Handbook of experimental economics results: 1
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28,[1] |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Handbook of experimental economics results |n 1 |c edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith |
| 250 | |a First edition | ||
| 264 | 1 | |a Amsterdam |b North-Holland |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a xliii, 1097, 31 Seiten |b Illustrationen. - Illustrationen | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Handbooks in economics |v 28,[1] | |
| 490 | 0 | |a Handbooks in economics | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Plott, Charles R. |4 edt | |
| 773 | 0 | 8 | |w (DE-604)BV024129142 |g 1 |
| 830 | 0 | |a Handbooks in economics |v 28,[1] |w (DE-604)BV000009734 |9 28,1 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME 1
Introduction to the Series
vii
Preface
ix
Introduction
ix
The Book Organization
xii
References
xii
PART
1:
MARKETS
Markets
3
3
1.1.
Institutional Environments
3
1.2.
Imperfect Competition
8
1.3.
Dynamics of Market Adjustments
11
References
13
PART
1.1:
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
PART
1.1.1:
PROPERTIES OF THE DOUBLE AUCTION
Chapter
1
Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets
CHARLES R. PLOTT
16
References
20
Chapter
2
From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market
Can Solve Systems of Equations
PETER BOSSAERTS AND CHARLES R. PLOTT
22
References
24
Chapter
3
Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous
Double Auction
VERNON L. SMITH AND MARK VAN BOENING
25
1.
Experimental Design
25
Contents
of
Volume 1
xtv
2.
Exogenous Uncertainty and the Bid/Ask Spread
27
3.
Conclusion 30
References
Chapter
4
Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour
PAUL I BREWER 31
L
Environment
32
l.L Vaiues and Costs
32
1.2.
Profits
32
1.3.
Limitations on Trading
32
1.4.
Market Rules
32
1.5.
Budget Constraints
33
1.6.
Trades Involve Arbitrage; No Speculative Trades
33
2.
Robot Agents
34
2.1.
Zero Intelligence Robots
-
Trading Algorithm
34
2.2.
UNIT Robots-Trading Algorithm
34
2.3.
Kaplan s Parasitic Robots -Trading Algorithm
35
3.
Literature
-
Robots and the Double Auction
35
3.1.
Types of Questions
35
3.2.
Major Results from the Literature
-
A Chronology
37
References
44
Chapters
Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading
VERNON L. SMITH AND ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS
46
1.
Introduction
46
2.
Experimental Design
46
3.
Experimental Results
48
4.
Why Do Non-binding Price Controls Interfere with the DA Market Process?
53
5.
Conclusions
53
References
53
PART
1.1.2:
PROPERTIES OF POSTED OFFER PROCESSES
Chapter
6
Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets
PRAVEEN KUJAL AND VERNON L. SMITH
55
1.
Introduction
55
2.
Market Experiments
55
2.1.
Extension: Posted Bid vs Posted Offer
56
2.2.
Our Experiments
57
3.
Hypothesis and Experimental Results
57
Contents
of
Volume
1 xv
4.
Discussion
58
4.1.
What is Fairness?
60
References
61
Chapter
7
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Be¬
havior in
Posted-Offer
Market Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND BART J. WILSON
62
1.
Introduction
62
2.
Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pricing Distributions
63
3.
Pricing Performance with Market Power
64
4.
Pricing Densities Relative to Static Nash Equilibrium Predictions
67
5.
Performance of Alternative Theories
68
6.
Summary
69
References
69
Chapter
8
Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets
JAMIE BROWN
KRUSE 71
1.
Introduction
71
2.
Summary of the Experimental Design
71
3.
Results
72
Acknowledgements
76
References
76
Chapter
9
The Performance of Double-Auction and
Posted-Offer
Markets with Advance
Production
STUART MESTELMAN
77
References
82
PART
1.1.3:
CALL MARKETS AND SEALED BIDS
Chapter
10
Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions
VERNON L. SMITH
84
1.
Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Sealed Bid-Offer Auction
85
2.
Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA)
88
3.
Summary
89
References
91
Chapter II
First Price Independent Private Values Auctions
JAMES C. COX
92
Contents
of
Volume
1
1.
Tests of the RNM with Market Prices
92
2.
Tests of the RNM with Subject Payoff Data
94
3.
Tests of the CRRAM and the RNM with Individual Bid Data
95
4.
Tests of the LCM with Individual Bid Data
96
5.
Summary of the Test Results
98
Acknowledgement
98
References
98
PART
1.1.4:
ALTERNATIVE MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Chapter
12
The Walrasian Auction
CORINNE
BRONFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE, DAVID PORTER, STEPHEN
RASSENTI AND VERNON SMITH
100
1.
Introduction
100
2.
Experimental Environments
100
2.1.
Baseline
100
2.2.
Multi-unit Non-stationary Supply and Demand Environment
101
3.
Walrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation
102
4.
Experimental Results
104
4.1.
The
E
і
Environment Replication
104
4.2.
Baseline and Treatment Effects
104
4.3.
Individual Behavior
105
References
108
Chapter
13
The Matching Market Institution
DANIEL FRIEDMAN AND CHANGHUA RICH
109
1.
Experimental Procedures
109
2.
Results HI
3.
Discussion
114
References
114
Chapter
14
Tâtonnement
CHARLES R. PLOTT
И5
Reference 1
17
PARTIE:
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
PART
1.2.1:
MARKET POWER
Chapter
15
Wage Differentials in Experimental Efficiency Wage Markets
Contents
of
Volume 1 xvii
ERNST FEHR AND SIMON GÄCHTER 120
1. Wage Differentials: Experiments
Help to Test Explanations
120
2.
The Fair Wage-Effort
Version
of Efficiency Wage Theory
121
2.1.
Experimental Design
121
2.2.
Results
121
3.
The Shirking Version of Efficiency Wage Theory
123
3.1.
Design
123
3.2.
Results
124
4.
Summary
125
References
126
Chapter
16
The Paradox of Power
YVONNE DURHAM, JACK HIRSHLEIFER AND VERNON L. SMITH
127
1.
The Model
128
2.
Implementing the Model
132
3.
Experimental Procedures and Design
132
4.
Results
133
4.1.
Nash vs Cooperative Comparisons
133
4.2.
Predictions of the Model
135
4.3.
Charting the Observations
136
References
136
Chapter
17
The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND CHARLES A. HOLT
138
1.
Introduction
138
2.
Market Power
139
3.
Applications of Market Power
143
References
145
Chapter
18
The Classical Experiments on Cournot Oligopoly
ANTONI
BOSCH-DOMÈNECH
AND NICOLAAS J.
VRIEND
146
1. Sauermann
and Selten s Results
146
2.
Hoggatt s Results
148
3.
Fouraker and
Siegeľs
Results
149
References
152
Chapter
19
Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint
JAMES C. COX AND R. MARK ISAAC
153
1.
Market Institutions for Monopoly Restraint I53
Contents
of Volume
í
2.
Contestable
Markets
^5
3.
The Lœb-Magat
Mechanism
156
4.
The Finsmger-Vogelsang Mechanism
157
5.
The Cox-Isaac Mechanism !59
Acknowledgement
61
References
161
PART
1.2.2:
COLLUSION
Price Signaling and Cheap Talk in Laboratory Posted Offer Markets
TIMOTHY
N.
CASON
164
L
Multi-Market versus Single-Market Competition
165
2.
The Importance of the Signaling Language
167
3.
Summary
168
References
168
Chapter
2
1
The Effects of Collusion in Laboratory Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND CHARLES A. HOLT
170
1.
Introduction
170
2.
Collusion with and without Secret Discounts
171
3.
Recent Work
175
References
176
Chapter
22
Predatory Pricing: Rare Like a Unicorn?
ROSARIO
GOMEZ, JACOB
K. GOEREE
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
178
1.
Introduction
178
2.
Single Market Designs
178
3.
Multiple Market Designs
180
4.
Summary
183
References
184
Chapter
23
Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price
Auctions
KATERINA SHERSTYUK [85
L
Experiments on Demand Reduction
186
2.
Experiments on Bidder Collusion
192
Acknowledgement I97
References
197
Contents
ąf
Volume
1 xix
PART
1.2.3:
NON-CONVEXITIES
Chapter
24
Non-Convexities, Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly and Monopolistic
Competition
CHARLES R. PLOTT
200
References
205
Chapter
25
Avoidable Cost Structures and Competitive Market Institutions
MARK V. BOENING AND NATHANIEL T. WILCOX
206
1.
A Simple Avoidable Cost Structure
206
2.
Three Market Institutions
208
3.
The Results
209
4.
A Next Step: Cooperative Arrangements?
211
References
211
PART
1.3:
DYNAMICS OF MARKET ADJUSTMENTS
Chapter
26
Principles of Market Adjustment and Stability
CHARLES R. PLOTT
214
1.
Theory
214
1.1.
Cobweb Dynamics
215
1.2.
The Walrasian (Hicks,
Samuelson)
Dynamics
216
1.3.
Marshallian Dynamics
216
2.
Experiments
217
2.1.
Instability does not Occur under Conditions Predicted by the Cobweb Model
217
2.2.
Walrasian Dynamics and not Marshallian Dynamics Capture the Backward-Bending Case
219
2.3.
The Marshallian Model and not the Walrasian Model Best Describes Market Behavior
in the Case of a Marshallian Externality or a Fad
223
3.
Summary
226
References
227
Chapter
27
Off-floor Trading, Market Disintegration and Price Volatility in Bid/Ask Markets
VERNON L. SMITH AND MARK VAN BOENING
228
1. The Problem
228
2.
The Environment
228
3.
Results
229
4.
Discussion: Implications for, and Barriers to, Institutional Redesign
232
References
232
Contents
of Volume I
Chapter
28
Quantitative Restrictions in Experimental Posted-offer Markets
PRAVEEN KUJAL 234
1.
Introduction
234
1.1.
Quotas
2.
Quota Experiments
235
3.
Experimental Design
236
3.1.
Market equilibrium
¿J
4.
Experimental Results
238
5.
Conclusion
240
References
24
J
Price Bubbles in Large Financial Asset Markets
ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS
242
References
246
Chapter
30
Price Bubbles
DAVID PORTER AND VERNON L. SMITH
247
1.
Introduction
247
2.
Empirical Results from Laboratory Asset Markets
247
References
255
Chapter
31
Experiments with Arbitrage Across Assets
ERIC O N. FISHER
256
References
259
Chapter
32
Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets: Common Knowledge
Failure?
CHARLES NOUSSAIR AND CHARLES PLOTT
260
References
263
Chapter
33
A Comparison of Market Institutions
TIMOTHY
N.
CASON AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
264
1.
Market Institutions
264
2.
Market Environment
266
3.
Related Work
266
4.
Results
267
4.1.
Market Efficiency
267
Contents
of
Volume
I
xxi
4.2.
Transaction Prices
269
4.3.
Transaction Volume
271
5.
