Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska: od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Slovenian |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Ljubljana
Muzej Novejše Zgodovine Slovenije
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina
1 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache |
| Beschreibung: | 344 S. Ill. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska |b od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |c Tomaž Kladnik |
| 264 | 1 | |a Ljubljana |b Muzej Novejše Zgodovine Slovenije |c 2006 | |
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| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina |v 1 | |
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache | ||
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1941-1945 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 650 | 4 | |a World War, 1939-1945 / Underground movements / Slovenia | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Military art and science / Slovenia | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Weltkrieg (1939-1945) | |
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| 650 | 4 | |a World War, 1939-1945 |x Underground movements |z Slovenia | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138135971430400 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
Vsebina
Uvod
9
1.
Formacija
· 21
1.1
Formacija Slovenskega domobranstva
22
1.2
Formacija NOV
in PO
Slovenije
45
2.
Načela delovanja Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
61
Strategija
in
taktika
62
2.1
Strategija
in
taktika delovanja Slovenskega domobranstva
63
2.1.1
Splošna določila
63
2.1.2
Pohod enot Slovenskega domobranstva
69
2.1.3
Razvijanje enot Slovenskega domobranstva
71
2.1.4
Napad enot Slovenskega domobranstva
75
2.1.5
Obramba enot Slovenskega domobranstva
79
2.1.6
Prekinitev boja
81
2.1.7
Ukazi, povelja
in
znaki
v enotah
Slovenskega domobranstva
81
2.2
Strategija
in
taktika delovanja NOV
in PO
Slovenije
85
2.2.1
Splošna določila
85
2.2.2
Napad enot NOV
in POS 87
2.2.3
Boj enot NOV
in POS
za utrjeno naselje, postojanko
92
2.2.4
Diverzantski napadi enot NOV
in POS 97
2.2.5
Obramba enot NOV
in POS 100
2.2.6
Povelje enotam NOV
in POS
za izvedbo naloge
104
2.2.7
Povelja
v
enotah NOV
in POS 106
3.
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
in
častnikov
v
Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
109
3.1
Vojaško usposabljanje
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
112
3.2
Poveljstvo tečajev slovenskega domobranstva
118
3.2.1
Ustanovitev in
organiziranost poveljstva tečajev
118
3.2.2
Evidenca tečajnikov
120
3.2.3
Oprema tečajnikov
121
3.3
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
122
3.3.1
Podčastniški tečaji Slovenskega domobranstva
122
3.3.1.1 Namen in
naloga
122
3.3.1.2
Potek
podčastniških tečajev
123
3.3.1.2.1
Prvi podčastniški tečaj
123
3.3.1.2.2
Drugi podčastniški tečaj
125
3.3.1.2.3
Tretji podčastniški tečaj
126
3.3.1.2.4
Četrti podčastniški tečaj
126
3.3.1.2.5
Peti podčastniški tečaj
127
3.3.1.2.6
Šesti podčastniški tečaj
128
JĹ
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
3.3.1.2.7
Sedmi podčastniški tečaj
129
3.3.1.2.8
Osmi
podčastniški
tečaj
129
3.3.1.2.9
Tečaj za četne narednike
130
3.3.1.3
Umile in
vsebina
dela
131
3.3.1.4
Napredovanje slušateljev
138
3.3.1.5
Tečaji za podčastnilce Slovenskega
domobranstva
pri nemški
podoficirski
soli v
Ljubljani
139
3.3.1.6
Pomen podčastniških tečajev
140
3.3.2
Usposabljanje podčastnikov v NOV
in POS 142
3.3.2.1
Nastanek in
organiziranje
dela v
podoficirskih šolah
NOV in PO
Slovenije
142
3.3.2.2
Učni náčrt in vsebina usposabljanja
143
3.3.2.3
Podoficirske
iole
posameznih enot
146
3.3.2.3.1
Podoficirska
sola
14.
divizije
146
3.3.2.3.2
Podoficirska
sola
15.
divizije
147
3.3.2.3.3
Podoficirska
sola
18.
divizije
147
3.3.2.3.4
Podoficirska šola
30.
divizije
148
3.3.2.3.5
Podoficirska šola
31.
divizije
148
3.3.2.3.6
Podoficirska šola
7.
korpusa
148
3.3.2.3.7
Podoficirska šola
9.
korpusa
149
3.3.2.3.8
Podoficirska šola
4.
operativne
cone
149
3.3.2.4
Pomen usposabljanja podčastnikov
150
3.3.3
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
obeh obravnavanih
formacij
150
3.4
Primerjava usposabljanja častnikov
Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
153
3.4.1
Usposabljanje častnikov Slovenskega domobranstva
153
3.4.1.1
Ustanovitev in
pogoji za
vpis
153
3.4.1.2
Potek častniških
tečajev
156
3.4.1.2.1
Prvi častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.2
Drugi častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.3
Treţji
častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.4
Četrti častniški tečaj
157
3.4.1.2.5
Peti častniški tečaj
159
3.4.1.3
Urnik
in
vsebina
dela
162
3.4.1.4
Pomen častniških tečajev
166
3.4.2
Usposabljanje častnikov
v
NOV
in POS 168
3.4.2.1
Nastanek
in
organiziranje
dela
168
3.4.2.2
Učni
nacrt
in
vsebina usposabljanja
170
3.4.2.3
Pomen usposabljanja častnikov
175
3.4.3
Primerjava usposabljanja častnikov
v obeh
obravnavanih formacijah
177
3.5
Spremembe načina usposabljanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
181
3.5.1
Potrebe po spremembah
v
usposabljanju
181
3.5.2
Učni pripomočki
185
3.5.3
Tečaj za častniške pripravnike pri nemški SS
-
podoastniški Soli
190
3.5.4
Višji oficirski tečaji
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
193
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
.И
3.5.5
Udeležba slušateljev šol
obeh
obravnavanih formacij
v
bojnih akcijah
198
4.
Spremembe načina delovanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
203
4.1
Spremembe
načina
delovanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
204
4.1.1
Poveljniška
linija
204
4.1.2
Boji enot Slovenskega
domobranstva
z nasprotnikom
210
4.1.2.1
Ocena nasprotnika
210
4.1.2.2
Odnos
pripadnikov Slovenskega
domobranstva
do Nemcev
216
4.1.2.3
Obramba vojašlcih postojanlc Slovenskega
domobranstva
222
4.1.2.3.1
Primer
obrambe postojanlce
Velike
Lašče
226
4.1.2.3.2
Primer
obrambe postojanlce
Višnja
gora in
Křižka
vas
231
4.1.2.3.3
Primer obrambe postojanlce
Verd
235
4.1.2.4
Ofenzivne akcije
Slovenskega
domobranstva
238
4.1.3
Morala
v enotah
Slovenskega domobranstva
249
4.2
Spremembe načina delovanja
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
259
4.2.1
Poveljniška linija
259
4.2.2
Boji enot NOV
in
POS
z
nasprotnikom
262
4.2.2.1
Ocena
nasprotnilca NOV
in POS
ter delovanja
lastnih enot
v boju z
njim
262
4.2.2.2
Obramba
lastnih
položajev enot NOV
in POS 272
4.2.2.3
Ofenzivne akcije enot NOV
in POS 278
4.2.2.3.1
Primer
napada na Velike lašče
in
Zdensko vas
280
4.2.2.3.2
Primer
napada na Kočevje
284
4.2.2.3.3
Primer
napada na Preserje
in Podpeč
288
4.2.3
Morala
v
enotah NOV
in POS 297
Sklep
307
Conclusion
317
Viri in
literatura
329
Kazalo slikovnih arhivskih
dokumentov
337
Imensko kazalo
338
Conclusion
In order to establish an independent army, it
is of significant importance that an army organise its
own training for its own soldiers, especially for officers
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) because, in
this way, an army can build its own identity and the
identity of the nation it belongs to. Furthermore, suc¬
cessful combat in any war and, at the end of it, the fi¬
nal victory depend upon the training status of officers
and NCOs in an individual group. This was the goal of
the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard,
the main staff of the National Liberation Army and the
partisan detachment in Slovenia when they established
military schools and courses and, thus, were able to
intensify the training for their officers and NCOs.
The basic structure, operations and tasks of
the partisan units were defined in the Partisan Law,
which was adopted by the main headquarters of the
Slovenian Partisan Companies as early as July
1941
and which stated that the partisan detachments were
to be comprised of partisan volunteers who eagerly and
persistently, and with arms in their hands, wanted to
fight for the high aims of the Slovenian nation against
the yoke of the fascist oppressors and for the rights of
wonting people. Partisan detachments were then for¬
med in different ways, and so the majority of partisan
companies developed from illegal or combat groups,
or were formed in such a way that a group of partisans
given the task to form a new detachment in another
area was separated from the core of an individual
partisan company. Field support to partisan units and
their logistic support was provided by the Liberation
Front field committees.
À
trojka
was the smallest unit in the partisan
army or brigade. It was composed of three partisans:
the
trojka
leader and two
trojka
members. The leader
was the partisan who showed the greatest competen¬
ce; he led and commanded the
trojka.
The
trojka
members fought, guarded, and patrolled together or,
together, deployed each other for tasks. A platoon was
composed of four trojkas and contained
12
partisans;
317
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
a trojka
was commanded by a sergeant who was also its Pl member. One of the
trojka
leaders or members was a political delegate. A company was the basic partisan unit and
was commanded by a commander and a political commissioner. A company was compo¬
sed of three completely identical platoons and
a trojka
which supported the company.
The 3rd
trojka
in the 2nd platoon had a company medical orderly. This way, a company,
the basic characteristics of which were great mobility and simplicity of command, had
41
members. A battalion was composed of the battalion command and three companies.
Each partisan in a company was armed with a rifle, knife, and bombs, while the machi¬
ne gunner carried a machine gun and a pistol (handgun) instead of a rifle.
With the intention of intensifying the effectiveness of military operations, the 1st
(14*)
Division, the units of which were operating along the Ljubljana-Postojna railway
line, and the 2nd
(15*)
Division, which operated along the Ljubljana-Zidani Most-Zagreb
railway line, were established on
14
June
1943
by an order of the main staff of the Natio¬
nal Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia. With the surrender of Ita¬
ly and the proclamation of a general mobilisation to the National Liberation Army for
all men who were fit to fight, new brigades were formed within the formations of both
divisions. With this increase in divisions, the role of the main staff had to be enforced;
this is why the
7Љ
Corps of the National Liberation Army and the partisan detachment
in Yugoslavia, whose missions were to operate in the Dolenjska and Notranjska regions,
and, in December, the 9lh Corps with the
ЗІ61
Brigade (the
Triglav
Brigade) and the
30*
Brigade (the
Gorica
Brigade), whose missions were to operate in the Gorenjska and
Primorska
regions, were established as interim bodies of the division and main staff.
