Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions:
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
2001
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
8294 |
| Beschreibung: | 35, [8] S. graph. Darst. |
Internformat
MARC
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| 100 | 1 | |a Hendricks, Kenneth |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |c Kenneth Hendricks ; Joris Pinkse ; Robert H. Porter |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |c 2001 | |
| 300 | |a 35, [8] S. |b graph. Darst. | ||
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 8294 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Pinkse, Joris |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Porter, Robert H. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research |t Working paper series |v 8294 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 8294 | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. |
| author_facet | Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. |
| author_role | aut aut aut |
| author_sort | Hendricks, Kenneth |
| author_variant | k h kh j p jp r h p rh rhp |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV026944504 |
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| id | DE-604.BV026944504 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:02:59Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-021605632 |
| oclc_num | 248025681 |
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| physical | 35, [8] S. graph. Darst. |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateSearch | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Hendricks, Kenneth Verfasser aut Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions Kenneth Hendricks ; Joris Pinkse ; Robert H. Porter Cambridge, Mass. 2001 35, [8] S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 8294 Pinkse, Joris Verfasser aut Porter, Robert H. Verfasser aut National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper series 8294 (DE-604)BV002801238 8294 |
| spellingShingle | Hendricks, Kenneth Pinkse, Joris Porter, Robert H. Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |
| title | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |
| title_auth | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |
| title_exact_search | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |
| title_full | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions Kenneth Hendricks ; Joris Pinkse ; Robert H. Porter |
| title_fullStr | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions Kenneth Hendricks ; Joris Pinkse ; Robert H. Porter |
| title_full_unstemmed | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions Kenneth Hendricks ; Joris Pinkse ; Robert H. Porter |
| title_short | Empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price, symmetric, commomn value auctions |
| title_sort | empirical implications of equilibrium bidding in first price symmetric commomn value auctions |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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