Applied game theory and strategic behavior:
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CRC Press
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| adam_text | Mathematics
APPLIED
GAME THEORY
AND STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR
Useful tools to help solve decision making problems
Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior demonstrates the use of various game
theory techniques to address practical business, economic, legal, and public policy
issues. It also illustrates the benefits of employing strategic thinking that incorporates
the uncertainty surrounding the behavior of other parties.
Real-world applications of game theory
Exploring a variety of games, the book outlines the process of modeling game theory
questions while thinking strategically. It introduces core concepts through simple
examples and case studies taken from the authors consulting work in the automotive,
beer, wine, and spirits industries as well as in debates over government regulation.
The authors include newly developed software applications that can construct and
solve game theory models and present strategic options in clear, visual diagrams.
Out of the box and into the business world
Striking the right balance between necessary mathematics and practical applications,
this book shows how game theory can be used in real life, not just in mathematical
models. It helps readers improve their strategic thinking, define games based on
actual situations, model games with payoffs and probabilities, and make strategically
sound decisions.
Features
•
Shows how to build a model in an interactive decision making environment to
analyze real-world problems
•
Presents case studies from business, the automotive industry, government
regulation, and the alcohol industry
•
Discusses various economic and game theory concepts, including static and
dynamic games, complete/incomplete information sets, asymmetric information,
and dominant/dominated strategies
•
Includes
MATLAB®
codes and illustrations of extensive form games developed in
Microsoft
Visio
Titel: Applied game theory and strategic behavior
Autor: Geçkil, Ilhan Kubilay
Jahr: 2010
Figure List
Table List
Preface
Purpose of this Book
Our Approach
Organization of Book
Our Appreciation
Chapter 1 A Brief History of Game Theory
Why Study Games?............................................................................. 1
Rapid Discoveries in the Twentieth Century..................................... 2
Key Conceptual Developments in Early Years.......................................2
Pioneers of Game Theory and Advancement of the Field.......................3
Game Theory s Evolution during the Last Three Decades.......................6
Recognition......................................................................................... 7
Chapter 2 Strategy and Game Theory Concepts
Game Theory, Strategy, and Strategic Behavior.............................. 10
More on Strategic Behavior and Strategy.............................................10
Game Theory and Strategic Behavior in Business................................11
Consumer Behavior, Utility Theory, and Game Theory.................. 12
Cardinal Utility ...................................................................................13
Choice Behavior and Game Theory ...................................................13
Utility Functions and Game-Theoretic Models...............................13
Utility Theory and Payoffs......................................................14
Game-Theoretic Models and Illustration.......................................... 14
The Payoff Matrix and Tree Diagram..................................................14
Strategic Thinking and Simultaneous- and
Sequential-Move Games ..................................,..................................16
Rules of the Game............................................................................ 16
Players ..............................................................................................17
Information........................................................................................17
Perfect vs. Imperfect Information..................................................18
Complete vs. Incomplete Information............................................18
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Information ............................................18
Set of Actions and Strategies..............................................................18
Payoffs..............................................................................................19
Strategy and Equilibrium.................................................................. 19
Dominant and Dominated Strategies....................................................19
Dominated Strategies ..........................................................................20
Equilibrium..................................................................................20
Nash Equilibrium ................................................................................22
Note on Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and
Nash Equilibrium........................................................:......23
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ...............................................23
Mixed Strategies; Repeated Games ...............................................23
Maximin Strategy................................................................................24
Sequential Games and Problem Solving...............................................25
Complex Games and Games by Categories..................................... 27
n-Person Games.................................................................................27
Different Categories of Games............................................................29
Zero-Sum Games vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games ....................................29
Static vs. Dynamic Games; Repeated Games ....................................30
Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Games ......................................30
Other Key Game Theory Concepts.................................................. 31
Threats and Rewards (Promises).........................................................31
Credibility ...................................................................................31
Sample Game with Threats ...........................................................31
The Threat as a Strategy...............................................................32
Games of Chance: Uncertainty and Risk..............................................32
Chapter 3 Modeling Games with Computer Software and
Experimenting Games
Prisoner s Dilemma........................................................................... 36
Analysis.............................................................................................36
Notes ..............................................................................................37
Modeling the Game with Matlab.......................................................38
Tit for Tat and the Repeated Game......................................................40
Famous Experiment............................................................................40
Another Prisoner s Dilemma Experiment.............................................41
Even More Experiments.....................................................................42
Battle of the Sexes............................................................................ 43
Analysis.............................................................................................43
Mixed Strategy........................................................................44
Modeling the Original Battle of the Sexes Game with Matlab.............45
A Battle of the Sexes Experiment........................................................47
Assumptions of the Researchers ...............................................48
Additional Experiments......................................................................50
A Sample Game of Dominated Strategies with Matlab.................. 50
Chapter 4 A Theory of Strategic Value
Introduction: The Game of Business................................................ 57
Strategic Value for a Business.............................................................58
Important Concepts............................................................................58
Advanced Topics.................................................................................59
Strategy and Value............................................................................ 60
Accounting Net Worth........................................................................60
