Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information:
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | Undetermined |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oslo
1995
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo
1995,25 |
| Beschreibung: | 20 S. |
| ISBN: | 8257090751 |
Internformat
MARC
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| any_adam_object | |
| author | Vislie, Jon |
| author_facet | Vislie, Jon |
| author_role | aut |
| author_sort | Vislie, Jon |
| author_variant | j v jv |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV026142597 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)257505478 (DE-599)BVBBV026142597 |
| format | Book |
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| id | DE-604.BV026142597 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T23:05:58Z |
| institution | BVB |
| isbn | 8257090751 |
| language | Undetermined |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-021731111 |
| oclc_num | 257505478 |
| open_access_boolean | |
| owner | DE-188 |
| owner_facet | DE-188 |
| physical | 20 S. |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publishDateSearch | 1995 |
| publishDateSort | 1995 |
| record_format | marc |
| series | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
| series2 | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
| spelling | Vislie, Jon Verfasser aut Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information by Jon Vislie Oslo 1995 20 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1995,25 Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1995,25 (DE-604)BV026082730 1995,25 |
| spellingShingle | Vislie, Jon Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
| title | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information |
| title_auth | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information |
| title_exact_search | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information |
| title_full | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information by Jon Vislie |
| title_fullStr | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information by Jon Vislie |
| title_full_unstemmed | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information by Jon Vislie |
| title_short | Designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information |
| title_sort | designing optimal environmental incentive schemes under moral hazard and private information |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV026082730 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT visliejon designingoptimalenvironmentalincentiveschemesundermoralhazardandprivateinformation |