Personal agency: the metaphysics of mind and action
E.J. Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will.
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford [u.a.]
Oxford University Press
2008
|
| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| Zusammenfassung: | E.J. Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will. |
| Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references and indexes |
| Beschreibung: | XVI, 222 S. |
| ISBN: | 9780199217144 9780199592500 |
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| 520 | 3 | |a E.J. Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will. | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Agent (Philosophy) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Choice (Psychology) | |
| 650 | 4 | |a Free will and determinism | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| adam_text | CONTENTS-SUMMARY LIST CF FIGURES XVLL INTRODUCTION 1 PART I. MENTAL
CAUSATION, CAUSAL CLOSURE, AND EMERGENT DUALISM 17 I. SELF, AGENCY, AND
MENTAL CAUSATION 19 2. CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES AND EMERGENTISM 41 3.
PHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE AND THE INVISIBILITY OF MENTAL CAUSATION 58 4.
COULD VOLITIONS BE EPIPHENOMENAL? 79 5. THE SELF AS AN EMERGENT
SUBSTANCE 92 PART 11. PERSONS, RATIONAL ACTION, AND FREE WILL 119 6.
EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 121 7. PERSONAL AGENCY 141 8.
SUBSTANCE CAUSATION, PERSONS, AND FREE WILL 159 9. RATIONAL SELVES AND
FREEDOM OF ACTION 179 10. NEEDS, FACTS, GOODNESS, AND TRUTH 199
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213 INDEX 219 CONTENTS LIST ~ FIGURES XVII INTRODUCTION 1
I. SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2 2. EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 3
3 FREE ACTION AND CAUSATION 6 4 REASONS AND CAUSES 8 5. AN INTERIM
SUMMING UP 11 6. THE CHALLENGE OF-AND TO-PHYSICALISM 12 7. A BRIEFLOOK
AHEAD 14 PART I. MENTAL CAUSATION, CAUSAL CLOSURE, AND EMERGENT DUALISM
17 I. SELF, AGENCY, AND MENTAL CAUSATION 19 LI. AN APPARENDY
INCONSISTENT TRIAD 19 1.2. THE SELF IS NOT ITS BODY 20 1.3 MENTAL
STATES ARE NOT PHYSICAL STATES 22 1.4 SELFHOOD REQUIRES AGENCY 23 1.5
ARE THE THREE CLAIMS INCONSISTENT? 25 1.6. NATURALISTIC DUALISM IS
POSSIBLE 26 1.7 ON COINCIDENTAL EVENTS 27 1.8. A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO
POSSIBLE WORLDS 29 1.9 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FINDINGS 33 1.10.
INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL CAUSATION 34 I. I I. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
37 1.12. AN OBJECTION AND A REPLY 39 2. CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES AND
EMERGENTISM 41 2.1. CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENTS FOR PHYSICALISM 41 2.2. THE
SURPRISING VARIETY OF CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES 43 23 SOME CAUSAL
CLOSURE PRINCIPLES THAT WE MAY JUSTIFIABLY IGNORE 45 XIV CONTENTS 24 A
CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE THAT IS MANIFESDY TOO WEAK 46 25 A STRONGER
CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE THAT AVOIDS THE TRANSITIVITY PROBLEM 48 2.6.
WEAK CAUSAL CLOSURE AND NON-COINCIDENCE THROUGH MENTAL CAUSATION 51 27
THE CONSISTENCY OF STRONG CAUSAL CLOSURE WITH DUALISTIC INTERACTIONISM
53 2.8. WHAT CAN WE REASONABLY DEMAND OF A MODEL OF MENTAL CAUSATION? 56
3 PHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE AND THE INVISIBILITY OF MENTAL CAUSATION 58
31. THE EARLY MODEM ROOTS OF THE DEBATE OVER INTERACTIVE DUALISM 58
3.2. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE AND THE APPEAL TO CAUSAL CLOSURE 62 33 IS
THE CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE (CCP) TRUE? 65 34 IS THE
NON-OVERDETERMINATION PRINCIPLE (NOP) TRUE? 68 35 THE INVISIBILITY OF
MENTAL CAUSATION 74 36. OBJECTIONS, REPLIES, AND SOME
PHILOSOPHICALLESSONS TO BE LEAMT 75 4 COULD VOLITIONS BE EPIPHENOMENAL?
