A primer in game theory:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Harlow ; Munich [u.a.]
Prentice Hall, Financial Times
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 15. [print.] |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
| Beschreibung: | XIII, 267 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9780745011592 |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a A primer in game theory |c Robert Gibbons |
| 250 | |a 15. [print.] | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Harlow ; Munich [u.a.] |b Prentice Hall, Financial Times |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a XIII, 267 S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke | ||
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Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138001960271872 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Contents
Preface
xi
1
Static
Games of Complete Information
1
1.1
Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash
Equilibrium
........................ 2
1.1.
A Normal-Form Representation of Games
.... 2
1.1.
В
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated
Strategies
..................... 4
1.1
.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium
8
1.2
Applications
....................... 14
1.2.
A Cournot Model of Duopoly
.......... 14
1.2.B
Bertrand
Model of Duopoly
.......... 21
1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration
............. 22
1.2.D The Problem of the Commons
......... 27
1.3
Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and
Existence of Equilibrium
................ 29
1.3.A Mixed Strategies
................. 29
1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium
......... 33
1.4
Further Reading
..................... 48
1.5
Problems
......................... 48
1.6
References
........................ 51
2
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
55
2.1
Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect
Information
....................... . 57
2.1.
A Theory: Backwards Induction
......... 57
2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly
......... 61
2.1.
С
Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm
64
2.1.D Sequential Bargaining
............. . 68
2.2
Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect
Information
........................ 71
2.2.A
Theory:
Subgame
Perfection
..........71
2.2.B Bank Runs
....................73
2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International
Competition
...................75
2.2.D Tournaments
...................79
2.3
Repeated Games
.....................82
2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games
.....82
2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games
......88
2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists
. . . .102
2.3.D Efficiency Wages
.................107
2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
.......112
2.4
Dynamic Games of Complete but
Imperfect Information
.................. 115
2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games
. . 115
2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
......122
2.5
Further Reading
.....................129
2.6
Problems
.........................130
2.7
References
........................138
Static Games of Incomplete Information
143
3.1
Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium
........................144
3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under
Asymmetric Information
............144
3.1.
В
Normal-Form Representation of Static
Bayesian Games
.................146
3.1.
С
Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
. . . 149
3.2
Applications
....................... 152
3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited
...........152
3.2.B An Auction
....................155
3.2.C A Double Auction
................158
3.3
The Revelation Principle
................164
3.4
Further Reading
.....................168
3.5
Problems
.........................169
3.6
References
........................172
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
173
4.1
Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
.....175
4.2
Signaling Games
.....................183
4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling
Games
.......................183
4.2.B
Job-Market Signaling
..............190
4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
. 205
4.2.D Monetary Policy
.................208
4.3
Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium
...................... .210
4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games
................210
4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric
Information
....................218
4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners Dilemma
...............224
4.4
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
.....233
4.5
Further Reading
.....................244
4.6
Problems
.........................245
4.7
References
........................253
Index
257
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide
audience
-
not only those who will specialize as pure game theorists but also those who
will construct (or even just consume) game-theoretic models in applied fields of
economics. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory as well as the
pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The variety
of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the
same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. To emphasize the broad
potential scope of the theory, applications are drawn from industrial organization, labor
economics, macroeconomics, financial economics, and international economics.
|
| adam_txt |
Contents
Preface
xi
1
Static
Games of Complete Information
1
1.1
Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash
Equilibrium
. 2
1.1.
A Normal-Form Representation of Games
. 2
1.1.
В
Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated
Strategies
. 4
1.1
.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium
8
1.2
Applications
. 14
1.2.
A Cournot Model of Duopoly
. 14
1.2.B
Bertrand
Model of Duopoly
. 21
1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration
. 22
1.2.D The Problem of the Commons
. 27
1.3
Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and
Existence of Equilibrium
. 29
1.3.A Mixed Strategies
. 29
1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium
. 33
1.4
Further Reading
. 48
1.5
Problems
. 48
1.6
References
. 51
2
Dynamic Games of Complete Information
55
2.1
Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect
Information
. . 57
2.1.
A Theory: Backwards Induction
. 57
2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly
. 61
2.1.
С
Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm
64
2.1.D Sequential Bargaining
. . 68
2.2
Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect
Information
. 71
2.2.A
Theory:
Subgame
Perfection
.71
2.2.B Bank Runs
.73
2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International
Competition
.75
2.2.D Tournaments
.79
2.3
Repeated Games
.82
2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games
.82
2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games
.88
2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists
. . . .102
2.3.D Efficiency Wages
.107
2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy
.112
2.4
Dynamic Games of Complete but
Imperfect Information
. 115
2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games
. . 115
2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
.122
2.5
Further Reading
.129
2.6
Problems
.130
2.7
References
.138
Static Games of Incomplete Information
143
3.1
Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash
Equilibrium
.144
3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under
Asymmetric Information
.144
3.1.
В
Normal-Form Representation of Static
Bayesian Games
.146
3.1.
С
Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
. . . 149
3.2
Applications
. 152
3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited
.152
3.2.B An Auction
.155
3.2.C A Double Auction
.158
3.3
The Revelation Principle
.164
3.4
Further Reading
.168
3.5
Problems
.169
3.6
References
.172
Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
173
4.1
Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
.175
4.2
Signaling Games
.183
4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling
Games
.183
4.2.B
Job-Market Signaling
.190
4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure
. 205
4.2.D Monetary Policy
.208
4.3
Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium
. .210
4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games
.210
4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric
Information
.218
4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma
.224
4.4
Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
.233
4.5
Further Reading
.244
4.6
Problems
.245
4.7
References
.253
Index
257
This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide
audience
-
not only those who will specialize as pure game theorists but also those who
will construct (or even just consume) game-theoretic models in applied fields of
economics. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory as well as the
pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The variety
of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the
same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. To emphasize the broad
potential scope of the theory, applications are drawn from industrial organization, labor
economics, macroeconomics, financial economics, and international economics. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
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| discipline | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Mathematik Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | 15. [print.] |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035058687 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:59:40Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:21:15Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780745011592 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016727227 |
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| publishDate | 2008 |
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| spelling | Gibbons, Robert 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)128730188 aut A primer in game theory Robert Gibbons 15. [print.] Harlow ; Munich [u.a.] Prentice Hall, Financial Times 2008 XIII, 267 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Spieltheorie Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd rswk-swf (DE-588)4151278-9 Einführung gnd-content Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 s DE-604 Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016727227&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung UB Passau application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016727227&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Klappentext |
| spellingShingle | Gibbons, Robert 1958- A primer in game theory Spieltheorie Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4056243-8 (DE-588)4151278-9 |
| title | A primer in game theory |
| title_auth | A primer in game theory |
| title_exact_search | A primer in game theory |
| title_exact_search_txtP | A primer in game theory |
| title_full | A primer in game theory Robert Gibbons |
| title_fullStr | A primer in game theory Robert Gibbons |
| title_full_unstemmed | A primer in game theory Robert Gibbons |
| title_short | A primer in game theory |
| title_sort | a primer in game theory |
| topic | Spieltheorie Spieltheorie (DE-588)4056243-8 gnd |
| topic_facet | Spieltheorie Einführung |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016727227&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016727227&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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