Current Income..................................................... .............60
Portfolio Investment...........................................................................61
Real Options......................................................................................61
States of Nature and Strategy........................................................... 61
The State of Nature............................................................................62
A Short Revolutionary Example ...................................................62
A Revolutionary Game: The State of Affairs in 1775.......................63
State Variables in 1775 Colonial America......................................63
State Variables for Business; Control Variables............................... 65
How Many Ships in Your Navy?.........................................................65
The Event Tree and Dynamic Payoffs............................................. 67
The Event Tree...................................................................................67
The Extensive Form and the Event Tree..............................................68
State and Control Variables in the Event Tree......................................68
Encoding History in the State .......................................................68
Additional Examples...........................................................................69
Payoffs and Business Value.................................................................69
Static Payoffs vs. Strategic Value ...................................................69
Value Changes.....................................................................................69
Dynamic Payoffs..........................................................................70
The Firm............................................................................................ 70
Equity in a Firm.................................................................................71
Note on Limited-Liability Companies ...........................................72
Markets..............................................................................................72
Real Options and Management Flexibility....................................... 72
The Ubiquity of Uncertainty...............................................................72
The Inherent Value of Management Flexibility.....................................73
The Investment Decision ....................................................................74
What is Value for a Firm?............................................................. 75
Earnings and Capital Gains...........................................................75
Strategy and the Pursuit of Total Return .....................................75
Available Principles of Valuation.........................................................76
Practical Models.................................................................................78
Example: Strategic Valuation for the Damaged Business......................80
Appendix 4.A Stochastic Processes, Diffusions, and Expectations...82
A. Introduction...................................................................................82
Use of Stochastic Processes in Study of Strategic Behavior............82
B. Brownian Motion and Random Events............................................82
The Markov Property ...................................................................83
C. Geometric Brownian Motion and Stock Prices.................................83
D. Expected Value..............................................................................84
Expected Value of a Strategy ........................................................84
Appendix 4.B Dynamic Programming...............................................85
A. Optimization over Time.................................................................85
B. A Prototype Bellman Equation for a Private Firm........................85
C. Recursive Decisions.......................................................................85
D. Existence Theory...........................................................................86
Chapter 5 A Dynamic Game of Asymmetric Information in the
Beer Industry
A Game between a Global Brewer and a National Importer.......... 87
Background........................................................................................87
Motivation and Incentives of Companies: Maximizing Business
Value............................................................................................88
Examples................................................................................89
Business Value Depends on a Strategic Course of Action.....................89
Implications of Value, Risk, and Strategic Decisions
to the Game.........................................................................................89
Regulated Alcoholic Beverages Industry and Three-Tier
System in the U.S......................................................................... 90
Sales Performance of Gambrinus; General Import Market............. 91
Incentives at the Time of the 1996 Decision................................... 91
Incentives for Grupo Modelo..............................................................92
Objectives of Gambrinus....................................................................92
Matching and Conflicting Objectives...................................................93
Matching Objectives ....................................................................93
Conflicting Objectives ........................................................................93
Concluding Remarks on Incentives......................................................94
Strategic Options Available in 1996 and the Game......................... 94
Introduction of Strategic Options.........................................................94
Strategic Options at Two Stages..........................................................95
Potential Outcomes.............................................................................95
Game-Theoretic Model..................................................................... 96
Description.........................................................................................96
Information..........................................................................................96
Analysis of the Game.........................................................................99
Stage I (1996) ..............................................................................99
Stage I (1996-2001) ...................................................................101
Stage II ..............................................................................................102
Outcomes of the Game and Conclusion.............................................103
Appendix 5.A......................................................................................104
Chapter 6 Consolidation in the Wine and Spirits Industry
Introduction.......................................................................................109
Economic Structure of the Industry................................................ 110
Distribution Arrangements in the Industry ...................................110
The Wine and Spirits Industry and Consolidation.......................... Ill
Consolidation at Wholesaler Level....................................................112
Recent M As and Business Ventures in Major Markets
at Wholesaler Level ..........................................................................113
A Hypothetical Consolidation......................................................... 114
Description of the Consolidation Game......................................... 116
Market Share and Power...................................................................116
The New Market and Strategic Issues................................................117
Players Strategies and Information...................................................119
Analysis of the Game.......................................................................120
Simultaneous-Move Game between Wholesalers iii and iv ...........122
Sequential Move Game between Supplier III and
Wholesalers iii and iv.................................................................122
Conclusion.......................................................................................124
Appendix 6.A......................................................................................125
Chapter 7 A Regulatory Game: CAFE Standards and Competing
Automakers
Introduction..................................................................................... 129
Lobbying and Game Theory..............................................................130
