Global games of creditor coordination:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Abschlussarbeit Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Hamburg
Kovač
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse
138 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Ausführliche Beschreibung Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | IX, 248 S. graph. Darst. 210 mm x 148 mm, 331 gr. |
| ISBN: | 9783830040118 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 300 | |a IX, 248 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 210 mm x 148 mm, 331 gr. | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse |v 138 | |
| 502 | |a Zugl.: Tübingen, Univ., Diss., 2008 | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138309714182144 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Game Theoretic Foundations 15
2.1 Characteristics of Coordination Games........... 16
2.2 Solving Coordination Games ................ 20
2.3 Equilibrium Selection in Global Games........... 23
2.4 Generalizing the Method to n-Player, 2-Action Games . . 31
3 A Static Benchmark Game of Creditor Coordination 35
3.1 The Basic Framework.................... 36
3.2 Multiple Equilibria under Complete Information..... 39
3.3 Unique Equilibrium under Incomplete Public and Private
Information.......................... 41
3.3.1 Derivation of a Unique Equilibrium......... 43
3.3.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium.............. 50
3.4 The Multiplier Effect of Public Information........ 52
Appendix A.......................... 57
4 Creditor Coordination via Information Policy 65
4.1 Comparative Static Effects of Information Precision ... 67
4.2 Endogenizing Information Precision ............ 75
4.2.1 Information Policy.................. 78
4.2.2 Risk Taking Behavior................ 84
4.2.3 Optimal Information and Risk Taking Policy ... 89
4.3 Conclusion .......................... 91
VII
5 Creditor Coordination via Debt Contracting 95
5.1 A Model of Debt Contracting................ 98
5.2 The Creditors Choice to Roll Over or to Foreclose .... 102
5.2.1 Coordination Failures under a Standard Debt
Contract........................ 102
5.2.2 Coordination Failures under a Leniency Debt
Contract........................ 104
5.3 The Debtor Firm s Choice of the Optimal Debt Contract 109
5.3.1 Comparing Coordination Failures in the Limiting
Case.......................... 110
5.3.2 Comparing Coordination Failures away from the
Limit ......................... Ill
5.4 The Creditors Choice of the Optimal Debt Contract ... 118
5.4.1 Comparing Expected Returns in the Limiting
Case.......................... 119
5.4.2 Comparing Expected Returns away from the
Limit ......................... 120
5.5 Concluding Remarks..................... 125
Appendix B.......................... 128
6 Creditor Coordination via Relationship Lending 141
6.1 A Static Global Game of Relationship Lending...... 143
6.1.1 Equilibrium with a Heterogeneous Creditor
Structure....................... 147
6.1.2 Comparative Statics away from the Limit..... 153
6.1.3 Comparative Statics in the Limiting Case..... 155
6.2 Signaling Effects of the Relationship Bank in a Dynamic
Global Game......................... 161
6.2.1 Equilibrium of the Sequential Move Game..... 162
6.2.2 Creditor Coordination Failures away from the
Limit ......................... 166
6.2.3 Creditor Coordination Failures in the Limiting
Case.......................... 171
6.3 Comparison of Results and Conclusion........... 173
Appendix C.......................... 176
VIII
7 Forbearance Lending and Soft Budget Constraints 189
7.1 A Model of Forbearance Lending and Soft Budget
Constraints.......................... 193
7.2 Derivation of the Equilibrium................ 197
7.2.1 Roll Over or Foreclosure Decisions of the Arm s
Length Lenders.................... 197
7.2.2 Refinancing by the Relationship Bank and
Implications on Forbearance Lending........ 201
7.2.3 The Debtor Firm s Restructuring Effort and
Implications on Soft Budget Constraints...... 204
7.3 Effects of the Relationship Bank s Signaling Ability .... 208
7.4 Conclusion .......................... 212
Appendix D.......................... 215
8 Summary and Discussion 219
References 227