Discussion
271
References
271
Chapter
34
Coordination Success in Non-cooperative Large Group Market Entry Games
AMNON RAPOPORT AND DARRYL A. SEALE
273
1.
The Market Entry Game
273
2.
Results
274
2.1.
Sundali, Rapoport,
and Seale
( 1995) 274
2.2.
Rapoport
et al.
(1998) 281
2.3.
Rapoport, Seale, and Winter
(1997) 282
3.
Adaptive Learning
293
Acknowledgement
294
References
294
PART
2:
MARKET ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION
Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information
299
Chapter
35
Learning to Forecast Rationally
HUGH KELLEY AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
303
1.
Introduction
303
2.
The Tasks
303
2.1.
Orange Juice Forecasting (OJ)
303
2.2.
The Medical Diagnosis Task (MD)
305
3.
Results
305
3.1.
Rolling Regressions
305
3.2.
OJ Learning Curves
306
3.3.
MD Learning Curves
308
4.
Discussion
308
References
310
Chapter
36
Laboratory Tests of Job Search Models
JAMES
С
COX AND RONALD L. OAXACA
311
1.
Basic Search Experiments
311
2.
Precommitment/No Precornmitment Experiments
313
3.
Recall Experiments
316
4.
Extensions of the Standard Search Model
3
g
Acknowledgements
318
Contents
of Volume
I
References 318
p
Reciprocity and Contract Enforcement
SIMON
GÄCHTER
AND ERNST FEHR
319
1.
The Contract Enforcement Problem
319
2.
Experimental Design and Results of Fehr and
Gächter
( 1
998a)
320
2.1.
Design
320
2.2.
Results
320
3.
Contract Enforcement with an Imperfect Verification Technology
323
4.
Summary
324
References
324
Chapter
38
Reciprocity in Experimental Markets
ERNST FEHR AND
ARMIN FALK
325
1.
Introduction
325
2.
Experimental Design
326
2.1.
Common Features of AH Treatments
326
2.2.
The One-sided Auction-treatment
327
2.3.
The Double Auction-treatment
327
2.4.
The Bilateral Bargaining-treatment
328
2.5.
Standard Predictions
328
3.
Results
328
4.
Reciprocity Under Conditions of High Stakes
329
5.
Related Experiments
330
Acknowledgement
333
References
334
Chapter
39
Information Cascade Experiments
LISA R. ANDERSON AND CHARLES A. HOLT
335
1.
Cascades
335
2.
Market Applications and Alternative Institutions
340
References
342
Further reading
343
Chapter
40
Markets and Information Aggregation Mechanisms
KAY-YUT CHEN AND CHARLES R. PLOTT
344
1.
Are The Lessons From The Simple Cases Useful?
348
References
352
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxiii
PART
3:
GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ECONOMICS OF MUL¬
TIPLE MARKET SYSTEMS
General Equilibrium and Multiple Market Systems
355
Chapter
41
Comparative Advantage and International Trade
CHARLES R. PLOTT
358
Reference
363
Chapter
42
Asset Pricing
PETER BOSSAERTS
364
1.
What the Theory Predicts
364
2.
The Empirical Question
365
3.
What the Field Data Teach Us
365
4.
What the Experiments Teach Us
366
References
369
Chapter
43
Price Discovery and Allocation in Chains and Networks of Markets
CHARLES R. PLOTT AND JACKIE YEUNG
370
Reference
375
Chapter
44
Multiple Market Systems and the Classical Principles of Price Dynamics in
General Equilibrium
CHARLES R. PLOTT
376
References
382
Further reading
383
PART
4:
GAMES
Games
387
4.1.
Accuracy of the Nash Model
387
4.2.
Learning in Games
389
PART
4.
ł
:
ACCURACY OF THE NASH MODEL
Chapter
45
Experimental Beauty Contest Games: Levels of Reasoning and Convergence
to Equilibrium
ROSEMARIE NAGEL
391
1.
Introduction
391
xxjv Contents of
Volume
1
2.
Variations on the Beauty Contest Game
392
3.
Bounded Rational Behavior
401
3.1.
Iterated Best Reply Model
401
3.2.
Learning
404
Appendix A: Instructions (from Duffy and
Nagel,
1997) 407
АЛ.
General
407
A.2. The Rules
407
A3.
What is the Median
408
A.4. Payoffs
408
A.5. Explanation Sheet
408
Appendix B:
408
References
409
Chapter
46
Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: An Introduction
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
411
1.
Motivation
411
2.
Ultimatum and Dictator Games Described
412
3.
Experimental Designs and Summary Results
412
4.
Interpretations and Discussion
414
References
415
Chapter
47
Preferences and Property Rights in Ultimatum and Dictator Games
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
417
1.
Property Rights Defined
417
2.
Experimental Design
417
3.
Ultimatum Results
419
4.
Dictator Games and Results
420
5.
Discussion
421
References
422
Chaptered
Prompting Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-regarding Behavior
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
423
1.
Introduction
423
i.î.
Previous Results
423
1.2.
The Current Experiment
425
2.
Experimental Design and Subject Recruitment
425
3.
Experimental Results
426
4.
Discussion
426
References
428
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxv
Chapter
49
Social
Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
429
1.
Defining Variations on Perceived Social Distance in Dictator Games
429
2.
Experimental Design
429
2.1.
Replicating Forsythe
et al. (
1994) 430
2.2.
FHSS-V
431
2.3.
Double Blind
2
(DB2)
433
2.4.
Single
Blindi
(SB
1) 433
2.5.
Single Blind
2
(SB2)
433
3.
Experimental Design and Research Hypothesis
434
4.
Results
435
References
435
Chapter
50
Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining
J. KEITH MURNIGHAN
436
1.
Defining and Investigating the Impact of Fairness Concerns
437
2.
My Offer is Fair
440
3.
Fairness, Anger, and Spite
445
4.
Ultimatum Bargaining by Children
449
5.
Ultimatums Dividing Money and M&Ms
449
6.
Conclusions
451
Acknowledgements
452
References
452
Further reading
453
Chapter
51
Coordination Failure in Market Statistic Games
JOHN VAN HUYCK AND RAYMOND BATTALIO
454
1.
Introduction
454
2.
Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure
455
3.
The Influence of Out-of-Equilibrium Payoffs
457
4.
The Influence of Group Size, Grid Size, and Order Statistic
458
5.
The Separatrix
459
Acknowledgements
461
References
461
Chapter
52
The Problem of Common Choice in Symmetric
ДГ
-person Coordination Games
CARL M. RHODES AND RICK K. WILSON
463
1.
The Problem
463
2.
Experimental Design
464
Contents
of
Volume
I
XXVI
3.
Single Stage Results 466
4.
Repeated Play Results 467
5.
Conclusion 470
Acknowledgements 4 *
References
4
Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games
NICOLE
BOUCHEZ
AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
472
1.
Laboratory Procedures and Treatments
472
2.
Results 475
3.
Discussion
479
References
479
Chapter
54
Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational?
JAMES ANDREONI AND JOHN H. MILLER
481
1. Introduction
481
2.
The Choice Task
483
3.
Checking GARP
483
4.
Conclusion
486
References
487
Chapter
55
Testing Theories of Other-regarding Behavior: A Sequence of Four Labora¬
tory Studies
GARY E.
BOLTON,
JORDI BRANDTS, ELENA
КАТОК,
AXEL OCKEN¬
FELS AND
RAMI
ZWICK 488
1.
Introduction
488
2.
Bolton
and
Zwick (1995):
Reputation Building versus Self-centered Fair¬
ness in an Ultimatum Game
489
3.
Bolton, Katók
and Zwick
(1998):
The Nature of Giving Behavior in Dic¬
tator Games
492
4. Selten
and Ockenfels
(1998)
and Ockenfels and Weimann
(1999):
The
Fixed Total Sacrifice Effect in the Solidarity Game
494
5.
Bolton,
Brandts, and Ockenfels
(1998):
Distribution versus Intentions in a
2-person Dilemma Game
495
6.
Summary: Regularities for Theory Building
498
References
498
Further reading
499
Chapter
56
Focal Points and Bargaining
Contents
of
Volume
I
xxvii
KEN
BINMORE
AND JOSEPH SWIERZBINSKI
500
References
507
PART
4.2:
ALTERNATIVES TO NASH
Chapter
57
Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental
Evidence
CATHERINE
С
ECKEL AND PHILIP J. GROSSMAN
509
Abstract
509
1.
Public Goods Experiments
510
2.
Ultimatum Experiments
513
3.
Dictator Experiments
515
4.
Conclusions
518
References
518
Chapter
58
Emergent Conventions in Evolutionary Games
JOHN VAN HUYCK
520
1.
Introduction
520
2.
Inefficient Conventions
521
3.
Coordination Conventions: Labels and Populations
522
4.
Unequal Division Bargaining Conventions
527
Acknowledgements
529
References
529
Further reading
530
Chapter
59
Self-centered Fairness in Games with More Than Two Players
GARY E.
BOLTON
AND AXEL OCKENFELS
531
1.
Introduction
531
2.
Sketch of ERC Preferences
532
3.
Evidence in Games with More Than Two Players
534
3.1.
The Giith-van Damme Bargaining Game
534
3.2.
Market Game
537
3.3.
The Fixed Total Sacrifice Effect
538
4.
Summary
539
References
540
Chapter
60
Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis
RICHARD
D. MCKEĽVEY
AND THOMAS R. PALFREY
541
1.
Introduction
541
2.
The Model
541
Contents
of
Volume
I
3.
Properties of the QRE 542
4.
Fit to Experimental Data 543
4.1.
Learning to Play Nash Over Time
543
4.2.
Systematic Bias Away from the Nash Equilibrium
543
4.3.
Nash Equilibrium Selection
544
Acknowledgement
547
References 54s
Chapter
61
Logit Equilibrium Models of Anomalous Behavior: What to do when the
Nash Equilibrium Says One Thing and the Data Say Something Else
SIMON P. ANDERSON, JACOB K. GOEREE AND CHARLES A. HOLT
549
1.
Background: The Logit Approach
551
2.
How to Find a Logit Equilibrium
552
3.
Comparative Static Properties
554
Acknowledgement
557
References
557
PART
4.3:
LEARNING IN GAMES
Chapter
62
Asymmetric Two-person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: Strate¬
gic Play and Adaptive Learning
AMNON RAPOPORT, TERRY E. DANIEL AND DARRYL A. SEALE
560
1. Most Participants Behave Strategically in General Accordance with the
Linear Equilibrium Strategy
561
2.
There is an Information Advantage Exceeding the Predictions of the
LES
563
3.
Repeated Play with a Fixed Partner Enhances Strategic Advantages
565
4.
Explanation of the Findings in Terms of Adaptive Learning
565
References
571
Chapter
63
The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-
Receiver Games
ANDREAS
BLUME,
DOUGLAS V. DEJONG AND GEOFFREY B. SPRIN¬
KLE
572
1.
Introduction
572
2.
The Games
572
3.
Results
574
3.1.