Lobbying as Part of the Game ....................................................130
History of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE).................. 131
Future Standards: Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007, 2011-2015 Targets..............................................................135
Current Debates............................................................................... 137
Strategic and Game Theoretical Motivation behind CAFE........... 138
Building the Game and Players, Strategies, Payoffs,
and Solution................................................................................ 140
Game Stage 1...................................................................................140
Game Stage 2...................................................................................141
Outcomes of Game Stages 1 and 2....................................................142
Game Stage 3...................................................................................143
Solving the Problem and Nash Equilibrium.......................................144
Conclusion.......................................................................................146
Appendix 7.A......................................................................................147
Chapter 8 Business Strategy and Crisis: The U.S. Auto Industry
Introduction and Cause of the 2008 Auto Industry Crisis............. 149
Likely Scenarios for the Automotive Industry............................... 150
Economic and Industry Conditions................................................ 152
Sales Trends by Automaker..............................................................153
Car Sales ...........................................................................................153
Truck Sales................................................................................154
Long-Term Sales Trends...................................................................154
Investor Confidence in Domestic Automakers and Suppliers..............155
Key Events to Date (December 2, 2008)....................................... 155
Discussion of Potential Scenarios................................................... 158
The Most-Likely Scenario.................................................................159
Scenario 1: A GM-Chrysler Merger with Federal Financial Aid ...159
Other Likely Scenarios.....................................................................160
Scenario 2: Federal Financial Aid and Radical Restructuring
outside of Bankruptcy .......................................................................160
Scenario 3: Federal Financial Aid and Radical Restructuring
outside of Bankruptcy; Chrysler Assets Purchased by
Competitors ...............................................................................160
Scenario 4: Chrysler Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy;
GM and Ford Restructure outside Bankruptcy ................................160
Scenario 5: Both GM and Chrysler File for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy ................................................................................161
Strategic Approach to a Potential Merger: Strategies
of Key Players............................................................................ 161
Players and Incentives......................................................................162
Incentives of the Players...................................................................162
Strategies.........................................................................................163
Sample Tree Diagrams Illustrating Players Moves
and Their Strategies.....................................................................164
Strategic Analysis and Conclusion.....................................................167
Chapter 9 Game Theory and the Law
Introduction..................................................................................... 169
Classic Game Theory Applications in Litigation........................... 170
Incentives to Settle...........................................................................170
Example: Litigation or Settlement in a Commercial
Damages Case ...........................................................................170
Optimal Sanctions............................................................................172
Example: Punitive Damages ....................................................172
Properly Constructing the Payoff Matrix............................................173
Examples: The Actual Payoff Elements...........................................173
Commercial Damages..................................................................... 174
Overview of Commercial Damages...................................................174
Events in a Typical Commercial Damages Case ..........................175
Evaluating Commercial Damages Using Game Theory.......................175
The Value of Investments under Uncertainty................................. 176
Game Theory and Real Options........................................................177
Extensive Form Modeling of an Investment Outcome........................177
A Simulation Model for Real Options and Game Theory
Valuation....................................................................................178
Results of Experiment Using Simulation Model...........................179
Game Theory and Antitrust Law.................................................... 181
Market Entry and Collusion..............................................................181
Example.............................................................................................181
Antitrust Case Study: United States of America,
et al., v. Microsoft Corporation.................................................. 182
History of Investigations Leading up to the Antitrust Suit..................183
Market Power: Windows and Internet Explorer..................................184
Major Competitors .....................................................................184
A Game-Theoretic Model of the Microsoft Antitrust Case..................185
Key Incentives ...........................................................................186
Analysis of Microsoft s Decision Tree.........................................186
The Trial and Conclusions of Law ..............................................187
The Appeal ................................................................................188
The Settlement ..................................................................................188
Appendix 9.A......................................................................................190
Bibliography...............................................................................................193
Index............................................................................................................199
Figure List
Figure 2.1 Tree Diagram of a Sample Game..................................................................16
Figure 2.2 Extensive Form of the Sample Game of Table 2.7
with Sequential Moves................................................................................. 25
Figure 2.3 Reduced Extensive Form of the Game........................................................ 26
Figure 2.4 Extensive Form of the Sample Game of Table 2.7
with Sequential Moves (Player II Moves First)........................................... 26
Figure 2.5 Reduced Extensive Form of the Game
(Player II Moves First)................................................................................. 27
Figure 2.6 Complex Version of the Game Illustrated in Figure 2.1.............................. 28
Figure 3.1 Tree Diagram Illustration of the Prisoner s Dilemma Game....................... 37
Figure 3.2 Matlab Codes for Prisoner s Dilemma....................................................... 38
Figure 3.3 Tree Diagram of Battle of the Sexes Game
(Husband Moves First).................................................................................44
Figure 3.4 Tree Diagram of Battle of the Sexes Game
(Wife Moves First).......................................................................................44
Figure 3.5 Matlab Codes for Battle of the Sexes Game.............................................. 45
Figure 3.6 Matlab Codes for Sample Game with Dominated Strategies..................... 52
Figure 4.1 Prototype State Vector..................................................................................63
Figure 4.2 Elements of the State Vector, 1775.............................................................. 64
Figure 4.3 State Vectors for the British and Americans, 1775...................................... 65
