Principled agents?: the political economy of good government
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford
Oxford Univ. Press
2007
|
| Ausgabe: | reprinted |
| Schriftenreihe: | Lindahl lectures
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Beschreibung: | XI, 266 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 019927150X 9780199271504 9780199283910 |
Internformat
MARC
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| 250 | |a reprinted | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Oxford |b Oxford Univ. Press |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a XI, 266 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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| 490 | 0 | |a Lindahl lectures | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Agency Theory |2 stw | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Agency-Theorie - Staatstätigkeit | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politik |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Politische Entscheidung |2 stw | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Staatsversagen |2 stw | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Ökonomische Theorie der Politik - Staatstätigkeit | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Politik | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Agent (Philosophy) |x Political aspects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Government productivity | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Motivation (Psychology) |x Political aspects | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Policy sciences | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Public administration | |
| 650 | 0 | 7 | |a Ökonomische Theorie der Politik |0 (DE-588)4043214-2 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138033295917057 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
viii
A cknowledgemen ts
xi
1
Competing views of government
1
1.1
The issues
1
1.2
This book
2
1.3
Background
4
1.3.1
The size of government
4
1.3.2
Corruption
10
1.3.3
Property rights
14
1.3.4
Trust and turnout
17
1.4
Economic policy making
20
1.4.1
Foundations
21
1.4.2
Good policies
23
1.4.3
The public choice critique of welfare
economics
25
1.5
Political economy
27
1.6
Incentives and selection in politics
36
1.7
Concluding comments
43
2
The
anatomy of government failure
45
2.1
Introduction
45
2.2
Three notions of government failure
48
2.2.1
Pareto inefficiency
48
2.2.2
Distributional failures
49
2.2.3
Wicksellian failures
52
2.2.4
Comparisons
53
2.3
An example: financing a public project
55
2.3.1
Private provision
56
2.3.2
Government Drovision
57
2.4
Sources
of government failure
2.4.1
Ignorance
2.4.2
Influence
2.4.3
The quality of leadership
2.5
Sources of political failure
2.5.1
Voting
2.5.2
Log-rolling and legislative behavior
2.6
Dynamics
2.6.1
Investment linkages
2.6.2
Political and policy linkages
2.6.3
Investment and politics
2.7
Implications
2.8
Concluding comments
Political agency and accountability
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Elements of political agency models
3.2.1
The nature of the uncertainty
3.2.2
The motives for holding office
3.2.3
The nature of accountability
3.2.4
Retrospective voting
3.2.5
Model types
3.3
The baseline model
3.3.1
The environment
3.3.2
Equilibrium
3.3.3
Implications
3.4
Extensions
3.4.1
Polarization and competition
3.4.2
Information and accountability
3.4.3
The nature of the distortion
3.4.4
Within-term cycles
3.4.5
Multiple issues
3.4.6
Multiple two-period terms
3.4.7
Indefinite terms
3.4.8
Multiple agents
3.5
Discussion
3.5.1
Civic virtue and the quality of
government
3.5.2
Decentralization versus centralization
3.5.3
Autocracy versus democracy
3.5.4
Accountability to whom?
169
3.5.5
Wage policies for politicians
170
3.5.6
Behavioral versus rational choice models
172
3.6
Concluding comments
172
4
Political agency and public finance
(with Michael Smart)
174
4.1
Introduction
174
4.2
The model
177
4.3
Three scenarios
180
4.3.1
Pure adverse selection
180
4.3.2
Pure moral hazard
182
4.3.3
Combining moral hazard and adverse
selection
185
4.4
Implications
188
4.4.1
Equilibrium voter welfare
189
4.4.2
Are good politicians necessarily good for
voters?
191
4.4.3
Turnover of politicians
193
4.4.4
The spending cycle
194
4.5
Restraining government
195
4.5.1
A direct restraint on the size of
government
199
4.5.2
Indirect restraints
200
4.5.3
Summary
209
4.6
Debt and deficits
210
4.7
Governments versus
NGOs
214
4.7.1
Framework
216
4.7.2
Aid to the government
219
4.7.3
Comparisons
220
4.7.4
Further issues
222
4.8
Competence
223
4.9
Conclusions
225
Appendix
226
5
Final
Comments
228
References
234
Index
249
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface
viii
A cknowledgemen ts
xi
1
Competing views of government
1
1.1
The issues
1
1.2
This book
2
1.3
Background
4
1.3.1
The size of government
4
1.3.2
Corruption
10
1.3.3
Property rights
14
1.3.4
Trust and turnout
17
1.4
Economic policy making
20
1.4.1
Foundations
21
1.4.2
Good policies
23
1.4.3
The public choice critique of welfare
economics
25
1.5
Political economy
27
1.6
Incentives and selection in politics
36
1.7
Concluding comments
43
2
The
anatomy of government failure
45
2.1
Introduction
45
2.2
Three notions of government failure
48
2.2.1
Pareto inefficiency
48
2.2.2
Distributional failures
49
2.2.3
Wicksellian failures
52
2.2.4
Comparisons
53
2.3
An example: financing a public project
55
2.3.1
Private provision
56
2.3.2
Government Drovision
57
2.4
Sources
of government failure
2.4.1
Ignorance
2.4.2
Influence
2.4.3
The quality of leadership
2.5
Sources of political failure
2.5.1
Voting
2.5.2
Log-rolling and legislative behavior
2.6
Dynamics
2.6.1
Investment linkages
2.6.2
Political and policy linkages
2.6.3
Investment and politics
2.7
Implications
2.8
Concluding comments
Political agency and accountability
3.1
Introduction
3.2
Elements of political agency models
3.2.1
The nature of the uncertainty
3.2.2
The motives for holding office
3.2.3
The nature of accountability
3.2.4
Retrospective voting
3.2.5
Model types
3.3
The baseline model
3.3.1
The environment
3.3.2
Equilibrium
3.3.3
Implications
3.4
Extensions
3.4.1
Polarization and competition
3.4.2
Information and accountability
3.4.3
The nature of the distortion
3.4.4
Within-term cycles
3.4.5
Multiple issues
3.4.6
Multiple two-period terms
3.4.7
Indefinite terms
3.4.8
Multiple agents
3.5
Discussion
3.5.1
Civic virtue and the quality of
government
3.5.2
Decentralization versus centralization
3.5.3
Autocracy versus democracy
3.5.4
Accountability to whom?