This formation was done with the preliminary approval of the supreme commander of
the National Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Yugoslavia. Through this
process, at the end of
1943,
the Slovenian Liberation Army introduced a regime that re¬
mained unchanged until the end of the war and was arranged in the following order: the
main staff, which was responsible for the operation of two corps and the
4*
(Staiermark)
operational zone that was composed of five divisions and a number of independent bri¬
gades, detachments and battalions.
The command function was performed by the commander, who represented the
unit and was responsible for its effectiveness, order, discipline, task performance, and
the implementation of measures to improve conditions and the effectiveness of the unit.
All of these tasks had to be carried out with the political commissioner s agreement. The
operational function, which meant the design of operations, intelligence, connections,
armament, ammunition and food supply, the deployment of units, movements, pro¬
ducing and receiving messages, command design, plans, sketches, photographs, and all
technical work, was performed by the chief-of-staff and the officers responsible for ope¬
rations. This represented the most important staff work, because the battle efficiency of
a unit depended upon a project being correctly performed.
Upon the surrender of Italy and the establishment of the
Jadransko primorje
ope¬
rational zone, which also included the Ljubljana region, the German military re-organi¬
sed the occupied area and established new subsidiary military police formations. At the
same time, the Slovenian counter-revolutionary side searched for solutions as to how to
establish an army which would be composed of Slovenians only . Eventually, General
Erwin Rösener
was responsible for its organisation and, after that, with a special decree,
also named the supreme commander of the Slovenian Home Guard. From mid-October
1943,
the so-called organisational staff (in German: Organisalionstab
für die Aufstel¬
lung des Slowenischen Landeswehr ) was
established as the head of the Slovenian Home
Guard. The name of the staff itself reveals its non-commanding nature. As early as
30
September
1943, Rösener
established a special directing staff
{ Führungsstab für
Вап-
318
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
denbekämpfiing ) in
his area of command, and on
26
October he formed a special staff
for the recruitment and deployment of Slovenian home guards
{ Organisationsstab für
die
Auf Stellung der slowenischen Landeswehr beim Höheren SS und Polizeiführer in Lai¬
bach ),
with an added statement which said that this one, too, would be a federal staff.
The main tasks of the organisational staff and units of the Slovenian Home Gu¬
ard were recruitment, deployment, training, equipment, and supply of the Slovenian
Home Guard. In order to perform tasks outside of this framework, units had to get
special approval from the staff. But when the home guard units were included in battle
intervention or deployed to positions outside a bunker line, they were subjected to the
German staff for command over the battle against the bandits. Thus, the structure of
the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard did not include one of the most
important sections of the staff of any army or army unit, and that is the section for
operational requirements. Those kind of matters were, as far as the Slovenian Home
Guard was concerned, indisputably and completely in the hands of the Germans. Since
there were instances of quarrels between German and home guard officers as to who
was superior to whom, the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard issued a
special order which stated: When a German officer has been ordered to perform a task,
the command is in his hands and our officers must follow his orders. It is a matter of intel¬
lect and prudence on the part of our officers to operate in such a manner that they don t
compromise their authority in the eyes of their subordinates .
With the intention of training soldiers and senior personnel in the Slovenian
Home Guard to familiarise them with German tactics and fighting strategy, all officers
and NCOs, especially those who distinguished themselves in the fight against the parti¬
sans, had to attend a special course led by German instructors. After they had completed
the course, all participants returned to their units and passed on the knowledge they
had obtained to the soldiers who had already been deployed to units or to those who
were to be redeployed.
The basic closed military unit in the Slovenian Home Guard was a company,
which was formed in the following way: a captain, the company commander; three other
officers, two of whom were first or second lieutenants and one a staff sergeant major; a
company sergeant; a pay sergeant; home guard members (a clerk, a tailor, a shoemaker,
two cooks, a medical orderly, a trumpeter, three orderlies and an armourer); a sergeant
who was the head of the company staff, a quarter master sergeant, as well as a corporal
and a commissioner .
A company consisted of three platoons, and each platoon was comprised of four
squads of ten soldiers
( desetina );
each
desetina
had a sergeant, a corporal, a machi¬
ne gun crew composed of a corporal and two home guards as well as six riflemen (five
of whom were home guards and one of them a corporal). A platoon also had three gre¬
nadiers one a corporal and two home guards as well as home guards, two orderlies, one
medical orderly and a sergeant who was the head of the platoon staff. From the point
of view of its formation, a company was structured in the following way:
1
captain,
2
se¬
cond or first lieutenants,
1
staff sergeant major,
6
sergeants,
13
sergeants,
28
corporals,
and
110
home guards; this way, a home guard company numbered
161
men in total. The
armament of a company was the following:
127
rifles,
12
machine guns, and
3
mortars
as well as
6
horses and
3
carriages for ammunition, food and luggage. Individual compa¬
nies and platoons were assigned to German school officers who had the task to train the
units for all kinds of battle conditions in hills, against the bandits . At the same time,
the Slovenian unit commanders were also responsible for conducting this task.
With a new military formation in the Ljubljana province, on
16
May
1944,
the
units of the Slovenian Home Guard were deployed as teams into individual strongholds
319
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
and four home guard offensive battalions were established; those battalions were rena¬
med the Ist, IP 1, IIIrd, and IVth Battalions and were formed into two groups: the Schumac¬
her group (Is1, III 1, and IVth Battalions) and the Rupnik group (IIій1 Battalion). Battalions
were formed out of three infantry and rifle companies and one heavy company and were
commanded by Slovenian Home Guard officers who, however, had a German officer
assigned to them, with the exception of those who were listed under a question-mark
instead of a German officer s name.
In June
1944,
the following formations were operating in the Slovenian Home
Guard: the organisational staff, training command, train command, orchestra com¬
mand, home guard control command, Is and 2nd school companies, 1st working com¬
pany, and
54
regular rifle companies which were mainly garrison companies in indivi¬
dual strongholds of the Slovenian Home Guard, and four manoeuvre battalions. On
15
March
1944,
the Slovenian Home Guard consisted of
9213
men in total,
256
of whom
were officers,
930
NCOs,
528
senior NCOs, and
7,489
home guards.
Partisan tactics or partisan combat strategies were based on the constant fighting
activity of the units, so the attack was a basic fighting strategy. Uninterrupted withdra¬
wals from action; night actions; surprising the enemy with sudden attacks, ambushes,
infiltrations, and sabotage; secret marches; and operating in any kind of terrain or
weather conditions were also the trademark of partisan tactics. With this wide a range
and originality in implementation, partisan tactics actually presented the antithesis to
the classical rules of military action. Partisan units operated in an original, bold, and
quick manner; with violent strikes, skilful attacks and retreats, and the courage of their
fighters and their superiors, they neutralised the enemy s numerical and technical do¬
minance.
On the other hand, broad thinking in the organisation and operation of the Slo¬
venian anti-partisan army was really only proven reliable in the area of strongholds and
swift mobile unit formation which used partisan combat strategies when fighting parti¬
sans. The Slovenian Home Guard was just in the initial phase of establishing itself as a
police/military formation and had not been granted permission by the Germans for its
own offensive actions, especially not on such a wide scale and sometimes, only in such a
way that they would not be included in anti-partisan offensives at all. It also did not take
into consideration the partisan army operation strategy, since it expected the partisans
to mostly withdraw from action and finally to flee because of enemy supremacy.
The theoretical provisions for the operation of Slovenian Home Guard units
were defined in the Principles of Home Guard Tactics, designed in the fall of
1944,
and
which served as the basis for setting goals, ways and focal points for the units activities.
An introduction to the Principles of Home Guard Tactics defines the basic principles
of general tactics, which are also applicable to a guerrilla fighting strategy where initi¬
ative is the most important component, yet which was, until then, implemented only by
partisans. That is why for the future tasks, home guard units were ordered to perform
offensives, attack activities, and izpadi (surprise attacks performed by Home Guards
by breaking out of their strongholds and attacking the partisans) in case those were con¬
ducted in the defence framework, with a special emphasis on morale, which, in a fight
and with the help of weapons, means a unit cannot be defeated.
The home guard tactics alone were defined by taking into consideration the
type of enemy they were fighting. In a fight against the terrain , intelligence and co-
unterintelligence work were very important, as well as the establishment of their own
intelligence network in areas where there were no permanent home guard strongholds.
Units with permanent strongholds and tactical units, which operated in a wider area,
fought against partisan units.
320
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojske
_..
The importance of permanent units lay in the constant deterrence of partisan
attacks on residential settlements which served as a base for shock troops at the time
of battles against the partisans. Their strength and constant control over the territory
or the area were important; the control task was conducted by dispatching patrols and
laying ambushes. It was important to have a well organised monitoring and intelligence
service which protected units from sudden partisan attacks. Special attention had to be
given to cooperation with the neighbouring home guard strongholds and their constant
connection and support during partisan attacks on strongholds. Slovenian Home Guard
assault troops had to constantly take offensive actions, especially when under attack.
In doing this, they had to take advantage of mistakes made by the partisans, cooperate
as consistently as possible, and constantly take the initiative in battlefield actions and
impose their fighting strategy on the partisans.
Except for the efficient function or implementation of the prescribed function
technique, both formations needed well-trained and combat-efficient command person¬
nel. At the beginning of their operations during WW II, the home guard and partisans
recruited command personnel for their military education from the same sources. The¬
se were experienced, former active duty and reserve officers and NCOs from the Royal
Yugoslav Army who had not been interned. With both armies increasing in size, service
members without the appropriate training backgrounds had to be recruited. So that
both opposing forces could operate efficiently, it was necessary to establish systematic
military training for combatants, home guard forces, partisans and, in particular, their
commanding officers. Initially, the training consisted of short courses; however, these
did not provide the necessary expertise and skills an individual needed to efficiently
command units. The release of a large number of former Yugoslav officers and NCOs
from Italian camps and their integration into home guard and partisan units contribu¬
ted to an increase in military training and its quality. At the beginning, partisan service
members had to become familiar with partisan warfare methods, and home guards had
to become familiar with anti-partisan warfare methods. The required expertise was quic¬
kly acquired and, therefore, both groups had instructors and relevant
NCO
and officer
training authorities at their disposal.
Soon after its establishment on
26
October
1943,
the Slovenian Home Guard
began organised training for its service members, in particular its senior officers. The
main purpose of the
NCO
and officer training, as well as that of other courses which
were provided by the Education Group of the Slovenian Home Guard Organisational
Staff, was to standardise the military expertise acquired by the Slovenian home guards
in the army or in the organisation which they had been members of before joining the
Slovenian Home Guard. Their expertise had to conform to the requirements derived
from the mission of the Slovenian Home Guard and their service members, depending
on the hierarchical duty applied in the police and military organisations and on the
situation in the entire Slovenian Home Guard which was part of the unit commanded
by the German
SS
and Police General
Rösener.