79 41. CONCERNING EPIPHENOMENALISM 79 42. VOLITIONS AND VOLITIONISM 81
43 AUTOMATISMS AND ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL 82 44 LIBET ON THE
UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRAL INITIATION OF VOLUNTARY ACTIONS 84 4.5. CAN THE
CAUSAL EFFICACY OF THE WILL COHERENDY BE DOUBTED? 85 4.6. HOW IS CAUSAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD POSSIBLE? 87 4.7. THE INCOHERENCE OF
FULL-BLOWN EPIPHENOMENALISM 89 5 THE SELF AS AN EMERGENT SUBSTANCE 92
51. NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM DEFINED 93 5.2. THE UNITY ARGUMENT
FOR NCSD 95 53 THE CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT AGAINST INTERACTIVE DUALISM
99 CONTENTS XV H TWO DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION
OF VOLUNTARY ACTION 101 55 A COUNTERFACTUAL-BASED ARGUMENT AGAINST
PSYCHONEURAL IDENTITY THEORIES 103 5.6. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO
REALIZATION ACCOUNTS 107 57 INTENTIONAL CAUSATION VERSUS PHYSICAL
CAUSATION 110 58. CONTEXT-DEPENDENCY TO THE RESCUE? 112 59 REASONS,
CAUSES, AND FREEDOM OF ACTION 116 PART 11. PERSONS, RATIONAL ACTION, AND
FREE WILL 119 6. EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 121 6.1. AGENTS AND
AGENT CAUSATION 122 6.2. A PUTATIVE ANALYSIS OF AGENT CAUSATION 123 63
CAUSATIVE ACTION VERBS AND BASIC ACTIONS 124 6.4. THE CASE FOR
IRREDUCIBLE AGENT CAUSATION 126 6.5. THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL 128 6.6.
MENTAL CAUSATION, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND FREEDOM OF ACTION 13 67 BASIC
ACTIONS AND BACKWARD CAUSATION 132 6.8. THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF AGENT
CAUSATION 133 69 AN ANALYSIS OF EVENT CAUSATION 135 6.10. IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY 139 7 PERSONAL AGENCY 141 71. EVENT
CAUSATION AND SUBSTANCE CAUSATION 141 7.2. THE PRIMACY OF SUBSTANCE
CAUSATION 143 73 THE REDUCTION OF EVENT CAUSATION TO SUBSTANCE
CAUSATION 145 74 AGENT CAUSATION AND BASIC ACTIONS 146 75 PERSONAL
AGENCY AND VOLITIONISM 147 7.6. CAUSAL POWERS AND THE NATURE OF THE WILL
149 77 CLASSICAL AGENT CAUSALISM VERSUS VOLITIONISM 151 7.8. IN
DEFENCE OF VOLITIONISM 153 79 THE WILL AND ITS FREEDOM 154 APPENDIX
157 8. SUBSTANCE CAUSATION, PERSONS, AND FREE WILL 159 8.1. THE PROBLEM
OF THE DISAPPEARING AGENT 159 XV! CONTENTS 8.2. MORE ON THE PRIMACY OF
SUBSTANCE CAUSATION 161 8.3. HUMAN PERSONS AS PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSTANCES
165 8.4. VOLITION AS THE EXECUTIVE ELEMENT IN INTENTIONAL ACTION 171
8.5. THE WILL AS A SPONTANEOUS POWER 176 9. RATIONAL SELVES AND FREEDOM
OF ACTION 9. I. ACTING FOR A REASON 9.2. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 9.3.
CHOICE, CAUSATION, AND FREE AGENCY 9.4. CHOICE AND CHANCE 9.5. CHOICE,
AGENCY, AND CONTROL 9.6. THE PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY OF DETERMINISM 10.