169
3.5.5
Wage policies for politicians
170
3.5.6
Behavioral versus rational choice models
172
3.6
Concluding comments
172
4
Political agency and public finance
(with Michael Smart)
174
4.1
Introduction
174
4.2
The model
177
4.3
Three scenarios
180
4.3.1
Pure adverse selection
180
4.3.2
Pure moral hazard
182
4.3.3
Combining moral hazard and adverse
selection
185
4.4
Implications
188
4.4.1
Equilibrium voter welfare
189
4.4.2
Are good politicians necessarily good for
voters?
191
4.4.3
Turnover of politicians
193
4.4.4
The spending cycle
194
4.5
Restraining government
195
4.5.1
A direct restraint on the size of
government
199
4.5.2
Indirect restraints
200
4.5.3
Summary
209
4.6
Debt and deficits
210
4.7
Governments versus
NGOs
214
4.7.1
Framework
216
4.7.2
Aid to the government
219
4.7.3
Comparisons
220
4.7.4
Further issues
222
4.8
Competence
223
4.9
Conclusions
225
Appendix
226
5
Final
Comments
228
References
234
Index
249 |
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| dewey-ones | 352 - General considerations of public administration |
| dewey-raw | 352.3 |
| dewey-search | 352.3 |
| dewey-sort | 3352.3 |
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| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| id | DE-604.BV035080996 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:07:16Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:21:45Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 019927150X 9780199271504 9780199283910 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016749241 |
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| physical | XI, 266 S. graph. Darst. |
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| series2 | Lindahl lectures |
| spelling | Besley, Timothy 1960- Verfasser (DE-588)128383178 aut Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley reprinted Oxford Oxford Univ. Press 2007 XI, 266 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Lindahl lectures Agency Theory stw Agency-Theorie - Staatstätigkeit Politik stw Politische Entscheidung stw Staatsversagen stw Ökonomische Theorie der Politik - Staatstätigkeit Politik Agent (Philosophy) Political aspects Government productivity Motivation (Psychology) Political aspects Policy sciences Public administration Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd rswk-swf Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd rswk-swf Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd rswk-swf Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 s Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 s DE-604 Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 s b DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016749241&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Besley, Timothy 1960- Principled agents? the political economy of good government Agency Theory stw Agency-Theorie - Staatstätigkeit Politik stw Politische Entscheidung stw Staatsversagen stw Ökonomische Theorie der Politik - Staatstätigkeit Politik Agent (Philosophy) Political aspects Government productivity Motivation (Psychology) Political aspects Policy sciences Public administration Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4043214-2 (DE-588)4182679-6 (DE-588)4126353-4 |
| title | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
| title_auth | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
| title_exact_search | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Principled agents? the political economy of good government |
| title_full | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
| title_fullStr | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
| title_full_unstemmed | Principled agents? the political economy of good government Timothy Besley |
| title_short | Principled agents? |
| title_sort | principled agents the political economy of good government |
| title_sub | the political economy of good government |
| topic | Agency Theory stw Agency-Theorie - Staatstätigkeit Politik stw Politische Entscheidung stw Staatsversagen stw Ökonomische Theorie der Politik - Staatstätigkeit Politik Agent (Philosophy) Political aspects Government productivity Motivation (Psychology) Political aspects Policy sciences Public administration Ökonomische Theorie der Politik (DE-588)4043214-2 gnd Staatstätigkeit (DE-588)4182679-6 gnd Agency-Theorie (DE-588)4126353-4 gnd |
| topic_facet | Agency Theory Agency-Theorie - Staatstätigkeit Politik Politische Entscheidung Staatsversagen Ökonomische Theorie der Politik - Staatstätigkeit Agent (Philosophy) Political aspects Government productivity Motivation (Psychology) Political aspects Policy sciences Public administration Ökonomische Theorie der Politik Staatstätigkeit Agency-Theorie |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016749241&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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