Figure 4.4 State Variable for Businesses....................................................................... 66
Figure 4.5 Prototype Event Tree...................................................................................67
Figure 4.6 Event Tree for Natural Resources Co.......................................................... 74
Figure 4.7 Damages Example........................................................................................ 81
Figure 5.1 Strategic Options of Modelo and Gambrinus in 1996; Extensive
Form of the Game.........................................................................................98
Figure 5.2 Stage III: Subgame; Renegotiation or Redeployment.................................. 99
Figure 6.1 Extensive Form of the Game between Supplier III and
Wholesalers iii and iv..................................................................................121
Figure 6.2 Extensive Form of the Game after the Simultaneous-Move
Game between Wholesalers....................................................................... 123
Figure 7.1 Historical CAFE Standards for Cars and Light Trucks (Combined),
Model Years 1978 through 2008.................................................................132
Figure 7.2 Real Gas Prices v. Combined Light Trucks CAFE Standards................... 133
Figure 7.3 Domestic v. Non-Domestic Passenger Car Fuel Economy Averages....... 134
Figure 7.4 Tree Diagram of the Game at the Last Stage between
Automakers T and C and Their Utility Payoffs......................................... 145
Figure 8.1 Flowchart of the Likely Scenarios..............................................................152
Figure 8.2 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample Merger Game -1.......................... 165
Figure 8.3 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample Merger Game - II......................... 166
Figure 8.4 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample Merger Game - III........................ 167
Figure 9.1 Events in a Commercial Damages Case.....................................................171
Figure 9.2 Business Interruption with Mitigation Opportunities................................ 180
Figure 9.3 A Tree Diagram of Market Entry and Collusion Example........................ 182
Figure 9.4 Extensive Form of the Antitrust Game: Microsoft Move.......................... 187
Figure 9.5 Matlab Codes for the SIMULINK Diagram............................................. 191
Table List
Table 2.1 Examples of Assigning Utilities to Different Bundles..................................12
Table 2.2 Illustration of a Sample Payoff Matrix..........................................................15
Table 2.3 First Sample Game ........................................................................................20
Table 2.4 Reduced Form of the First Sample Game .....................................................21
Table 2.5 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy...................................................22
Table 2.6 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy or Nash
Equilibria .......................................................................................................23
Table 2.7 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy...................................................24
Table 2.8 Complex Game with Many Strategies...........................................................29
Table 2.9 A Sample Game of Non-Credible Threat......................................................32
Table 3.1 Normal Form of the Classic Prisoner s Dilemma Game............................... 36
Table 3.2 A Prisoner s Dilemma with Low Gains from Cooperation............................41
Table 3.3 A Prisoner s Dilemma with High Gains from Cooperation...........................41
Table 3.4 Normal Form Illustration of Battle of the Sexes Game..................................43
Table 3.5 Inequalities in the Battle of the Sexes Game..................................................45
Table 3.6 Battle of the Sexes Payoff Matrix (University of
Iowa Experiment) ...........................................................................................48
Table 3.7 Comparison of Results across Communications Treatments.........................49
Table 3.8 Normal Form of the Sample Game with Dominated
Strategies ........................................................................................................50
Table 3.9 Reduced Form of the Sample Game with Dominated
Strategies ........................................................................................................51
Table 3.10 Reduced Form of the Game in Table 3.9......................................................51
Table 4.1 Available Principles of Business Valuation..................................................77
Table 4.2 Valuation Models in Practical Use................................................................79
Table 5.1 Actions and Probabilities of Stage 1.............................................................100
Table 5.2 Payoff Matrix of Stage I..............................................................................100
Table 5.3 Payoff Matrix with Assigned Numbers.......................................................101
Table 5.4 Actions and Probabilities of Stage II...........................................................102
Table 5.5 Outcomes of Stage II...................................................................................103
Table 5.6 Selected Major Brewers and Importers, Total U.S. Shipments,
1994-2003 ....................................................................................................105
Table 5.7 Selected Major Brewers and Importers, U.S. Market Share,
1994-2003 ....................................................................................................106
Table 5.8 Beer Shipments by Brand: Gambrinus v. Barton, U.S., 1997-2004............107
Table 6.1 Sample Market of Wine and Spirits, before Consolidation.......................... 114
Table 6.2 Sample Market of Wine and Spirits, after Supplier Fs Acquisition
of Supplier II................................................................................................115
Table 6.3 Final Version of the Sample Market after the Sequence of
Consolidations .............................................................................................115
Table 6.4 Consumption Market Share of Brands in the Sample Market.....................116
Table 6.5 Market Shares after Initial Transaction.......................................................117
Table 6.6 Normal Form of the Game between Wholesalers Hi and iv........................122
Table 6.7 Top Ten Suppliers of Wine by Sales, U.S., 2003 and 2004........................126
Table 6.8 Top Ten Suppliers of Spirits by Volume, U.S., 2005 .................................127
Table 7.1 DOT Average Fuel Economy Targets, Model Year 2011-2015...................136
Table 7.2 Automaker T s Level of Expenditure on Lobbying and Probabilities of
Success and Failure......................................................................................141
Table 7.3 Probabilities of Higher-CAFE-Standards Legislation Based upon
Outcomes of the Lobbying Efforts of Automaker T ...................................142
Table 7.4 Lobbying Expenditure — Legislation Matrix.............................................143
Table 7.5 Expected Utility Payoffs for Automaker T for Its Different Level
of Expenditures at the First Stage................................................................146
Table 7.6 Fuel Economy Averages (mpg) by Automaker for 2000, 2004, and 2008 .148
Table 8.1 Light Vehicle Sales in the U.S., 2003-2008 (in millions of units)...............153
Table 8.2 Car Sales in the U.S. for the Major Manufacturers, First Three
Quarters, 2007-2008 ....................................................................................153
Table 8.3 Truck Sales in the U.S. for the Major Manufacturers, First Three
Quarters, 2007-2008 ....................................................................................154
Table 8.4 2008 Economic Crisis and Impact on Auto Companies Value
(Stock Prices in USD, Daily Close).............................................................155
Table 9.1 Elements of a Payoff Matrix.........................................................................174
|
| adam_txt |
Mathematics
APPLIED
GAME THEORY
AND STRATEGIC
BEHAVIOR
Useful tools to help solve decision making problems
Applied Game Theory and Strategic Behavior demonstrates the use of various game
theory techniques to address practical business, economic, legal, and public policy
issues. It also illustrates the benefits of employing strategic thinking that incorporates
the uncertainty surrounding the behavior of other parties.
