastern block and to force them into the Yugoslav
ideological doctrine.
After the accession of Leonid Brezhnev to the office of
Cenerai
Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the political rela¬
tionships between both parties improved steadily. Both countries had the same
or very similar attitude towards the conflict in Vietnam, to the tensions in the
Middle East, and to the course of events in China. During the so called Six-day War
in the Middle East in
1967,
Tito made an unprecedented decision. He left without
consulting with the leadership of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)
-
for the first time since
1948 -
for a multilateral meeting of the Soviet block leaders
.
Moscow simultaneously manifested her respect towards Yugoslavia as an equal
348
JUCOSLÄVIE
A PRAŽSKÉ JARO
partner, not one of the satellite countries of her power sphere.
1ће
co-operation of
both countries in economic and military spheres showed dynamic development.
However, the relationship between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was not
ideal, even at the end of
1967.
In addition to the residuum of distrust that had
accumulated in previous decades and due to the distant attitude towards the inter¬
national communist movement, mutual relations were burdened by several substantial
or more or less banal complications. Belgrade expressed its dissatisfaction with a
problem linked to the existence of approximately
500
Yugoslavs living in Soviet
exile
-
these people had stayed in the Soviet Union after the Tito-Stalin split. For
her part, Moscow articulated her utmost reserved attitude towards some kind of
liberalization of economic and social life in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo¬
slavia (SFRY).
The typical feature of internal conditions in Yugoslavia in
1968
was increas¬
ing instability, not only in many spheres of social and economic relations but also
at the highest levels of the ruling oligarchy. The unstable mood gave rise to a wide
spectrum of impulses: the growing sense of uncertainty resulting from fears and
doubts how the evolving Yugoslavia would be able to deal with the inevitable de¬
parture of the then seventy-six years old
Josip Broz
Tito·; with long-term economic
difficulties and frequent failures of economic reforms; and with increasing dif¬
ferences in living conditions of particular groups of inhabitants. Some regions
showed sharp deterioration of national relations
.
The instability was at that time
caused by the permanently occurring modification of the mechanisms of power,
particularly in the translation of real influence from the centre to the particu¬
lar republics of the Yugoslavian Federation and to the autonomous districts of
Kosovo and
Vojvodina.
Moreover, in the 1960s the moral ethos of Tito's regime
evaporated.
The authoritarian system was also disturbed by real, while in no way distinc¬
tive, liberalization of internal conditions
-
particularly by substantial but not un¬
limited subjection of news media to executive power. In the
1960s,
the restraint
of increased liberty on Yugoslav citizens by comparison with the liberty permit¬
ted to inhabitants in the Soviet sphere of influence was reduced. Under these cir¬
cumstances, when the members of the younger functionary generation entered
the highest offices, the profiling process towards more conservative and liberal
streams and groups in the party leadership accelerated. Nevertheless, in compar¬
ison with a majority of other European socialist countries the more favourable
349
JAN PELIKAN
conditions for social-economic development were not created the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia.
Soon after the general assembly of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) in January
1968,
the more liberally oriented repre¬
sentatives of the LCY began to hope to look forward to the changes that were in
progress in Czechoslovakia.
The main reason was due to the caution of the leading representatives of both
countries.
Josip
Broz Tito and even more so the members of
Dubček's
leadership
were afraid that Moscow would interpret their more intensive co-operation as an
aspiration to disrupt the Soviet sphere of power. Even several weeks after the Janu¬
ary general assembly of the CPCz, the Belgrade leadership was not able to appreci¬
ate the seriousness of the changes established in Czechoslovakia. For some time
they assessed the course of events in Czechoslovakia, not as a fundamental shift,
but rather as an acceleration of changes that had been in progress from the begin¬
ning of the second third of the
1960s.
In Prague, the discreetness of the Yugoslavia leadership was understood as
the best chosen policy. This attitude fitted into the tactics of the majority of mem¬
bers of the
Dubček's
group
-
their aim was to prevent any disturbance of Moscow
and a possible repetition of the Hungarian events
12
years previously,
lhe
pro-
reform members of the CPCz leadership believed, on the one hand in support by
Yugoslavia, and on the other hand were alarmed by the consequences of eventual
revelation of sympathies from Belgrade. Moreover, until the definitive removal of
Antonín Novotný
in April
1968
they were afraid that their internal political oppo¬
nents could employ similarly aimed criticism.
During March and April the interest of some elements of the oligarchy ruling
in Yugoslavia concerning about the situation in Prague grew up. Liberally orien¬
tated officers of the LCY began to regard the Czechoslovakian development as an
example of how from the initiative of the Communist party, with the support of
the greater part of society, could liberalize conditions in the socialist state with¬
out the return of capitalism.