The most significant training elements
were, therefore, familiarisation with and die handling of weapons, combat training,
and familiarisation with and training in anti-guerrilla and anti-partisan tactics. After
completing the course, the participants in the
NCO
and officer training courses had to
apply their recently acquired expertise as commanding officers or NCOs to real combat
situations. Thus trained and having demonstrated their skills, newly commissioned or
promoted Slovenian Home Guard officers joined their comrades in arms who had acqui¬
red their military expertise during peacetime at military schools for active and reserve
forces. Thus, they joined home guard units, in particular companies, in the fight against
partisan units.
321
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
Regardless of all the restraints, in particular the German supervision as well as
the German determination of the content and purpose of training, the Slovenian Home
Guard succeeded in planning, organising and implementing officer and
NCO
training.
In this manner, despite the war and all the disagreements within the leadership of the
Slovenian counter-revolution, they managed to lay the groundwork for the possible
future development of training for NCOs and
COs
in the Slovenian Home Guard and
Slovenian National Army respectively.
Due to the less than favourable conditions during the establishment of the par¬
tisan military schools, the first school didn t start to operate until
1943.
The military
schools of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment in Slovenia were,
soon after their establishment, united under one name as the Officer School. Soon af¬
terwards, an
NCO
training school, a political school, and other schools were established.
Thus, in the first half of
1944,
the necessary schools were available for the training of
partisan officers and NCOs from various branches and services. The conditions under
which these schools operated were adverse. Due to hostile acts, they had to interrupt
their classes and participate in fights. Since the conditions were unfavourable, some of
the schools had to be closed although they were very significant to the development of
the partisan movement. During a period of intensive training, the main emphasis was
on familiarisation with the weapons and tactics of partisan units. Personnel require¬
ments, the organisational improvement of units, the establishment of new branches
and services and the improvement of weapons and their tactical operation required the
gradual improvement of the training programs. Good co-operation of all branches and
services of the partisan army was possible only if the senior commanding officers were
well trained not only in the lmowledge of their own branches but also in the lmowledge
of other branches and services in the partisan army. At the end of the war, the partisan
army was well-organised.
In making a comparative analysis of the officer training of the two opposing
sides, we can conclude that, besides the differences which derived from the goals and
purposes of both formations, there were also similarities. On both sides, NCOs who
had already had combat experience yet were not familiar with the appropriate military
expertise for the post they had been deployed to, or fighters (partisans and home guards
who, during fights, had proven themselves to be capable of commanding smaller units)
participated in
NCO
training courses. In this way, both commanders and headquarters
deployed non-commissioned officers and regular fighters to
NCO
training courses. The
curriculum for both courses was based on tactics
-
lessons in fighting or army service
when fighting
-
and becoming familiar with one s own as well as the enemy s weapons.
Due to the short time available for training, which was additionally shortened or inter¬
rupted by fighting and preparations for fighting, the training was very intensive and was
based on practical lessons, particularly on handling partisan or anti-partisan tactics,
which was equally important on both sides.
Trainers and commanders doing the training were mostly former Yugoslavian
officers and NCOs who had joined one of the formations; on the home guard side, there
were also German officers and NCOs, while on the partisan side, there were also senior
partisan leaders who had effectively performed various tasks and showed talent for
educational work and lecturing and had professional lmowledge yet no broad military
education. Teaching aids, especially lecture notes on the home guard side, were mostly
translations of German and former Yugoslavian lecture notes, whereas on the partisan
side, there were almost no teaching aids or lecture notes specifically addressing
NCO
training available, except for weapons, so they used those designed for officer training.
At the end of training, the participants were trained to be corporals and sergeants. But
322
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojske
because of the span of the formation and training on the entire Slovenian territory,
there were by far more officers trained in partisan units than in the home guard. In this
way, in partisan military schools, there were all together
1807
trainees trained in schools
for lower command personnel and NCOs, while in the home guard
NCO
course, there
were
433
trainees or future terrain NCOs of the National Liberation Army and partisan
detachment in Slovenia, and of the Slovenian Home Guard.
As with the
NCO
training, similarities can, to a certain extent, also be seen when
making a comparison between officer training in the Slovenian Home Guard and officer
training that was carried out in the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment
in Slovenia. Training for officers was, in both formations, centralised, because registrati¬
on requirements, selection instructions and the selection of candidates themselves were
conducted by the main staff of the Slovenian Liberation Army, the partisan detachment
in Slovenia and the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard.
Enlistment requirements were more precisely defined in the home guard, espe¬
cially those regarding education requirements, yet candidates in both formations had
to prove themselves in combat and show leadership and command competence prior
to their entry in a course. Those members who already had officer ranks and needed
to adopt their military knowledge to the newly-arisen situation, or partisans and home
guards with
NCO
ranks or those who did not have
NCO
ranks but had been recommen¬
ded by their superiors as suitable for the future position of officers, were deployed to
courses.
Training in both formations was based on lessons in tactics and armament and,
in the Slovenian Home Guard, also on general subjects. In both formations, the trainers
were former Yugoslavian officers and NCOs; in die Slovenian Home Guard, German
officers and NCOs as well as civilian lecturers had an important role in training future
officers, while in partisan units trainers were those partisans who had experience in
fighting and those who had obtained their military knowledge at the National Libera¬
tion Army school for officers and the partisan detachment in Slovenia. Teaching aids
on one side, which were mostly lecture notes, were issued by the school section which
operated within the framework of the Slovenian Home Guard Organisational Staff scho¬
ol group; these were mainly translations of German and Yugoslavian lecture notes and
rules. On the other side, lecture notes were edited by the science section of the main
staff of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment in Slovenia and, later,
also the schools for officers of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment
in Slovenia; those lecture notes were initially written by the lecturers.
At the end of a course, the participants took exams and, based on the grades they
achieved, they were trained to be platoon or company sergeants and then deployed to
the units they had originated from; in the Slovenian Home Guard, there was a general
practice of deploying them to other units. In this way, the school for officers in the Na¬
tional Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia trained
520
infantry
officers, while the course for officers in the Slovenian Home Guard produced
132
infan¬
try officers, bearing in mind the fact that officer training of the Slovenian Home Guard
was, in
1945,
transferred to the German
SS
school for NCOs and was no longer carried
out within the formation of the Slovenian Home Guard. An important part of
NCO
and
officer training in both formations was ideological or political education.
In order to conduct this kind of operation successfully, information about the
enemy was of crucial importance.
In order to establish the proper work of the home guard s own intelligence ser¬
vice, it was important to get familiar with the enemy s: courier and intelligence service,
position of unit staffs, the commands of places and districts, hospitals, airports, perma-
323
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
nent
military bases, military schools, the organisation of connections, the procedures
for partisan territory supply, morale among civilians, and the tactical protection of units
and liberated territories. As equally important as gathering information on the enemy
was the establishment of counter-intelligence activities for the protection of their own
units and commands as well as individual Slovenian home guards against enemy pro¬
paganda and intelligence activities.
Given the situation in the field, the Slovenian Home Guard had to protect the
territory they were already supposed to be in control of; this was the territory on the
Grosuplje
-
Velike Lašče
-
Borovnica
-
Rakek
-
Rovte
-
Polhov
Gradec
-
Ježića
-
Polje
line. Home guards were supposed to destroy partisan network terrain operations in this
territory and capture every courier who tried to get in or out of Ljubljana. This territory
was also supposed to serve as an operational base for further tactical work.
With insurance measures for individual strongholds, home guards, at the same
time, wanted to establish protection against sabotage and a partisan attack. In order
to decrease the number of soldiers needed in a stronghold, it was necessary to conduct
a range of technical measures for its protection, measures such as preventing access
with wired obstacles, mines, alarm devices and lighting as well as the construction of a
trench system. It was necessary to clean the territory around their stronghold, within
optimum reach and, in this way, create a surveyable and clear area in an obstacle zone
and in front of them. The teams, however, had to be trained as a well-oiled machine .
Every commander had to deploy his own personnel , who had to provide intelligence
information, clear the area around their stronghold of all suspicious elements , get in
contact with neighbouring commanders and organise a chase in the clearance area.
Effective or ineffective defence and attacks on individual fortified strongholds
of the Slovenian Home Guard were analysed by the defending as well as the attacking
parties.
The defenders recorded that the partisans implemented the tactics of being as
mobile as possible and that they attacked the main spot with their full power, destroyed
the enemy, and then, when the enemy was starting to receive help from the outside, they
moved to another spot where the enemy was weaker. The partisans had good connecti¬
ons; they set up strong ambushes all around the vicinity of a stronghold and they had
better weapons and more of them. During a siege, the team itself constantly carried out
izpadi , since they were of the opinion that a bunker fight against the partisans would
not bring the hoped for success and that it was necessary to establish the home guard
operation in such a way that all the men would be organized into groups which would be
given good leadership, and then they could strike the partisans together, first of all the
spots which were the most important as, for instance, the partisan staff location.
The attackers (the partisans) recorded the following: the time available for orga¬
nising actions was often too short, so they were unable to set up weapons, and they
could not carry out a swift or sudden break into a stronghold; this was due particularly
to inaccurate information provided by their intelligence; no connection between indivi¬
dual attacking forces, units and types was established; the ratio between the attacking
forces and those of the defenders was disadvantageous for the attacker because both
had approximately the same number of forces; therefore, it wasn t possible to establish
a blocking position on a stronghold, so the enemy took advantage of the situation and
carried out izpadi from it; there was no clear, serious attempt to attack and destroy a
stronghold; it was evident that the infantry was not sufficiently trained, and this became
even more obvious during an attack because fighters used only natural shelters not arti¬
ficial ones; a break through enemy lines was always carried out at the same spot and the
results of these were not used and, after an unsuccessful breakthrough, the units always
324
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
went back to their initial positions; the use of fire from infantry weapons, especially au¬
tomatic ones, wasn t efficient, because the concentric fire from the machine guns wasn t
constantly directed on the bunkers; unit staffs did not have precisely selected command
spots which caused difficulties when delivering messages and establishing connections
between command spots.
When fighting the partisans, the enemy used two fighting strategies, two tactics.
