Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie: plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Polish |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Warszawa
Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk
2008
|
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Abstract |
| Beschreibung: | Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| Beschreibung: | 276 s. 24 cm |
| ISBN: | 9788360580202 |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000 c 4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV035020149 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20081127 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 080825s2008 |||| 00||| pol d | ||
| 020 | |a 9788360580202 |9 978-83-60580-20-2 | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)233521181 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV035020149 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger |e rakwb | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a pol | |
| 049 | |a DE-12 | ||
| 084 | |a 8 |2 ssgn | ||
| 084 | |a 7,41 |2 ssgn | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Jarząbek, Wanda |d 1969- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)101956668X |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie |b plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |c Wanda Jarząbek |
| 264 | 1 | |a Warszawa |b Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 276 s. |c 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe | ||
| 505 | 0 | |a Bibliogr. s. 261-265. Indeks | |
| 610 | 1 | 7 | |a Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska |2 jhpk |
| 610 | 1 | 7 | |a Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska |2 jhpk |
| 610 | 2 | 7 | |a Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa |0 (DE-588)5114817-1 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf |
| 648 | 7 | |a Geschichte 1964-1975 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989 |2 jhpk | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989 |2 jhpk | |
| 651 | 7 | |a Polen |0 (DE-588)4046496-9 |2 gnd |9 rswk-swf | |
| 689 | 0 | 0 | |a Polen |0 (DE-588)4046496-9 |D g |
| 689 | 0 | 1 | |a Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa |0 (DE-588)5114817-1 |D b |
| 689 | 0 | 2 | |a Geschichte 1964-1975 |A z |
| 689 | 0 | |5 DE-604 | |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| 856 | 4 | 2 | |m Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen |q application/pdf |u http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |3 Abstract |
| 940 | 1 | |n oe | |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016689279 | ||
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09046 |g 438 |
| 942 | 1 | 1 | |c 909 |e 22/bsb |f 09047 |g 438 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804137945968410624 |
|---|---|
| adam_text | Spis
tresei
Wstęp
.................................................................................................................... 7
Rozdział
1.
Narodziny i krystalizowanie się koncepcji konferencji
..................... 13
Koncepcj a konferencj i na tle polityki zagranicznej PRL
........................... 15
Początki akcji dyplomatycznej
................................................................... 23
Konsultacje wewnątrz bloku
....................................................................... 37
Rozdział
2.
O kształt konferencji
.......................................................................... 43
Próba wypracowania wspólnego stanowiska bloku
................................... 53
Doradczy Komitet Polityczny w Pradze i jego pokłosie
............................ 66
Rozdział
3.
Prace nad modelem konferencji
(1970-1972)................................... 77
Dyskusje nad propozycjami tematyki konferencji
(1970-1971)................ 77
W kierunku unifikacji pozycji bloku
.......................................................... 91
Rozdział
4.
Wielostronne Rozmowy Przygotowawcze
........................................ 105
Polskie stanowisko przed WRP
.................................................................. 106
Negocjacje w Helsinkach
........................................................................... 115
Rozdział
5.
Prace Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie
(lipiec
1973 -
lipiec
1975).................................................................................... 131
II
faza KBWE
............................................................................................. 135
Ocena wyników konferencji
....................................................................... 151
Zakończenie
.......................................................................................................... 165
Dokumenty
............................................................................................................ 177
Bibliografia
........................................................................................................... 261
Summary
............................................................................................................... 267
Indeks osób
........................................................................................................... 273
Summary
Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Plans and reality,
1964-1975
The main purpose of this book is to present the Polish attitude towards the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE),
to show Polish
expectations and perceptions, using Polish documents, most of which are
generally unfamiliar to both Polish and foreign researchers. These documents
are mostly contained in the Archive of the Modern Acts
(Archiwum
Akt
Nowych
-
AAN)
and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Archiwum
Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych
-
AMSZ),
few in the Archives of the
Institute of National Remembrance.
As a part of the Soviet bloc, Poland lacked full independence in foreign
affairs and its policies generally had to be coordinated with Kremlin. However,
while most aspects of Polish diplomacy needed to be discussed with the
Soviets, the Poles did not always follow Moscow s line. Especially after
1956
and
Władysław
Gomuika s return to power, Polish communist authorities
tried to take advantage of a growing number of opportunities and were
seeking solutions to the two issues they saw as most urgent: non-recognition
of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent western frontier and non-proliferation
of nuclear arms in West Germany. On such critical issues, Warsaw was even
prepared to oppose Soviet position.