NEEDS, FACTS, GOODNESS, AND TRUTH 10.1. A SUMMARY OFTHE STORY SO FAR
10.2. WHAT KIND OF THING IS A REASON FOR ACTION? 10.3. REASONS FOR
ACTION VERSUS REASONS FOR BELIEF 10.4. OBJECTIVE NEEDS AS REASONS FOR
ACTION 10.5. THE LOGIC OF ACTION VERSUS THE LOGIC OFBELIEF 10.6. TAKING
NEEDS SERIOUSLY BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX 179 180 183 187 190 195 197 199 200
202 205 208 209 211 21 3 21 9
|
| adam_txt |
CONTENTS-SUMMARY LIST CF FIGURES XVLL INTRODUCTION 1 PART I. MENTAL
CAUSATION, CAUSAL CLOSURE, AND EMERGENT DUALISM 17 I. SELF, AGENCY, AND
MENTAL CAUSATION 19 2. CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES AND EMERGENTISM 41 3.
PHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE AND THE INVISIBILITY OF MENTAL CAUSATION 58 4.
COULD VOLITIONS BE EPIPHENOMENAL? 79 5. THE SELF AS AN EMERGENT
SUBSTANCE 92 PART 11. PERSONS, RATIONAL ACTION, AND FREE WILL 119 6.
EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 121 7. PERSONAL AGENCY 141 8.
SUBSTANCE CAUSATION, PERSONS, AND FREE WILL 159 9. RATIONAL SELVES AND
FREEDOM OF ACTION 179 10. NEEDS, FACTS, GOODNESS, AND TRUTH 199
BIBLIOGRAPHY 213 INDEX 219 CONTENTS LIST ~ FIGURES XVII INTRODUCTION 1
I. SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 2 2. EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 3
3 FREE ACTION AND CAUSATION 6 4 REASONS AND CAUSES 8 5. AN INTERIM
SUMMING UP 11 6. THE CHALLENGE OF-AND TO-PHYSICALISM 12 7. A BRIEFLOOK
AHEAD 14 PART I. MENTAL CAUSATION, CAUSAL CLOSURE, AND EMERGENT DUALISM
17 I. SELF, AGENCY, AND MENTAL CAUSATION 19 LI. AN APPARENDY
INCONSISTENT TRIAD 19 1.2. THE SELF IS NOT ITS BODY 20 1.3 MENTAL
STATES ARE NOT PHYSICAL STATES 22 1.4 SELFHOOD REQUIRES AGENCY 23 1.5
ARE THE THREE CLAIMS INCONSISTENT? 25 1.6. NATURALISTIC DUALISM IS
POSSIBLE 26 1.7 ON COINCIDENTAL EVENTS 27 1.8. A COMPARISON BETWEEN TWO
POSSIBLE WORLDS 29 1.9 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THESE FINDINGS 33 1.10.
INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL CAUSATION 34 I. I I. AN ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
37 1.12. AN OBJECTION AND A REPLY 39 2. CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES AND
EMERGENTISM 41 2.1. CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENTS FOR PHYSICALISM 41 2.2. THE
SURPRISING VARIETY OF CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLES 43 23 SOME CAUSAL
CLOSURE PRINCIPLES THAT WE MAY JUSTIFIABLY IGNORE 45 XIV CONTENTS 24 A
CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE THAT IS MANIFESDY TOO WEAK 46 25 A STRONGER
CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE THAT AVOIDS THE TRANSITIVITY PROBLEM 48 2.6.
WEAK CAUSAL CLOSURE AND NON-COINCIDENCE THROUGH MENTAL CAUSATION 51 27
THE CONSISTENCY OF STRONG CAUSAL CLOSURE WITH DUALISTIC INTERACTIONISM
53 2.8. WHAT CAN WE REASONABLY DEMAND OF A MODEL OF MENTAL CAUSATION? 56
3 PHYSICAL CAUSAL CLOSURE AND THE INVISIBILITY OF MENTAL CAUSATION 58
31. THE EARLY MODEM ROOTS OF THE DEBATE OVER INTERACTIVE DUALISM 58
3.2. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE AND THE APPEAL TO CAUSAL CLOSURE 62 33 IS
THE CAUSAL CLOSURE PRINCIPLE (CCP) TRUE? 65 34 IS THE
NON-OVERDETERMINATION PRINCIPLE (NOP) TRUE? 68 35 THE INVISIBILITY OF
MENTAL CAUSATION 74 36. OBJECTIONS, REPLIES, AND SOME
PHILOSOPHICALLESSONS TO BE LEAMT 75 4 COULD VOLITIONS BE EPIPHENOMENAL?