Real-world applications of game theory
Exploring a variety of games, the book outlines the process of modeling game theory
questions while thinking strategically. It introduces core concepts through simple
examples and case studies taken from the authors' consulting work in the automotive,
beer, wine, and spirits industries as well as in debates over government regulation.
The authors include newly developed software applications that can construct and
solve game theory models and present strategic options in clear, visual diagrams.
Out of the box and into the business world
Striking the right balance between necessary mathematics and practical applications,
this book shows how game theory can be used in real life, not just in mathematical
models. It helps readers improve their strategic thinking, define games based on
actual situations, model games with payoffs and probabilities, and make strategically
sound decisions.
Features
•
Shows how to build a model in an interactive decision making environment to
analyze real-world problems
•
Presents case studies from business, the automotive industry, government
regulation, and the alcohol industry
•
Discusses various economic and game theory concepts, including static and
dynamic games, complete/incomplete information sets, asymmetric information,
and dominant/dominated strategies
•
Includes
MATLAB®
codes and illustrations of extensive form games developed in
Microsoft
Visio
Titel: Applied game theory and strategic behavior
Autor: Geçkil, Ilhan Kubilay
Jahr: 2010
Figure List
Table List
Preface
Purpose of this Book
Our Approach
Organization of Book
Our Appreciation
Chapter 1 A Brief History of Game Theory
Why Study Games?. 1
Rapid Discoveries in the Twentieth Century. 2
Key Conceptual Developments in Early Years.2
Pioneers of Game Theory and Advancement of the Field.3
Game Theory's Evolution during the Last Three Decades.6
Recognition. 7
Chapter 2 Strategy and Game Theory Concepts
Game Theory, Strategy, and Strategic Behavior. 10
More on Strategic Behavior and Strategy.10
Game Theory and Strategic Behavior in Business.11
Consumer Behavior, Utility Theory, and Game Theory. 12
Cardinal Utility .13
Choice Behavior and Game Theory .13
Utility Functions and Game-Theoretic Models.13
Utility Theory and Payoffs.14
Game-Theoretic Models and Illustration. 14
The Payoff Matrix and Tree Diagram.14
Strategic Thinking and Simultaneous- and
Sequential-Move Games .,.16
Rules of the Game. 16
Players .17
Information.17
Perfect vs. Imperfect Information.18
Complete vs. Incomplete Information.18
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Information .18
Set of Actions and Strategies.18
Payoffs.19
Strategy and Equilibrium. 19
Dominant and Dominated Strategies.19
Dominated Strategies .20
Equilibrium.20
Nash Equilibrium .22
Note on Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and
Nash Equilibrium.:.23
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium .23
Mixed Strategies; Repeated Games .23
Maximin Strategy.24
Sequential Games and Problem Solving.25
Complex Games and Games by Categories. 27
n-Person Games.27
Different Categories of Games.29
Zero-Sum Games vs. Non-Zero-Sum Games .29
Static vs. Dynamic Games; Repeated Games .30
Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Games .30
Other Key Game Theory Concepts. 31
Threats and Rewards (Promises).31
Credibility .31
Sample Game with Threats .31
The Threat as a Strategy.32
Games of Chance: Uncertainty and Risk.32
Chapter 3 Modeling Games with Computer Software and
Experimenting Games
Prisoner's Dilemma. 36
Analysis.36
Notes .37
Modeling the Game with Matlab.38
Tit for Tat and the Repeated Game.40
Famous Experiment.40
Another Prisoner's Dilemma Experiment.41
Even More Experiments.42
Battle of the Sexes. 43
Analysis.43
Mixed Strategy.44
Modeling the Original Battle of the Sexes Game with Matlab.45
A Battle of the Sexes Experiment.47
Assumptions of the Researchers .48
Additional Experiments.50
A Sample Game of Dominated Strategies with Matlab. 50
Chapter 4 A Theory of Strategic Value
Introduction: The Game of Business. 57
Strategic Value for a Business.58
Important Concepts.58
Advanced Topics.59
Strategy and Value. 60
Accounting Net Worth.60
Current Income. .60
Portfolio Investment.61
Real Options.61
States of Nature and Strategy. 61
The State of Nature.62
A Short Revolutionary Example .62
A Revolutionary Game: The State of Affairs in 1775.63
State Variables in 1775 Colonial America.63
State Variables for Business; Control Variables. 65
How Many Ships in Your Navy?.65
The Event Tree and Dynamic Payoffs. 67
The Event Tree.67
The Extensive Form and the Event Tree.68
State and Control Variables in the Event Tree.68
Encoding History in the State .68
Additional Examples.69
Payoffs and Business Value.69
Static "Payoffs" vs. Strategic Value .69
Value Changes.69
Dynamic Payoffs.70
The Firm. 70
Equity in a Firm.71
Note on Limited-Liability Companies .72
Markets.72
Real Options and Management Flexibility. 72
The Ubiquity of Uncertainty.72
