Games, strategies and decision making:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Worth
2009
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. print. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | Getr. Zählung Ill., graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780716766308 0716766302 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Harrington, Joseph Emmett |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132332752 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Games, strategies and decision making |c Joseph E. Harrington |
| 250 | |a 1. print. | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a New York, NY |b Worth |c 2009 | |
| 300 | |a Getr. Zählung |b Ill., graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics, Mathematical | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making / Mathematics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Strategic planning / Mathematics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Mathematik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Decision making |x Mathematics | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Economics, Mathematical | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Game theory | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Strategic planning |x Mathematics | |
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| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Statistische Entscheidungstheorie |0 (DE-588)4077850-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138052623269888 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | BRIEF CONTENTS PREFACE XV CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING
1 CHAPTER 2 BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17 CHAPTER 3
ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 55 CHAPTER 4 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES
WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS 89 CHAPTER 5 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN
DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 CHAPTER 6 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN
CONTINUOUS GAMES ...147 CHAPTER 7 KEEP EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED
STRATEGIES 1 SI CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT
INFORMATION 219 CHAPTER 9 TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES
WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 VII CHAPTER 10 I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON T
KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 CHAPTER 11 WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME
WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES 325 CHAPTER 12 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS
THAT TELL THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 CHAPTER 13 PLAYING FOREVER:
REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391 CHAPTER 14
COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH
INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 423 CHAPTER 15 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED
INSTITUTIONS 451 CHAPTER 16 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY:
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES 479 CHAPTER 17 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR
UNDERSTANDING QUESTIONS S-1 GLOSSARY G-1 INDEX 1-1 BRIEF CONTENTS VLIL
CONTENTS PREFACE XV CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING 1 1.1
WHO WANTS TO BE A GAME THEORIST? ... 1 1.2 A SAMPLING OF STRATEGIC
SITUATIONS 3 1.3 WHETTING YOUR APPETITE: THE GAME OF CONCENTRATION 5 1.4
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF A PLAYER 8 1.4.1 PREFERENCES 8 1.4.2 BELIEFS 11
1.4.3 HOW DO PLAYERS DIFFER? 12 1.5 PLAYING THE GENDER PRONOUN GAME...
13 REFERENCES 14 CHAPTER 2 BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17
2.1 INTRODUCTION 17 2.2 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: PERFECT INFORMATION 18
BASEBALL,! 21 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, I 22 HAGGLING AT AN
AUTO DEALERSHIP, I 24 2.3 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: IMPERFECT INFORMATION 27