Game
1 574
3.2.
Game
2 575
4.
Summary 5g4
References 5g4
Contents
of
Volume 1 xxix
Chapter
64
Learning in Entry Limit Pricing Games
DAVID J. COOPER
585
1.
Introduction
585
2.
The Limit-pricing Game
585
3.
Experimental Procedures
588
4.
Adaptive Learning
588
5.
Experimental Results
592
6.
Conclusions
592
References
597
Chapter
65
Payoff Uncertainty and Cooperation in Finitely-repeated Prisoner s Dilemma
Games
LAWRENCE M.
KAHN
AND J. KEITH MURNIGHAN
598
1.
Methods
599
2.
The Experimental Design
599
3.
Results
602
4.
Discussion and Conclusions
604
Acknowledgements
605
References
605
Chapter
66
Learning and Equilibrium in Games
COLIN
F. CAMERER,
TECK H.
HO AND JUIN-KUAN CHONG
607
1.
Introduction
607
2.
Adaptive
EWA
and Other Learning Models
607
3.
Sophisticated
EWA
and Equilibrium Models
611
References
615
PART
5:
MECHANISM DESIGN AND POLICY APPLICATIONS
Mechanism Design and Policy Applications
619
5.1.
Abstract, Theory Driven
619
5.2.
Applied, Problem Driven
620
5.3.
From the Lab to the Field
622
References
623
PART
5.1 :
ABSTRACT, THEORY DRIVEN
Chapter
67
Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Ex¬
perimental Research
Contents
of
Volume 1
YAN
CHEN
625
1.
Introduction
625
1.1.
Theoretical Results and Unresolved Issues
625
1.2.
Economic Environments in Experiments
627
2.
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
628
3.
Nash-efficient Mechanisms
630
4.
Mechanisms Using Refinements of Nash as Implementation Concepts
635
4.1.
Perfect Nash Mechanisms
635
4.2.
Subgame
Perfect Mechanisms
637
5.
Other Mechanisms
638
6.
Concluding Remarks
639
Acknowledgements
640
References
640
Chapter
68
The Combinatorial Auction
STEPHEN J. RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
644
1.
The Environment
645
1.1.
Two Market Mechanisms: The Independent Auction and the Combinatorial Auction
646
2.
The After Market
649
3.
Results
649
References
653
PART
5.2:
APPLIED, PROBLEM DRIVEN
Chapter
69
Share Trading and Coupon Banking Interact to Improve Performance in Emis¬
sion Trading Markets
STUART MESTELMAN AND R. ANDREW
MULLER
655
References
659
Chapter
70
Trading Institutions and Emission Allowances
ΉΜΟΤΗ
Y
N.
CASON
661
1.
The Federal Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Program and the EPA Emissions
Trading Auction
661
2.
Other Emission Allowance Trading Assessments: China, Ontario and Los
Angeles
665
3.
Summary
667
References
667
Chapter
71
Procurement Contracting
Contents
of Volume
1 xxxi
JAMES
С. СОХ
AND R. MARK ISAAC
669
1.
A Model of Cost Information Asymmetry
669
2.
Linear Contracts
670
3.
Testable Hypotheses
670
4.
Experimental Results
671
Acknowledgements
674
References
675
Chapter
72
Electric Power Market Design Issues and Laboratory Experiments
STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON SMITH
676
1.
Nodal Price Theory for Lossy Lines
677
Acknowledgements
679
References
679
Chapter
73
Energy, Reserve and Adjustment Market Behavior With Industry Network,
Demand and Generator Parameters
MARK A. OLSON, STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
681
1.
Modeling Generators
681
2.
Modeling Demand
685
3.
Market Design
687
4.
Sealed Bid Day-Ahead Energy Market
687
5.
Reserve Market
688
6.
Load Adjustment Market
689
7.
Continuous Double Auction Energy Market
690
8.
The Network
690
9.
Optimization
691
lO.Subjects
691
11
.Data Analysis: Questions and Answers
692
11.1
.What is the Competitive Efficiency of the Two Markets Based on Marginal Energy Costs?
692
1
1
.2-Do SBO Prices and
CDA
Weighted Average Prices Converge to Comparable Levels?
694
1
13.What are the Profitability Levels for the Various Agents in the System?
694
11
Λ.Όο
Nodal Prices Reflect Distance Sensitivity and Line Constraints?
694
Reference
699
Chapter
74
Transmission Constraints, Incentive Auction Rules and Trader Experience in
an Electric Power Market
STEVEN BACKERMAN, STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
700
1.
Experimental Network Environment
700
2.
Experimental Design
703
3.
The Mechanism: A Continuously Updated Nodal Uniform Price Auction
703
Contents
of
Volume
I
4.
Hypotheses
and Tests
705
5.
Regression Results
ľ/
6.
Further Results 707
7.
Conclusions 708
References 709
Chapter
75
A Smart Market for the Spot Pricing and Pricing of Transmission Through a
Power Grid
HUNG-PO
CHAO
AND CHARLES
R. PLOTT
710
1. Kirchoff
s Law and Resource Constraints
710
2.
The Mechanism
71
1
2.1.
Notation
712
2.2.
Notation
713
2.3.
Dual Linear Program for Continuous-time Double Auction
713
3.
Parameter and the
Testbed
714
4.
Performance
715
Reference
718
Further reading
718
PART
5.3:
FROM THE LAB TO THE HELD
Chapter
76
Asset Market Manipulation: A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting
COLIN F.CAMERER
720
1.
Experimental Design
720
2.
Experimental Results
722
3.
Conclusion
723
References
724
Chapter
77
Pre-testing International Climate Change Policies: Methods and Results
PETER
BOHM
725
1.
Testing Gains from Emissions Quota Trade among a Few Countries
(Bohm,
1997) 726
J.Í.
TestDesigH
726
1.2.
Test Results
727
2.
Testing International Acceptability of a Global* Tradable-quota Treaty
with Diplomats as Subjects
(Bohm, 1997b)
730
References
732
Chapter
78
Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Regional Employment Subsidies
Contents
of Volume
¡
xxxiii
PETER
BOHM
733
1.
Experimental
Design
733
2.
Results
734
Further reading
735
Chapter
79
Field-test Elicitations of Demand for Public Goods
PETER
BOHM
736
References
740
Chapter
80
Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research
JOYCE BERG, ROBERT
FORS YTHE,
FORREST NELSON AND THOMAS
RIETZ
742
1.
Introduction and Description of Election Futures Markets
742
2.
Market Mechanism
743
3.
Results from Share Markets
744
3.1.
Absolute Market Accuracy
744
3.2.
Accuracy Relative to Polls
746
4.
How and why do Election Futures Markets Work?
748
5.
Other Issues Studied and Future Research Potential
749
Acknowledgements
750
References
75
j
Chapter
81
Experimental Evidence on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elici-
tation Methods
GLENN W. HARRISON AND E.
ELISABET RUTSTRÖM
752
1.
The CVM Literature and Tests with Private Goods
753
2.
The CVM Literature and Tests with Public Goods
755
3.
Open-ended Elicitation in the Lab
758
4.
Dichotomous Choice Elicitation in the Lab
760
5.
Social Elicitation in the Lab
761
6.
Constructive Solutions
762
6.1.
Instrument Calibration
762
6.2.
Statistical Calibration
763
7.
Conclusions
765
References
766
PART
6:
NON-MARKET AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH
Non-market and Organizational Research
77
j
Introduction
771
xxxiv Contents of Volume I
6.1.
Public Goods and Externalities
771
6.2.
Committees and Voting Groups
77
і
Reference 774
PART
6.1 :
PUBLIC GOODS, EXTERNALITIES AND COMMON POOLS
Chapter
82
Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments
JAMES ANDREONI AND RACHEL CROSON
776
1.
Introduction
776
2.
Partners versus Strangers
777
3.
A Closer Look
777
4.
Partners, Strangers, Warm-glow and Confusion
781
5.
What is Next?
781
References
782
Chapter
83
Differentiating Altruism and Reciprocity
RACHEL T.A. CROSON
784
1.
Introduction
784
2.
Hypotheses
785
3.
The Experiments and Results
785
4.
Types of Reciprocity
788
5.
Discussion and Conclusion
789
References
791
Chapter
84
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior
Nash Equilibria
SUSAN K.
LAURY
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
792
1.
Introduction
792
2.
Dominant Strategy Designs
793
3.
Non-dominant Strategy Designs
795
4.
Treatment Effects
799
5.
Final Observations
800
Acknowledgements
800
References gOO
Chapter
85
Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments
TATSUYOSHI
SAÜO
802
1.
Saijo-Nakamura Experiments
803
2.
Non-excludable Public Good Experiments
810
Contents
of Volume
1 xxxv
Acknowledgement
816
References
816
Chapter
86
Explaining the Comparative Statics in Step-Level Public Good Games
ARTHUR
SCHRAM, THEO OFFERMAN
AND
JOEP SONNEMANS
817
1.
Introduction
817
2.
Basic Experimental Tools
818
3.
Treatments
818
4.
Interpreting the Results
821
References
824
Cooperation in VCM Experiments: Results Using the Contribution Function
Approach
JORDI BRANDTS AND ARTHUR
SCHRAM
825
1.
Introduction
825
2.
Description of the Design
825
3.
Results
826
4.
Some Insights
829
References
829
Chapter
88
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
KENNETH S. CHAN, STUART MESTELMAN AND R. ANDREW
MULLER
831
References
835
Chapter
89
Intrinsic Motivation in a Public Good Environment
FRANS
VAN
WINDEN, FRANS
VAN
DIJK
AND
JOEP
SONNEMANS
836
1.
Introduction
836
2.
Experimental Design
837
3.
Main Observations
841
3.
i. Different Intrinsic Motivation for Contributing
841
3.2.
Intrinsic Motivation Changes with Social Interaction
841
3.3.
Effect of Success of Sociallnteraction (Social Ties)
841
3.4.
Group Formation
844
4.
Conclusions
844
References
844
Chapter
90
Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Ex¬
periments
xxxvi Contents
of Volume
I
CHARLES A. HOLT AND SUSAN K.
LAURY
846
1.
Introduction
846
2.
Generalized Preferences
848
3.
Noisy Decision Making
850
4.
Evolution and Adaptation
851
4.1.
Cooperation and Signaling ■ ■^
5.
Final Observations
854
Acknowledgement
854
References
854
PART
6.2:
COMMITTEES AND VOTING GROUPS
Chapter
91
Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule
WILLIAM P. BOTTOM, RONALD A. KING, LARRY HANDLIN AND
GARY J. MILLER
857
1.
General Introduction
857
2.
Agenda Control
858
2.1.
One-dimensional Agenda Control
858
2.2.
Decentralized Agenda Control
861
3.
Extraordinary Majorities and the Veto
864
4.
Bicameralism
867
Acknowledgements
870
References
870
Chapter
92
Endogenous Properties of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in Spatial Com¬
mittee Games
RICK K. WILSON
872
1.