The Inherent Value of Management Flexibility.73
The Investment Decision .74
What is "Value" for a Firm?. 75
Earnings and Capital Gains.75
Strategy and the Pursuit of "Total Return".75
Available Principles of Valuation.76
Practical Models.78
Example: Strategic Valuation for the Damaged Business.80
Appendix 4.A Stochastic Processes, Diffusions, and Expectations.82
A. Introduction.82
Use of Stochastic Processes in Study of Strategic Behavior.82
B. Brownian Motion and Random Events.82
The Markov Property .83
C. Geometric Brownian Motion and Stock Prices.83
D. Expected Value.84
Expected Value of a Strategy .84
Appendix 4.B Dynamic Programming.85
A. Optimization over Time.85
B. A Prototype "Bellman Equation" for a Private Firm.85
C. Recursive Decisions.85
D. Existence Theory.86
Chapter 5 A Dynamic Game of Asymmetric Information in the
Beer Industry
A Game between a Global Brewer and a National Importer. 87
Background.87
Motivation and Incentives of Companies: Maximizing Business
Value.88
Examples.89
Business Value Depends on a Strategic Course of Action.89
Implications of Value, Risk, and Strategic Decisions
to the Game.89
Regulated Alcoholic Beverages Industry and Three-Tier
System in the U.S. 90
Sales Performance of Gambrinus; General Import Market. 91
Incentives at the Time of the 1996 Decision. 91
Incentives for Grupo Modelo.92
Objectives of Gambrinus.92
Matching and Conflicting Objectives.93
Matching Objectives .93
Conflicting Objectives .93
Concluding Remarks on Incentives.94
Strategic Options Available in 1996 and the Game. 94
Introduction of Strategic Options.94
Strategic Options at Two Stages.95
Potential Outcomes.95
Game-Theoretic Model. 96
Description.96
Information.96
Analysis of the Game.99
Stage I (1996) .99
Stage I (1996-2001) .101
Stage II .102
Outcomes of the Game and Conclusion.103
Appendix 5.A.104
Chapter 6 Consolidation in the Wine and Spirits Industry
Introduction.109
Economic Structure of the Industry. 110
Distribution Arrangements in the Industry .110
The Wine and Spirits Industry and Consolidation. Ill
Consolidation at Wholesaler Level.112
Recent M As and Business Ventures in Major Markets
at Wholesaler Level .113
A Hypothetical Consolidation. 114
Description of the Consolidation Game. 116
Market Share and Power.116
The New Market and Strategic Issues.117
Players' Strategies and Information.119
Analysis of the Game.120
Simultaneous-Move Game between Wholesalers iii and iv .122
Sequential Move Game between Supplier III and
Wholesalers iii and iv.122
Conclusion.124
Appendix 6.A.125
Chapter 7 A Regulatory Game: CAFE Standards and Competing
Automakers
Introduction. 129
Lobbying and Game Theory.130
Lobbying as Part of the Game .130
History of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). 131
Future Standards: Energy Independence and Security Act of
2007, 2011-2015 Targets.135
Current Debates. 137
Strategic and Game Theoretical Motivation behind CAFE. 138
Building the Game and Players, Strategies, Payoffs,
and Solution. 140
Game Stage 1.140
Game Stage 2.141
Outcomes of Game Stages 1 and 2.142
Game Stage 3.143
Solving the Problem and Nash Equilibrium.144
Conclusion.146
Appendix 7.A.147
Chapter 8 Business Strategy and Crisis: The U.S. Auto Industry
Introduction and Cause of the 2008 Auto Industry Crisis. 149
Likely Scenarios for the Automotive Industry. 150
Economic and Industry Conditions. 152
Sales Trends by Automaker.153
Car Sales .153
Truck Sales.154
Long-Term Sales Trends.154
Investor Confidence in Domestic Automakers and Suppliers.155
Key Events to Date (December 2, 2008). 155
Discussion of Potential Scenarios. 158
The Most-Likely Scenario.159
Scenario 1: A GM-Chrysler Merger with Federal Financial Aid .159
Other Likely Scenarios.160
Scenario 2: Federal Financial Aid and Radical Restructuring
outside of Bankruptcy .160
Scenario 3: Federal Financial Aid and Radical Restructuring
outside of Bankruptcy; Chrysler Assets Purchased by
Competitors .160
Scenario 4: Chrysler Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy;
GM and Ford Restructure outside Bankruptcy .160
Scenario 5: Both GM and Chrysler File for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy .161
Strategic Approach to a Potential Merger: Strategies
of Key Players. 161
Players and Incentives.162
Incentives of the Players.162
Strategies.163
Sample Tree Diagrams Illustrating Players' Moves
and Their Strategies.164
Strategic Analysis and Conclusion.167
Chapter 9 Game Theory and the Law
Introduction. 169
Classic Game Theory Applications in Litigation. 170
Incentives to Settle.170
Example: Litigation or Settlement in a Commercial
Damages Case .170
Optimal Sanctions.172
Example: "Punitive" Damages .172
Properly Constructing the Payoff Matrix.173
Examples: The Actual Payoff Elements.173
Commercial Damages. 174
Overview of Commercial Damages.174
Events in a Typical Commercial Damages Case .175
Evaluating Commercial Damages Using Game Theory.175
The Value of Investments under Uncertainty. 176
Game Theory and Real Options.177