Ihat
part of the Belgrade political elite that knew
well the Marxist thesis that a socially fair society can originate only in an eco¬
nomic advanced country, revived in Yugoslavia a deeply rooted understanding of
Czechoslovakia as an economically developed state with a long democratic tradi¬
tion and an educated and culturally advanced population. With regard to the ab¬
sence of their own conception of real reform, the Czechoslovakian development
suddenly offered them a suitable model. They were encouraged by the optimistic
350
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
statements of some Czechoslovak politicians about future co-operation between
both countries in the creation of a new type of socially fair society. However, their
viewpoints were not shared by Tito, who kept a clear distance from the Prague
reform process.
Following the April general assembly of the Central committee of the CPCz,
in which many well-known Stalinists were removed from important posts, the
actual establishment of bilateral contacts became untenable. The ruling group in
Prague understood that distance from SFRY brought no positives them in terms of
the Kremlin's attitude towards the Prague reform movement. The Foreign Min¬
ister of Czechoslovakia
Hájek
asked his departmental counterpart for an urgent
meeting. Moreover, the more radical proponents of the Prague Spring began to
investigate the prospects of a treaty contract with Yugoslavia. However, this idea
was unambiguously rejected by Belgrade.
The situation in Czechoslovakia became the main point of dialogue between
Tito and Brezhnev at the end of April
1968
in Moscow. The Soviet representatives
unambiguously supported the attitude that the leadership of the CPCz was no
longer able to control developments in the country and that the initiative had
transferred to the counter-revolutionary powers. They warned against the dan¬
ger of the execution of Czechoslovak communists if such a development were to
continue, and they fiercely refused all Tito's attempts to polemize with their in¬
terpretation. This was all the more remarkable because Tito referred to no posi¬
tive trends (even indirectly) of the Czechoslovak development during the whole
course of the Moscow dialogues. He always spoke only about the ability of the new
Prague leadership to manage the negative tendencies of the then developments.
Tito pretended not to notice Brezhnev's not very well concealed references to
the necessity of the power intervention in Czechoslovakia. However, he irritably
responded to the comment that developments in Czechoslovakia could negatively
influence not only the internal situation in neighbouring socialist countries, but
also in Yugoslavia. The passions diminished when Tito mentioned the Yugoslav
opposition towards Stalin, and in this way indirectly reminded the Russians that
there were other alternatives than their co-operation with Moscow. Despite the
very strong style of the discussions, Tito had to pay attention to the fact that there
was no allusion on the part of Soviet delegation or accusation against Yugoslavia
of a direct or indirect share in the unfavourable development of the situation in
Czechoslovakia.
351
JAN PELIKAN
Tito's responses to the dialogues were ambiguous. The tirade of the Soviet
leaders should warn him not to intervene independently in the events in Czecho¬
slovakia. Moreover, the meeting confirmed his feeling that the Kremlin did not
intend to permit Czechoslovakia gain a special position similar to SFRY. On the
other hand, the Belgrade dictator was asked to influence stabilization of the
course of events in Czechoslovakia. He considered this request as an expression of
personal appreciation for him, and as a proof that Moscow respected the Yugoslav
position. The results of the Moscow discussions, despite their inconsistent course,
reassured him in his opinion that bilateral relations between the two countries
were progressing in the right direction. He concluded that Kremlin had always
regarded
SERY
as the potential troublesome element on the frontier of its interest
sphere, but on the other hand that Soviet politics essentially needed his help to
solve problems within the scope of the Communist movement and the Eastern
block. Nevertheless he did not underestimate Brezhnev's constraint supported
by his closest collaborators. During his Moscow visit he obviously attempted to
preserve the existing level of relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet leader
showed quite clearly that he would in no case support such reforms in Czecho¬
slovakia that exceeded a framework defined by the limits of liberalized Stalinism.
The Yugoslav leader dramatically underestimated the degree of the Soviet leader¬
ship's nervousness resulting from events in Prague. Although Tito did not ignore
the possibility of Soviet military intervention, he did not realize that Brezhnev as
early as the beginning of April had ordered a speedy commencement of prepara¬
tions for eventual military occupation of Czechoslovakia. He believed that his at¬
tempt to calm down and persuade the Kremlin leadership that developments in
Czechoslovakia would not endanger the Soviet interests had been a success.
In April, and as well as in August
1968,
Tito disagreed with Brezhnev's view
of Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslav leader supported some kind of softening of the
Stalinist system, but at the same time he believed that
Dubček
and other Prague
leaders would be able to eliminate the counter-revolutionary powers. He considered the
nervousness of the CPSS leaders resulting from the Czechoslovak development as
exaggerated, though not entirely groundless.
The attitude of the Yugoslav leader towards the course of events in Czecho¬
slovakia was ambiguous, careful and rather passive. He usually referred to the
Prague Spring in brief words and intentionally vaguely. His assessment was dif¬
ferent in private and in public.
352
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
In May
1968,
Prague was visited by the Foreign minister M.
Nikezić
and the
member of the presidium of the LCY
S
.
Milosavlevski
.