Theoretical Background
872
2.
Experimental Design
873
3.
Endogenous Preferences
874
3.1.
The Core
874
3.2.
Star Preferences
875
3.3.
Skew Star Preferences
877
4.
Discussion g78
Acknowledgements
878
References g79
Chapter
93
Structure Induced Equilibrium in Spatial Committee Games
RICK K. WILSON
880
1.
Theoretical Basics ggO
Contents
of
Volume 1 xxxvii
2.
Experimental
Design 881
3.
Monopoly
Agenda
Setting
882
4.
Backward Voting Agenda
884
5.
Conclusion
887
Acknowledgements
888
References
888
Chapter
94
Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated
Outcomes and Duverger s Law
THOMAS RIETZ
889
1.
Introduction
889
2.
The Experiments
891
2.1.
Common Procedures
891
2.2.
Equilibria
891
2.3.
Specific Treatments
892
3.
Results
893
3.1.
Candidate Winning Frequencies
893
3.2.
Other Results
895
4.
Conclusions and Other Issues Studied with Similar Experiments
895
Acknowledgements
896
References
896
Chapter
95
Participation Game Experiments: Explaining Voter Turnout
JOEP SONNEMANS
AND ARTHUR
SCHRAM
898
References
901
PART
6.3:
BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATIONS
Chapter
96
Growing Organizational Culture in the Laboratory
COLIN
F. CAMERER
AND ROBERTO WEBER
903
References
907
PART
7:
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR
Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior
9
11
Risk: Effect of Stakes and Sex
9
1
}
Endowment effects
9
1
2
References
913
Contents
of
Volume 1
xxxviii J
Chapter
97
Motivation
Theory and Experimental Behavior under the Decision Cost Hy¬
pothesis
VERNON L. SMITH AND JAMES M. WALKER
914
1.
Payoffs and Behavior
914
1.1.
Decision Making and Decision Cost Under Uncertainty
915
1.2.
Two-person Interactive Model of Decision Cost
References
20
Chapter
98
Intertemporal
Choice under Habit Formation
ERNST
PEHR
AND PETER
K. ZYCH
923
1.
Introduction
923
2.
Experimental Design
923
3.
Results
924
4.
Conclusions
927
References
928
Chapter
99
Preference Reversal: Now You See it, Now You Do Not!
PETER
BOHM
929
Concluding remarks
937
References
938
Chapter
100
The Endowment Effect: Evidence of Losses Valued More than Gains
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JACK L. KNETSCH AND RICHARD H. THALER
939
1.
Experimental Verification
940
2.
Exchanges
941
3.
Repeated Trials
943
4.
Buy, Sell, and Choose
943
5.
Market Transactions
946
6.
Summary
946
References
947
Chapter
101
The Endowment Effect
PRAVEEN KUJAL AND VERNON L. SMITH
949
1. The Background
949
2.
The Experiments
950
2.1.
Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaier Choice Experiments
950
2.2.
Franciosi et al.
Choice Experiments
950
2.3.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1991)
Exchange Experiments
952
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxxix
2.4.
Mug Exchange Experiments using Uniform Price Double Auction
953
References
955
Chapter
102
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanism is not Generally Incentive-
Compatible in Practice
PETER
BOHM
956
1.
Experimental design
956
2.
Conclusions
957
References
957
Chapter
103
Utility Maximization
JAMES
С. СОХ
958
1.
The Utility Hypothesis
958
2.
A Complete, Disaggregated Data Set
960
3.
Test Results and Power
961
4.
Are the Inconsistencies with Utility Maximization Significant?
963
Acknowledgement
965
References
965
Chapter
104
Preference Reversals
JAMES
С. СОХ
967
1.
Seminal Experiments
968
2.
Independence Axiom Treatments
969
3.
Incentive Treatment
971
4.
Transitivity Treatments
972
5.
Risk Neutrality Treatment
973
6.
Market Treatment
974
Acknowledgement
975
References
975
Chapter
105
Rationality the Fast and Frugal Way: Introduction
GERD
GIGERENZER AND PETER M. TODD
976
1.
Heuristics
977
2.
A Fast and Frugal Heuristic
977
3.
The Adaptive Toolbox
979
3.1.
Heuristic Principles for Guiding Search
979
3.2.
Heuristic Principles for Stopping Search
980
3.3.
Heuristic Principles for Decision Making
980
4.
Emergency Room Decisions
981
, Contents
of
Volume
I
5.
Ecological Rationality
983
6.
What is to Come 984
References 985
Chapter
106
The Recognition Heuristic and the Less-Is-More Effect
DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN AND
GERD GIGERENZER 987
1.
Accuracy of the Recognition Heuristic
988
2.
The Less-is-More Effect
988
3.
Do People Use the Recognition Heuristic?
990
4.
Does the Less-is-More Effect Occur in Human Reasoning?
991
5.
The Underpinnings of the Recognition Heuristic
992
References
992
Chapter
107
The Recognition Heuristic: A Fast and Frugal Way to investment Choice?
ANDREAS
ORTMANN, GERD
GIGERENZER,
BERNHARD BORGES
AND DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN
993
1.
Investment Theory and Practice
993
2.
Recognition-based Investment Decisions
994
2.1.
When Choosing a Subset from a Larger Set, Choose Those Objects in the Larger Set
That are Highly Recognized
994
3.
Study
1 994
3.1.
Study Design
994
3.2.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Low Recognition Portfolios?
997
3.3.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Market Indices?
997
3.4.
How Did High Recognition Perform Relative to Managed Funds?
998
3.5.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Random Stock Picks?
999
3.6.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Individuals Investment Choices?
1000
4.
From Recognition to Riches?
1000
5.
Study
2 1000
5.1.
Study Design
1001
5.2.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Low Recognition Portfolios?
1001
5.3.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Various Benchmarks?
1002
5.4.
What About Gender Effects
ľ
1002
5.5.
From Recognition to Riches?
1002
6.
Conclusion
1003
References
1003
Chapter
108
One-Reason Decision Making
GERD GIGERENZER,
LAURA MARTIGNON,
ULRICH HOFFRAGE,
JÖRG
RIESKAMP, JEAN CZERLINSKI AND DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN
1004
Contents
of
Volume 1 xli
1.
Take The Best and Minimalist
1004
2.
Simple Rules for Search
1006
3.
Predicting Homelessness
1008
4.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics Versus Linear Models: A Competition
1008
5.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics Versus Bayesian Methods
1009
6.
Why is Take The Best so Robust?
1010
7.
Ecological Rationality: Which Environmental Structures Can Take The
Best Exploit
1011
8.
Non-compensatory Information
1011
9.
Scarce Information
1012
10.
Abundant Information
1013
1
l.Do People Intuitively Adapt Heuristics to Environmental Structures?
1013
12.Does the Use of Lexicographic Strategies Depend on Time Pressure?
1014
13.An Intelligent System Must Ignore Information
1015
References
1016
Chapter
109
Cognitive Illusions Reconsidered
GERD
GIGERENZER, RALPH HERTWIG,
ULRICH HOFFRAGE
AND
PETER SEDLMEIER
1018
1.
Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered
1018
2.
The Ecological Argument
1019
3.
Helping John Q. Public
1020
4.
Helping Physicians
1021
5.
Helping AIDS Counselors
1023
6.
Helping Lawyers and Judges
1023
7.
How to Teach Bayesian Reasoning
1024
8.
Overconfidence Bias Reconsidered
1025
9.
Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered
1027
10.
Availability Reconsidered
1030
11.
Conclusion
1033
References
1033
Chapter
¡10
Social Heuristics
PETER M. TODD,
JÖRG RIESKAMP
AND
GERD
GIGERENZER
1035
1.
Social Heuristics for Cooperation
1035
2.
Detecting Cheaters
1037
3.
Cheater Detection Versus Social Contracts
1040
4.
Cheater Detection Versus Logical Reasoning
1041
5.
Searching for Mates
1042
6.
Conclusion
1045
References
1045
,
..
Contents of Volume
1
Chapter 111
Payoff Scale Effects and Risk Preference Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions
SUSAN K.
LAURY
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
1047
1.
Introduction *04
2.
Incentive Effects for Choices Involving Gains
1048
3.
Choices in the Loss Domain, and the Reflection Effect
1050
4.
Conclusion
052
References
1053
Chapter
112
Rewards and Behavior in First Price Auctions
VBRNON L. SMITH AND JAMES M. WALKER
1054
1.
The First Price Auction
1054
2.
The Experimental Environment
1055
3.
Behavior
1056
References
1060
Chapter
113
Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence
CATHERINE C. ECKEL AND PHILIP J. GROSSMAN
1061
L
Abstract Gamble Experiments
1062
2.
Contextual Environment Experiments
1066
3.
Evidence From Field Studies
1069
4.
Discussion
1071
References
1072
PART
8:
METHODS
8.
Methods
1077
Chapter
114
Experimetrics: The Use of Market Experiments to Evaluate the Performance
of Econometric Estimators
JAMES
С
COX AND RONALD L. OAXACA
і
078
1
.
Designing Experiments to Study the Properties of Estimators
1079
2.
Performance of the Estimators
1080
3.
Explanation of the Posted Offer Results
1083
Acknowledgement
[085
References J086
Chapter
¡15
On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences
JOYCE E. BERG, THOMAS A. RIETZ AND JOHN W.
DICKHAUT 1087
Contents
of
Volume 1 xliii
1.
Introduction
1087
2.
Inducing Risk Preferences in Theory
1087
3.
Evidence
1090
3.1.
Inducing Risk Neutrality: Evidence from Sealed Bid Auctions
1090
3.2.
Inducing Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking: Evidence from Paired Choice Tasks
1092
3.3.
Inducing Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking: Evidence from the Becker-DeGroot-
Marshak Procedure
1093
4.
Summary
1094
Acknowledgements
1096
References
1096
Author Index of Volume
1
I-
1
Subject Index of Volume
1 1-19
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME 1
Introduction to the Series
vii
Preface
ix
Introduction
ix
The Book Organization
xii
References
xii
PART
1:
MARKETS
Markets
3
3
1.1.
Institutional Environments
3
1.2.
Imperfect Competition
8
1.3.
Dynamics of Market Adjustments
11
References
13
PART
1.1:
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS
PART
1.1.1:
PROPERTIES OF THE DOUBLE AUCTION
Chapter
1
Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets
CHARLES R. PLOTT
16
References
20
Chapter
2
From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market
Can Solve Systems of Equations
PETER BOSSAERTS AND CHARLES R. PLOTT
22
References
24
Chapter
3
Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid-Ask Spread in the Continuous
Double Auction
VERNON L. SMITH AND MARK VAN BOENING
25
1.
Experimental Design
25
Contents
of
Volume 1
xtv
2.
Exogenous Uncertainty and the Bid/Ask Spread
27
3.
Conclusion 30
References
Chapter
4
Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour
PAUL I BREWER 31
L
Environment
32
l.L Vaiues and Costs
32
1.2.