MUGGING 29 US, COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 30 THE IRAQ WAR
AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ... 32 2.4 WHAT IS A STRATEGY? 34 2.5
STRATEGIC FORM GAMES 36 TOSCA 37 COMPETITION FOR ELECTED OFFICE 38 THE
SCIENCE 84 GAME 39 2.6 MOVING FROM THE EXTENSIVE FORM AND STRATEGIC FORM
39 BASEBALL, II 39 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, II 40 HAGGLING
AT AN AUTO DEALERSHIP, II 41 2.7 GOING FROM THE STRATEGIC FORM TO THE
EXTENSIVE FORM 42 2.8 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 43 2.9 A FEW MORE ISSUES IN
MODELING GAMES 45 SUMMARY 48 EXERCISES 49 REFERENCES 54 CHAPTER 3
ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 55 3.1 INTRODUCTION 55 3.2 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE
RATIONAL 56 3.2.1 STRICT DOMINANCE 56 WHITE FLIGHT AND RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 59 BANNING CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION 60
3.2.2 WEAK DOMINANCE 64 BIDDING AT AN AUCTION 64 THE PROXY BID PARADOX
AT EBAY 66 3.3 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL AND PLAYERS KNOW
THAT PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL 68 TEAM-PROJECT GAME 68 IX EXISTENCE-OF-GOD
GAME 70 BOXED-PIGS GAME 71 3.4 SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 73 3.4.1 THE DOPING GAME: IS IT RATIONAL FOR ATHLETES TO USE
STEROIDS? 73 3.4.2 ITERATIVE DELETION OF STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES
76 SUMMARY 78 EXERCISES 79 3.5 APPENDIX: STRICT AND WEAK DOMINANCE 84
3.6 APPENDIX: RATIONAFIZABILITY (ADVANCED) 84 REFERENCES 87 CHAPTER 4
STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS
89 4.1 DEFINING NASH EQUILIBRIUM 89 4.2 CLASSIC TWO-PLAYER GAMES 92
PRISONERS DILEMMA 93 A COORDINATION GAME * DRIVING CONVENTIONS 95 A
GAME OF COORDINATION AND CONFLICT * TELEPHONE ,. 95 AN OUTGUESSING GAME
* ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS 97 CONFLICT AND MUTUAL INTEREST IN GAMES 99 4.3
THE BEST-REPLY METHOD 99 4.4 THREE-PLAYER GAMES 101 AMERICAN IDOL FANDOM
101 VOTING, SINCERE OR DEVIOUS? 102 PROMOTION AND SABOTAGE 706 4.5
FOUNDATIONS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM... 109 4.5.1 RELATIONSHIP TO RATIONALITY
IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 109 4.5.2 THE DEFINITION OF A STRATEGY, REVISITED
.110 SUMMARY 111 EXERCISES 112 4.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH
EQUILIBRIUM 116 REFERENCES , 116 CHAPTER 5 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA
IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 5.1 INTRODUCTION 117 5.2 SYMMETRIC GAMES
118 THE SNEETCHES 119 AIRLINE SECURITY 122 OPERATING SYSTEMS: MAC OR
WINDOWS? 125 APPLYING FOR AN INTERNSHIP 128 5.3 ASYMMETRIC GAMES 130
ENTRY INTO A MARKET 130 CIVIL UNREST 134 5.4 SELECTING AMONG NASH
EQUILIBRIA ... 137 SUMMARY 141 EXERCISES 141 REFERENCES 145 CHAPTER 6
STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES 147 6.1 INTRODUCTION
147 6.2 SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CALCULUS 148 PRICE
COMPETITION WITH IDENTICAL PRODUCTS 149 NEUTRALIZING PRICE COMPETITION
WITH PRICE-MATCHING GUARANTEES 152 COMPETING FOR ELECTED OFFICE 154 6.3
SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH CALCULUS (OPTIONAL) 157 PRICE
COMPETITION WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 160 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS *
THE EXTINCTION OF THE WOOLLY MAMMOTH 164 CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE POWER
OF MATCHING GRANTS 169 SUMMARY 174 EXERCISES 175 REFERENCES 179 X
CONTENTS CHAPTER 7 KEEP EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES IS-I 7.1
POLICE PATROLS AND THE DRUG TRADE 181 7.2 MAKING DECISIONS UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 182 7.2.1 PROBABILITY AND EXPECTATION 182 7.2.2 PREFERENCES
OVER UNCERTAIN OPTIONS ... 185 7.2.3 ORDINAL VS. CARDINAL PAYOFFS 186
7.3 MIXED STRATEGIES AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 187 7.3.1 BACK ON THE BEAT 187
7.3.2 SOME GENERAL PROPERTIES OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES
191 7.4 EXAMPLES 192 AVRANCHES GAP IN WORLD WAR II 193 ENTRY INTO A