The enemy reacted to the offensive activities by the larger partisan units with
a greater concentration of infantry forces; these forces were supported by mechanised
units which saw action before the infantry units. At the same time, the infantry units
attacked in accordance with the tactical rules of a regular army, because before an
infantry attack, gun and mortar attacks were regularly carried out. Then followed the
infantry units, which were, as the rifle formations prepared to fire, approaching the par¬
tisan unit positions and carrying out the assault. At night, the enemy wasn t carrying out
attacks; on the contrary, even without a partisan counterattack, they left the positions
they had taken during the day, stopped and fortified themselves at hill reefs around a vil¬
lage. During attacks, the enemy burned down only the buildings near a village; the fire
lit the surrounding area during the night. During partisan attacks at night, the enemy
let the partisans approach them as closely as possible
(20
or
30
metres) and then opened
fire using all the light armament they had. Even though the enemy outnumbered the
partisans, they never tried to surround the partisan units. The enemy employed regular
army tactics during the times its units were composed mostly of German units which
outnumbered the partisans.
Another fighting strategy was employed mostly by the battalions of the Slovenian
Home Guard, which implemented secret movements in the woods, for which they used
good guides who knew the territory very well and could lead the units down the paths or
bypass them. A smaller column was usually on the move down a road with the intention
of fooling partisan staffs and engaging units responsible for their destruction, while the
majority of the column had already split off and continued to move to their final desti¬
nation. In this way, they employed the tactics of parallel, relatively quick moving units,
each of which moved in its own direction and finally merged into a large group before
they reached their final destination. Battalions usually returned to their strongholds on
the same path yet often they went to another stronghold and went back to their base
after they had taken a rest. During an attack, they employed the strategies of surprise
and quick action. First, they would enclose an area on two sides and then hit the target
with the main force while, at the same time, they moved some of the soldiers in the di¬
rection they expected the partisans to retreat to. The attack was prepared with heavy fire
from all kinds of weapons, especially mortars, and there was lots of shouting designed
to cause panic. They stayed in the attack spot only for a short time and as soon as they
sensed major danger from the partisan side they changed the strategy from attack to
retreat. Prior to a battle, they had already set up ambushes, masked machine gun po¬
sitions and rear columns in the direction of the retreat with the intention of surprising
the partisan fighters and hitting them from behind. They also set up ambushes in the
direction of the expected partisan attack. During attacks, they employed various tricks.
For instance, the whole force was not dressed in the same type of clothes; some of them
were dressed in German and home guard uniforms, some of them in civilian clothes;
all of this was done with the intention of creating the impression of a partisan column.
They were mostly bareheaded or wore Titovka . They attempted to trick the guards
by telling them not to open fire and, in that way, they could approach the guards and
then kill them. All these actions were risky and did not exclude the possibility that the
partisan units might completely destroy them.
325
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
With the enemy s new fighting strategy, the partisan units faced a new military
challenge they had not yet faced in previous fights, and so they had a response to ene¬
my activities only for the first type of tactics. For the guerrilla fighting strategy of the
enemy, the partisan units had no proper or effective response. Their response was: it
is a bit strange, because our fighters and we, the partisans, first employed these fighting
tactics which are now being used by the enemy and are a reflection of his weakness . The
partisan tactics had not changed much during the whole period of fighting and, thus,
they had not adapted to the enemy s new fighting strategy. Up until then, die partisan
army had been talcing the initiative and constantly attacking, while the enemy had been
forced to defend itself in its fortified strongholds and respond to the partisan actions.
If the partisans wanted to avoid the consequences of their own passiveness, they had to
either start a general offensive, thus bending the enemy s activity to their own will, or
adapt their fighting strategy to that of the enemy s. Starting a general offensive did not
depend upon a local but a general strategic situation which, however, did not prevent
them from being more active in the individual fields of their activity and, in this way,
they imposed their will upon the enemy. Therefore, adapting the tactics was entirely in
the hands of the partisan units whose staffs had to act according to the rule: Whoever
wants to surprise someone has to be prepared to be surprised himself.
The partisans had
started to ignore this rule and for that reason the enemy became bolder and started to
agitate the partisan army more and more.
With the intention of preventing this kind of enemy activity which caused great
losses to partisan units, the partisan units, above all, had to implement measures for the
destruction of the enemy s intelligence network. With this, they also had to employ dra-
conian measures in the sense of collective punishment for civilians who were sympathising
with the home guards, such as deporting their families, etc.
.
As another measure, it was
necessary to establish their own civilian intelligence network which would immediately
send information about the enemy s departure from a stronghold and his intentions.
Among the other measures were the following: they had to send secret, specialised pa¬
trols to the vicinity of strongholds; they had to increase the secrecy of activities and se¬
curity in combat service support units; and the brigades had to concentrate on following
and destroying the enemy s columns.
In the partisan army as well as in the Slovenian Home Guard, commanders were
faced with the problem of insufficiently trained personnel, changes to the formation of
their forces, and changes in the way military operations were implemented; all of these
factors influenced success in the actions the formations led against each other on the
battlefield. One solution to these problems was to make changes in the training techni¬
ques for the soldiers, whether partisans or home guards, and to provide higher quality
training for officers and NCOs.
Changes in individual courses were implemented through inspections which were
carried out by superior commands during training and examinations as well as through
the exchange of literature and analyses of individual military battles between the Offi¬
cers School, the Training Command, and fighting units of their own formations.
Operational sections and officers of the main staff, corps, operational zones and
divisions were responsible for the connections between the units and military schools
and the transfer of experiences gained by partisan units in fights against the enemy and
which were subsequently introduced to the training programmes of the officer and
NCO
courses of the partisan army. In this way, they had to pay attention to the constant influx
of information on new German tactics and forward it to the schools for the officers and
NCOs who were responsible within the framework of the command over their units.
In the same way, they had to have constant contact with the schools and control over
326
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
examination procedures; this also helped them get to know future command personnel.
Operational officers also had to prepare studies of individual actions and fights carried
out by their units, studies which were based on data from those actions and fights and
would serve as the basis for changes implemented in units or commanding personnel.
In its regular orders, the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard also
presented the topical situation with the bandits
,
where they presented information on
the organisation of partisan units in individual territories and their fighting strategy as
provided by the intelligence service; on this basis, it gave orders and countermeasure
instructions to home guard units, in particular very detailed instructions on fighting
strategies to be used against partisan units in individual cases, and orders on constant
training in this area for all units, especially courses for officers and NCOs in the Slove¬
nian Home Guard.
In schools, they encouraged instructors to spend less time presenting theoretical
knowledge, which was related primarily to the action principles that were employed
in a regular army and not adapted to the specialities of operations and the needs of
individual formations; instructors were encouraged, because of the great amount of
subject matter material and the short training time available, to extract the gist of the
knowledge required for a good sergeant, commander or commandant and to pay atten¬
tion to the minimal school education the participants had and the fact that, during the
training, more attention needed to be given to the practical part of the training so that
the participants could relate to it more easily, memorize it more easily, and make better
use of it later when performing their duties as commanders.
During the short training time in the schools, lecturers had to train the trainees
as well as possible so that they could immediately return to their units, prepared to take
over the command and efficiently lead a unit in a battle against the enemy. This task
could be implemented only if the training itself was related as closely as possible to the
actual situation on the battlefield, which meant that the future commanders of units
in both formations had to perform command duties during their training as often as
possible. Due to the conditions under which the training was implemented, they could
not perform this in real-life units , so training for future commanders was carried out
primarily on a theoretical basis
-
in the form of solving tactical tasks.
It was especially important that the best officers and NCOs from battle units were
deployed as training instructors, especially those who were experienced lecturers and
had experience in fighting strategies, because most lecturers before that had used the
know-how they had obtained when lecturing at Yugoslavian military academies and had
neither knowledge nor experience in partisan fighting strategies.
The answer to the established deficiencies in the knowledge of higher-ranking
officer personnel in the partisan army was the establishment of a course for officers
of higher ranks in the schools for officers at the General Staff of the National Libera¬
tion Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia, with the intention of training and
educating officers of higher rank to lead battalions, brigades and divisions in combat.
After successfully completing training, the most competent trainees were trained as bri¬
gade commandants or even division commandants; those who had achieved good grades
were trained to become battalion commandants and underachieving students company
commanders.
It also happened that the commanders of individual partisan and home guard
units blamed the ineffective training of officers and NCOs for failures in fights against
the enemy which contributed to losses of their own personnel. The commanders belie¬
ved that in order to achieve more success in battles, they should deploy to courses those
soldiers who had greater intellectual and physical competence and those who had alrea-
327
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partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
dy
performed command duties yet had not participated in appropriate military training,
because leadership also required knowledge which corresponded to the position and, in
the cases when they had no knowledge, it was impossible to expect good leadership.
The final goal of both opposing military formations in WWII in Slovenia was the
establishment of a Slovenian army, but it was created and it operated under different
circumstances and under different conditions just as new candidates for officers and
NCOs were trained under different conditions and circumstances; however, in spite of
the insurmountable differences between them and the hatred which members of both
formations showed towards each other, we can also identify some mutual characteristics
in both military school systems. They both contributed to the fact that the prior military
knowledge of the NCOs and officers of both formations was first harmonised and then
adapted to the fighting strategies employed by the two formations which then began to
train new NCOs and officers who contributed to the growth of both formations. In this,
Љеу
kept close connections and exchanged knowledge and experience in fights with
the enemy and implemented them in new ways and training programmes, all of which
contributed to success on the battlefield.
328
|
| adam_txt |
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
Vsebina
Uvod
9
1.
Formacija
· 21
1.1
Formacija Slovenskega domobranstva
22
1.2
Formacija NOV
in PO
Slovenije
45
2.
Načela delovanja Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
61
Strategija
in
taktika
62
2.1
Strategija
in
taktika delovanja Slovenskega domobranstva
63
2.1.1
Splošna določila
63
2.1.2
Pohod enot Slovenskega domobranstva
69
2.1.3
Razvijanje enot Slovenskega domobranstva
71
2.1.4
Napad enot Slovenskega domobranstva
75
2.1.5
Obramba enot Slovenskega domobranstva
79
2.1.6
Prekinitev boja
81
2.1.7
Ukazi, povelja
in
znaki
v enotah
Slovenskega domobranstva
81
2.2
Strategija
in
taktika delovanja NOV
in PO
Slovenije
85
2.2.1
Splošna določila
85
2.2.2
Napad enot NOV
in POS 87
2.2.3
Boj enot NOV
in POS
za utrjeno naselje, postojanko
92
2.2.4
Diverzantski napadi enot NOV
in POS 97
2.2.5
Obramba enot NOV
in POS 100
2.2.6
Povelje enotam NOV
in POS
za izvedbo naloge
104
2.2.7
Povelja
v
enotah NOV
in POS 106
3.