During their visits the opin¬
ion of the CPCz leadership that the events in Czechoslovakia had a full support of Yu¬
goslavia had been heightened. Nevertheless the approach of the highest leadership
to the relations with Yugoslavia characterized from August
1968
by the distinctive
amplitudes was again changed during May. Their declared interest concerning the
all-embracing development of the co-operation with Yugoslavia manifested in the
end of April was changed to hesitation and wariness. Such a change meant, with¬
in the scope of the reform process, nothing extraordinary. It corresponded with
rises and falls of particular influences in the Czechoslovak leadership struggling
for distinctive changes. During the Prague Spring the majority of its protagonists
were characterized by hesitation resulting from both a non-developed approach
towards the fundamental conceptual questions
,
and towards the solution of actual
political problems, and naturally the fears about their carriers. The Czechoslovak
leadership showed no real interest in the realization of plans leading towards the
marked advancement of contacts between the representatives of Czechoslovakia
and SFRY and to more frequent bilateral consultation and co-ordination of their at¬
titudes. The change in attitudes of
Dubček's
leadership was influenced by activity
resulting from a still more complicated internal situation and from the increasing¬
ly unscrupulous Moscow press. At the same time, it was a preventative measure
implemented by Prague with the intention of avoiding possible criticism by the
Kremlin accusing the proponents of the Prague Spring of repeating the Yugoslav
model and of the creation of inadmissible bonds with Belgrade.
The reduction of interest in the deepening of relations with Belgrade was
reflected in an indefinite postponement of
Dubček's
SFRY visit, to which he had
been invited as early as the end of February. Following Tito's discussions in Mos¬
cow, the Yugoslavs began to encourage the meeting of the chief proponents of
both countries still more. The Czechoslovak representatives simply gave them
false assurances that
Dubček
would come to Belgrade immediately that his work¬
ing engagements would permit such a visit, but advance dates promised were
frequently postponed. The Yugoslav elite were probably rightly persuaded that
the date with Tito had been intentionally delayed by the highest leadership of
the CPCz. On the Czechoslovak part, there was no interest in meeting other im¬
portant proponents of the new leadership of the CPCz in Yugoslavia. The over¬
cautious policy of
Dubček's
leadership served the purpose of Yugoslavs because
ЗЅЗ
JAN PELIKAN
Tito
preferred to maintain harmonious relations with Moscow concerning sup¬
port for the Prague Spring.
The evident passivity of the highest leadership of the SFRY towards events
in Czechoslovakia deepened still more during June
1968.
The unconcealed and
markedly unquiet development of the internal situation in the then Yugoslavia
led for the first time since the end of the World War II in a mass eruption of some
elements of society. For an entire week in Belgrade a mass student revolt was in
progress and the authorities displayed an inability to stop it. Only after Tito's pub¬
lic promises did the university students decide to finish their protest.
The direct influence of the developments in Czechoslovakia on the student
revolt in Belgrade was small. Nevertheless, at that time the chiefs of the most im¬
portant news media in Yugoslavia were influenced to limit their reports concern¬
ing the events in Prague. The Yugoslav leadership began to be afraid that informa¬
tion about rapid progress of Czechoslovak liberalization could, from their point of
view, unfavourably influence the demands of the students.
The ruling elite in SFRY following the Belgrade unrest changed their atti¬
tude towards the Prague Spring. The student storm strengthened doubtfulness
about the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak development. The evaluation of causes
behind the protests finding no sympathy at all groups among the LCY leadership
was explained among other things by the fact that the LCY dampened activities at
the universities and by the infiltration of some party organizations at particular
universities with hostile elements. Weakening of the authoritative character of the
regime, implementing of civil rights, and systematic restraint of influence of the
party bureaucracy and its effect on society represented the fundamental trends
of the reform process in Czechoslovakia. The student revolt in Belgrade indicated
where the development of events which began in January in Prague could lead.
The student storms confirmed what could happen in a Leninist-Stalinist system if
the development of society escaped from party bureaucracy control. Therefore the
Yugoslav leadership from June intensified calls for strong measures to be imple¬
mented by Yugoslavian government
Even the majority of liberally orientated representatives of the LCY perceived
the student unrests as a possible prologue to chaos and anarchy. Even the elements
in the leadership of the LCY supporting reforms considered such a development
in light of their conceptions as a greater danger than partial restrictive measures
and confinement of discussion within the party elite. On the other hand, it did
not mean that all liberals would immediately cease to lay hopes on possible success
354
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Undoubtedly their fears of the inter¬
national and internal complications which could have an impact on the Prague
Spring were heightened. K. Crvenkovski, M. Tripalo, M.
Nikezić
and other person¬
alities of the inconsistent reform stream in the LCY leadership did not cease to have
a liking for the Prague Spring and the reform process, and found there for Yugoslavia
much inspiration. Nevertheless, following the June student revolt they started
slowly to criticize the spontaneous and by the party little controlled development in Czecho¬
slovakia. These reservations were deepened still more after August
1968,
and par¬
ticularly from April
1969.