MARKET 197 7.5 ADVANCED EXAMPLES 198 PENALTY KICK IN SOCCER 198 SLASH
EM UP: FRIDAY THE 13TH 201 BYSTANDER EFFECT 204 7.6 GAMES OF PURE
CONFLICT AND CAUTIOUS BEHAVIOR 207 SUMMARY 211 EXERCISES 212 7.7
APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES 215
REFERENCES 216 CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT
INFORMATION 219 8.1 INTRODUCTION 219 8.2 BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME
PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM ;. 221 8.3 EXAMPLES 225 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
225 ENRON AND PROSECUTORIAL PREROGATIVE 227 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND
SPORTS 229 8.4 WAITING GAMES: PREEMPTION AND ATTRITION 235 8.4.1
PREEMPTION ...236 8.4.2 WAR OF ATTRITION 238 8.5 DO PEOPLE REASON USING
BACKWARD INDUCTION? 239 8.5.1 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE AND BACKWARD
INDUCTION 239 8.5.2 A LOGICAL PARADOX WITH BACKWARD INDUCTION 242
SUMMARY 243 EXERCISES 244 REFERENCES 254 CHAPTER 9 TAKING TURNS IN THE
DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 9.1 INTRODUCTION
255 9.2 SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 257 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 260
9.3 EXAMPLES 263 OS/2 264 AGENDA CONTROL IN THE SENATE 268 9.4
COMMITMENT 270 9.4.1 DETERRENCE OF ENTRY 270 9.4.2 MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS
AND COMPETITION: EAST INDIA TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 277 SUMMARY
280 EXERCISES 281 REFERENCES 289 CONTENTS XI CHAPTER 10 I KNOW SOMETHING
YOU DON T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 10.1 INTRODUCTION 291
10.2 A GAME OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: THE MUNICH AGREEMENT ... 291 10.3
BAYESIAN GAMES AND BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 296 GUNFIGHT IN THE WILD WEST
298 10.4 WHEN ALL PLAYERS HAVE PRIVATE INFORMATION: AUCTIONS 301
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES AND SHADING YOUR BID 302 COMMON VALUE AND THE
WINNER S CURSE 304 10.5 VOTING ON COMMITTEES AND JURIES 307 10.5.1
STRATEGIC ABSTENTION 307 10.5.2 SEQUENTIAL VOTING IN THE JURY ROOM ...
309 SUMMARY 312 EXERCISES 313 10.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF
BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 318 10.7 APPENDIX: FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID
AUCTION WITH A CONTINUUM OF TYPES 319 10.7.1 INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES
319 10.7.2 COMMON VALUE 321 REFERENCES 323 CHAPTER 11 WHAT YOU DO TELLS
ME WHO YOU ARE; SIGNALING GAMES 325 11.1 INTRODUCTION 325 11.2 PERFECT
BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM ....326 MANAGEMENT TRAINEE ,. 329 11.3 EXAMPLES
333 LEMONS AND THE MARKET FOR USED CARS 333 COURTSHIP 337 BRINKMANSHIP
343 SUMMARY 346 EXERCISES 348 11.4 APPENDIX: BAYES S RULE AND UPDATING
BELIEFS 354 REFERENCES 357 CHAPTER 12 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL
THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 12.1 INTRODUCTION 359 12.2 COMMUNICATION IN A
GAME-THEORETIC WORLD 360 12.3 SIGNALING INFORMATION 363 DEFENSIVE
MEDICINE 363 STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 367 12.4 SIGNALING INTENTIONS 374
12.4.1 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THEORY 374 12.4.2 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION
IN PRACTICE.... 379 SUMMARY 381 EXERCISES 382 REFERENCES 388 CHAPTER 13
PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391
13.1 TRENCH WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I 391 13.2 CONSTRUCTING A REPEATED GAME
... 393 13.3 TRENCH WARFARE: FINITE HORIZON .... 398 13.4 TRENCH
WARFARE: INFINITE HORIZON 401 13.5 SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE
REPEATED PRISONERS DILEMMA ... 406 SUMMARY 410 EXERCISES 411 XII
CONTENTS 1 3.6 APPENDIX: PRESENT VALUE OF A PAYOFF STREAM 416 13.7
APPENDIX: DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 420 REFERENCES 422 CHAPTER 14 COOPERATION
AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY
LIVED PLAYERS 423 14.1 INTRODUCTION 423 14.2 A MENU OF PUNISHMENTS 424
14.2.1 PRICE-FIXING 424 14.2.2 TEMPORARY REVERSION TO MODERATE RATES 427