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
in
častnikov
v
Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
109
3.1
Vojaško usposabljanje
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
112
3.2
Poveljstvo tečajev slovenskega domobranstva
118
3.2.1
Ustanovitev in
organiziranost poveljstva tečajev
118
3.2.2
Evidenca tečajnikov
120
3.2.3
Oprema tečajnikov
121
3.3
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
122
3.3.1
Podčastniški tečaji Slovenskega domobranstva
122
3.3.1.1 Namen in
naloga
122
3.3.1.2
Potek
podčastniških tečajev
123
3.3.1.2.1
Prvi podčastniški tečaj
123
3.3.1.2.2
Drugi podčastniški tečaj
125
3.3.1.2.3
Tretji podčastniški tečaj
126
3.3.1.2.4
Četrti podčastniški tečaj
126
3.3.1.2.5
Peti podčastniški tečaj
127
3.3.1.2.6
Šesti podčastniški tečaj
128
JĹ
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
3.3.1.2.7
Sedmi podčastniški tečaj
129
3.3.1.2.8
Osmi
podčastniški
tečaj
129
3.3.1.2.9
Tečaj za četne narednike
130
3.3.1.3
Umile in
vsebina
dela
131
3.3.1.4
Napredovanje slušateljev
138
3.3.1.5
Tečaji za podčastnilce Slovenskega
domobranstva
pri nemški
podoficirski
soli v
Ljubljani
139
3.3.1.6
Pomen podčastniških tečajev
140
3.3.2
Usposabljanje podčastnikov v NOV
in POS 142
3.3.2.1
Nastanek in
organiziranje
dela v
podoficirskih šolah
NOV in PO
Slovenije
142
3.3.2.2
Učni náčrt in vsebina usposabljanja
143
3.3.2.3
Podoficirske
iole
posameznih enot
146
3.3.2.3.1
Podoficirska
sola
14.
divizije
146
3.3.2.3.2
Podoficirska
sola
15.
divizije
147
3.3.2.3.3
Podoficirska
sola
18.
divizije
147
3.3.2.3.4
Podoficirska šola
30.
divizije
148
3.3.2.3.5
Podoficirska šola
31.
divizije
148
3.3.2.3.6
Podoficirska šola
7.
korpusa
148
3.3.2.3.7
Podoficirska šola
9.
korpusa
149
3.3.2.3.8
Podoficirska šola
4.
operativne
cone
149
3.3.2.4
Pomen usposabljanja podčastnikov
150
3.3.3
Primerjava usposabljanja podčastnikov
obeh obravnavanih
formacij
150
3.4
Primerjava usposabljanja častnikov
Slovenskega domobranstva
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
153
3.4.1
Usposabljanje častnikov Slovenskega domobranstva
153
3.4.1.1
Ustanovitev in
pogoji za
vpis
153
3.4.1.2
Potek častniških
tečajev
156
3.4.1.2.1
Prvi častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.2
Drugi častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.3
Treţji
častniški tečaj
156
3.4.1.2.4
Četrti častniški tečaj
157
3.4.1.2.5
Peti častniški tečaj
159
3.4.1.3
Urnik
in
vsebina
dela
162
3.4.1.4
Pomen častniških tečajev
166
3.4.2
Usposabljanje častnikov
v
NOV
in POS 168
3.4.2.1
Nastanek
in
organiziranje
dela
168
3.4.2.2
Učni
nacrt
in
vsebina usposabljanja
170
3.4.2.3
Pomen usposabljanja častnikov
175
3.4.3
Primerjava usposabljanja častnikov
v obeh
obravnavanih formacijah
177
3.5
Spremembe načina usposabljanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
NOV
in PO
Slovenije
181
3.5.1
Potrebe po spremembah
v
usposabljanju
181
3.5.2
Učni pripomočki
185
3.5.3
Tečaj za častniške pripravnike pri nemški SS
-
podoastniški Soli
190
3.5.4
Višji oficirski tečaji
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
193
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
.И
3.5.5
Udeležba slušateljev šol
obeh
obravnavanih formacij
v
bojnih akcijah
198
4.
Spremembe načina delovanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
ter
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
203
4.1
Spremembe
načina
delovanja
v Slovenskem
domobranstvu
204
4.1.1
Poveljniška
linija
204
4.1.2
Boji enot Slovenskega
domobranstva
z nasprotnikom
210
4.1.2.1
Ocena nasprotnika
210
4.1.2.2
Odnos
pripadnikov Slovenskega
domobranstva
do Nemcev
216
4.1.2.3
Obramba vojašlcih postojanlc Slovenskega
domobranstva
222
4.1.2.3.1
Primer
obrambe postojanlce
Velike
Lašče
226
4.1.2.3.2
Primer
obrambe postojanlce
Višnja
gora in
Křižka
vas
231
4.1.2.3.3
Primer obrambe postojanlce
Verd
235
4.1.2.4
Ofenzivne akcije
Slovenskega
domobranstva
238
4.1.3
Morala
v enotah
Slovenskega domobranstva
249
4.2
Spremembe načina delovanja
v NOV
in PO
Slovenije
259
4.2.1
Poveljniška linija
259
4.2.2
Boji enot NOV
in
POS
z
nasprotnikom
262
4.2.2.1
Ocena
nasprotnilca NOV
in POS
ter delovanja
lastnih enot
v boju z
njim
262
4.2.2.2
Obramba
lastnih
položajev enot NOV
in POS 272
4.2.2.3
Ofenzivne akcije enot NOV
in POS 278
4.2.2.3.1
Primer
napada na Velike lašče
in
Zdensko vas
280
4.2.2.3.2
Primer
napada na Kočevje
284
4.2.2.3.3
Primer
napada na Preserje
in Podpeč
288
4.2.3
Morala
v
enotah NOV
in POS 297
Sklep
307
Conclusion
317
Viri in
literatura
329
Kazalo slikovnih arhivskih
dokumentov
337
Imensko kazalo
338
Conclusion
In order to establish an independent army, it
is of significant importance that an army organise its
own training for its own soldiers, especially for officers
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) because, in
this way, an army can build its own identity and the
identity of the nation it belongs to. Furthermore, suc¬
cessful combat in any war and, at the end of it, the fi¬
nal victory depend upon the training status of officers
and NCOs in an individual group. This was the goal of
the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard,
the main staff of the National Liberation Army and the
partisan detachment in Slovenia when they established
military schools and courses and, thus, were able to
intensify the training for their officers and NCOs.
The basic structure, operations and tasks of
the partisan units were defined in the Partisan Law,
which was adopted by the main headquarters of the
Slovenian Partisan Companies as early as July
1941
and which stated that the partisan detachments were
to be comprised of partisan volunteers who eagerly and
persistently, and with arms in their hands, wanted to
"fight for the high aims of the Slovenian nation against
the yoke of the fascist oppressors" and for the rights of
wonting people. Partisan detachments were then for¬
med in different ways, and so the majority of partisan
companies developed from illegal or combat groups,
or were formed in such a way that a group of partisans
given the task to form a new detachment in another
area was separated from the core of an individual
partisan company. Field support to partisan units and
their logistic support was provided by the Liberation
Front field committees.
À
"trojka"
was the smallest unit in the partisan
army or brigade. It was composed of three partisans:
the
trojka
leader and two
trojka
members. The leader
was the partisan who showed the greatest competen¬
ce; he led and commanded the
trojka.
The
trojka
members fought, guarded, and patrolled together or,
together, deployed each other for tasks. A platoon was
composed of four trojkas and contained
12
partisans;
317
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
a trojka
was commanded by a sergeant who was also its Pl member. One of the
trojka
leaders or members was a political delegate. A company was the basic partisan unit and
was commanded by a commander and a political commissioner. A company was compo¬
sed of three completely identical platoons and
a trojka
which supported the company.
The 3rd
trojka
in the 2nd platoon had a company medical orderly. This way, a company,
the basic characteristics of which were great mobility and simplicity of command, had
41
members. A battalion was composed of the battalion command and three companies.
Each partisan in a company was armed with a rifle, knife, and bombs, while the machi¬
ne gunner carried a machine gun and a pistol (handgun) instead of a rifle.
With the intention of intensifying the effectiveness of military operations, the 1st
(14*)
Division, the units of which were operating along the Ljubljana-Postojna railway
line, and the 2nd
(15*)
Division, which operated along the Ljubljana-Zidani Most-Zagreb
railway line, were established on
14
June
1943
by an order of the main staff of the Natio¬
nal Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia. With the surrender of Ita¬
ly and the proclamation of a general mobilisation to the National Liberation Army for
all men who were fit to fight, new brigades were formed within the formations of both
divisions. With this increase in divisions, the role of the main staff had to be enforced;
this is why the
7Љ
Corps of the National Liberation Army and the partisan detachment
in Yugoslavia, whose missions were to operate in the Dolenjska and Notranjska regions,
and, in December, the 9lh Corps with the
ЗІ61
Brigade (the
Triglav
Brigade) and the
30*
Brigade (the
Gorica
Brigade), whose missions were to operate in the Gorenjska and
Primorska
regions, were established as interim bodies of the division and main staff.
This formation was done with the preliminary approval of the supreme commander of
the National Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Yugoslavia. Through this
process, at the end of
1943,
the Slovenian Liberation Army introduced a regime that re¬
mained unchanged until the end of the war and was arranged in the following order: the
main staff, which was responsible for the operation of two corps and the
4*
(Staiermark)
operational zone that was composed of five divisions and a number of independent bri¬
gades, detachments and battalions.
The command function was performed by the commander, who represented the
unit and was responsible for its effectiveness, order, discipline, task performance, and
the implementation of measures to improve conditions and the effectiveness of the unit.
All of these tasks had to be carried out with the political commissioner's agreement. The
operational function, which meant the design of operations, intelligence, connections,
armament, ammunition and food supply, the deployment of units, movements, pro¬
ducing and receiving messages, command design, plans, sketches, photographs, and all
technical work, was performed by the chief-of-staff and the officers responsible for ope¬
rations. This represented the most important staff work, because the battle efficiency of
a unit depended upon a project being correctly performed.
Upon the surrender of Italy and the establishment of the
Jadransko primorje
ope¬
rational zone, which also included the Ljubljana region, the German military re-organi¬
sed the occupied area and established new subsidiary military police formations. At the
same time, the Slovenian counter-revolutionary side searched for solutions as to how to
establish an "army which would be composed of Slovenians only". Eventually, General
Erwin Rösener
was responsible for its organisation and, after that, with a special decree,
also named the supreme commander of the Slovenian Home Guard. From mid-October
1943,
the so-called organisational staff (in German: "Organisalionstab
für die Aufstel¬
lung des Slowenischen Landeswehr") was
established as the head of the Slovenian Home
Guard. The name of the staff itself reveals its non-commanding nature. As early as
30
September
1943, Rösener
established a special directing staff
{"Führungsstab für
Вап-
318
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
denbekämpfiing") in
his area of command, and on
26
October he formed a special staff
for the recruitment and deployment of Slovenian home guards
{"Organisationsstab für
die
Auf Stellung der slowenischen Landeswehr beim Höheren SS und Polizeiführer in Lai¬
bach'),
with an added statement which said that this one, too, would be a federal staff.