79 41. CONCERNING EPIPHENOMENALISM 79 42. VOLITIONS AND VOLITIONISM 81
43 AUTOMATISMS AND ILLUSIONS OF CONTROL 82 44 LIBET ON THE
UNCONSCIOUS CEREBRAL INITIATION OF VOLUNTARY ACTIONS 84 4.5. CAN THE
CAUSAL EFFICACY OF THE WILL COHERENDY BE DOUBTED? 85 4.6. HOW IS CAUSAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD POSSIBLE? 87 4.7. THE INCOHERENCE OF
FULL-BLOWN EPIPHENOMENALISM 89 5 THE SELF AS AN EMERGENT SUBSTANCE 92
51. NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM DEFINED 93 5.2. THE UNITY ARGUMENT
FOR NCSD 95 53 THE CAUSAL CLOSURE ARGUMENT AGAINST INTERACTIVE DUALISM
99 CONTENTS XV H TWO DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE CAUSAL EXPLANATION
OF VOLUNTARY ACTION 101 55 A COUNTERFACTUAL-BASED ARGUMENT AGAINST
PSYCHONEURAL IDENTITY THEORIES 103 5.6. EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT TO
'REALIZATION' ACCOUNTS 107 57 INTENTIONAL CAUSATION VERSUS PHYSICAL
CAUSATION 110 58. CONTEXT-DEPENDENCY TO THE RESCUE? 112 59 REASONS,
CAUSES, AND FREEDOM OF ACTION 116 PART 11. PERSONS, RATIONAL ACTION, AND
FREE WILL 119 6. EVENT CAUSATION AND AGENT CAUSATION 121 6.1. AGENTS AND
AGENT CAUSATION 122 6.2. A PUTATIVE ANALYSIS OF AGENT CAUSATION 123 63
CAUSATIVE ACTION VERBS AND BASIC ACTIONS 124 6.4. THE CASE FOR
IRREDUCIBLE AGENT CAUSATION 126 6.5. THE PROBLEM OF 'FREE WILL' 128 6.6.
MENTAL CAUSATION, RATIONAL CHOICE, AND FREEDOM OF ACTION 13 67 BASIC
ACTIONS AND BACKWARD CAUSATION 132 6.8. THE CONCEPTUAL PRIORITY OF AGENT
CAUSATION 133 69 AN ANALYSIS OF EVENT CAUSATION 135 6.10. IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE NOTION OF CAUSALITY 139 7 PERSONAL AGENCY 141 71. EVENT
CAUSATION AND SUBSTANCE CAUSATION 141 7.2. THE PRIMACY OF SUBSTANCE
CAUSATION 143 73 THE REDUCTION OF EVENT CAUSATION TO SUBSTANCE
CAUSATION 145 74 AGENT CAUSATION AND BASIC ACTIONS 146 75 PERSONAL
AGENCY AND VOLITIONISM 147 7.6. CAUSAL POWERS AND THE NATURE OF THE WILL
149 77 CLASSICAL AGENT CAUSALISM VERSUS VOLITIONISM 151 7.8. IN
DEFENCE OF VOLITIONISM 153 79 THE WILL AND ITS FREEDOM 154 APPENDIX
157 8. SUBSTANCE CAUSATION, PERSONS, AND FREE WILL 159 8.1. THE PROBLEM
OF THE DISAPPEARING AGENT 159 XV! CONTENTS 8.2. MORE ON THE PRIMACY OF
SUBSTANCE CAUSATION 161 8.3. HUMAN PERSONS AS PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSTANCES
165 8.4. VOLITION AS THE EXECUTIVE ELEMENT IN INTENTIONAL ACTION 171
8.5. THE WILL AS A SPONTANEOUS POWER 176 9. RATIONAL SELVES AND FREEDOM
OF ACTION 9. I. ACTING FOR A REASON 9.2. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 9.3.