Profits
32
1.3.
Limitations on Trading
32
1.4.
Market Rules
32
1.5.
Budget Constraints
33
1.6.
Trades Involve Arbitrage; No Speculative Trades
33
2.
Robot Agents
34
2.1.
Zero Intelligence Robots
-
Trading Algorithm
34
2.2.
UNIT Robots-Trading Algorithm
34
2.3.
Kaplan's Parasitic Robots'-Trading Algorithm
35
3.
Literature
-
Robots and the Double Auction
35
3.1.
Types of Questions
35
3.2.
Major Results from the Literature
-
A Chronology
37
References
44
Chapters
Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading
VERNON L. SMITH AND ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS
46
1.
Introduction
46
2.
Experimental Design
46
3.
Experimental Results
48
4.
Why Do Non-binding Price Controls Interfere with the DA Market Process?
53
5.
Conclusions
53
References
53
PART
1.1.2:
PROPERTIES OF POSTED OFFER PROCESSES
Chapter
6
Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets
PRAVEEN KUJAL AND VERNON L. SMITH
55
1.
Introduction
55
2.
Market Experiments
55
2.1.
Extension: Posted Bid vs Posted Offer
56
2.2.
Our Experiments
57
3.
Hypothesis and Experimental Results
57
Contents
of
Volume
1 xv
4.
Discussion
58
4.1.
What is Fairness?
60
References
61
Chapter
7
Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Be¬
havior in
Posted-Offer
Market Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND BART J. WILSON
62
1.
Introduction
62
2.
Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pricing Distributions
63
3.
Pricing Performance with Market Power
64
4.
Pricing Densities Relative to Static Nash Equilibrium Predictions
67
5.
Performance of Alternative Theories
68
6.
Summary
69
References
69
Chapter
8
Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets
JAMIE BROWN
KRUSE 71
1.
Introduction
71
2.
Summary of the Experimental Design
71
3.
Results
72
Acknowledgements
76
References
76
Chapter
9
The Performance of Double-Auction and
Posted-Offer
Markets with Advance
Production
STUART MESTELMAN
77
References
82
PART
1.1.3:
CALL MARKETS AND SEALED BIDS
Chapter
10
Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions
VERNON L. SMITH
84
1.
Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Sealed Bid-Offer Auction
85
2.
Strategy-Proof Equilibria in the Uniform Price Double Auction (UPDA)
88
3.
Summary
89
References
91
Chapter II
First Price Independent Private Values Auctions
JAMES C. COX
92
Contents
of
Volume
1
1.
Tests of the RNM with Market Prices
92
2.
Tests of the RNM with Subject Payoff Data
94
3.
Tests of the CRRAM and the RNM with Individual Bid Data
95
4.
Tests of the LCM with Individual Bid Data
96
5.
Summary of the Test Results
98
Acknowledgement
98
References
98
PART
1.1.4:
ALTERNATIVE MARKET INSTITUTIONS
Chapter
12
The Walrasian Auction
CORINNE
BRONFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE, DAVID PORTER, STEPHEN
RASSENTI AND VERNON SMITH
100
1.
Introduction
100
2.
Experimental Environments
100
2.1.
Baseline
100
2.2.
Multi-unit Non-stationary Supply and Demand Environment
101
3.
Walrasian Auction Design and Computerized Implementation
102
4.
Experimental Results
104
4.1.
The
E
і
Environment Replication
104
4.2.
Baseline and Treatment Effects
104
4.3.
Individual Behavior
105
References
108
Chapter
13
The Matching Market Institution
DANIEL FRIEDMAN AND CHANGHUA RICH
109
1.
Experimental Procedures
109
2.
Results HI
3.
Discussion
114
References
114
Chapter
14
Tâtonnement
CHARLES R. PLOTT
И5
Reference 1
17
PARTIE:
IMPERFECT COMPETITION
PART
1.2.1:
MARKET POWER
Chapter
15
Wage Differentials in Experimental Efficiency Wage Markets
Contents
of
Volume 1 xvii
ERNST FEHR AND SIMON GÄCHTER 120
1. Wage Differentials: Experiments
Help to Test Explanations
120
2.
The Fair Wage-Effort
Version
of Efficiency Wage Theory
121
2.1.
Experimental Design
121
2.2.
Results
121
3.
The Shirking Version of Efficiency Wage Theory
123
3.1.
Design
123
3.2.
Results
124
4.
Summary
125
References
126
Chapter
16
The Paradox of Power
YVONNE DURHAM, JACK HIRSHLEIFER AND VERNON L. SMITH
127
1.
The Model
128
2.
Implementing the Model
132
3.
Experimental Procedures and Design
132
4.
Results
133
4.1.
Nash vs Cooperative Comparisons
133
4.2.
Predictions of the Model
135
4.3.
Charting the Observations
136
References
136
Chapter
17
The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND CHARLES A. HOLT
138
1.
Introduction
138
2.
Market Power
139
3.
Applications of Market Power
143
References
145
Chapter
18
The Classical Experiments on Cournot Oligopoly
ANTONI
BOSCH-DOMÈNECH
AND NICOLAAS J.
VRIEND
146
1. Sauermann
and Selten's Results
146
2.
Hoggatt's Results
148
3.
Fouraker and
Siegeľs
Results
149
References
152
Chapter
19
Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint
JAMES C. COX AND R. MARK ISAAC
153
1.
Market Institutions for Monopoly Restraint I53
Contents
of Volume
í
2.
Contestable
Markets
^5
3.
The Lœb-Magat
Mechanism
156
4.
The Finsmger-Vogelsang Mechanism
157
5.
The Cox-Isaac Mechanism !59
Acknowledgement
'61
References
161
PART
1.2.2:
COLLUSION
Price Signaling and "Cheap Talk" in Laboratory Posted Offer Markets
TIMOTHY
N.
CASON
164
L
Multi-Market versus Single-Market Competition
165
2.
The Importance of the Signaling Language
167
3.
Summary
168
References
168
Chapter
2
1
The Effects of Collusion in Laboratory Experiments
DOUGLAS D. DAVIS AND CHARLES A. HOLT
170
1.
Introduction
170
2.
Collusion with and without Secret Discounts
171
3.
Recent Work
175
References
176
Chapter
22
Predatory Pricing: Rare Like a Unicorn?
ROSARIO
GOMEZ, JACOB
K. GOEREE
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
178
1.
Introduction
178
2.
Single Market Designs
178
3.
Multiple Market Designs
180
4.
Summary
183
References
184
Chapter
23
Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price
Auctions
KATERINA SHERSTYUK [85
L
Experiments on Demand Reduction
186
2.
Experiments on Bidder Collusion
192
Acknowledgement I97
References
197
Contents
ąf
Volume
1 xix
PART
1.2.3:
NON-CONVEXITIES
Chapter
24
Non-Convexities, Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly and Monopolistic
Competition
CHARLES R. PLOTT
200
References
205
Chapter
25
Avoidable Cost Structures and Competitive Market Institutions
MARK V. BOENING AND NATHANIEL T. WILCOX
206
1.
A Simple Avoidable Cost Structure
206
2.
Three Market Institutions
208
3.
The Results
209
4.
A Next Step: Cooperative Arrangements?
211
References
211
PART
1.3:
DYNAMICS OF MARKET ADJUSTMENTS
Chapter
26
Principles of Market Adjustment and Stability
CHARLES R. PLOTT
214
1.
Theory
214
1.1.
Cobweb Dynamics
215
1.2.
The Walrasian (Hicks,
Samuelson)
Dynamics
216
1.3.
Marshallian Dynamics
216
2.
Experiments
217
2.1.
Instability does not Occur under Conditions Predicted by the Cobweb Model
217
2.2.
Walrasian Dynamics and not Marshallian Dynamics Capture the Backward-Bending Case
219
2.3.
The Marshallian Model and not the Walrasian Model Best Describes Market Behavior
in the Case of a Marshallian Externality or a "Fad"
223
3.
Summary
226
References
227
Chapter
27
Off-floor Trading, Market Disintegration and Price Volatility in Bid/Ask Markets
VERNON L. SMITH AND MARK VAN BOENING
228
1. The Problem
228
2.
The Environment
228
3.
Results
229
4.
Discussion: Implications for, and Barriers to, Institutional Redesign
232
References
232
Contents
of Volume I
Chapter
28
Quantitative Restrictions in Experimental Posted-offer Markets
PRAVEEN KUJAL 234
1.
Introduction
234
1.1.
Quotas
2.
Quota Experiments
235
3.
Experimental Design
236
3.1.
Market equilibrium
¿J
'
4.
Experimental Results
238
5.
Conclusion
240
References
24
J
Price Bubbles in Large Financial Asset Markets
ARLINGTON W. WILLIAMS
242
References
246
Chapter
30
Price Bubbles
DAVID PORTER AND VERNON L. SMITH
247
1.
Introduction
247
2.
Empirical Results from Laboratory Asset Markets
247
References
255
Chapter
31
Experiments with Arbitrage Across Assets
ERIC O'N. FISHER
256
References
259
Chapter
32
Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets: Common Knowledge
Failure?
CHARLES NOUSSAIR AND CHARLES PLOTT
260
References
263
Chapter
33
A Comparison of Market Institutions
TIMOTHY
N.
CASON AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
264
1.
Market Institutions
264
2.
Market Environment
266
3.
Related Work
266
4.
Results
267
4.1.
Market Efficiency
267
Contents
of
Volume
I
xxi
4.2.
Transaction Prices
269
4.3.
Transaction Volume
271
5.
Discussion
271
References
271
Chapter
34
Coordination Success in Non-cooperative Large Group Market Entry Games
AMNON RAPOPORT AND DARRYL A. SEALE
273
1.
The Market Entry Game
273
2.
Results
274
2.1.
Sundali, Rapoport,
and Seale
( 1995) 274
2.2.
Rapoport
et al.
(1998) 281
2.3.
Rapoport, Seale, and Winter
(1997) 282
3.
Adaptive Learning
293
Acknowledgement
294
References
294
PART
2:
MARKET ECONOMICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION
Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information
299
Chapter
35
Learning to Forecast Rationally
HUGH KELLEY AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
303
1.
Introduction
303
2.
The Tasks
303
2.1.
Orange Juice Forecasting (OJ)
303
2.2.
The Medical Diagnosis Task (MD)
305
3.
Results
305
3.1.
Rolling Regressions
305
3.2.
OJ Learning Curves
306
3.3.
MD Learning Curves
308
4.
Discussion
308
References
310
Chapter
36
Laboratory Tests of Job Search Models
JAMES
С
COX AND RONALD L. OAXACA
311
1.
Basic Search Experiments
311
2.
Precommitment/No Precornmitment Experiments
313
3.
Recall Experiments
316
4.
Extensions of the Standard Search Model
3
\
g
Acknowledgements
318
Contents
of Volume
I
References 318
p
Reciprocity and Contract Enforcement
SIMON
GÄCHTER
AND ERNST FEHR
319
1.
