Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Undetermined |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
1992
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
4078 |
| Beschreibung: | 11 S. |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:03:01Z |
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| physical | 11 S. |
| publishDate | 1992 |
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| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Bebchuk, Lucian Arye Verfasser aut Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals Lucian Arye Bebchuk ; Louis Kaplow Cambridge, Mass. 1992 11 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 4078 Kaplow, Louis Sonstige oth National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper series 4078 (DE-604)BV002801238 4078 |
| spellingShingle | Bebchuk, Lucian Arye Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| title | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| title_auth | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| title_exact_search | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| title_full | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals Lucian Arye Bebchuk ; Louis Kaplow |
| title_fullStr | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals Lucian Arye Bebchuk ; Louis Kaplow |
| title_full_unstemmed | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals Lucian Arye Bebchuk ; Louis Kaplow |
| title_short | Optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| title_sort | optimal sanctions when the probability of apprehension varies among individuals |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bebchuklucianarye optimalsanctionswhentheprobabilityofapprehensionvariesamongindividuals AT kaplowlouis optimalsanctionswhentheprobabilityofapprehensionvariesamongindividuals |