Extensive Form Modeling of an Investment Outcome.177
A Simulation Model for Real Options and Game Theory
Valuation.178
Results of Experiment Using Simulation Model.179
Game Theory and Antitrust Law. 181
Market Entry and Collusion.181
Example.181
Antitrust Case Study: United States of America,
et al., v. Microsoft Corporation. 182
History of Investigations Leading up to the Antitrust Suit.183
Market Power: Windows and Internet Explorer.184
Major Competitors .184
A Game-Theoretic Model of the Microsoft Antitrust Case.185
Key Incentives .186
Analysis of Microsoft's Decision Tree.186
The Trial and Conclusions of Law .187
The Appeal .188
The Settlement .188
Appendix 9.A.190
Bibliography.193
Index.199
Figure List
Figure 2.1 Tree Diagram of a Sample Game.16
Figure 2.2 Extensive Form of the Sample Game of Table 2.7
with Sequential Moves. 25
Figure 2.3 Reduced Extensive Form of the Game. 26
Figure 2.4 Extensive Form of the Sample Game of Table 2.7
with Sequential Moves (Player II Moves First). 26
Figure 2.5 Reduced Extensive Form of the Game
(Player II Moves First). 27
Figure 2.6 Complex Version of the Game Illustrated in Figure 2.1. 28
Figure 3.1 Tree Diagram Illustration of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 37
Figure 3.2 Matlab Codes for Prisoner's Dilemma. 38
Figure 3.3 Tree Diagram of Battle of the Sexes Game
(Husband Moves First).44
Figure 3.4 Tree Diagram of Battle of the Sexes Game
(Wife Moves First).44
Figure 3.5 Matlab Codes for Battle of the Sexes Game. 45
Figure 3.6 Matlab Codes for Sample Game with Dominated Strategies. 52
Figure 4.1 Prototype State Vector.63
Figure 4.2 Elements of the State Vector, 1775. 64
Figure 4.3 State Vectors for the British and Americans, 1775. 65
Figure 4.4 State Variable for Businesses. 66
Figure 4.5 Prototype Event Tree.67
Figure 4.6 Event Tree for Natural Resources Co. 74
Figure 4.7 Damages Example. 81
Figure 5.1 Strategic Options of Modelo and Gambrinus in 1996; Extensive
Form of the Game.98
Figure 5.2 Stage III: Subgame; Renegotiation or Redeployment. 99
Figure 6.1 Extensive Form of the Game between Supplier III and
Wholesalers iii and iv.121
Figure 6.2 Extensive Form of the Game after the Simultaneous-Move
Game between Wholesalers. 123
Figure 7.1 Historical CAFE Standards for Cars and Light Trucks (Combined),
Model Years 1978 through 2008.132
Figure 7.2 Real Gas Prices v. Combined Light Trucks CAFE Standards. 133
Figure 7.3 Domestic v. Non-Domestic Passenger Car Fuel Economy Averages. 134
Figure 7.4 Tree Diagram of the Game at the Last Stage between
Automakers T and C and Their Utility Payoffs. 145
Figure 8.1 Flowchart of the Likely Scenarios.152
Figure 8.2 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample "Merger Game" -1. 165
Figure 8.3 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample "Merger Game" - II. 166
Figure 8.4 Decision-Tree Diagram of a Sample "Merger Game" - III. 167
Figure 9.1 Events in a Commercial Damages Case.171
Figure 9.2 Business Interruption with Mitigation Opportunities. 180
Figure 9.3 A Tree Diagram of Market Entry and Collusion Example. 182
Figure 9.4 Extensive Form of the Antitrust Game: Microsoft Move. 187
Figure 9.5 Matlab Codes for the SIMULINK Diagram. 191
Table List
Table 2.1 Examples of Assigning Utilities to Different Bundles.12
Table 2.2 Illustration of a Sample Payoff Matrix.15
Table 2.3 First Sample Game .20
Table 2.4 Reduced Form of the First Sample Game .21
Table 2.5 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy.22
Table 2.6 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy or Nash
Equilibria .23
Table 2.7 Sample Game with No Dominant Strategy.24
Table 2.8 Complex Game with Many Strategies.29
Table 2.9 A Sample Game of Non-Credible Threat.32
Table 3.1 Normal Form of the Classic Prisoner's Dilemma Game. 36
Table 3.2 A Prisoner's Dilemma with Low Gains from Cooperation.41
Table 3.3 A Prisoner's Dilemma with High Gains from Cooperation.41
Table 3.4 Normal Form Illustration of Battle of the Sexes Game.43
Table 3.5 Inequalities in the Battle of the Sexes Game.45
Table 3.6 Battle of the Sexes Payoff Matrix (University of
Iowa Experiment) .48
Table 3.7 Comparison of Results across Communications Treatments.49
Table 3.8 Normal Form of the Sample Game with Dominated
Strategies .50
Table 3.9 Reduced Form of the Sample Game with Dominated
Strategies .51
Table 3.10 Reduced Form of the Game in Table 3.9.51
Table 4.1 Available Principles of Business Valuation.77
Table 4.2 Valuation Models in Practical Use.79
Table 5.1 Actions and Probabilities of Stage 1.100
Table 5.2 Payoff Matrix of Stage I.100
Table 5.3 Payoff Matrix with Assigned Numbers.101
Table 5.4 Actions and Probabilities of Stage II.102
Table 5.5 Outcomes of Stage II.103
Table 5.6 Selected Major Brewers and Importers, Total U.S. Shipments,
1994-2003 .105
Table 5.7 Selected Major Brewers and Importers, U.S. Market Share,
1994-2003 .106
Table 5.8 Beer Shipments by Brand: Gambrinus v. Barton, U.S., 1997-2004.107
Table 6.1 Sample Market of Wine and Spirits, before Consolidation. 114