The Polish attitude towards the
CSCE
has not recently been a subject of
profound research or analysis. Polish publications concerning the
CSCE
were
written mostly by those personally involved in the conference during the
1970s
and
1980s
and are usually based on their personal experiences and official
CSCE
documents. They have value in that they provide personal observations,
but primary sources now allow us to see some new aspects of the policy
process, revealing high level consultations between Polish officials and their
268
Summary
counterparts from the USSR, other bloc countries, and the West, as well as
providing researchers with numerous studies and expert reports which provide
better opportunities to evaluate both Polish contributions to the conference and
the policy process behind them. The idea to convent an European conference
was rooted in the Polish particular needs and political interests. Much attention
in the book is devoted to Polish preparations for the conference, where the
Poles and Soviets distinguished between conceptions and expectations, Polish
diplomatic action in the Western Europe, i.e. to the talks with some countries as
Belgium, Denmark, France. The Polish political conceptions of the European
conference can be placed among the then different conceptions of
détente
which
were to be met in Europe in the sixties. Poland was not in favor of a supper
-
powers
détente,
wanted the smaller countries, also not entirely sovereign to take
part in preparatory talks and next in the conference negotiations. In the next
chapter, the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and Geneva talks are described. This
is followed by an analysis of the official Polish attitude toward the Helsinki
Final Act, with an evaluation of gains and losses. Annex of seventeen more
important and characteristic Polish document ends the book.
Polish hopes connected with the Conference of Security and Cooperation
in Europe changed between the mid-sixties, when the idea of conference
occurred and the end of the first conference in
1975.
As the Oder-Neisse line
issue constituted one of the more crucial element of the Polish foreign policy
after
1945,
when the idea of the conference was born, according to one of the
documents describing Polish expectations: the main aim of the conference
was to gain West-Germany s acceptance of the territorial and political status
quo in Europe . The European conference was initially treated as a quasi-
peace conference and the Polish authorities wanted to avoid increasing West
Germany s international status, while minimizing the chances for eventual
German reunification. Nevertheless, Polish expectations went beyond the
German context.
The second important topic which according to the Polish stance was to
be discussed during an European conference, was economic collaboration.
Poland was interested in broadening East-West exchange because its economic
problems were difficult to resolve solely from within the bloc. Polish work
on the rules for economic collaboration within the
CSCE,
which concentrated
on facilitating inter-bloc trade, were a consequence of Poland s experience
of a worsened international economic environment in the mid-sixties. Poland
Summary
269
needed hard currency to buy Western products and was very interested
in the possibility of selling its products to the West to fulfill international
commitments. In the sixties, more gates to the West were closing just as
Warsaw was looking for new markets. This need was partly spurred by Poland s
GATT
accession in
1967.
Imports from the West were especially dependent on
détente, as
according to regulations set by
COCOM
(Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls) many products with potential or actual
military applications were banned from export to the bloc countries; in many
cases this included the latest in civilian technologies. It seems that Soviet
interest in broadening economic and trade cooperation with the West was very
limited, and that Moscow did not want the opportunities which arose from
détente
to be extended to its satellites, at least until such time as Moscow was
able to construct new instruments of social and political control. The Poles in
vain tried to convince Moscow to accept at least some their ideas on economic
cooperation. The opening of economic relations with the West would change
Polish relations with Moscow, giving the Polish authorities more room to
maneuver, but this did not mean that, at least in short term, that there would be
any change in Poland s political regime. The authorities were not interested in
it. Moreover, carefully designed economic collaboration with the West could
serve the regime, which was facing serious economic problems which in turn
might lead to social unrest. Nevertheless, economic cooperation would give the
ruling class greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Also, Polish society at
large would be served due to the rise in the standard of living. But we can not
exclude the possibility of an entirely different effect contacts with the West
over the long term would change not only the character of Poland s ties with
the Soviet Union, but also its domestic system.
The idea of facilitating economic collaboration with the West and speaking
about different concepts of security can be described as aimed at changing
relations within the bloc to make Poland less dependant upon the Soviet Union.
The Polish early planning included also question of disarmament, considered to
be important topic for European conference talks.