CHOICE, CAUSATION, AND FREE AGENCY 9.4. CHOICE AND CHANCE 9.5. CHOICE,
AGENCY, AND CONTROL 9.6. THE PRAGMATIC INCONSISTENCY OF DETERMINISM 10.
NEEDS, FACTS, GOODNESS, AND TRUTH 10.1. A SUMMARY OFTHE STORY SO FAR
10.2. WHAT KIND OF THING IS A REASON FOR ACTION? 10.3. REASONS FOR
ACTION VERSUS REASONS FOR BELIEF 10.4. OBJECTIVE NEEDS AS REASONS FOR
ACTION 10.5. THE LOGIC OF ACTION VERSUS THE LOGIC OFBELIEF 10.6. TAKING
NEEDS SERIOUSLY BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX 179 180 183 187 190 195 197 199 200
202 205 208 209 211 21 3 21 9 |
| any_adam_object | 1 |
| any_adam_object_boolean | 1 |
| author | Lowe, E. J. 1950-2014 |
| author_GND | (DE-588)136076920 |
| author_facet | Lowe, E. J. 1950-2014 |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Lowe, E. J. 1950-2014 |
| author_variant | e j l ej ejl |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV035006898 |
| callnumber-first | B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
| callnumber-label | B105 |
| callnumber-raw | B105.A35 |
| callnumber-search | B105.A35 |
| callnumber-sort | B 3105 A35 |
| callnumber-subject | B - Philosophy |
| classification_rvk | BF 8050 CC 6960 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)213600372 (DE-599)BVBBV035006898 |
| dewey-full | 128/.4 |
| dewey-hundreds | 100 - Philosophy & psychology |
| dewey-ones | 128 - Humankind |
| dewey-raw | 128/.4 |
| dewey-search | 128/.4 |
| dewey-sort | 3128 14 |
| dewey-tens | 120 - Epistemology, causation, humankind |
| discipline | Philosophie Theologie / Religionswissenschaften |
| discipline_str_mv | Philosophie Theologie / Religionswissenschaften |
| edition | 1. publ. |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV035006898 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T21:42:29Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:20:03Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 9780199217144 9780199592500 |
| language | English |
| lccn | 2008011593 |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016676205 |
| oclc_num | 213600372 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-29 DE-12 DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| owner_facet | DE-29 DE-12 DE-384 DE-19 DE-BY-UBM DE-355 DE-BY-UBR |
| physical | XVI, 222 S. |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | marc |
| spelling | Lowe, E. J. 1950-2014 Verfasser (DE-588)136076920 aut Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action E. J. Lowe 1. publ. Oxford [u.a.] Oxford University Press 2008 XVI, 222 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke Includes bibliographical references and indexes E.J. Lowe defends a common-sense view of ourselves as free agents, capable of bringing about changes in the world through the choices we make, rather than being caused to act as we do by factors external to our will. Agent (Philosophy) Choice (Psychology) Free will and determinism Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd rswk-swf Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd rswk-swf Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd rswk-swf Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd rswk-swf Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 s Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 s DE-604 Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 s Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 s Digitalisierung UB Erlangen application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016676205&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
| spellingShingle | Lowe, E. J. 1950-2014 Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action Agent (Philosophy) Choice (Psychology) Free will and determinism Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| subject_GND | (DE-588)4113844-2 (DE-588)4079320-5 (DE-588)4149218-3 (DE-588)4030102-3 |
| title | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action |
| title_auth | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action |
| title_exact_search | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action |
| title_full | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action E. J. Lowe |
| title_fullStr | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action E. J. Lowe |
| title_full_unstemmed | Personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action E. J. Lowe |
| title_short | Personal agency |
| title_sort | personal agency the metaphysics of mind and action |
| title_sub | the metaphysics of mind and action |
| topic | Agent (Philosophy) Choice (Psychology) Free will and determinism Handlungstheorie (DE-588)4113844-2 gnd Willensfreiheit (DE-588)4079320-5 gnd Determinismus (DE-588)4149218-3 gnd Kausalität (DE-588)4030102-3 gnd |
| topic_facet | Agent (Philosophy) Choice (Psychology) Free will and determinism Handlungstheorie Willensfreiheit Determinismus Kausalität |
| url | http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=016676205&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
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