The main tasks of the organisational staff and units of the Slovenian Home Gu¬
ard were "recruitment, deployment, training, equipment, and supply" of the Slovenian
Home Guard. In order to perform tasks outside of this framework, units had to get
special approval from the staff. But when the home guard units were included in battle
intervention or deployed to positions outside a bunker line, they were subjected to the
German staff for command over the battle against the bandits. Thus, the structure of
the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard did not include one of the most
important sections of the staff of any army or army unit, and that is the section for
operational requirements. Those kind of matters were, as far as the Slovenian Home
Guard was concerned, indisputably and completely in the hands of the Germans. Since
there were instances of quarrels between German and home guard officers as to who
was superior to whom, the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard issued a
special order which stated: "When a German officer has been ordered to perform a task,
the command is in his hands and our officers must follow his orders. It is a matter of intel¬
lect and prudence on the part of our officers to operate in such a manner that they don't
compromise their authority in the eyes of their subordinates".
With the intention of training soldiers and senior personnel in the Slovenian
Home Guard to familiarise them with German tactics and fighting strategy, all officers
and NCOs, especially those who "distinguished" themselves in the fight against the parti¬
sans, had to attend a special course led by German instructors. After they had completed
the course, all participants returned to their units and passed on the knowledge they
had obtained to the soldiers who had already been deployed to units or to those who
were to be redeployed.
The basic closed military unit in the Slovenian Home Guard was a company,
which was formed in the following way: a captain, the company commander; three other
officers, two of whom were first or second lieutenants and one a staff sergeant major; a
company sergeant; a pay sergeant; home guard members (a clerk, a tailor, a shoemaker,
two cooks, a medical orderly, a trumpeter, three orderlies and an armourer); a sergeant
who was the head of the company staff, a quarter master sergeant, as well as a corporal
and a "commissioner".
A company consisted of three platoons, and each platoon was comprised of four
squads of ten soldiers
("desetina");
each
"desetina"
had a sergeant, a corporal, a machi¬
ne gun crew composed of a corporal and two home guards as well as six riflemen (five
of whom were home guards and one of them a corporal). A platoon also had three gre¬
nadiers one a corporal and two home guards as well as home guards, two orderlies, one
medical orderly and a sergeant who was the head of the platoon staff. From the point
of view of its formation, a company was structured in the following way:
1
captain,
2
se¬
cond or first lieutenants,
1
staff sergeant major,
6
sergeants,
13
sergeants,
28
corporals,
and
110
home guards; this way, a home guard company numbered
161
men in total. The
armament of a company was the following:
127
rifles,
12
machine guns, and
3
mortars
as well as
6
horses and
3
carriages for ammunition, food and luggage. Individual compa¬
nies and platoons were assigned to German school officers who had the task to train the
units for all kinds of battle conditions in hills, against the "bandits". At the same time,
the Slovenian unit commanders were also responsible for conducting this task.
With a new military formation in the Ljubljana province, on
16
May
1944,
the
units of the Slovenian Home Guard were deployed as teams into individual strongholds
319
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
and four home guard offensive battalions were established; those battalions were rena¬
med the Ist, IP"1, IIIrd, and IVth Battalions and were formed into two groups: the Schumac¬
her group (Is1, III"1, and IVth Battalions) and the Rupnik group (IIій1 Battalion). Battalions
were formed out of three infantry and rifle companies and one heavy company and were
commanded by Slovenian Home Guard officers who, however, had a German officer
assigned to them, with the exception of those who were listed under a question-mark
instead of a German officer's name.
In June
1944,
the following formations were operating in the Slovenian Home
Guard: the organisational staff, training command, train command, orchestra com¬
mand, home guard control command, Is' and 2nd school companies, 1st working com¬
pany, and
54
regular rifle companies which were mainly garrison companies in indivi¬
dual strongholds of the Slovenian Home Guard, and four manoeuvre battalions. On
15
March
1944,
the Slovenian Home Guard consisted of
9213
men in total,
256
of whom
were officers,
930
NCOs,
528
senior NCOs, and
7,489
home guards.
Partisan tactics or partisan combat strategies were based on the constant fighting
activity of the units, so the attack was a basic fighting strategy. Uninterrupted withdra¬
wals from action; night actions; surprising the enemy with sudden attacks, ambushes,
infiltrations, and sabotage; secret marches; and operating in any kind of terrain or
weather conditions were also the trademark of partisan tactics. With this wide a range
and originality in implementation, partisan tactics actually presented the antithesis to
the classical rules of military action. Partisan units operated in an original, bold, and
quick manner; with violent strikes, skilful attacks and retreats, and the courage of their
fighters and their superiors, they neutralised the enemy's numerical and technical do¬
minance.
On the other hand, broad thinking in the organisation and operation of the Slo¬
venian anti-partisan army was really only proven reliable in the area of strongholds and
swift mobile unit formation which used partisan combat strategies when fighting parti¬
sans. The Slovenian Home Guard was just in the initial phase of establishing itself as a
police/military formation and had not been granted permission by the Germans for its
own offensive actions, especially not on such a wide scale and sometimes, only in such a
way that they would not be included in anti-partisan offensives at all. It also did not take
into consideration the partisan army operation strategy, since it expected the partisans
to mostly withdraw from action and finally to flee because of enemy supremacy.
The theoretical provisions for the operation of Slovenian Home Guard units
were defined in the Principles of Home Guard Tactics, designed in the fall of
1944,
and
which served as the basis for setting goals, ways and focal points for the units' activities.
An introduction to the Principles of Home Guard Tactics defines the basic principles
of general tactics, which are also applicable to a guerrilla fighting strategy where initi¬
ative is the most important component, yet which was, until then, implemented only by
partisans. That is why for the future tasks, home guard units were ordered to perform
offensives, attack activities, and "izpadi" (surprise attacks performed by Home Guards
by breaking out of their strongholds and attacking the partisans) in case those were con¬
ducted in the defence framework, with a special emphasis on morale, which, in a fight
and with the help of weapons, means a unit cannot be defeated.
The home guard tactics alone were defined by taking into consideration the
type of enemy they were fighting. In a fight against the "terrain", intelligence and co-
unterintelligence work were very important, as well as the establishment of their own
intelligence network in areas where there were no permanent home guard strongholds.
Units with permanent strongholds and tactical units, which operated in a wider area,
fought against partisan units.
320
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojske
_.
The importance of permanent units lay in the constant deterrence of partisan
attacks on residential settlements which served as a base for shock troops at the time
of battles against the partisans. Their strength and constant control over the territory
or the area were important; the control task was conducted by dispatching patrols and
laying ambushes. It was important to have a well organised monitoring and intelligence
service which protected units from sudden partisan attacks. Special attention had to be
given to cooperation with the neighbouring home guard strongholds and their constant
connection and support during partisan attacks on strongholds. Slovenian Home Guard
assault troops had to constantly take offensive actions, especially when under attack.
In doing this, they had to take advantage of mistakes made by the partisans, cooperate
as consistently as possible, and constantly take the initiative in battlefield actions and
impose their fighting strategy on the partisans.
Except for the efficient function or implementation of the prescribed function
technique, both formations needed well-trained and combat-efficient command person¬
nel. At the beginning of their operations during WW II, the home guard and partisans
recruited command personnel for their military education from the same sources. The¬
se were experienced, former active duty and reserve officers and NCOs from the Royal
Yugoslav Army who had not been interned. With both armies increasing in size, service
members without the appropriate training backgrounds had to be recruited. So that
both opposing forces could operate efficiently, it was necessary to establish systematic
military training for combatants, home guard forces, partisans and, in particular, their
commanding officers. Initially, the training consisted of short courses; however, these
did not provide the necessary expertise and skills an individual needed to efficiently
command units. The release of a large number of former Yugoslav officers and NCOs
from Italian camps and their integration into home guard and partisan units contribu¬
ted to an increase in military training and its quality. At the beginning, partisan service
members had to become familiar with partisan warfare methods, and home guards had
to become familiar with anti-partisan warfare methods. The required expertise was quic¬
kly acquired and, therefore, both groups had instructors and relevant
NCO
and officer
training authorities at their disposal.
Soon after its establishment on
26
October
1943,
the Slovenian Home Guard
began organised training for its service members, in particular its senior officers. The
main purpose of the
NCO
and officer training, as well as that of other courses which
were provided by the Education Group of the Slovenian Home Guard Organisational
Staff, was to standardise the military expertise acquired by the Slovenian home guards
in the army or in the organisation which they had been members of before joining the
Slovenian Home Guard. Their expertise had to conform to the requirements derived
from the mission of the Slovenian Home Guard and their service members, depending
on the hierarchical duty applied in the police and military organisations and on the
situation in the entire Slovenian Home Guard which was part of the unit commanded
by the German
SS
and Police General
Rösener.
The most significant training elements
were, therefore, familiarisation with and die handling of weapons, combat training,
and familiarisation with and training in anti-guerrilla and anti-partisan tactics. After
completing the course, the participants in the
NCO
and officer training courses had to
apply their recently acquired expertise as commanding officers or NCOs to real combat
situations. Thus trained and having demonstrated their skills, newly commissioned or
promoted Slovenian Home Guard officers joined their comrades in arms who had acqui¬
red their military expertise during peacetime at military schools for active and reserve
forces. Thus, they joined home guard units, in particular companies, in the fight against
partisan units.
321
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
Regardless of all the restraints, in particular the German supervision as well as
the German determination of the content and purpose of training, the Slovenian Home
Guard succeeded in planning, organising and implementing officer and
NCO
training.
In this manner, despite the war and all the disagreements within the leadership of the
Slovenian counter-revolution, they managed to lay the groundwork for the possible
future development of training for NCOs and
COs
in the Slovenian Home Guard and
Slovenian National Army respectively.
Due to the less than favourable conditions during the establishment of the par¬
tisan military schools, the first school didn't start to operate until
1943.
The military
schools of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment in Slovenia were,
soon after their establishment, united under one name as the Officer School. Soon af¬
terwards, an
NCO
training school, a political school, and other schools were established.
Thus, in the first half of
1944,
the necessary schools were available for the training of
partisan officers and NCOs from various branches and services. The conditions under
which these schools operated were adverse. Due to hostile acts, they had to interrupt
their classes and participate in fights. Since the conditions were unfavourable, some of
the schools had to be closed although they were very significant to the development of
the partisan movement. During a period of intensive training, the main emphasis was
on familiarisation with the weapons and tactics of partisan units. Personnel require¬
ments, the organisational improvement of units, the establishment of new branches
and services and the improvement of weapons and their tactical operation required the
gradual improvement of the training programs. Good co-operation of all branches and
services of the partisan army was possible only if the senior commanding officers were
well trained not only in the lmowledge of their own branches but also in the lmowledge
of other branches and services in the partisan army. At the end of the war, the partisan
army was well-organised.