Starting in the spring of
1969
and up until the summer of
1970,
the Poles
struggled to define the shape of the conference. Poland was so engaged in
peddling its ideas in negotiations with the USSR because of the fear that
Moscow would treat the conference as a mere instrument for facilitating further
bilateral talks with the United States and other Western countries over the heads
270
Summary
of the rest of the Eastern bloc. Had this come to pass, Moscow would have
strengthened its hegemony over the bloc countries, and Poland s goals for
the conference would never have been achieved. Because Poland treated the
conference as a unique opportunity to realize its plans, the Polish leadership did
not want it to be convened in haste. Warsaw tried to convince the Soviet Union
to abandon its narrow vision, threatening to publicly oppose the suggested
agenda. Poland stressed the need for intra-bloc consultations, expecting to
receive support from the other countries for its proposal. The Polish authorities
wanted the Warsaw Pact meetings to discuss the agenda of future conferences
because the decisions of Pact s political structures were considered binding for
every member country. Simultaneously, Warsaw initiated diplomatic action in
the West. Poland wanted the conference to end with a Treaty on Security and
Cooperation in Europe , which was to start building of a system of collective
security. The draft treaty (finished in
1969)
included provisions on territorial
status quo, consultations among signatories to discuss questions of further
cooperation, provisions on disarmament and rules of cooperation in economy,
environmental protection. When Polish preparations began, human rights issues
were not taken into consideration. The Polish draft treaty spoke of developing
cultural and scientific collaboration. But at the beginning of the 1970 s, the
issue of the free flow of ideas, individuals and information was raised in Polish
bilateral talks by Western diplomats. Soon the importance of this aspect grew.
The first phase of the conference started in
1973,
when the bilateral treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, signed in December
1970,
was ratified by the Bundestag. At this point, it appeared that at least
some of Poland s political aims were achieved. The Polish authorities wanted
to strengthen the border guarantees by ensconcing them in the
CSCE
principles
of international relations. The Communist Polish government wanted to secure
its own interests in the
CSCE
talks. The Helsinki Final Act was perceived as
an acceptance by the West of the political system in the Eastern countries and
the ideology which dominated there. The Polish authorities expected that as
a consequence of this, it would be possible to limit Radio Free Europe s activity
because it was contradictory to detente and the principle of non-interference.
After reaching a final agreement in Helsinki, a formal interpretation of the
documents was prepared in Poland. Most crucial from the Polish point of view
was describing, elaborating upon, and signing the ten principles of international
relations, especially the final portions on the principle of sovereign equality,
Summary
271
renunciation of the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity
and non-intervention in internal affairs (understood in Poland, and the rest of
the Eastern bloc as non-interference). Subordinating the formula concerning
peaceful alteration of boundaries to the principal of sovereign equality, as
opposed to the principle of inviolability of frontiers was presented as a success
of Polish diplomacy, and in general that of the socialist countries . The results
of Basket II negotiations were presented as partly satisfactory, for example, the
MFN clause was formulated in a very general way.
Much attention was paid to Principle
VII
and Basket III. As the Basket
III recommendations, among them the principle of non-intervention, were
subordinated to the ten principles of international relations, they were shown as
dependent on them and also upon the stage of
détente.
In
1975,
the
CSCE
was seen as a success, and the potential dangers were
not mentioned, but this does not mean that they were not seen. Most likely
some of them were understood, but not necessarily outspoken. In a long run,
the
CSCE
process was an important factor promoting improvement of Polish
citizens situation, facilitating the democratic transition and finally major
political change in Poland.
|
| adam_txt |
Spis
tresei
Wstęp
. 7
Rozdział
1.
Narodziny i krystalizowanie się koncepcji konferencji
. 13
Koncepcj a konferencj i na tle polityki zagranicznej PRL
. 15
Początki akcji dyplomatycznej
. 23
Konsultacje wewnątrz bloku
. 37
Rozdział
2.
O kształt konferencji
. 43
Próba wypracowania wspólnego stanowiska bloku
. 53
Doradczy Komitet Polityczny w Pradze i jego pokłosie
. 66
Rozdział
3.
Prace nad modelem konferencji
(1970-1972). 77
Dyskusje nad propozycjami tematyki konferencji
(1970-1971). 77
W kierunku unifikacji pozycji bloku
. 91
Rozdział
4.
Wielostronne Rozmowy Przygotowawcze
. 105
Polskie stanowisko przed WRP
. 106
Negocjacje w Helsinkach
. 115
Rozdział
5.