Table 6.2 Sample Market of Wine and Spirits, after Supplier Fs Acquisition
of Supplier II.115
Table 6.3 Final Version of the Sample Market after the Sequence of
Consolidations .115
Table 6.4 Consumption Market Share of Brands in the Sample Market.116
Table 6.5 Market Shares after Initial Transaction.117
Table 6.6 Normal Form of the Game between Wholesalers Hi and iv.122
Table 6.7 Top Ten Suppliers of Wine by Sales, U.S., 2003 and 2004.126
Table 6.8 Top Ten Suppliers of Spirits by Volume, U.S., 2005 .127
Table 7.1 DOT Average Fuel Economy Targets, Model Year 2011-2015.136
Table 7.2 Automaker T's Level of Expenditure on Lobbying and Probabilities of
Success and Failure.141
Table 7.3 Probabilities of Higher-CAFE-Standards Legislation Based upon
Outcomes of the Lobbying Efforts of Automaker T .142
Table 7.4 Lobbying Expenditure — Legislation Matrix.143
Table 7.5 Expected Utility Payoffs for Automaker T for Its Different Level
of Expenditures at the First Stage.146
Table 7.6 Fuel Economy Averages (mpg) by Automaker for 2000, 2004, and 2008 .148
Table 8.1 Light Vehicle Sales in the U.S., 2003-2008 (in millions of units).153
Table 8.2 Car Sales in the U.S. for the Major Manufacturers, First Three
Quarters, 2007-2008 .153
Table 8.3 Truck Sales in the U.S. for the Major Manufacturers, First Three
Quarters, 2007-2008 .154
Table 8.4 2008 Economic Crisis and Impact on Auto Companies' Value
(Stock Prices in USD, Daily Close).155
Table 9.1 Elements of a Payoff Matrix.174 |
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| author | Geckil, Ilhan Kubilay Anderson, Patrick L. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)171901576 (DE-588)129419486 |
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| dewey-ones | 519 - Probabilities and applied mathematics |
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| dewey-sort | 3519.3 |
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:02:08Z |
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| isbn | 9781584888437 1584888431 |
| language | English |
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| spelling | Geckil, Ilhan Kubilay Verfasser (DE-588)171901576 aut Applied game theory and strategic behavior Ilhan Kubilay Geçkil ; Patrick L. Anderson Boca Raton, Fla. [u.a.] CRC Press 2010 208 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Game theory Strategische Planung (DE-588)4309237-8 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf Problemlösen (DE-588)4076358-4 gnd rswk-swf Entscheidungsverhalten (DE-588)4113448-5 gnd rswk-swf Führungsentscheidung (DE-588)4390843-3 gnd rswk-swf Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s Strategische Planung (DE-588)4309237-8 s Problemlösen (DE-588)4076358-4 s DE-604 Führungsentscheidung (DE-588)4390843-3 s Entscheidungsverhalten (DE-588)4113448-5 s DE-188 Anderson, Patrick L. Verfasser (DE-588)129419486 aut Digitalisierung UB Bayreuth application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016733835&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext HBZ Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016733835&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Geckil, Ilhan Kubilay Anderson, Patrick L. Applied game theory and strategic behavior Game theory Strategische Planung (DE-588)4309237-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Problemlösen (DE-588)4076358-4 gnd Entscheidungsverhalten (DE-588)4113448-5 gnd Führungsentscheidung (DE-588)4390843-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4309237-8 (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4076358-4 (DE-588)4113448-5 (DE-588)4390843-3 |
| title | Applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| title_auth | Applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| title_exact_search | Applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| title_full | Applied game theory and strategic behavior Ilhan Kubilay Geçkil ; Patrick L. Anderson |
| title_fullStr | Applied game theory and strategic behavior Ilhan Kubilay Geçkil ; Patrick L. Anderson |
| title_full_unstemmed | Applied game theory and strategic behavior Ilhan Kubilay Geçkil ; Patrick L. Anderson |
| title_short | Applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| title_sort | applied game theory and strategic behavior |
| topic | Game theory Strategische Planung (DE-588)4309237-8 gnd Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd Problemlösen (DE-588)4076358-4 gnd Entscheidungsverhalten (DE-588)4113448-5 gnd Führungsentscheidung (DE-588)4390843-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Game theory Strategische Planung Spieltheorie Problemlösen Entscheidungsverhalten Führungsentscheidung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016733835&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016733835&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT geckililhankubilay appliedgametheoryandstrategicbehavior AT andersonpatrickl appliedgametheoryandstrategicbehavior |