In making a comparative analysis of the officer training of the two opposing
sides, we can conclude that, besides the differences which derived from the goals and
purposes of both formations, there were also similarities. On both sides, NCOs who
had already had combat experience yet were not familiar with the appropriate military
expertise for the post they had been deployed to, or fighters (partisans and home guards
who, during fights, had proven themselves to be capable of commanding smaller units)
participated in
NCO
training courses. In this way, both commanders and headquarters
deployed non-commissioned officers and regular fighters to
NCO
training courses. The
curriculum for both courses was based on tactics
-
lessons in fighting or army service
when fighting
-
and becoming familiar with one's own as well as the enemy's weapons.
Due to the short time available for training, which was additionally shortened or inter¬
rupted by fighting and preparations for fighting, the training was very intensive and was
based on practical lessons, particularly on handling partisan or anti-partisan tactics,
which was equally important on both sides.
Trainers and commanders doing the training were mostly former Yugoslavian
officers and NCOs who had joined one of the formations; on the home guard side, there
were also German officers and NCOs, while on the partisan side, there were also senior
partisan leaders who had effectively performed various tasks and showed talent for
educational work and lecturing and had professional lmowledge yet no broad military
education. Teaching aids, especially lecture notes on the home guard side, were mostly
translations of German and former Yugoslavian lecture notes, whereas on the partisan
side, there were almost no teaching aids or lecture notes specifically addressing
NCO
training available, except for weapons, so they used those designed for officer training.
At the end of training, the participants were trained to be corporals and sergeants. But
322
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojske
because of the span of the formation and training on the entire Slovenian territory,
there were by far more officers trained in partisan units than in the home guard. In this
way, in partisan military schools, there were all together
1807
trainees trained in schools
for lower command personnel and NCOs, while in the home guard
NCO
course, there
were
433
trainees or future terrain NCOs of the National Liberation Army and partisan
detachment in Slovenia, and of the Slovenian Home Guard.
As with the
NCO
training, similarities can, to a certain extent, also be seen when
making a comparison between officer training in the Slovenian Home Guard and officer
training that was carried out in the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment
in Slovenia. Training for officers was, in both formations, centralised, because registrati¬
on requirements, selection instructions and the selection of candidates themselves were
conducted by the main staff of the Slovenian Liberation Army, the partisan detachment
in Slovenia and the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard.
Enlistment requirements were more precisely defined in the home guard, espe¬
cially those regarding education requirements, yet candidates in both formations had
to prove themselves in combat and show leadership and command competence prior
to their entry in a course. Those members who already had officer ranks and needed
to adopt their military knowledge to the newly-arisen situation, or partisans and home
guards with
NCO
ranks or those who did not have
NCO
ranks but had been recommen¬
ded by their superiors as suitable for the future position of officers, were deployed to
courses.
Training in both formations was based on lessons in tactics and armament and,
in the Slovenian Home Guard, also on general subjects. In both formations, the trainers
were former Yugoslavian officers and NCOs; in die Slovenian Home Guard, German
officers and NCOs as well as civilian lecturers had an important role in training future
officers, while in partisan units trainers were those partisans who had experience in
fighting and those who had obtained their military knowledge at the National Libera¬
tion Army school for officers and the partisan detachment in Slovenia. Teaching aids
on one side, which were mostly lecture notes, were issued by the school section which
operated within the framework of the Slovenian Home Guard Organisational Staff scho¬
ol group; these were mainly translations of German and Yugoslavian lecture notes and
rules. On the other side, lecture notes were edited by the science section of the main
staff of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment in Slovenia and, later,
also the schools for officers of the National Liberation Army and partisan detachment
in Slovenia; those lecture notes were initially written by the lecturers.
At the end of a course, the participants took exams and, based on the grades they
achieved, they were trained to be platoon or company sergeants and then deployed to
the units they had originated from; in the Slovenian Home Guard, there was a general
practice of deploying them to other units. In this way, the school for officers in the Na¬
tional Liberation Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia trained
520
infantry
officers, while the course for officers in the Slovenian Home Guard produced
132
infan¬
try officers, bearing in mind the fact that officer training of the Slovenian Home Guard
was, in
1945,
transferred to the German
SS
school for NCOs and was no longer carried
out within the formation of the Slovenian Home Guard. An important part of
NCO
and
officer training in both formations was ideological or political education.
In order to conduct this kind of operation successfully, information about the
enemy was of crucial importance.
In order to establish the proper work of the home guard's own intelligence ser¬
vice, it was important to get familiar with the enemy's: courier and intelligence service,
position of unit staffs, the commands of places and districts, hospitals, airports, perma-
323
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
nent
military bases, military schools, the organisation of connections, the procedures
for partisan territory supply, morale among civilians, and the tactical protection of units
and liberated territories. As equally important as gathering information on the enemy
was the establishment of counter-intelligence activities for the protection of their own
units and commands as well as individual Slovenian home guards against enemy pro¬
paganda and intelligence activities.
Given the situation in the field, the Slovenian Home Guard had to protect the
territory they were already supposed to be in control of; this was the territory on the
Grosuplje
-
Velike Lašče
-
Borovnica
-
Rakek
-
Rovte
-
Polhov
Gradec
-
Ježića
-
Polje
line. Home guards were supposed to destroy partisan network terrain operations in this
territory and capture every courier who tried to get in or out of Ljubljana. This territory
was also supposed to serve as an operational base for further tactical work.
With insurance measures for individual strongholds, home guards, at the same
time, wanted to establish protection against sabotage and a partisan attack. In order
to decrease the number of soldiers needed in a stronghold, it was necessary to conduct
a range of technical measures for its protection, measures such as preventing access
with wired obstacles, mines, alarm devices and lighting as well as the construction of a
trench system. It was necessary to clean the territory around their stronghold, within
optimum reach and, in this way, create a surveyable and clear area in an obstacle zone
and in front of them. The teams, however, had to be "trained as a well-oiled machine".
Every commander had to "deploy his own personnel", who had to provide intelligence
information, clear the area around their stronghold of all "suspicious elements", get in
contact with neighbouring commanders and organise a chase in the clearance area.
Effective or ineffective defence and attacks on individual fortified strongholds
of the Slovenian Home Guard were analysed by the defending as well as the attacking
parties.
The defenders recorded that the partisans implemented the tactics of being as
mobile as possible and that they attacked the main spot with their full power, destroyed
the enemy, and then, when the enemy was starting to receive help from the outside, they
moved to another spot where the enemy was weaker. The partisans had good connecti¬
ons; they set up strong ambushes all around the vicinity of a stronghold and they had
better weapons and more of them. During a siege, the team itself constantly carried out
"izpadi", since they were of the opinion that a bunker fight against the partisans would
not bring the hoped for success and that it was necessary to establish the home guard
operation in such a way that all the men would be organized into groups which would be
given good leadership, and then they could strike the partisans together, first of all the
spots which were the most important as, for instance, the partisan staff location.
The attackers (the partisans) recorded the following: the time available for orga¬
nising actions was often too short, so they were unable to set up weapons, and they
could not carry out a swift or sudden break into a stronghold; this was due particularly
to inaccurate information provided by their intelligence; no connection between indivi¬
dual attacking forces, units and types was established; the ratio between the attacking
forces and those of the defenders was disadvantageous for the attacker because both
had approximately the same number of forces; therefore, it wasn't possible to establish
a blocking position on a stronghold, so the enemy took advantage of the situation and
carried out "izpadi" from it; there was no clear, serious attempt to attack and destroy a
stronghold; it was evident that the infantry was not sufficiently trained, and this became
even more obvious during an attack because fighters used only natural shelters not arti¬
ficial ones; a break through enemy lines was always carried out at the same spot and the
results of these were not used and, after an unsuccessful breakthrough, the units always
324
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
went back to their initial positions; the use of fire from infantry weapons, especially au¬
tomatic ones, wasn't efficient, because the concentric fire from the machine guns wasn't
constantly directed on the bunkers; unit staffs did not have precisely selected command
spots which caused difficulties when delivering messages and establishing connections
between command spots.
When fighting the partisans, the enemy used two fighting strategies, two tactics.
The enemy reacted to the offensive activities by the larger partisan units with
a greater concentration of infantry forces; these forces were supported by mechanised
units which saw action before the infantry units. At the same time, the infantry units
attacked in accordance with the tactical rules of a regular army, because before an
infantry attack, gun and mortar attacks were regularly carried out. Then followed the
infantry units, which were, as the rifle formations prepared to fire, approaching the par¬
tisan unit positions and carrying out the assault. At night, the enemy wasn't carrying out
attacks; on the contrary, even without a partisan counterattack, they left the positions
they had taken during the day, stopped and fortified themselves at hill reefs around a vil¬
lage. During attacks, the enemy burned down only the buildings near a village; the fire
lit the surrounding area during the night. During partisan attacks at night, the enemy
let the partisans approach them as closely as possible
(20
or
30
metres) and then opened
fire using all the light armament they had. Even though the enemy outnumbered the
partisans, they never tried to surround the partisan units. The enemy employed regular
army tactics during the times its units were composed mostly of German units which
outnumbered the partisans.
Another fighting strategy was employed mostly by the battalions of the Slovenian
Home Guard, which implemented secret movements in the woods, for which they used
good guides who knew the territory very well and could lead the units down the paths or
bypass them. A smaller column was usually on the move down a road with the intention
of fooling partisan staffs and engaging units responsible for their destruction, while the
majority of the column had already split off and continued to move to their final desti¬
nation. In this way, they employed the tactics of parallel, relatively quick moving units,
each of which moved in its own direction and finally merged into a large group before
they reached their final destination. Battalions usually returned to their strongholds on
the same path yet often they went to another stronghold and went back to their base
after they had taken a rest. During an attack, they employed the strategies of surprise
and quick action. First, they would enclose an area on two sides and then hit the target
with the main force while, at the same time, they moved some of the soldiers in the di¬
rection they expected the partisans to retreat to. The attack was prepared with heavy fire
from all kinds of weapons, especially mortars, and there was lots of shouting designed
to cause panic. They stayed in the attack spot only for a short time and as soon as they
sensed major danger from the partisan side they changed the strategy from attack to
retreat. Prior to a battle, they had already set up ambushes, masked machine gun po¬
sitions and rear columns in the direction of the retreat with the intention of surprising
the partisan fighters and hitting them from behind. They also set up ambushes in the
direction of the expected partisan attack. During attacks, they employed various tricks.