Even the liberal leaders of the LCY advocated the position
that the process of change had to come from above. The enlargement of democratic
mechanisms should, according to them, be related only to the limited structures
of the Communist party. The liberalization of the life of society should, according
to their opinion, have given limits which should be controlled and guided by the
enlightened party leadership. The majority of these people were unable to imagine
other alternatives than a softened appearance of the Tito (i.e. Leninist-Stalinist)
system capable of dealing vigorously with all anti-socialist excesses.
The wide, vague and often contradictory envisaged program of the Prague
Spring failed to engage broad social support. Moreover the viewpoints and atti¬
tudes of ordinary members of the CPCz and the non-party men became the motive
power accelerating and radicalizing the reform processes. The liberal stream in
the LCY had no social anchorage, and the attitudes of a majority of Yugoslav citi¬
zens towards Tito's regime were largely positive. In
1968,
the desire to change the
regime in Yugoslavia was quite small.
In July, Tito ordered the dissolution of the party organizations at the Philo¬
sophical and Philological faculties of the Belgrade University. He launched the
campaign by criticizing the incorrect attitudes of some leading representatives
of the intelligentsia. It was not possible at all to take similar steps in the then
Czechoslovakia. Rather, such measures marked the normalization steps during
Husák's
regime, approximately two years later.
The character of political relations between the two states began transform¬
ing dramatically from the first and second July weeks. The ruling elite in SFRY
were alarmed by the reports of verbal assaults of the Warsaw Agreement states
against
Dubček's
leaderships and by the information about the real threat of a
Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Yugoslavs decided to express
clearly their attitude towards the crisis originated by the Soviet pressure against
Czechoslovakia. Belgrade again invited
A. Dubček
and early offered an immediate
355
JAN PELIKAN
visit by Tito to Prague. The Yugoslavs also publicly criticized the Soviet interfer¬
ence into the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia.
The essential reason for the change of the SFRY attitude lies in the fact that
the Czechoslovak crisis ceased to be just a limited controversy within the scope of
the Eastern block and raised memories of Stalin's pressure towards Yugoslavia. At
that moment when there was a threat that tension between Moscow and Prague
would grow into an open split, the ruling group in SFRY had to abandon their
reserved approach. If they did not act in this way there would be the real threat of
losing the great prestige they had justifiably gained in
1948.
The particular steps of the Czechoslovak leadership towards Yugoslavia were
stigmatized by the development during the two July weeks that ended with the
meeting of the leading representatives of the CPSU in
Čierna nad Tisou.
This pe¬
riod was characterized by the dramatically unconcealed even chaotic development
of the international and internal situation, by the ominous Soviet intervention,
by the different attitudes of particular high representatives of the CPCz, and un¬
doubtedly also by the insufficient decisiveness of
A. Dubček
and his closest col¬
laborators. Relations in the political sphere fell into a number of partial contacts
having no clearly defined frame. Despite the indisputable revival the mutual rela¬
tions remained even in this short phase of the Prague Spring period without atten¬
tion, and influenced the crisis only partially.
The Belgrade leader knew very well how markedly different was the situation
concerning the present crisis of the Prague Spring from when Yugoslavia had been
exposed to Soviet pressure. Twenty years earlier, Stalin's steps had been without
rational warrant. At that time Tito's oligarchy remained in every way the loyal ally,
strengthened its power and copied devoutly and thoroughly the Soviet conditions.
On the other hand, in
1968
there was a real threat that the situation in Czechoslo¬
vakia could get out of
Dubček's
control and the development could lead not merely
to a modification, but directly to overthrow, of the left-authoritative system of the
Lenin type. The menaces from Kremlin against these processes accelerated still
more. Thereupon Tito, who did not wish for the disintegration of the existing po¬
litical and economic system in Czechoslovakia, accepted legitimacy of the CPCz and
Czechoslovak workers intervention against powers struggling for removal of the left-
authoritative regime. He was not content with
Dubček's
strategy. Therefore at a
time of real threat of Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav
oligarchy remained surprisingly inactive.
3S6
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
Tito and his closest associates were particularly interested in the fact that
processes which started at the January plenum of the Central Committee of the
CPCz could raise these serious commotions in the Eastern bloc and threaten the
internal stability of Yugoslavia. Vaguely defined favourable outcomes of the re¬
form process played only secondary role in their consideration of the Czechoslovak
events. For this reason, Belgrade welcomed with relief an agreement to bilateral
negotiations between leading representatives of the CPCz and CPSU. Even the Yu¬
goslav president willingly advanced the date of his visit in Czechoslovakia.
After repeated postponements, Tito arrived in Prague on the 9th August, and
his visit taking place in an extremely difficult social atmosphere had a number of
objectives
.
The emotional aspect of this visit was supplemented by the diplomatic
calculus. The exaggerated and often false echo of the calculated as well as unwant¬
ed guests was mingled with manoeuvring, rational political debates
,
hypothetical
considerations, and pragmatic recommendations. Czechoslovak society naturally
perceived
Josip
Broz Tito as a symbol of opposition against the Soviet constraint.