14.2.3 PRICE WARS: TEMPORARY REVERSION TO LOW RATES 428 14,2.4 A MORE
EQUITABLE PUNISHMENT 430 14.3 QUID-PRO-QUO 431 U.S, CONGRESS AND
PORK-BARREL SPENDING 431 VAMPIRE BATS AND RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 434 14.4
REPUTATION 437 LENDING TO KINGS 437 HENRY FORD AND THE $5 WORKDAY 439
14.5 IMPERFECT MONITORING AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES 441 SUMMARY 444
EXERCISES 445 REFERENCES 450 CHAPTER 15 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED
INSTITUTIONS 451 15.1 INTRODUCTION 451 15.2 COOPERATION WITH OVERLAPPING
GENERATIONS 452 TRIBAL DEFENSE 453 TAKING CARE OF YOUR ELDERLY PARENTS
456 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LAME-DUCK PRESIDENTS 458 15.3 COOPERATION IN A
LARGE POPULATION 463 EBAY 464 MEDIEVAL LAW MERCHANT 469 SUMMARY 473
EXERCISES 474 REFERENCES 478 CHAPTER 16 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND
BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGIES 479 16.1 INTRODUCING
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 479 16.2 HAWK-DOVE CONFLICT 481 16.3
EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY 484 STAYIN ALIVE ON A COWPAT 488 16.4
PROPERTIES OF AN ESS 491 SIDE-BLOTCHED LIZARDS 493 16.5 MULTIPOPULATION
GAMES 496 PARENTAL CARE 497 16.6 EVOLUTION OF SPITE 499 SUMMARY 501
EXERCISES 502 REFERENCES 505 CHAPTER 17 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND
BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 17.1 INTRODUCTION 507 17.2 REPLICATOR
DYNAMICS AND THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 508 17.3 GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE
REPLICATOR DYNAMIC 512 CONTENTS XIII 17.4 ESS AND ATTRACTORS OF THE
EXERCISES 530 REPLICATOR DYNAMSC 513 REFERENCES 532 17.5 EXAMPLES 515 .
**. , ., ... .... A U * R-.R- ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR UNDERSTANDING STAG
HUNT 515 A _ HANDEDNESS IN BASEBALL 517 Q UEST!ONS S 1 EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 521 GLOSSARY G-1 SUMMARY 529 INDEX 1-1
|
| adam_txt |
BRIEF CONTENTS PREFACE XV CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING
1 CHAPTER 2 BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17 CHAPTER 3
ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 55 CHAPTER 4 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES
WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS 89 CHAPTER 5 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN
DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 CHAPTER 6 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN
CONTINUOUS GAMES .147 CHAPTER 7 KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED
STRATEGIES 1 SI CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT
INFORMATION 219 CHAPTER 9 TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES
WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 VII CHAPTER 10 I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON'T
KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 CHAPTER 11 WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME
WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES 325 CHAPTER 12 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS
THAT TELL THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 CHAPTER 13 PLAYING FOREVER:
REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391 CHAPTER 14
COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH
INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 423 CHAPTER 15 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED
INSTITUTIONS 451 CHAPTER 16 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY:
EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES 479 CHAPTER 17 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 ANSWERS TO "CHECK YOUR
UNDERSTANDING" QUESTIONS S-1 GLOSSARY G-1 INDEX 1-1 BRIEF CONTENTS VLIL
CONTENTS PREFACE XV CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING 1 1.1
WHO WANTS TO BE A GAME THEORIST? . 1 1.2 A SAMPLING OF STRATEGIC
SITUATIONS 3 1.3 WHETTING YOUR APPETITE: THE GAME OF CONCENTRATION 5 1.4
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE OF A PLAYER 8 1.4.1 PREFERENCES 8 1.4.2 BELIEFS 11