List of Tables 237
List of Figures 239
List of Symbols 243
IX
List of Tables
Table 1.1:
Classification of creditor coordination games............. 8
Table 2.1:
A simple 2x2-coordination game.................. 17
Table 2.2:
The generalized 2x2-game T(0)................... 20
Table 3.1:
Payoff matrix for creditors...................... 39
Table 6.1:
Limiting values of 6_ by size and relative information precision
of the relationship bank....................... 160
Table 6.2:
Fundamental threshold 0 of the static and dynamic game in
the limit as /3 — oo, 7 — 00, and 7//? — r............. 174
List of Figures
Figure 2.1:
Best-response functions and equilibria................ 17
Figure 2.2:
Player i s equilibrium strategies contingent on 0.......... 21
Figure 2.3:
Iterative elimination of dominated strategies............ 29
Figure 3.1:
Critical rate of terminated loans................... 38
Figure 3.2:
Unique fundamental threshold 0*.................. 48
Figure 3.3:
Multiple fundamental thresholds................... 50
Figure 3.4:
Conventional effect and coordination effect............. 54
Figure 3.5:
Fundamental threshold 0* as a function of /z............ 56
Figure 4.1:
Influence of a and 0 on the fundamental threshold 0*....... 73
Figure 4.2:
Regions of unique and multiple equilibria.............. 74
240 List of Figures
Figure 4.3:
Influence of /? on 6* for k 1/2 and /x k............. 79
Figure 4.4:
Influence of /? on 6* for k 1/2 and n k............. 80
Figure 4.5:
Influence of /3 on 6* for k 1/2 and /x k............. 81
Figure 4.6:
Influence of j5 on 9* for k 1/2 and i k............. 83
Figure 4.7:
Optimal risk taking and information policy with associated
probabilities of default........................ 90
Figure 5.1:
Timeline of the model....................... 101
Figure 5.2:
Fundamental thresholds for /j, = 1.5 and varying /3......... 113
Figure 5.3:
Fundamental thresholds for n = -0.5 and varying f3........ 114
Figure 5.4:
Fundamental thresholds for i = 1.5 and varying c......... 116
Figure 5.5:
Fundamental thresholds for i = -0.5 and varying c........ 117
Figure 5.6:
Creditors ex ante expected returns for n = 1.5 and varying (3 . . . 122
Figure 5.7:
Creditors ex ante expected returns for fj, = -0.5 and varying j3 . . 122
Figure 5.8:
Creditors ex ante expected returns for /x = 1.5 and varying c . . . 123
List of Figures 241
Figure 5.9:
Creditors ex ante expected returns for /z = —0.5 and varying c . . 124
Figure 6.1:
Critical mass conditions under multiple heterogeneous source
financing................................ 148
Figure 6.2:
Critical mass conditions in the limit as (3 —? oo, 7 — 00,
and 7//? - r............................. 156
Figure 6.3:
Fundamental threshold 9 as a function of A............. 160
Figure 6.4:
Fundamental thresholds 6_ and 0 for different values of A and
varying -y//3.............................. 169
Figure 7.1:
Debtor firm s restructuring effort as a function of 0 in the
limit as 7 — 00 and 7//? — 00.................... 206
Figure 7.2:
Debtor firm s restructuring effort as a function of 8 in the
limit as 7 — 00 and 7//? —» 0..................... 211
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 Game Theoretic Foundations 15
2.1 Characteristics of Coordination Games. 16
2.2 Solving Coordination Games . 20
2.3 Equilibrium Selection in Global Games. 23
2.4 Generalizing the Method to n-Player, 2-Action Games . . 31
3 A Static Benchmark Game of Creditor Coordination 35
3.1 The Basic Framework. 36
3.2 Multiple Equilibria under Complete Information. 39
3.3 Unique Equilibrium under Incomplete Public and Private
Information. 41
3.3.1 Derivation of a Unique Equilibrium. 43
3.3.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium. 50
3.4 The Multiplier Effect of Public Information. 52
Appendix A. 57
4 Creditor Coordination via Information Policy 65
4.1 Comparative Static Effects of Information Precision . 67
4.2 Endogenizing Information Precision . 75
4.2.1 Information Policy. 78
4.2.2 Risk Taking Behavior. 84
4.2.3 Optimal Information and Risk Taking Policy . 89
4.3 Conclusion . 91
VII
5 Creditor Coordination via Debt Contracting 95
5.1 A Model of Debt Contracting. 98
5.2 The Creditors' Choice to Roll Over or to Foreclose . 102
5.2.1 Coordination Failures under a Standard Debt