The Contract Enforcement Problem
319
2.
Experimental Design and Results of Fehr and
Gächter
( 1
998a)
320
2.1.
Design
320
2.2.
Results
320
3.
Contract Enforcement with an Imperfect Verification Technology
323
4.
Summary
324
References
324
Chapter
38
Reciprocity in Experimental Markets
ERNST FEHR AND
ARMIN FALK
325
1.
Introduction
325
2.
Experimental Design
326
2.1.
Common Features of AH Treatments
326
2.2.
The One-sided Auction-treatment
327
2.3.
The Double Auction-treatment
327
2.4.
The Bilateral Bargaining-treatment
328
2.5.
Standard Predictions
328
3.
Results
328
4.
Reciprocity Under Conditions of High Stakes
329
5.
Related Experiments
330
Acknowledgement
333
References
334
Chapter
39
Information Cascade Experiments
LISA R. ANDERSON AND CHARLES A. HOLT
335
1.
Cascades
335
2.
Market Applications and Alternative Institutions
340
References
342
Further reading
343
Chapter
40
Markets and Information Aggregation Mechanisms
KAY-YUT CHEN AND CHARLES R. PLOTT
344
1.
Are The Lessons From The Simple Cases Useful?
348
References
352
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxiii
PART
3:
GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE ECONOMICS OF MUL¬
TIPLE MARKET SYSTEMS
General Equilibrium and Multiple Market Systems
355
Chapter
41
Comparative Advantage and International Trade
CHARLES R. PLOTT
358
Reference
363
Chapter
42
Asset Pricing
PETER BOSSAERTS
364
1.
What the Theory Predicts
364
2.
The Empirical Question
365
3.
What the Field Data Teach Us
365
4.
What the Experiments Teach Us
366
References
369
Chapter
43
Price Discovery and Allocation in Chains and Networks of Markets
CHARLES R. PLOTT AND JACKIE YEUNG
370
Reference
375
Chapter
44
Multiple Market Systems and the Classical Principles of Price Dynamics in
General Equilibrium
CHARLES R. PLOTT
376
References
382
Further reading
383
PART
4:
GAMES
Games
387
4.1.
Accuracy of the Nash Model
387
4.2.
Learning in Games
389
PART
4.
ł
:
ACCURACY OF THE NASH MODEL
Chapter
45
Experimental Beauty Contest Games: Levels of Reasoning and Convergence
to Equilibrium
ROSEMARIE NAGEL
391
1.
Introduction
391
xxjv Contents of
Volume
1
2.
Variations on the Beauty Contest Game
392
3.
Bounded Rational Behavior
401
3.1.
Iterated Best Reply Model
401
3.2.
Learning
404
Appendix A: Instructions (from Duffy and
Nagel,
1997) 407
АЛ.
General
407
A.2. The Rules
407
A3.
What is the Median
408
A.4. Payoffs
408
A.5. Explanation Sheet
408
Appendix B:
408
References
409
Chapter
46
Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: An Introduction
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
411
1.
Motivation
411
2.
Ultimatum and Dictator Games Described
412
3.
Experimental Designs and Summary Results
412
4.
Interpretations and Discussion
414
References
415
Chapter
47
Preferences and Property Rights in Ultimatum and Dictator Games
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
417
1.
Property Rights Defined
417
2.
Experimental Design
417
3.
Ultimatum Results
419
4.
Dictator Games and Results
420
5.
Discussion
421
References
422
Chaptered
Prompting Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-regarding Behavior
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
423
1.
Introduction
423
i.î.
Previous Results
423
1.2.
The Current Experiment
425
2.
Experimental Design and Subject Recruitment
425
3.
Experimental Results
426
4.
Discussion
426
References
428
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxv
Chapter
49
Social
Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games
ELIZABETH HOFFMAN, KEVIN MCCABE AND VERNON SMITH
429
1.
Defining Variations on Perceived Social Distance in Dictator Games
429
2.
Experimental Design
429
2.1.
Replicating Forsythe
et al. (
1994) 430
2.2.
FHSS-V
431
2.3.
Double Blind
2
(DB2)
433
2.4.
Single
Blindi
(SB
1) 433
2.5.
Single Blind
2
(SB2)
433
3.
Experimental Design and Research Hypothesis
434
4.
Results
435
References
435
Chapter
50
Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining
J. KEITH MURNIGHAN
436
1.
Defining and Investigating the Impact of Fairness Concerns
437
2.
"My Offer is Fair"
440
3.
Fairness, Anger, and Spite
445
4.
Ultimatum Bargaining by Children
449
5.
Ultimatums Dividing Money and M&Ms
449
6.
Conclusions
451
Acknowledgements
452
References
452
Further reading
453
Chapter
51
Coordination Failure in Market Statistic Games
JOHN VAN HUYCK AND RAYMOND BATTALIO
454
1.
Introduction
454
2.
Strategic Uncertainty and Coordination Failure
455
3.
The Influence of Out-of-Equilibrium Payoffs
457
4.
The Influence of Group Size, Grid Size, and Order Statistic
458
5.
The Separatrix
459
Acknowledgements
461
References
461
Chapter
52
The Problem of Common Choice in Symmetric
ДГ
-person Coordination Games
CARL M. RHODES AND RICK K. WILSON
463
1.
The Problem
463
2.
Experimental Design
464
Contents
of
Volume
I
XXVI
3.
Single Stage Results 466
4.
Repeated Play Results 467
5.
Conclusion 470
Acknowledgements 4'*
References
4 '
Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games
NICOLE
BOUCHEZ
AND DANIEL FRIEDMAN
472
1.
Laboratory Procedures and Treatments
472
2.
Results 475
3.
Discussion
479
References
479
Chapter
54
Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational?
JAMES ANDREONI AND JOHN H. MILLER
481
1. Introduction
481
2.
The Choice Task
483
3.
Checking GARP
483
4.
Conclusion
486
References
487
Chapter
55
Testing Theories of Other-regarding Behavior: A Sequence of Four Labora¬
tory Studies
GARY E.
BOLTON,
JORDI BRANDTS, ELENA
КАТОК,
AXEL OCKEN¬
FELS AND
RAMI
ZWICK 488
1.
Introduction
488
2.
Bolton
and
Zwick (1995):
Reputation Building versus Self-centered Fair¬
ness in an Ultimatum Game
489
3.
Bolton, Katók
and Zwick
(1998):
The Nature of Giving Behavior in Dic¬
tator Games
492
4. Selten
and Ockenfels
(1998)
and Ockenfels and Weimann
(1999):
The
Fixed Total Sacrifice Effect in the Solidarity Game
494
5.
Bolton,
Brandts, and Ockenfels
(1998):
Distribution versus Intentions in a
2-person Dilemma Game
495
6.
Summary: Regularities for Theory Building
498
References
498
Further reading
499
Chapter
56
Focal Points and Bargaining
Contents
of
Volume
I
xxvii
KEN
BINMORE
AND JOSEPH SWIERZBINSKI
500
References
507
PART
4.2:
ALTERNATIVES TO NASH
Chapter
57
Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental
Evidence
CATHERINE
С
ECKEL AND PHILIP J. GROSSMAN
509
Abstract
509
1.
Public Goods Experiments
510
2.
Ultimatum Experiments
513
3.
Dictator Experiments
515
4.
Conclusions
518
References
518
Chapter
58
Emergent Conventions in Evolutionary Games
JOHN VAN HUYCK
520
1.
Introduction
520
2.
Inefficient Conventions
521
3.
Coordination Conventions: Labels and Populations
522
4.
Unequal Division Bargaining Conventions
527
Acknowledgements
529
References
529
Further reading
530
Chapter
59
Self-centered Fairness in Games with More Than Two Players
GARY E.
BOLTON
AND AXEL OCKENFELS
531
1.
Introduction
531
2.
Sketch of ERC Preferences
532
3.
Evidence in Games with More Than Two Players
534
3.1.
The Giith-van Damme Bargaining Game
534
3.2.
Market Game
537
3.3.
The Fixed Total Sacrifice Effect
538
4.
Summary
539
References
540
Chapter
60
Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis
RICHARD
D. MCKEĽVEY
AND THOMAS R. PALFREY
541
1.
Introduction
541
2.
The Model
541
Contents
of
Volume
I
3.
Properties of the QRE 542
4.
Fit to Experimental Data 543
4.1.
Learning to Play Nash Over Time
543
4.2.
Systematic Bias Away from the Nash Equilibrium
543
4.3.
Nash Equilibrium Selection
544
Acknowledgement
547
References 54s
Chapter
61
Logit Equilibrium Models of Anomalous Behavior: What to do when the
Nash Equilibrium Says One Thing and the Data Say Something Else
SIMON P. ANDERSON, JACOB K. GOEREE AND CHARLES A. HOLT
549
1.
Background: The Logit Approach
551
2.
How to Find a Logit Equilibrium
552
3.
Comparative Static Properties
554
Acknowledgement
557
References
557
PART
4.3:
LEARNING IN GAMES
Chapter
62
Asymmetric Two-person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: Strate¬
gic Play and Adaptive Learning
AMNON RAPOPORT, TERRY E. DANIEL AND DARRYL A. SEALE
560
1. Most Participants Behave Strategically in General Accordance with the
Linear Equilibrium Strategy
561
2.
There is an Information Advantage Exceeding the Predictions of the
LES
563
3.
Repeated Play with a Fixed Partner Enhances Strategic Advantages
565
4.
Explanation of the Findings in Terms of Adaptive Learning
565
References
571
Chapter
63
The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-
Receiver Games
ANDREAS
BLUME,
DOUGLAS V. DEJONG AND GEOFFREY B. SPRIN¬
KLE
572
1.
Introduction
572
2.
The Games
572
3.
Results
574
3.1.
Game
1 574
3.2.
Game
2 575
4.
Summary 5g4
References 5g4
Contents
of
Volume 1 xxix
Chapter
64
Learning in Entry Limit Pricing Games
DAVID J. COOPER
585
1.
Introduction
585
2.
The Limit-pricing Game
585
3.
Experimental Procedures
588
4.
Adaptive Learning
588
5.
Experimental Results
592
6.
Conclusions
592
References
597
Chapter
65
Payoff Uncertainty and Cooperation in Finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Games
LAWRENCE M.
KAHN
AND J. KEITH MURNIGHAN
598
1.
Methods
599
2.
The Experimental Design
599
3.
Results
602
4.
Discussion and Conclusions
604
Acknowledgements
605
References
605
Chapter
66
Learning and Equilibrium in Games
COLIN
F. CAMERER,
TECK H.
HO AND JUIN-KUAN CHONG
607
1.
Introduction
607
2.
Adaptive
EWA
and Other Learning Models
607
3.
Sophisticated
EWA
and Equilibrium Models
611
References
615
PART
5:
MECHANISM DESIGN AND POLICY APPLICATIONS
Mechanism Design and Policy Applications
619
5.1.
Abstract, Theory Driven
619
5.2.