In dramatic days of uncertainty, crowds in the Prague streets welcomed him not
only as the representative of a friendly state but also as a hero very much needed.
Czechoslovak society spontaneously identified itself with the myth connected
with Tito's personality.
The prevailing enthusiasm, and often wholly uncritical expectations that the
maj
ori
ty
of Czechoslovak society linked to Tito's visit
,
contrasted with the careful
,
even reserved, approach of some members of the CPCz leadership.
Tito came to Prague with no clear idea about the aims of negotiations. He
realized that his visit would be perceived as an unambiguous expression of his
sympathies for the reform process. As a pragmatic politician maintaining particu¬
larly the interests of his state, Tito did not wish for Moscow to assess his negotia¬
tions in Prague in this way. He wanted to present his visit in Czechoslovakia to the
Soviet leaders
-
and he probably considered it in this way
-
as a fulfilment of his
promise given at the end of April to Brezhnev, when he then committed himself
to help the Kremlin to stabilize the situation in Czechoslovakia.
The dialogues took for long time place in a confused atmosphere. At the gen¬
eral meetings
,
Dubček
avoided politically delicate topics
.
Only during the separate
meeting with Tito did
Dubček
provide him with more confidential information.
However,
Dubček
did not mention the promises given to Brezhnev in
Čierna nad
Tisou.
Tito made plain to his partners not to underestimate the Soviet threat, to
357
JAN PELIKAN
try finding a modus Vivendi, consolidate the internal situation, to strengthen their
own power position, and to deal fiercely with 'anti-socialistic elements'.
The Yugoslav top leadership was taken by surprise by the military inter¬
vention of the states of the Warsaw Pact on 21st August
1968.
Immediately after
the leadership of the LCY received the information about the military interven¬
tion in Czechoslovakia they met to discuss the consequences for Yugoslavia. The
tone of the dealings and the main principles of the resolutions were formulated
by Tito. In his speeches it is possible to discern clearly the minimal interest in
the future fate of the reform process in Czechoslovakia, and considerable fears of
a threat to the internal and external stability of Yugoslavia. The highest repre¬
sentative of the SFRY unambiguously rejected the reasons for the occupation of
Czechoslovakia presented by the Soviet leadership. On the other hand, in com¬
parison to his attitudes taken twelve years earlier to the events in Hungary and
Poland, he immediately on the 21st August withdrew all support for the reform
group in the CPCz.
Immediately following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito was evi¬
dently unable to evaluate where Brezhnev's intentions laid. He was even afraid of
a Soviet military intervention in Yugoslavia, and his fears included also the threat
of sudden outbreaks of internal unrest. Yet he unambiguously demonstrated that
he would resist any external attack and that he was ready to deal fiercely with
internal opposition. The police preventively arrested some people and brought ac¬
cusations of seditious activities against more than
2,500
others.
Tito decided to face the expected complications by an essentially simple tac¬
tic. In no case did he want to give to Moscow a pretext for raising pressure against
Yugoslavia. Therefore he made an effort to avoid any steps that would needlessly
provoke the Brezhnev group, and sought to secure internal stability. Tito's ap¬
proach towards the new phase of the Czechoslovak crisis continuously concurred
with his actual attitude towards the Prague Spring.
Immediately following the events of 21st August, Moscow tried to continue
with the development of her co-operation with Yugoslavia. Although the Krem¬
lin made clear to Belgrade that the events in Czechoslovakia were exclusively the
business of the Soviet sphere of interest, Tito should at the same time understand
that Brezhnev was concerned to preserve good relations with Yugoslavia.
After the first shock of the new Yugoslav policy had subsided, the new policy
towards Czechoslovakia speedily crystallized. This process was not unambiguous
and included several conflicting factors. The external form of this approach varied
358
JUGOSLÁVIE A PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
greatly from its essence
;
outwardly declared principles did not correspond by far to
the real aims which the Belgrade leadership wanted to achieve.
The Belgrade leader soon recognized with relief that Yugoslavia was not cur¬
rently threatened by Soviet military intervention. He was also calmed by the un¬
derstanding that the Czechoslovak occupation was not connected with a redistri¬
bution of the sphere of influence in the bipolar world or with the power constraint
of the West on Yugoslavia with silent assent.
The public proclamations of the Yugoslav representatives condemning reso¬
lutely the aggression against Czechoslovakia revived the dusty colours of the por¬
trait of Tito's Yugoslavia as a liberal-minded, independent and principled state.
Thus uni-dimensionally and then largely obscurely the greater part of the world
public perceived the policy of Belgrade. Following the Czechoslovak occupation
and thanks to these clever steps the sympathies of the Yugoslav population to¬
wards the Communist regime were markedly heightened. The propagandist main¬
tenance of Czechoslovak sovereignty and the right of its citizens to decide matters
concerning their own state paradoxically weakened the position of those streams
in the LCY demanding the realization of fundamental internal reforms in Yugosla¬
via. The events linked to the events of 21st August caused that public forgot about
the recent revolt of the Belgrade students. Thanks to his decisive public presence
during the August days, the Yugoslav leader created a favourable position for the
suppression of the potential liberal opposition, which was crushed from
1971
to
1973.