Prace Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie
(lipiec
1973 -
lipiec
1975). 131
II
faza KBWE
. 135
Ocena wyników konferencji
. 151
Zakończenie
. 165
Dokumenty
. 177
Bibliografia
. 261
Summary
. 267
Indeks osób
. 273
Summary
Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe. Plans and reality,
1964-1975
The main purpose of this book is to present the Polish attitude towards the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE),
to show Polish
expectations and perceptions, using Polish documents, most of which are
generally unfamiliar to both Polish and foreign researchers. These documents
are mostly contained in the Archive of the Modern Acts
(Archiwum
Akt
Nowych
-
AAN)
and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Archiwum
Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych
-
AMSZ),
few in the Archives of the
Institute of National Remembrance.
As a part of the Soviet bloc, Poland lacked full independence in foreign
affairs and its policies generally had to be coordinated with Kremlin. However,
while most aspects of Polish diplomacy needed to be discussed with the
Soviets, the Poles did not always follow Moscow's line. Especially after
1956
and
Władysław
Gomuika's return to power, Polish communist authorities
tried to take advantage of a growing number of opportunities and were
seeking solutions to the two issues they saw as most urgent: non-recognition
of the Oder-Neisse line as a permanent western frontier and non-proliferation
of nuclear arms in West Germany. On such critical issues, Warsaw was even
prepared to oppose Soviet position.
The Polish attitude towards the
CSCE
has not recently been a subject of
profound research or analysis. Polish publications concerning the
CSCE
were
written mostly by those personally involved in the conference during the
1970s
and
1980s
and are usually based on their personal experiences and official
CSCE
documents. They have value in that they provide personal observations,
but primary sources now allow us to see some new aspects of the policy
process, revealing high level consultations between Polish officials and their
268
Summary
counterparts from the USSR, other bloc countries, and the West, as well as
providing researchers with numerous studies and expert reports which provide
better opportunities to evaluate both Polish contributions to the conference and
the policy process behind them. The idea to convent an European conference
was rooted in the Polish particular needs and political interests. Much attention
in the book is devoted to Polish preparations for the conference, where the
Poles and Soviets distinguished between conceptions and expectations, Polish
diplomatic action in the Western Europe, i.e. to the talks with some countries as
Belgium, Denmark, France. The Polish political conceptions of the European
conference can be placed among the then different conceptions of
détente
which
were to be met in Europe in the sixties. Poland was not in favor of a supper
-
powers
détente,
wanted the smaller countries, also not entirely sovereign to take
part in preparatory talks and next in the conference negotiations. In the next
chapter, the Multilateral Preparatory Talks and Geneva talks are described. This
is followed by an analysis of the official Polish attitude toward the Helsinki
Final Act, with an evaluation of gains and losses. Annex of seventeen more
important and characteristic Polish document ends the book.
Polish hopes connected with the Conference of Security and Cooperation
in Europe changed between the mid-sixties, when the idea of conference
occurred and the end of the first conference in
1975.
As the Oder-Neisse line
issue constituted one of the more crucial element of the Polish foreign policy
after
1945,
when the idea of the conference was born, according to one of the
documents describing Polish expectations: "the main aim of the conference
was to gain West-Germany's acceptance of the territorial and political status
quo in Europe". The European conference was initially treated as a quasi-
peace conference and the Polish authorities wanted to avoid increasing West
Germany's international status, while minimizing the chances for eventual
German reunification. Nevertheless, Polish expectations went beyond the
"German context."
The second important topic which according to the Polish stance was to
be discussed during an European conference, was economic collaboration.
Poland was interested in broadening East-West exchange because its economic
problems were difficult to resolve solely from within the bloc. Polish work
on the rules for economic collaboration within the
CSCE,
which concentrated
on facilitating inter-bloc trade, were a consequence of Poland's experience
of a worsened international economic environment in the mid-sixties. Poland
Summary
269
needed hard currency to buy Western products and was very interested
in the possibility of selling its products to the West to fulfill international
commitments. In the sixties, more "gates to the West" were closing just as
Warsaw was looking for new markets. This need was partly spurred by Poland's
GATT
accession in
1967.