1.4.3 HOW DO PLAYERS DIFFER? 12 1.5 PLAYING THE GENDER PRONOUN GAME.
13 REFERENCES 14 CHAPTER 2 BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION 17
2.1 INTRODUCTION 17 2.2 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: PERFECT INFORMATION 18
BASEBALL,! 21 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, I ' 22 HAGGLING AT AN
AUTO DEALERSHIP, I 24 2.3 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES: IMPERFECT INFORMATION 27
MUGGING 29 US, COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 30 THE IRAQ WAR
AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION . 32 2.4 WHAT IS A STRATEGY? 34 2.5
STRATEGIC FORM GAMES 36 TOSCA 37 COMPETITION FOR ELECTED OFFICE 38 THE
SCIENCE 84 GAME 39 2.6 MOVING FROM THE EXTENSIVE FORM AND STRATEGIC FORM
39 BASEBALL, II 39 GALILEO GALILEI AND THE INQUISITION, II 40 HAGGLING
AT AN AUTO DEALERSHIP, II 41 2.7 GOING FROM THE STRATEGIC FORM TO THE
EXTENSIVE FORM 42 2.8 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 43 2.9 A FEW MORE ISSUES IN
MODELING GAMES 45 SUMMARY 48 EXERCISES 49 REFERENCES 54 CHAPTER 3
ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 55 3.1 INTRODUCTION 55 3.2 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE
RATIONAL 56 3.2.1 STRICT DOMINANCE 56 WHITE FLIGHT AND RACIAL
SEGREGATION IN HOUSING 59 BANNING CIGARETTE ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION 60
3.2.2 WEAK DOMINANCE 64 BIDDING AT AN AUCTION 64 THE PROXY BID PARADOX
AT EBAY 66 3.3 SOLVING A GAME WHEN PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL AND PLAYERS KNOW
THAT PLAYERS ARE RATIONAL 68 TEAM-PROJECT GAME 68 IX EXISTENCE-OF-GOD
GAME 70 BOXED-PIGS GAME 71 3.4 SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON
KNOWLEDGE 73 3.4.1 THE DOPING GAME: IS IT RATIONAL FOR ATHLETES TO USE
STEROIDS? 73 3.4.2 ITERATIVE DELETION OF STRICTLY DOMINATED STRATEGIES
76 SUMMARY 78 EXERCISES 79 3.5 APPENDIX: STRICT AND WEAK DOMINANCE 84
3.6 APPENDIX: RATIONAFIZABILITY (ADVANCED) 84 REFERENCES 87 CHAPTER 4
STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS
89 4.1 DEFINING NASH EQUILIBRIUM 89 4.2 CLASSIC TWO-PLAYER GAMES 92
PRISONERS' DILEMMA 93 A COORDINATION GAME * DRIVING CONVENTIONS 95 A
GAME OF COORDINATION AND CONFLICT * TELEPHONE ,. 95 AN OUTGUESSING GAME
* ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS 97 CONFLICT AND MUTUAL INTEREST IN GAMES 99 4.3
THE BEST-REPLY METHOD 99 4.4 THREE-PLAYER GAMES 101 AMERICAN IDOL FANDOM
101 VOTING, SINCERE OR DEVIOUS? 102 PROMOTION AND SABOTAGE 706 4.5
FOUNDATIONS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM. 109 4.5.1 RELATIONSHIP TO RATIONALITY
IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE 109 4.5.2 THE DEFINITION OF A STRATEGY, REVISITED
.110 SUMMARY 111 EXERCISES 112 4.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH
EQUILIBRIUM 116 REFERENCES , 116 CHAPTER 5 STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA
IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 117 5.1 INTRODUCTION 117 5.2 SYMMETRIC GAMES
118 THE SNEETCHES 119 AIRLINE SECURITY 122 OPERATING SYSTEMS: MAC OR
WINDOWS? 125 APPLYING FOR AN INTERNSHIP 128 5.3 ASYMMETRIC GAMES 130
ENTRY INTO A MARKET 130 CIVIL UNREST 134 5.4 SELECTING AMONG NASH
EQUILIBRIA . 137 SUMMARY 141 EXERCISES 141 REFERENCES 145 CHAPTER 6
STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES 147 6.1 INTRODUCTION