Applied, Problem Driven
620
5.3.
From the Lab to the Field
622
References
623
PART
5.1 :
ABSTRACT, THEORY DRIVEN
Chapter
67
Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Ex¬
perimental Research
Contents
of
Volume 1
YAN
CHEN
625
1.
Introduction
625
1.1.
Theoretical Results and Unresolved Issues
625
1.2.
Economic Environments in Experiments
627
2.
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
628
3.
Nash-efficient Mechanisms
630
4.
Mechanisms Using Refinements of Nash as Implementation Concepts
635
4.1.
Perfect Nash Mechanisms
635
4.2.
Subgame
Perfect Mechanisms
637
5.
Other Mechanisms
638
6.
Concluding Remarks
639
Acknowledgements
640
References
640
Chapter
68
The Combinatorial Auction
STEPHEN J. RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
644
1.
The Environment
645
1.1.
Two Market Mechanisms: The Independent Auction and the Combinatorial Auction
646
2.
The After Market
649
3.
Results
649
References
653
PART
5.2:
APPLIED, PROBLEM DRIVEN
Chapter
69
Share Trading and Coupon Banking Interact to Improve Performance in Emis¬
sion Trading Markets
STUART MESTELMAN AND R. ANDREW
MULLER
655
References
659
Chapter
70
Trading Institutions and Emission Allowances
ΉΜΟΤΗ
Y
N.
CASON
661
1.
The Federal Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Program and the EPA Emissions
Trading Auction
661
2.
Other Emission Allowance Trading Assessments: China, Ontario and Los
Angeles
665
3.
Summary
667
References
667
Chapter
71
Procurement Contracting
Contents
of Volume
1 xxxi
JAMES
С. СОХ
AND R. MARK ISAAC
669
1.
A Model of Cost Information Asymmetry
669
2.
Linear Contracts
670
3.
Testable Hypotheses
670
4.
Experimental Results
671
Acknowledgements
674
References
675
Chapter
72
Electric Power Market Design Issues and Laboratory Experiments
STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON SMITH
676
1.
Nodal Price Theory for Lossy Lines
677
Acknowledgements
679
References
679
Chapter
73
Energy, Reserve and Adjustment Market Behavior With Industry Network,
Demand and Generator Parameters
MARK A. OLSON, STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
681
1.
Modeling Generators
681
2.
Modeling Demand
685
3.
Market Design
687
4.
Sealed Bid Day-Ahead Energy Market
687
5.
Reserve Market
688
6.
Load Adjustment Market
689
7.
Continuous Double Auction Energy Market
690
8.
The Network
690
9.
Optimization
691
lO.Subjects
691
11
.Data Analysis: Questions and Answers
692
11.1
.What is the Competitive Efficiency of the Two Markets Based on Marginal Energy Costs?
692
1
1
.2-Do SBO Prices and
CDA
Weighted Average Prices Converge to Comparable Levels?
694
1
13.What are the Profitability Levels for the Various Agents in the System?
694
11
Λ.Όο
Nodal Prices Reflect Distance Sensitivity and Line Constraints?
694
Reference
699
Chapter
74
Transmission Constraints, Incentive Auction Rules and Trader Experience in
an Electric Power Market
STEVEN BACKERMAN, STEPHEN RASSENTI AND VERNON L. SMITH
700
1.
Experimental Network Environment
700
2.
Experimental Design
703
3.
The Mechanism: A Continuously Updated Nodal Uniform Price Auction
703
Contents
of
Volume
I
4.
Hypotheses
and Tests
705
5.
Regression Results
"ľ/
6.
Further Results 707
7.
Conclusions 708
References 709
Chapter
75
A Smart Market for the Spot Pricing and Pricing of Transmission Through a
Power Grid
HUNG-PO
CHAO
AND CHARLES
R. PLOTT
710
1. Kirchoff
's Law and Resource Constraints
710
2.
The Mechanism
71
1
2.1.
Notation
712
2.2.
Notation
713
2.3.
Dual Linear Program for Continuous-time Double Auction
713
3.
Parameter and the
Testbed
714
4.
Performance
715
Reference
718
Further reading
718
PART
5.3:
FROM THE LAB TO THE HELD
Chapter
76
Asset Market Manipulation: A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting
COLIN F.CAMERER
720
1.
Experimental Design
720
2.
Experimental Results
722
3.
Conclusion
723
References
724
Chapter
77
Pre-testing International Climate Change Policies: Methods and Results
PETER
BOHM
725
1.
Testing Gains from Emissions Quota Trade among a Few Countries
(Bohm,
1997) 726
J.Í.
TestDesigH
726
1.2.
Test Results
727
2.
Testing International Acceptability of a 'Global* Tradable-quota Treaty
with Diplomats as Subjects
(Bohm, 1997b)
730
References
732
Chapter
78
Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Regional Employment Subsidies
Contents
of Volume
¡
xxxiii
PETER
BOHM
733
1.
Experimental
Design
733
2.
Results
734
Further reading
735
Chapter
79
Field-test Elicitations of Demand for Public Goods
PETER
BOHM
736
References
740
Chapter
80
Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research
JOYCE BERG, ROBERT
FORS YTHE,
FORREST NELSON AND THOMAS
RIETZ
742
1.
Introduction and Description of Election Futures Markets
742
2.
Market Mechanism
743
3.
Results from Share Markets
744
3.1.
Absolute Market Accuracy
744
3.2.
Accuracy Relative to Polls
746
4.
How and why do Election Futures Markets "Work?"
748
5.
Other Issues Studied and Future Research Potential
749
Acknowledgements
750
References
75
j
Chapter
81
Experimental Evidence on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elici-
tation Methods
GLENN W. HARRISON AND E.
ELISABET RUTSTRÖM
752
1.
The CVM Literature and Tests with Private Goods
753
2.
The CVM Literature and Tests with Public Goods
755
3.
Open-ended Elicitation in the Lab
758
4.
Dichotomous Choice Elicitation in the Lab
760
5.
Social Elicitation in the Lab
761
6.
Constructive Solutions
762
6.1.
Instrument Calibration
762
6.2.
Statistical Calibration
763
7.
Conclusions
765
References
766
PART
6:
NON-MARKET AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH
Non-market and Organizational Research
77
j
Introduction
771
xxxiv Contents of Volume I
6.1.
Public Goods and Externalities
771
6.2.
Committees and Voting Groups
77
і
Reference 774
PART
6.1 :
PUBLIC GOODS, EXTERNALITIES AND COMMON POOLS
Chapter
82
Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments
JAMES ANDREONI AND RACHEL CROSON
776
1.
Introduction
776
2.
Partners versus Strangers
777
3.
A Closer Look
777
4.
Partners, Strangers, Warm-glow and Confusion
781
5.
What is Next?
781
References
782
Chapter
83
Differentiating Altruism and Reciprocity
RACHEL T.A. CROSON
784
1.
Introduction
784
2.
Hypotheses
785
3.
The Experiments and Results
785
4.
Types of Reciprocity
788
5.
Discussion and Conclusion
789
References
791
Chapter
84
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior
Nash Equilibria
SUSAN K.
LAURY
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
792
1.
Introduction
792
2.
Dominant Strategy Designs
793
3.
Non-dominant Strategy Designs
795
4.
Treatment Effects
799
5.
Final Observations
800
Acknowledgements
800
References gOO
Chapter
85
Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments
TATSUYOSHI
SAÜO
802
1.
Saijo-Nakamura Experiments
803
2.
Non-excludable Public Good Experiments
810
Contents
of Volume
1 xxxv
Acknowledgement
816
References
816
Chapter
86
Explaining the Comparative Statics in Step-Level Public Good Games
ARTHUR
SCHRAM, THEO OFFERMAN
AND
JOEP SONNEMANS
817
1.
Introduction
817
2.
Basic Experimental Tools
818
3.
Treatments
818
4.
Interpreting the Results
821
References
824
Cooperation in VCM Experiments: Results Using the Contribution Function
Approach
JORDI BRANDTS AND ARTHUR
SCHRAM
825
1.
Introduction
825
2.
Description of the Design
825
3.
Results
826
4.
Some Insights
829
References
829
Chapter
88
Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
KENNETH S. CHAN, STUART MESTELMAN AND R. ANDREW
MULLER
831
References
835
Chapter
89
Intrinsic Motivation in a Public Good Environment
FRANS
VAN
WINDEN, FRANS
VAN
DIJK
AND
JOEP
SONNEMANS
836
1.
Introduction
836
2.
Experimental Design
837
3.
Main Observations
841
3.
i. Different Intrinsic Motivation for Contributing
841
3.2.
Intrinsic Motivation Changes with Social Interaction
841
3.3.
Effect of Success of Sociallnteraction (Social Ties)
841
3.4.
Group Formation
844
4.
Conclusions
844
References
844
Chapter
90
Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Ex¬
periments
xxxvi Contents
of Volume
I
CHARLES A. HOLT AND SUSAN K.
LAURY
846
1.
Introduction
846
2.
Generalized Preferences
848
3.
Noisy Decision Making
850
4.
Evolution and Adaptation
851
4.1.
Cooperation and Signaling "■'■^
5.
Final Observations
854
Acknowledgement
854
References
854
PART
6.2:
COMMITTEES AND VOTING GROUPS
Chapter
91
Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule
WILLIAM P. BOTTOM, RONALD A. KING, LARRY HANDLIN AND
GARY J. MILLER
857
1.
General Introduction
857
2.
Agenda Control
858
2.1.
One-dimensional Agenda Control
858
2.2.
Decentralized Agenda Control
861
3.
Extraordinary Majorities and the Veto
864
4.
Bicameralism
867
Acknowledgements
870
References
870
Chapter
92
Endogenous Properties of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in Spatial Com¬
mittee Games
RICK K. WILSON
872
1.
Theoretical Background
872
2.
Experimental Design
873
3.
Endogenous Preferences
874
3.1.
The Core
874
3.2.
Star Preferences
875
3.3.
Skew Star Preferences
877
4.
Discussion g78
Acknowledgements
878
References g79
Chapter
93
Structure Induced Equilibrium in Spatial Committee Games
RICK K. WILSON
880
1.
Theoretical Basics ggO
Contents
of
Volume 1 xxxvii
2.
Experimental
Design 881
3.
Monopoly
Agenda
Setting
882
4.
Backward Voting Agenda
884
5.
Conclusion
887
Acknowledgements
888
References
888
Chapter
94
Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated
Outcomes and Duverger's Law
THOMAS RIETZ
889
1.
Introduction
889
2.
The Experiments
891
2.1.
Common Procedures
891
2.2.
Equilibria
891
2.3.
Specific Treatments
892
3.
Results
893
3.1.
Candidate Winning Frequencies
893
3.2.
Other Results
895
4.