The changed international situation effectively challenged the creation of
a strong allied axis between Yugoslavia and Romania
.
Both states were minimally
threatened by the Brezhnev regime, yet from the beginning Tito rejected this idea.
At a critical moment he did not want to relate to the north-eastern neighbour and
to give Moscow a pretext to interpret a rapprochement of both countries as the
creation of an anti-Soviet alliance. On the other hand he promised Ceausescu dur¬
ing their meeting on the 24th August that in the event of Soviet aggression against
Romania he would not permit the Soviet state or its allies the passage through Yu¬
goslav territory and he would not close borders with Romania. However, he stated
that in such a case Yugoslavia would not support Romania militarily and would
disarm Romanian soldiers entering its territory. By these means, Tito influenced
Ceausescu to expeditiously consolidate his relations with Moscow.
From 24th August the Soviet approach towards Yugoslavia began to change.
Brezhnev's group was outraged at the news service in Yugoslav media. The Soviet
representatives were also exasperated by the Yugoslav moves at the meeting of the
359
JAN PELIKAN
United Nations Security
Council
where the Yugoslavs condemned the military ac¬
tion of the Warsaw pact. Thus the Yugoslav ruling group did not conform to the
tactical targets set by Tito. The Soviet leadership did not properly understand the
complex signals coming from Belgrade 'in code'. Tito made an effort to convince
Moscow that Yugoslavia must preserve her appearance (and therefore condemn
publicly the military action of five Warsaw Pact countries), but on the other hand
the Yugoslav politicians were not particularly interested in the further destiny of
Czechoslovakia, and their key foreign priorities lay in the preservation of the ex¬
isting
moăusvivendi
of relations with the Soviet Union. Moscow did not understand
that public condemnation of the Czechoslovak occupation was just the propa¬
gandist part of the so called seesaw policy long practised as a tactic in balancing on
the frontier of the East and West blocks. The Soviet politicians also incorrectly
assumed that critical comments of the Yugoslav media expressed the official posi¬
tion of Tito's group.
After the signature of the Moscow protocol and the cessation of the first wave
of international outrage in connection with the Czechoslovakian occupation, the
Brezhnev's group decided to fiercely challenge Yugoslavia to change its approach
towards the Soviet policy. On the 30th August in a verbal note they accused Tito
of supporting anti-socialist and anti-Soviet forces and that he "derogates the Sovi¬
et-Yugoslavian relations and socialism in Yugoslavia". The Yugoslav leader indig¬
nantly rejected these statements, recited by the Soviet ambassador. However, at
the following session of the LCY leadership on the
2nd
September he fiercely urged
the necessity to improve relations with Kremlin. At the same time he criticized
some liberally orientated representatives of the Party, who were demanding an in¬
crease of the distancing from the Soviet Union. Within the scope of this tactic,
Tito distanced himself through diplomatic channels from the activities of four
Czechoslovak ministers, who were on the 21st August coincidently visiting SFRY
and who were unsuccessfully attempting to create in Belgrade the core of an exile
government with the silent consent of the Yugoslav offices.
In response to the Soviet verbal note conveyed in Moscow on the 12th Septem¬
ber, Tito unambiguously protested against the Soviet criticism. Moreover, the text
criticized the occupation of Czechoslovakia and emphasized the inadmissibility of
the intervention by force in another socialist country, even though motivated by
the intention to save socialism. They protested against the Soviet criticism of the
news media. At the same time Tito's group signalled that they were prepared to
respect the Moscow protocol. Tito clearly claimed in his message that he consid-
360
JUGOSLAVIE A
PRAŽSKÉ JARO
ered
the prospective public disputation to be counter-productive, and he offered
Brezhnev a personal meeting.
Tito knew that he must not show weakness in contacts with the Kremlin or to
submit immediately. In tactical games with the Soviet leader he was always able
to manoeuvre skilfully, and this was the reason why he alternated compromises
with firmness over short intervals
.
He feinted also in the beginning of autumn
1968
when he combined promises and critical invectives. Also, he tolerated and
possibly initiated the presence of the high ranking officers of the LCY, starkly criti¬
cizing the Soviet policy. On the other hand he signalled to Moscow that he was
in no way responsible for the outbreak of tension in bilateral relations
,
and that
he intended to exert significant effort to convince his collaborators of the need to
improve contacts with Moscow.
The Kremlin did not recognize the real intentions of the Yugoslav leader.