Contract. 102
5.2.2 Coordination Failures under a Leniency Debt
Contract. 104
5.3 The Debtor Firm's Choice of the Optimal Debt Contract 109
5.3.1 Comparing Coordination Failures in the Limiting
Case. 110
5.3.2 Comparing Coordination Failures away from the
Limit . Ill
5.4 The Creditors' Choice of the Optimal Debt Contract . 118
5.4.1 Comparing Expected Returns in the Limiting
Case. 119
5.4.2 Comparing Expected Returns away from the
Limit . 120
5.5 Concluding Remarks. 125
Appendix B. 128
6 Creditor Coordination via Relationship Lending 141
6.1 A Static Global Game of Relationship Lending. 143
6.1.1 Equilibrium with a Heterogeneous Creditor
Structure. 147
6.1.2 Comparative Statics away from the Limit. 153
6.1.3 Comparative Statics in the Limiting Case. 155
6.2 Signaling Effects of the Relationship Bank in a Dynamic
Global Game. 161
6.2.1 Equilibrium of the Sequential Move Game. 162
6.2.2 Creditor Coordination Failures away from the
Limit . 166
6.2.3 Creditor Coordination Failures in the Limiting
Case. 171
6.3 Comparison of Results and Conclusion. 173
Appendix C. 176
VIII
7 Forbearance Lending and Soft Budget Constraints 189
7.1 A Model of Forbearance Lending and Soft Budget
Constraints. 193
7.2 Derivation of the Equilibrium. 197
7.2.1 Roll Over or Foreclosure Decisions of the Arm's
Length Lenders. 197
7.2.2 Refinancing by the Relationship Bank and
Implications on Forbearance Lending. 201
7.2.3 The Debtor Firm's Restructuring Effort and
Implications on Soft Budget Constraints. 204
7.3 Effects of the Relationship Bank's Signaling Ability . 208
7.4 Conclusion . 212
Appendix D. 215
8 Summary and Discussion 219
References 227
List of Tables 237
List of Figures 239
List of Symbols 243
IX
List of Tables
Table 1.1:
Classification of creditor coordination games. 8
Table 2.1:
A simple 2x2-coordination game. 17
Table 2.2:
The generalized 2x2-game T(0). 20
Table 3.1:
Payoff matrix for creditors. 39
Table 6.1:
Limiting values of 6_ by size and relative information precision
of the relationship bank. 160
Table 6.2:
Fundamental threshold 0 of the static and dynamic game in
the limit as /3 — oo, 7 — 00, and 7//? — r. 174
List of Figures
Figure 2.1:
Best-response functions and equilibria. 17
Figure 2.2:
Player i's equilibrium strategies contingent on 0. 21
Figure 2.3:
Iterative elimination of dominated strategies. 29
Figure 3.1:
Critical rate of terminated loans. 38
Figure 3.2:
Unique fundamental threshold 0*. 48
Figure 3.3:
Multiple fundamental thresholds. 50
Figure 3.4:
Conventional effect and coordination effect. 54
Figure 3.5:
Fundamental threshold 0* as a function of /z. 56
Figure 4.1:
Influence of a and 0 on the fundamental threshold 0*. 73
Figure 4.2:
Regions of unique and multiple equilibria. 74
240 List of Figures
Figure 4.3:
Influence of /? on 6* for k 1/2 and /x k. 79
Figure 4.4:
Influence of /? on 6* for k 1/2 and n k. 80
Figure 4.5:
Influence of /3 on 6* for k 1/2 and /x k. 81
Figure 4.6:
Influence of j5 on 9* for k 1/2 and \i k. 83
Figure 4.7:
Optimal risk taking and information policy with associated
probabilities of default. 90
Figure 5.1:
Timeline of the model. 101
Figure 5.2:
Fundamental thresholds for /j, = 1.5 and varying /3. 113
Figure 5.3:
Fundamental thresholds for n = -0.5 and varying f3. 114
Figure 5.4:
Fundamental thresholds for \i = 1.5 and varying c. 116
Figure 5.5:
Fundamental thresholds for \i = -0.5 and varying c. 117
Figure 5.6:
Creditors' ex ante expected returns for n = 1.5 and varying (3 . . . 122
Figure 5.7:
Creditors' ex ante expected returns for fj, = -0.5 and varying j3 . . 122
Figure 5.8:
Creditors' ex ante expected returns for /x = 1.5 and varying c . . . 123
List of Figures 241
Figure 5.9:
Creditors' ex ante expected returns for /z = —0.5 and varying c . . 124
Figure 6.1:
Critical mass conditions under multiple heterogeneous source
financing. 148
Figure 6.2:
Critical mass conditions in the limit as (3 —? oo, 7 — 00,
and 7//? - r. 156
Figure 6.3:
Fundamental threshold 9 as a function of A. 160
Figure 6.4:
Fundamental thresholds 6_ and 0 for different values of A and
varying -y//3. 169
Figure 7.1:
Debtor firm's restructuring effort as a function of 0 in the
limit as 7 — 00 and 7//? — 00. 206
Figure 7.2:
Debtor firm's restructuring effort as a function of 8 in the