Conclusions and Other Issues Studied with Similar Experiments
895
Acknowledgements
896
References
896
Chapter
95
Participation Game Experiments: Explaining Voter Turnout
JOEP SONNEMANS
AND ARTHUR
SCHRAM
898
References
901
PART
6.3:
BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATIONS
Chapter
96
Growing Organizational Culture in the Laboratory
COLIN
F. CAMERER
AND ROBERTO WEBER
903
References
907
PART
7:
INDIVIDUAL CHOICE, BELIEFS AND BEHAVIOR
Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior
9
11
Risk: Effect of Stakes and Sex
9
1
}
Endowment effects
9
1
2
References
913
Contents
of
Volume 1
xxxviii J
Chapter
97
Motivation
Theory and Experimental Behavior under the Decision Cost Hy¬
pothesis
VERNON L. SMITH AND JAMES M. WALKER
914
1.
Payoffs and Behavior
914
1.1.
Decision Making and Decision Cost Under Uncertainty
915
1.2.
Two-person Interactive Model of Decision Cost
" ' '
References
"20
Chapter
98
Intertemporal
Choice under Habit Formation
ERNST
PEHR
AND PETER
K. ZYCH
923
1.
Introduction
923
2.
Experimental Design
923
3.
Results
924
4.
Conclusions
927
References
928
Chapter
99
Preference Reversal: Now You See it, Now You Do Not!
PETER
BOHM
929
Concluding remarks
937
References
938
Chapter
100
The Endowment Effect: Evidence of Losses Valued More than Gains
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, JACK L. KNETSCH AND RICHARD H. THALER
939
1.
Experimental Verification
940
2.
Exchanges
941
3.
Repeated Trials
943
4.
Buy, Sell, and Choose
943
5.
Market Transactions
946
6.
Summary
946
References
947
Chapter
101
The Endowment Effect
PRAVEEN KUJAL AND VERNON L. SMITH
949
1. The Background
949
2.
The Experiments
950
2.1.
Kahneman-Knetsch-Thaier Choice Experiments
950
2.2.
Franciosi et al.
Choice Experiments
950
2.3.
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1991)
Exchange Experiments
952
Contents
of
Volume
1 xxxix
2.4.
Mug Exchange Experiments using Uniform Price Double Auction
953
References
955
Chapter
102
The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanism is not Generally Incentive-
Compatible in Practice
PETER
BOHM
956
1.
Experimental design
956
2.
Conclusions
957
References
957
Chapter
103
Utility Maximization
JAMES
С. СОХ
958
1.
The Utility Hypothesis
958
2.
A Complete, Disaggregated Data Set
960
3.
Test Results and Power
961
4.
Are the Inconsistencies with Utility Maximization Significant?
963
Acknowledgement
965
References
965
Chapter
104
Preference Reversals
JAMES
С. СОХ
967
1.
Seminal Experiments
968
2.
Independence Axiom Treatments
969
3.
Incentive Treatment
971
4.
Transitivity Treatments
972
5.
Risk Neutrality Treatment
973
6.
Market Treatment
974
Acknowledgement
975
References
975
Chapter
105
Rationality the Fast and Frugal Way: Introduction
GERD
GIGERENZER AND PETER M. TODD
976
1.
Heuristics
977
2.
A Fast and Frugal Heuristic
977
3.
The Adaptive Toolbox
979
3.1.
Heuristic Principles for Guiding Search
979
3.2.
Heuristic Principles for Stopping Search
980
3.3.
Heuristic Principles for Decision Making
980
4.
Emergency Room Decisions
981
, Contents
of
Volume
I
5.
Ecological Rationality
983
6.
What is to Come 984
References 985
Chapter
106
The Recognition Heuristic and the Less-Is-More Effect
DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN AND
GERD GIGERENZER 987
1.
Accuracy of the Recognition Heuristic
988
2.
The Less-is-More Effect
988
3.
Do People Use the Recognition Heuristic?
990
4.
Does the Less-is-More Effect Occur in Human Reasoning?
991
5.
The Underpinnings of the Recognition Heuristic
992
References
992
Chapter
107
The Recognition Heuristic: A Fast and Frugal Way to investment Choice?
ANDREAS
ORTMANN, GERD
GIGERENZER,
BERNHARD BORGES
AND DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN
993
1.
Investment Theory and Practice
993
2.
Recognition-based Investment Decisions
994
2.1.
When Choosing a Subset from a Larger Set, Choose Those Objects in the Larger Set
That are Highly Recognized
994
3.
Study
1 994
3.1.
Study Design
994
3.2.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Low Recognition Portfolios?
997
3.3.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Market Indices?
997
3.4.
How Did High Recognition Perform Relative to Managed Funds?
998
3.5.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Random Stock Picks?
999
3.6.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Individuals' Investment Choices?
1000
4.
From Recognition to Riches?
1000
5.
Study
2 1000
5.1.
Study Design
1001
5.2.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Low Recognition Portfolios?
1001
5.3.
How Did High Recognition Portfolios Perform Relative to Various Benchmarks?
1002
5.4.
What About Gender Effects
ľ
1002
5.5.
From Recognition to Riches?
1002
6.
Conclusion
1003
References
1003
Chapter
108
One-Reason Decision Making
GERD GIGERENZER,
LAURA MARTIGNON,
ULRICH HOFFRAGE,
JÖRG
RIESKAMP, JEAN CZERLINSKI AND DANIEL G. GOLDSTEIN
1004
Contents
of
Volume 1 xli
1.
"Take The Best" and Minimalist
1004
2.
Simple Rules for Search
1006
3.
Predicting Homelessness
1008
4.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics Versus Linear Models: A Competition
1008
5.
Fast and Frugal Heuristics Versus Bayesian Methods
1009
6.
Why is Take The Best so Robust?
1010
7.
Ecological Rationality: Which Environmental Structures Can Take The
Best Exploit
1011
8.
Non-compensatory Information
1011
9.
Scarce Information
1012
10.
Abundant Information
1013
1
l.Do People Intuitively Adapt Heuristics to Environmental Structures?
1013
12.Does the Use of Lexicographic Strategies Depend on Time Pressure?
1014
13.An Intelligent System Must Ignore Information
1015
References
1016
Chapter
109
Cognitive Illusions Reconsidered
GERD
GIGERENZER, RALPH HERTWIG,
ULRICH HOFFRAGE
AND
PETER SEDLMEIER
1018
1.
Base Rate Fallacy Reconsidered
1018
2.
The Ecological Argument
1019
3.
Helping John Q. Public
1020
4.
Helping Physicians
1021
5.
Helping AIDS Counselors
1023
6.
Helping Lawyers and Judges
1023
7.
How to Teach Bayesian Reasoning
1024
8.
Overconfidence Bias Reconsidered
1025
9.
Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered
1027
10.
Availability Reconsidered
1030
11.
Conclusion
1033
References
1033
Chapter
¡10
Social Heuristics
PETER M. TODD,
JÖRG RIESKAMP
AND
GERD
GIGERENZER
1035
1.
Social Heuristics for Cooperation
1035
2.
Detecting Cheaters
1037
3.
Cheater Detection Versus Social Contracts
1040
4.
Cheater Detection Versus Logical Reasoning
1041
5.
Searching for Mates
1042
6.
Conclusion
1045
References
1045
,
.
Contents of Volume
1
Chapter 111
Payoff Scale Effects and Risk Preference Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions
SUSAN K.
LAURY
AND CHARLES A. HOLT
1047
1.
Introduction *04'
2.
Incentive Effects for Choices Involving Gains
1048
3.
Choices in the Loss Domain, and the Reflection Effect
1050
4.
Conclusion
'052
References
1053
Chapter
112
Rewards and Behavior in First Price Auctions
VBRNON L. SMITH AND JAMES M. WALKER
1054
1.
The First Price Auction
1054
2.
The Experimental Environment
1055
3.
Behavior
1056
References
1060
Chapter
113
Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence
CATHERINE C. ECKEL AND PHILIP J. GROSSMAN
1061
L
Abstract Gamble Experiments
1062
2.
Contextual Environment Experiments
1066
3.
Evidence From Field Studies
1069
4.
Discussion
1071
References
1072
PART
8:
METHODS
8.
Methods
1077
Chapter
114
Experimetrics: The Use of Market Experiments to Evaluate the Performance
of Econometric Estimators
JAMES
С
COX AND RONALD L. OAXACA
і
078
1
.
Designing Experiments to Study the Properties of Estimators
1079
2.
Performance of the Estimators
1080
3.
Explanation of the Posted Offer Results
1083
Acknowledgement
[085
References J086
Chapter
¡15
On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences
JOYCE E. BERG, THOMAS A. RIETZ AND JOHN W.
DICKHAUT 1087
Contents
of
Volume 1 xliii
1.
Introduction
1087
2.
Inducing Risk Preferences in Theory
1087
3.
Evidence
1090
3.1.
Inducing Risk Neutrality: Evidence from Sealed Bid Auctions
1090
3.2.
Inducing Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking: Evidence from Paired Choice Tasks
1092
3.3.
Inducing Risk Aversion and Risk Seeking: Evidence from the Becker-DeGroot-
Marshak Procedure
1093
4.
Summary
1094
Acknowledgements
1096
References
1096
Author Index of Volume
1
I-
1
Subject Index of Volume
1 1-19 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author2 | Plott, Charles R. |
| author2_role | edt |
| author2_variant | c r p cr crp |
| author_facet | Plott, Charles R. |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035037088 |
| classification_tum | WIR 005f |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)634939909 (DE-599)BVBBV035037088 |
| discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
| edition | First edition |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035037088 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:51:52Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:20:45Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780444826428 |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016705969 |
| oclc_num | 634939909 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-M49 DE-BY-TUM DE-92 DE-703 DE-384 DE-N2 DE-521 DE-M382 DE-945 DE-20 DE-473 DE-BY-UBG DE-355 DE-BY-UBR DE-29 DE-M347 DE-91 DE-BY-TUM |
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| physical | xliii, 1097, 31 Seiten Illustrationen. - Illustrationen |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | North-Holland |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Handbooks in economics |
| series2 | Handbooks in economics |
| spelling | Handbook of experimental economics results 1 edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith First edition Amsterdam North-Holland 2008 xliii, 1097, 31 Seiten Illustrationen. - Illustrationen txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Handbooks in economics 28,[1] Handbooks in economics Plott, Charles R. edt (DE-604)BV024129142 1 Handbooks in economics 28,[1] (DE-604)BV000009734 28,1 Digitalisierung UB Bamberg application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016705969&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Handbook of experimental economics results Handbooks in economics |
| title | Handbook of experimental economics results |
| title_auth | Handbook of experimental economics results |
| title_exact_search | Handbook of experimental economics results |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Handbook of experimental economics results |
| title_full | Handbook of experimental economics results 1 edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith |
| title_fullStr | Handbook of experimental economics results 1 edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith |
| title_full_unstemmed | Handbook of experimental economics results 1 edited by Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith |
| title_short | Handbook of experimental economics results |
| title_sort | handbook of experimental economics results |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016705969&sequence=000002&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV024129142 (DE-604)BV000009734 |
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