147 6.2 SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITHOUT CALCULUS 148 PRICE
COMPETITION WITH IDENTICAL PRODUCTS 149 NEUTRALIZING PRICE COMPETITION
WITH PRICE-MATCHING GUARANTEES 152 COMPETING FOR ELECTED OFFICE 154 6.3
SOLVING FOR NASH EQUILIBRIA WITH CALCULUS (OPTIONAL) 157 PRICE
COMPETITION WITH DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS 160 TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS *
THE EXTINCTION OF THE WOOLLY MAMMOTH 164 CHARITABLE GIVING AND THE POWER
OF MATCHING GRANTS 169 SUMMARY 174 EXERCISES 175 REFERENCES 179 X
CONTENTS CHAPTER 7 KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES IS-I 7.1
POLICE PATROLS AND THE DRUG TRADE 181 7.2 MAKING DECISIONS UNDER
UNCERTAINTY 182 7.2.1 PROBABILITY AND EXPECTATION 182 7.2.2 PREFERENCES
OVER UNCERTAIN OPTIONS . 185 7.2.3 ORDINAL VS. CARDINAL PAYOFFS 186
7.3 MIXED STRATEGIES AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 187 7.3.1 BACK ON THE BEAT 187
7.3.2 SOME GENERAL PROPERTIES OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES
191 7.4 EXAMPLES 192 AVRANCHES GAP IN WORLD WAR II 193 ENTRY INTO A
MARKET 197 7.5 ADVANCED EXAMPLES 198 PENALTY KICK IN SOCCER 198 SLASH
'EM UP: FRIDAY THE 13TH 201 BYSTANDER EFFECT 204 7.6 GAMES OF PURE
CONFLICT AND CAUTIOUS BEHAVIOR 207 SUMMARY 211 EXERCISES 212 7.7
APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MIXED STRATEGIES 215
REFERENCES 216 CHAPTER 8 TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH PERFECT
INFORMATION 219 8.1 INTRODUCTION 219 8.2 BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME
PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM ;. 221 8.3 EXAMPLES 225 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
225 ENRON AND PROSECUTORIAL PREROGATIVE 227 RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND
SPORTS 229 8.4 WAITING GAMES: PREEMPTION AND ATTRITION 235 8.4.1
PREEMPTION .236 8.4.2 WAR OF ATTRITION 238 8.5 DO PEOPLE REASON USING
BACKWARD INDUCTION? 239 8.5.1 EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE AND BACKWARD
INDUCTION 239 8.5.2 A LOGICAL PARADOX WITH BACKWARD INDUCTION 242
SUMMARY 243 EXERCISES 244 REFERENCES 254 CHAPTER 9 TAKING TURNS IN THE
DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION 255 9.1 INTRODUCTION
255 9.2 SUBGAME PERFECT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 257 BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 260
9.3 EXAMPLES 263 OS/2 264 AGENDA CONTROL IN THE SENATE 268 9.4
COMMITMENT 270 9.4.1 DETERRENCE OF ENTRY 270 9.4.2 MANAGERIAL CONTRACTS
AND COMPETITION: EAST INDIA TRADE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 277 SUMMARY
280 EXERCISES 281 REFERENCES 289 CONTENTS XI CHAPTER 10 I KNOW SOMETHING
YOU DON'T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION 291 10.1 INTRODUCTION 291
10.2 A GAME OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: THE MUNICH AGREEMENT . 291 10.3
BAYESIAN GAMES AND BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 296 GUNFIGHT IN THE WILD WEST
298 10.4 WHEN ALL PLAYERS HAVE PRIVATE INFORMATION: AUCTIONS 301
INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES AND SHADING YOUR BID 302 COMMON VALUE AND THE
WINNER'S CURSE 304 10.5 VOTING ON COMMITTEES AND JURIES 307 10.5.1
STRATEGIC ABSTENTION 307 10.5.2 SEQUENTIAL VOTING IN THE JURY ROOM .