limit as 7 — 00 and 7//? —» 0. 211 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Schüle, Tobias |
| author_GND | (DE-588)133597598 |
| author_facet | Schüle, Tobias |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Schüle, Tobias |
| author_variant | t s ts |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035151439 |
| classification_rvk | QK 640 QP 752 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)304381219 (DE-599)DNB989940675 |
| dewey-full | 332.7015193 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 332 - Financial economics |
| dewey-raw | 332.7015193 |
| dewey-search | 332.7015193 |
| dewey-sort | 3332.7015193 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| format | Thesis Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035151439 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:46:50Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:26:09Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9783830040118 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016958679 |
| oclc_num | 304381219 |
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| owner_facet | DE-N2 DE-20 DE-12 DE-703 |
| physical | IX, 248 S. graph. Darst. 210 mm x 148 mm, 331 gr. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Kovač |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse |
| series2 | Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse |
| spelling | Schüle, Tobias Verfasser (DE-588)133597598 aut Global games of creditor coordination Tobias Schüle Hamburg Kovač 2008 IX, 248 S. graph. Darst. 210 mm x 148 mm, 331 gr. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 138 Zugl.: Tübingen, Univ., Diss., 2008 Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd rswk-swf Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd rswk-swf Kreditfinanzierung (DE-588)4032930-6 gnd rswk-swf Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd rswk-swf Koordination (DE-588)4032393-6 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4113937-9 Hochschulschrift gnd-content Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 s Kreditfinanzierung (DE-588)4032930-6 s Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 s Koordination (DE-588)4032393-6 s Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 s DE-604 Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse 138 (DE-604)BV011622667 138 text/html http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-8300-4011-8.htm Ausführliche Beschreibung HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016958679&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Schüle, Tobias Global games of creditor coordination Schriftenreihe Volkswirtschaftliche Forschungsergebnisse Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd Kreditfinanzierung (DE-588)4032930-6 gnd Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd Koordination (DE-588)4032393-6 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4061963-1 (DE-588)4021126-5 (DE-588)4032930-6 (DE-588)4252658-9 (DE-588)4032393-6 (DE-588)4113937-9 |
| title | Global games of creditor coordination |
| title_auth | Global games of creditor coordination |
| title_exact_search | Global games of creditor coordination |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Global games of creditor coordination |
| title_full | Global games of creditor coordination Tobias Schüle |
| title_fullStr | Global games of creditor coordination Tobias Schüle |
| title_full_unstemmed | Global games of creditor coordination Tobias Schüle |
| title_short | Global games of creditor coordination |
| title_sort | global games of creditor coordination |
| topic | Unternehmen (DE-588)4061963-1 gnd Gläubiger (DE-588)4021126-5 gnd Kreditfinanzierung (DE-588)4032930-6 gnd Experimentelle Spieltheorie (DE-588)4252658-9 gnd Koordination (DE-588)4032393-6 gnd |
| topic_facet | Unternehmen Gläubiger Kreditfinanzierung Experimentelle Spieltheorie Koordination Hochschulschrift |
| url | http://www.verlagdrkovac.de/978-3-8300-4011-8.htm http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016958679&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV011622667 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT schuletobias globalgamesofcreditorcoordination |