Imports from the West were especially dependent on
détente, as
according to regulations set by
COCOM
(Coordinating Committee
for Multilateral Export Controls) many products with potential or actual
military applications were banned from export to the bloc countries; in many
cases this included the latest in civilian technologies. It seems that Soviet
interest in broadening economic and trade cooperation with the West was very
limited, and that Moscow did not want the opportunities which arose from
détente
to be extended to its satellites, at least until such time as Moscow was
able to construct new instruments of social and political control. The Poles in
vain tried to convince Moscow to accept at least some their ideas on economic
cooperation. The opening of economic relations with the West would change
Polish relations with Moscow, giving the Polish authorities more room to
maneuver, but this did not mean that, at least in short term, that there would be
any change in Poland's political regime. The authorities were not interested in
it. Moreover, carefully designed economic collaboration with the West could
serve the regime, which was facing serious economic problems which in turn
might lead to social unrest. Nevertheless, economic cooperation would give the
ruling class greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Also, Polish society at
large would be served due to the rise in the standard of living. But we can not
exclude the possibility of an entirely different effect contacts with the West
over the long term would change not only the character of Poland's ties with
the Soviet Union, but also its domestic system.
The idea of facilitating economic collaboration with the West and speaking
about different concepts of security can be described as aimed at changing
relations within the bloc to make Poland less dependant upon the Soviet Union.
The Polish early planning included also question of disarmament, considered to
be important topic for European conference talks.
Starting in the spring of
1969
and up until the summer of
1970,
the Poles
struggled to define the shape of the conference. Poland was so engaged in
peddling its ideas in negotiations with the USSR because of the fear that
Moscow would treat the conference as a mere instrument for facilitating further
bilateral talks with the United States and other Western countries over the heads
270
Summary
of the rest of the Eastern bloc. Had this come to pass, Moscow would have
strengthened its hegemony over the bloc countries, and Poland's goals for
the conference would never have been achieved. Because Poland treated the
conference as a unique opportunity to realize its plans, the Polish leadership did
not want it to be convened in haste. Warsaw tried to convince the Soviet Union
to abandon its narrow vision, threatening to publicly oppose the suggested
agenda. Poland stressed the need for intra-bloc consultations, expecting to
receive support from the other countries for its proposal. The Polish authorities
wanted the Warsaw Pact meetings to discuss the agenda of future conferences
because the decisions of Pact's political structures were considered binding for
every member country. Simultaneously, Warsaw initiated diplomatic action in
the West. Poland wanted the conference to end with a "Treaty on Security and
Cooperation in Europe", which was to start building of a system of collective
security. The draft treaty (finished in
1969)
included provisions on territorial
status quo, consultations among signatories to discuss questions of further
cooperation, provisions on disarmament and rules of cooperation in economy,
environmental protection. When Polish preparations began, human rights issues
were not taken into consideration. The Polish draft treaty spoke of developing
cultural and scientific collaboration. But at the beginning of the 1970's, the
issue of the free flow of ideas, individuals and information was raised in Polish
bilateral talks by Western diplomats. Soon the importance of this aspect grew.
The first phase of the conference started in
1973,
when the bilateral treaty
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland, signed in December
1970,
was ratified by the Bundestag. At this point, it appeared that at least
some of Poland's political aims were achieved. The Polish authorities wanted
to strengthen the border guarantees by ensconcing them in the
CSCE
principles
of international relations. The Communist Polish government wanted to secure
its own interests in the
CSCE
talks. The Helsinki Final Act was perceived as
an acceptance by the West of the political system in the Eastern countries and
the ideology which dominated there. The Polish authorities expected that as
a consequence of this, it would be possible to limit Radio Free Europe's activity
because it was contradictory to detente and the principle of non-interference.
After reaching a final agreement in Helsinki, a formal interpretation of the
documents was prepared in Poland. Most crucial from the Polish point of view
was describing, elaborating upon, and signing the ten principles of international
relations, especially the final portions on the principle of sovereign equality,
Summary
271
renunciation of the use of force, the inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity
and non-intervention in internal affairs (understood in Poland, and the rest of
the Eastern bloc as non-interference). Subordinating the formula concerning
peaceful alteration of boundaries to the principal of sovereign equality, as
opposed to the principle of inviolability of frontiers was presented as a success
of Polish diplomacy, and in general that of the "socialist countries". The results
of Basket II negotiations were presented as partly satisfactory, for example, the
MFN clause was formulated in a very general way.
Much attention was paid to Principle
VII
and Basket III. As the Basket
III recommendations, among them the principle of non-intervention, were
subordinated to the ten principles of international relations, they were shown as
dependent on them and also upon the "stage of
détente."