For instance, the whole force was not dressed in the same type of clothes; some of them
were dressed in German and home guard uniforms, some of them in civilian clothes;
all of this was done with the intention of creating the impression of a partisan column.
They were mostly bareheaded or wore "Titovka". They attempted to trick the guards
by telling them not to open fire and, in that way, they could approach the guards and
then kill them. All these actions were risky and did not exclude the possibility that the
partisan units might completely destroy them.
325
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
With the enemy's new fighting strategy, the partisan units faced a new military
challenge they had not yet faced in previous fights, and so they had a response to ene¬
my activities only for the first type of tactics. For the guerrilla fighting strategy of the
enemy, the partisan units had no proper or effective response. Their response was: "it
is a bit strange, because our fighters and we, the partisans, first employed these fighting
tactics which are now being used by the enemy and are a reflection of his weakness". The
partisan tactics had not changed much during the whole period of fighting and, thus,
they had not adapted to the enemy's new fighting strategy. Up until then, die partisan
army had been talcing the initiative and constantly attacking, while the enemy had been
forced to defend itself in its fortified strongholds and respond to the partisan actions.
If the partisans wanted to avoid the consequences of their own passiveness, they had to
either start a general offensive, thus bending the enemy's activity to their own will, or
adapt their fighting strategy to that of the enemy's. Starting a general offensive did not
depend upon a local but a general strategic situation which, however, did not prevent
them from being more active in the individual fields of their activity and, in this way,
they imposed their will upon the enemy. Therefore, adapting the tactics was entirely in
the hands of the partisan units whose staffs had to act according to the rule: "Whoever
wants to surprise someone has to be prepared to be surprised himself.
"
The partisans had
started to ignore this rule and for that reason the enemy became bolder and started to
"agitate" the partisan army more and more.
With the intention of preventing this kind of enemy activity which caused great
losses to partisan units, the partisan units, above all, had to implement measures for the
destruction of the enemy's intelligence network. With this, they also had to employ "dra-
conian measures in the sense of collective punishment for civilians who were sympathising
with the home guards, such as deporting their families, etc.
".
As another measure, it was
necessary to establish their own civilian intelligence network which would immediately
send information about the enemy's departure from a stronghold and his intentions.
Among the other measures were the following: they had to send secret, specialised pa¬
trols to the vicinity of strongholds; they had to increase the secrecy of activities and se¬
curity in combat service support units; and the brigades had to concentrate on following
and destroying the enemy's columns.
In the partisan army as well as in the Slovenian Home Guard, commanders were
faced with the problem of insufficiently trained personnel, changes to the formation of
their forces, and changes in the way military operations were implemented; all of these
factors influenced success in the actions the formations led against each other on the
battlefield. One solution to these problems was to make changes in the training techni¬
ques for the soldiers, whether partisans or home guards, and to provide higher quality
training for officers and NCOs.
Changes in individual courses were implemented through inspections which were
carried out by superior commands during training and examinations as well as through
the exchange of literature and analyses of individual military battles between the Offi¬
cers School, the Training Command, and fighting units of their own formations.
Operational sections and officers of the main staff, corps, operational zones and
divisions were responsible for the connections between the units and military schools
and the transfer of experiences gained by partisan units in fights against the enemy and
which were subsequently introduced to the training programmes of the officer and
NCO
courses of the partisan army. In this way, they had to pay attention to the constant influx
of information on new German tactics and forward it to the schools for the officers and
NCOs who were responsible within the framework of the command over their units.
In the same way, they had to have constant contact with the schools and control over
326
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
examination procedures; this also helped them get to know future command personnel.
Operational officers also had to prepare studies of individual actions and fights carried
out by their units, studies which were based on data from those actions and fights and
would serve as the basis for changes implemented in units or commanding personnel.
In its regular orders, the organisational staff of the Slovenian Home Guard also
presented the topical "situation with the bandits
",
where they presented information on
the organisation of partisan units in individual territories and their fighting strategy as
provided by the intelligence service; on this basis, it gave orders and countermeasure
instructions to home guard units, in particular very detailed instructions on fighting
strategies to be used against partisan units in individual cases, and orders on constant
training in this area for all units, especially courses for officers and NCOs in the Slove¬
nian Home Guard.
In schools, they encouraged instructors to spend less time presenting theoretical
knowledge, which was related primarily to the action principles that were employed
in a regular army and not adapted to the specialities of operations and the needs of
individual formations; instructors were encouraged, because of the great amount of
subject matter material and the short training time available, to extract the gist of the
knowledge required for a good sergeant, commander or commandant and to pay atten¬
tion to the minimal school education the participants had and the fact that, during the
training, more attention needed to be given to the practical part of the training so that
the participants could relate to it more easily, memorize it more easily, and make better
use of it later when performing their duties as commanders.
During the short training time in the schools, lecturers had to train the trainees
as well as possible so that they could immediately return to their units, prepared to take
over the command and efficiently lead a unit in a battle against the enemy. This task
could be implemented only if the training itself was related as closely as possible to the
actual situation on the battlefield, which meant that the future commanders of units
in both formations had to perform command duties during their training as often as
possible. Due to the conditions under which the training was implemented, they could
not perform this in "real-life units", so training for future commanders was carried out
primarily on a theoretical basis
-
in the form of solving tactical tasks.
It was especially important that the best officers and NCOs from battle units were
deployed as training instructors, especially those who were experienced lecturers and
had experience in fighting strategies, because most lecturers before that had used the
know-how they had obtained when lecturing at Yugoslavian military academies and had
neither knowledge nor experience in partisan fighting strategies.
The answer to the established deficiencies in the knowledge of higher-ranking
officer personnel in the partisan army was the establishment of a course for officers
of higher ranks in the schools for officers at the General Staff of the National Libera¬
tion Army and the partisan detachment in Slovenia, with the intention of training and
"educating" officers of higher rank to lead battalions, brigades and divisions in combat.
After successfully completing training, the most competent trainees were trained as bri¬
gade commandants or even division commandants; those who had achieved good grades
were trained to become battalion commandants and underachieving students company
commanders.
It also happened that the commanders of individual partisan and home guard
units blamed the ineffective training of officers and NCOs for failures in fights against
the enemy which contributed to losses of their own personnel. The commanders belie¬
ved that in order to achieve more success in battles, they should deploy to courses those
soldiers who had greater intellectual and physical competence and those who had alrea-
327
Slovenska
partizanska
in
domobranska vojska
dy
performed command duties yet had not participated in appropriate military training,
because leadership also required knowledge which corresponded to the position and, in
the cases when they had no knowledge, it was impossible to expect good leadership.
The final goal of both opposing military formations in WWII in Slovenia was the
establishment of a Slovenian army, but it was created and it operated under different
circumstances and under different conditions just as new candidates for officers and
NCOs were trained under different conditions and circumstances; however, in spite of
the insurmountable differences between them and the hatred which members of both
formations showed towards each other, we can also identify some mutual characteristics
in both military school systems. They both contributed to the fact that the prior military
knowledge of the NCOs and officers of both formations was first harmonised and then
adapted to the fighting strategies employed by the two formations which then began to
train new NCOs and officers who contributed to the growth of both formations. In this,
Љеу
kept close connections and exchanged knowledge and experience in fights with
the enemy and implemented them in new ways and training programmes, all of which
contributed to success on the battlefield.
328 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Kladnik, Tomaž |
| author_GND | (DE-588)136741649 |
| author_facet | Kladnik, Tomaž |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Kladnik, Tomaž |
| author_variant | t k tk |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035147951 |
| callnumber-first | D - World History |
| callnumber-label | D802 |
| callnumber-raw | D802.S67 |
| callnumber-search | D802.S67 |
| callnumber-sort | D 3802 S67 |
| callnumber-subject | D - General History |
| classification_rvk | NQ 2665 NQ 4640 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)263064417 (DE-599)BVBBV035147951 |
| discipline | Geschichte |
| discipline_str_mv | Geschichte |
| era | Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1941-1945 |
| format | Book |
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| geographic_facet | Slovenia / History, Military Slovenia History, Military Slowenien |
| id | DE-604.BV035147951 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:29:33Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:23:23Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | Slovenian |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016815238 |
| oclc_num | 263064417 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-12 DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | 344 S. Ill. |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | Muzej Novejše Zgodovine Slovenije |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina |
| series2 | Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina |
| spelling | Kladnik, Tomaž Verfasser (DE-588)136741649 aut Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne Tomaž Kladnik Ljubljana Muzej Novejše Zgodovine Slovenije 2006 344 S. Ill. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina 1 Zsfassung in engl. Sprache Geschichte 1941-1945 gnd rswk-swf World War, 1939-1945 / Underground movements / Slovenia Military art and science / Slovenia Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Military art and science Slovenia World War, 1939-1945 Underground movements Slovenia Paramilitärischer Verband (DE-588)4192344-3 gnd rswk-swf Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd rswk-swf Slovenia / History, Military Slovenia History, Military Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 gnd rswk-swf Slowenien (DE-588)4055302-4 g Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 s Paramilitärischer Verband (DE-588)4192344-3 s Geschichte 1941-1945 z DE-604 Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina 1 (DE-604)BV035147927 1 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016815238&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016815238&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Kladnik, Tomaž Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne Zbirka Slovenska vojaška zgodovina World War, 1939-1945 / Underground movements / Slovenia Military art and science / Slovenia Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Military art and science Slovenia World War, 1939-1945 Underground movements Slovenia Paramilitärischer Verband (DE-588)4192344-3 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4192344-3 (DE-588)4079167-1 (DE-588)4055302-4 |
| title | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |
| title_auth | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |
| title_exact_search | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |
| title_full | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne Tomaž Kladnik |
| title_fullStr | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne Tomaž Kladnik |
| title_full_unstemmed | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne Tomaž Kladnik |
| title_short | Slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska |
| title_sort | slovenska partizanska in domobranska vojska od ustanovitve do konca 2 svetovne vojne |
| title_sub | od ustanovitve do konca 2. svetovne vojne |
| topic | World War, 1939-1945 / Underground movements / Slovenia Military art and science / Slovenia Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Military art and science Slovenia World War, 1939-1945 Underground movements Slovenia Paramilitärischer Verband (DE-588)4192344-3 gnd Zweiter Weltkrieg (DE-588)4079167-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | World War, 1939-1945 / Underground movements / Slovenia Military art and science / Slovenia Weltkrieg (1939-1945) Military art and science Slovenia World War, 1939-1945 Underground movements Slovenia Paramilitärischer Verband Zweiter Weltkrieg Slovenia / History, Military Slovenia History, Military Slowenien |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016815238&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016815238&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV035147927 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kladniktomaz slovenskapartizanskaindomobranskavojskaodustanovitvedokonca2svetovnevojne |