Therefore the Brezhnev group behaved towards Yugoslavia with wariness, suspi¬
cion and disquiet. In the middle of October, the Soviet leadership sent another
despatch to Belgrade. The letter was formulated in a conciliatory although quite
condescending tone, which contrasted with the irritable and almost hysterical
tone of the note read for Tito on the 30th August. Moscow probably wanted by way
of this latest mission to end the polemic which was begun by Kremlin politicians
at the end of August. Moscow wished to return relations between the two states
to what they had been before the occupation of Czechoslovakia. At the same time,
the Soviet politicians indirectly reserved the right of the superpower to have the
last word.
However Tito came to a conclusion that neither the position of Belgrade in its
relations with Moscow nor his internal position would have been strengthened if
he had accepted Brezhnev's message without reserve
.
Although he did not change
his attitude that there was a need to improve relations with the Soviets
,
he never¬
theless concluded that it was necessary at that moment to manifest strength and
firmness once more to the Kremlin. He did not want to permit Moscow politicians
to conclude that they could force acquiescence from Yugoslavia. He was also ap¬
parently irritated by the fact that the Soviet Union refused to confirm explicitly
respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the SFRY. He
felt that the Kremlin rulers should realize that there for them there was a possible
worst outcome in terms of an economic, political and eventually military-strate¬
gic swing of Yugoslavia to the West. Tito aimed to remind Brezhnev that at the
361
JAN PELIKAN
beginning of
1953,
in a time of peak Stalinist compulsion, he had already begun to
navigate his country in that direction.
The content of the letter given on the 12th November differed diametrically
from Tito's previously conciliatory expressions. He condemned the occupation of
Czechoslovakia and emphasized equality in relations between the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia. He accused the Kremlin of pressurising the SFRY with the final
objective of forcing his country to renounce its independent policy.
Immediately following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia, Tito tried to
conceal the growing tension in relations with Moscow. However, at the turn of
October and November he chose a different approach. He decided that the Brezh¬
nev letter and the Yugoslav answer would be revealed to the wider party body. At
the same time he ordered that information about the internal polemics with Mos¬
cow should be provided to foreign countries.
Tne
unfriendly, deliberately irritable tone of the letter handed over on the 12th
November indirectly but quite clearly warning Kremlin against the unpleasant con¬
sequences of further exasperation of relations with Yugoslavia proved to be a suc¬
cessful tactic. Although Tito's move strengthened the long-term suspicion of the
Soviet leaders towards Yugoslavia, on the other hand it persuaded them to take a
friendlier stand towards Belgrade and to look for an acceptable modus
vivendi
with
Tito's regime
.
The Kremlin leaders decided to demonstrate publicly their pleasure in
developing bilateral co-operation with the SFRY. At the end of November they took
advantage of the oncoming 25th anniversary of the second creation of Yugoslavia.
They expressed to Tito in salutatory telegram their will to develop friendly relations
with Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslav leader reacted positively to this favourable step.
Following the 21st August and in the ensuing months and years, the rela¬
tions of Yugoslavia towards the Soviet Union remained the subject of internal
discussions among the Belgrade political elite. The agreement confirmed their
opinion concerning the uselessness of support for the Czechoslovak reform process.
One of the reasons was the understanding that Yugoslavia could not help Czecho¬
slovakia at all. In Belgrade they knew that such an attempt would evoke an exas¬
perated reaction from the Kremlin. An almost general lack of interest concerning
the further developments in Czechoslovakia was determined particularly by the
disillusion of the leading representatives of the CPCz and of the mild reaction of
the Czechoslovak population to the occupation of their country. The above men¬
tioned approach by Yugoslavia was essentially welcomed by all groups participat¬
ing in power in Prague.
Tne
body of opinion trying in conditions of the Soviet oc-
362
JUGOSLÁVIE A PRAŽSKÉ
JARO
cupation
to defend the results of the reform process did not endeavour at all to
find support in Yugoslavia. In the context of their passive tactics they considered
the need for temporary limitation of their relations with Belgrade as rational. The
supporters of the neo-Stalinist regime perceived Yugoslavia as a symbol of danger¬
ous revisionism. In principle unobtrusively and without the great interest of pub¬
lic the bilateral contacts in the political sphere were interrupted. In the context
of this approach, Belgrade accepted in April the accession of neo-Stalinists to the
the leadership of the CPCz without great interest. The prevailing opinion of the
Czechoslovak population in assessing Yugoslavia as the only sincere, confidential
and reliable ally was in no case changed. Tito's regime became for Czechoslovak
society still more the pattern of the attractive socially correct state.
By December
1968
the tension originated after the occupation of Czechoslova¬
kia was overcome. In an atmosphere of calm, the new and in principle the last stage
of relations between the Communist regimes in Moscow and Belgrade began; the
period being characterized by mutual recognition of the status quo and by an absence
of more seriously mentioned attempts to change it. Over the following twenty years
,
the relations between the two states remained more or less constant. It cannot be
denied that there were periods of considerable rapprochement and on the other
hand periods of distrust and alarm, and both of these tendencies remained con¬
stantly present in bilateral relations
.
These disturbances were not generally caused
by real antagonism but by moments of minor importance resulting very often from
insufficient foreknowledge or from distrust accumulated in previous years.