In
1975,
the
CSCE
was seen as a success, and the potential dangers were
not mentioned, but this does not mean that they were not seen. Most likely
some of them were understood, but not necessarily outspoken. In a long run,
the
CSCE
process was an important factor promoting improvement of Polish
citizens' situation, facilitating the democratic transition and finally major
political change in Poland. |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Jarząbek, Wanda 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)101956668X |
| author_facet | Jarząbek, Wanda 1969- |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Jarząbek, Wanda 1969- |
| author_variant | w j wj |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035020149 |
| contents | Bibliogr. s. 261-265. Indeks |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)233521181 (DE-599)BVBBV035020149 |
| era | Geschichte 1964-1975 gnd |
| era_facet | Geschichte 1964-1975 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02411nam a2200493 c 4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV035020149</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20081127 </controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">080825s2008 |||| 00||| pol d</controlfield><datafield tag="020" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">9788360580202</subfield><subfield code="9">978-83-60580-20-2</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)233521181</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV035020149</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield><subfield code="e">rakwb</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">pol</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-12</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="084" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">7,41</subfield><subfield code="2">ssgn</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Jarząbek, Wanda</subfield><subfield code="d">1969-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)101956668X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie</subfield><subfield code="b">plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975</subfield><subfield code="c">Wanda Jarząbek</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Warszawa</subfield><subfield code="b">Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk</subfield><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">276 s.</subfield><subfield code="c">24 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Bibliogr. s. 261-265. Indeks</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="1" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="610" ind1="2" ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)5114817-1</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="648" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1964-1975</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989</subfield><subfield code="2">jhpk</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="651" ind1=" " ind2="7"><subfield code="a">Polen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046496-9</subfield><subfield code="2">gnd</subfield><subfield code="9">rswk-swf</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Polen</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)4046496-9</subfield><subfield code="D">g</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)5114817-1</subfield><subfield code="D">b</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2="2"><subfield code="a">Geschichte 1964-1975</subfield><subfield code="A">z</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="689" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="5">DE-604</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Inhaltsverzeichnis</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="2"><subfield code="m">Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen</subfield><subfield code="q">application/pdf</subfield><subfield code="u">http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA</subfield><subfield code="3">Abstract</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="940" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="n">oe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016689279</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09046</subfield><subfield code="g">438</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="942" ind1="1" ind2="1"><subfield code="c">909</subfield><subfield code="e">22/bsb</subfield><subfield code="f">09047</subfield><subfield code="g">438</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| geographic | Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989 jhpk Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989 jhpk Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd |
| geographic_facet | Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989 Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989 Polen |
| id | DE-604.BV035020149 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:46:15Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:20:22Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9788360580202 |
| language | Polish |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016689279 |
| oclc_num | 233521181 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-12 |
| owner_facet | DE-12 |
| physical | 276 s. 24 cm |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Jarząbek, Wanda 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)101956668X aut Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 Wanda Jarząbek Warszawa Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk 2008 276 s. 24 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Zsfassung in engl. Sprache u.d.T.: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Bibliogr. s. 261-265. Indeks Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska jhpk Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska jhpk Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (DE-588)5114817-1 gnd rswk-swf Geschichte 1964-1975 gnd rswk-swf Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989 jhpk Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989 jhpk Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 gnd rswk-swf Polen (DE-588)4046496-9 g Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (DE-588)5114817-1 b Geschichte 1964-1975 z DE-604 Digitalisierung BSBMuenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis Digitalisierung BSB Muenchen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Abstract |
| spellingShingle | Jarząbek, Wanda 1969- Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 Bibliogr. s. 261-265. Indeks Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska jhpk Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska jhpk Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (DE-588)5114817-1 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)5114817-1 (DE-588)4046496-9 |
| title | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |
| title_auth | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |
| title_exact_search | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |
| title_full | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 Wanda Jarząbek |
| title_fullStr | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 Wanda Jarząbek |
| title_full_unstemmed | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 Wanda Jarząbek |
| title_short | Polska wobec Konferencji Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie |
| title_sort | polska wobec konferencji bezpieczenstwa i wspolpracy w europie plany i rzeczywistosc 1964 1975 |
| title_sub | plany i rzeczywistość 1964 - 1975 |
| topic | Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska jhpk Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska jhpk Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (DE-588)5114817-1 gnd |
| topic_facet | Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie / (1972-1975 / Helsinki) / i Polska Konferencja Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy w Europie - (1972-1975 ; - Helsinki) - i Polska Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa Polska / stosunki zagraniczne / 1945-1989 Polska - stosunki zagraniczne - 1945-1989 Polen |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000003&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016689279&sequence=000004&line_number=0002&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT jarzabekwanda polskawobeckonferencjibezpieczenstwaiwspołpracyweuropieplanyirzeczywistosc19641975 |