309 SUMMARY 312 EXERCISES 313 10.6 APPENDIX: FORMAL DEFINITION OF
BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM 318 10.7 APPENDIX: FIRST-PRICE, SEALED-BID
AUCTION WITH A CONTINUUM OF TYPES 319 10.7.1 INDEPENDENT PRIVATE VALUES
319 10.7.2 COMMON VALUE 321 REFERENCES 323 CHAPTER 11 WHAT YOU DO TELLS
ME WHO YOU ARE; SIGNALING GAMES 325 11.1 INTRODUCTION 325 11.2 PERFECT
BAYES-NASH EQUILIBRIUM .326 MANAGEMENT TRAINEE ,. 329 11.3 EXAMPLES
333 LEMONS AND THE MARKET FOR USED CARS 333 COURTSHIP 337 BRINKMANSHIP
343 SUMMARY 346 EXERCISES 348 11.4 APPENDIX: BAYES'S RULE AND UPDATING
BELIEFS 354 REFERENCES 357 CHAPTER 12 LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL
THEM: CHEAP TALK GAMES 359 12.1 INTRODUCTION 359 12.2 COMMUNICATION IN A
GAME-THEORETIC WORLD 360 12.3 SIGNALING INFORMATION 363 DEFENSIVE
MEDICINE 363 STOCK RECOMMENDATIONS 367 12.4 SIGNALING INTENTIONS 374
12.4.1 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION IN THEORY 374 12.4.2 PREPLAY COMMUNICATION
IN PRACTICE. 379 SUMMARY 381 EXERCISES 382 REFERENCES 388 CHAPTER 13
PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY LIVED PLAYERS 391
13.1 TRENCH WARFARE IN WORLD WAR I 391 13.2 CONSTRUCTING A REPEATED GAME
. 393 13.3 TRENCH WARFARE: FINITE HORIZON . 398 13.4 TRENCH
WARFARE: INFINITE HORIZON 401 13.5 SOME EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE FOR THE
REPEATED PRISONERS' DILEMMA . 406 SUMMARY 410 EXERCISES 411 XII
CONTENTS 1 3.6 APPENDIX: PRESENT VALUE OF A PAYOFF STREAM 416 13.7
APPENDIX: DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING 420 REFERENCES 422 CHAPTER 14 COOPERATION
AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY
LIVED PLAYERS 423 14.1 INTRODUCTION 423 14.2 A MENU OF PUNISHMENTS 424
14.2.1 PRICE-FIXING 424 14.2.2 TEMPORARY REVERSION TO MODERATE RATES 427
14.2.3 PRICE WARS: TEMPORARY REVERSION TO LOW RATES 428 14,2.4 A MORE
EQUITABLE PUNISHMENT 430 14.3 QUID-PRO-QUO 431 U.S, CONGRESS AND
PORK-BARREL SPENDING 431 VAMPIRE BATS AND RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM 434 14.4
REPUTATION 437 LENDING TO KINGS 437 HENRY FORD AND THE $5 WORKDAY 439
14.5 IMPERFECT MONITORING AND ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES 441 SUMMARY 444
EXERCISES 445 REFERENCES 450 CHAPTER 15 INTERACTION IN INFINITELY LIVED
INSTITUTIONS 451 15.1 INTRODUCTION 451 15.2 COOPERATION WITH OVERLAPPING
GENERATIONS 452 TRIBAL DEFENSE 453 TAKING CARE OF YOUR ELDERLY PARENTS
456 POLITICAL PARTIES AND LAME-DUCK PRESIDENTS 458 15.3 COOPERATION IN A
LARGE POPULATION 463 EBAY 464 MEDIEVAL LAW MERCHANT 469 SUMMARY 473
EXERCISES 474 REFERENCES 478 CHAPTER 16 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND
BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGIES 479 16.1 INTRODUCING
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY 479 16.2 HAWK-DOVE CONFLICT 481 16.3
EVOLUTIONARY STABLE STRATEGY 484 "STAYIN' ALIVE" ON A COWPAT 488 16.4
PROPERTIES OF AN ESS 491 SIDE-BLOTCHED LIZARDS 493 16.5 MULTIPOPULATION
GAMES 496 PARENTAL CARE 497 16.6 EVOLUTION OF SPITE 499 SUMMARY 501
EXERCISES 502 REFERENCES 505 CHAPTER 17 EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND
BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS 507 17.1 INTRODUCTION 507 17.2 REPLICATOR
DYNAMICS AND THE HAWK-DOVE GAME 508 17.3 GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE
REPLICATOR DYNAMIC 512 CONTENTS XIII 17.4 ESS AND ATTRACTORS OF THE
EXERCISES 530 REPLICATOR DYNAMSC 513 REFERENCES 532 17.5 EXAMPLES 515 .