This characteristic is fully applicable for the whole period after
1969.
Both
states had no more serious controversies related to their concrete internal or for¬
eign policy. Most problems were external or were connected with some nuances in
the ideological sphere; these disagreements although both sides reacted to them
too sensitively often had the nature of purely academic disputations.
Relatively quiet relations between Belgrade and Moscow were briefly and not
seriously impaired by the decision of Kremlin to boycott the congress of the LCY
in March
1969.
This step was motivated by the fear of expected public criticism
of the Soviet policy at this forum. The Kremlin recognized that Tito's regime was
socialist and at the same time accepted that Yugoslavia did not belong to the East¬
ern block. The Brezhnev group was compliant with the need to present on the
international scene harmonious relations with SFRY as an example of its tolerant
,
liberal and peaceful approach towards smaller independent states. At the same
time however the Soviet leadership did not know how it should react to public
363
JAN PELIKAN
disapproval to its internal or foreign policy presented in the very same socialist
Yugoslavia. Criticism reported at the party congress in country considered by the
Soviet Union as socialist would be for Moscow extremely unacceptable, and the
Soviet delegation could not disguise this. Any kind of public reaction would lead
immediately to a deterioration of relations, and moreover would damage the im¬
age of the Soviet Union. It was for this reason that Brezhnev organized a boycott
of the IX Congress of the LCY.
364 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Pelikán, Jan 1959- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)1174933356 |
| author_facet | Pelikán, Jan 1959- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Pelikán, Jan 1959- |
| author_variant | j p jp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035166837 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | DB2232 |
| callnumber-raw | DB2232 DR1258.C95 |
| callnumber-search | DB2232 DR1258.C95 |
| callnumber-sort | DB 42232 |
| callnumber-subject | DB - Austria, Liechtenstein, Hungary, Czechoslovakia |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)312181359 (DE-599)BVBBV035166837 |
| edition | Vyd. 1. |
| format | Book |
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| geographic | Jugoslawien Sowjetunion Tschechoslowakei Czechoslovakia Foreign relations Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia History Intervention, 1968 Czechoslovakia Politics and government 1945-1992 Soviet Union Foreign relations Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Soviet Union Yugoslavia Politics and government 1945-1980 Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Jugoslawien Sowjetunion Tschechoslowakei Czechoslovakia Foreign relations Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia History Intervention, 1968 Czechoslovakia Politics and government 1945-1992 Soviet Union Foreign relations Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Soviet Union Yugoslavia Politics and government 1945-1980 |
| id | DE-604.BV035166837 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:52:49Z |
| indexdate | 2025-01-29T17:03:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788073082208 9788090358942 |
| language | Czech |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016973848 |
| oclc_num | 312181359 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-M457 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-M457 DE-Re13 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 377 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Univ. Karlova, Filozofická Fak. [u.a.] |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis |
| series2 | Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis |
| spelling | Pelikán, Jan 1959- Verfasser (DE-588)1174933356 aut Jugoslávie a pražské jaro Jan Pelikán Vyd. 1. Praha Univ. Karlova, Filozofická Fak. [u.a.] 2008 377 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 5 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Yugoslavia and the Prague spring Außenpolitik Geschichte Politik Prager Frühling (DE-588)4175577-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien Sowjetunion Tschechoslowakei Czechoslovakia Foreign relations Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia History Intervention, 1968 Czechoslovakia Politics and government 1945-1992 Soviet Union Foreign relations Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Soviet Union Yugoslavia Politics and government 1945-1980 Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 gnd rswk-swf Jugoslawien (DE-588)4028966-7 g Prager Frühling (DE-588)4175577-7 s DE-604 Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis 5 (DE-604)BV022779205 5 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016973848&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016973848&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Pelikán, Jan 1959- Jugoslávie a pražské jaro Opera Facultatis Philosophicae Universitatis Carolinae Pragensis Außenpolitik Geschichte Politik Prager Frühling (DE-588)4175577-7 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4175577-7 (DE-588)4028966-7 |
| title | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |
| title_auth | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |
| title_exact_search | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |
| title_full | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro Jan Pelikán |
| title_fullStr | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro Jan Pelikán |
| title_full_unstemmed | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro Jan Pelikán |
| title_short | Jugoslávie a pražské jaro |
| title_sort | jugoslavie a prazske jaro |
| topic | Außenpolitik Geschichte Politik Prager Frühling (DE-588)4175577-7 gnd |
| topic_facet | Außenpolitik Geschichte Politik Prager Frühling Jugoslawien Sowjetunion Tschechoslowakei Czechoslovakia Foreign relations Yugoslavia Czechoslovakia History Intervention, 1968 Czechoslovakia Politics and government 1945-1992 Soviet Union Foreign relations Yugoslavia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Czechoslovakia Yugoslavia Foreign relations Soviet Union Yugoslavia Politics and government 1945-1980 |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016973848&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016973848&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV022779205 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT pelikanjan jugoslavieaprazskejaro |