**. , ., . . A U * R-.R- ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR UNDERSTANDING STAG
HUNT 515 A _ HANDEDNESS IN BASEBALL 517 Q UEST!ONS S " 1 EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 521 GLOSSARY G-1 SUMMARY 529 INDEX 1-1 |
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| author | Harrington, Joseph Emmett 1957- |
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| author_variant | j e h je jeh |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035094106 |
| classification_rvk | QH 430 QP 327 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)258085506 (DE-599)BVBBV035094106 |
| dewey-full | 330.015193 |
| dewey-hundreds | 300 - Social sciences |
| dewey-ones | 330 - Economics |
| dewey-raw | 330.015193 |
| dewey-search | 330.015193 |
| dewey-sort | 3330.015193 |
| dewey-tens | 330 - Economics |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. print. |
| format | Book |
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| genre_facet | Lehrbuch |
| id | DE-604.BV035094106 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:11:40Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:22:04Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780716766308 0716766302 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016762174 |
| oclc_num | 258085506 |
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| physical | Getr. Zählung Ill., graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateSearch | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | Worth |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Harrington, Joseph Emmett 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)132332752 aut Games, strategies and decision making Joseph E. Harrington 1. print. New York, NY Worth 2009 Getr. Zählung Ill., graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Game theory Economics, Mathematical Decision making / Mathematics Strategic planning / Mathematics Mathematik Decision making Mathematics Strategic planning Mathematics Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Statistische Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4077850-2 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4123623-3 Lehrbuch gnd-content Statistische Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4077850-2 s Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 SWBplus Fremddatenuebernahme application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016762174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Harrington, Joseph Emmett 1957- Games, strategies and decision making Game theory Economics, Mathematical Decision making / Mathematics Strategic planning / Mathematics Mathematik Decision making Mathematics Strategic planning Mathematics Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Statistische Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4077850-2 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4077850-2 (DE-588)4123623-3 |
| title | Games, strategies and decision making |
| title_auth | Games, strategies and decision making |
| title_exact_search | Games, strategies and decision making |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Games, strategies and decision making |
| title_full | Games, strategies and decision making Joseph E. Harrington |
| title_fullStr | Games, strategies and decision making Joseph E. Harrington |
| title_full_unstemmed | Games, strategies and decision making Joseph E. Harrington |
| title_short | Games, strategies and decision making |
| title_sort | games strategies and decision making |
| topic | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Decision making / Mathematics Strategic planning / Mathematics Mathematik Decision making Mathematics Strategic planning Mathematics Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Statistische Entscheidungstheorie (DE-588)4077850-2 gnd |
| topic_facet | Game theory Economics, Mathematical Decision making / Mathematics Strategic planning / Mathematics Mathematik Decision making Mathematics Strategic planning Mathematics Spieltheorie Statistische Entscheidungstheorie Lehrbuch |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016762174&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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