Voting in democracies: a study of majority and proportional electoral systems
Gespeichert in:
Späterer Titel: | How democracies vote |
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Hauptverfasser: | , |
Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
London
Faber and Faber
1955
|
Online-Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Beschreibung: | 303 S. |
Internformat
MARC
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100 | 1 | |a Lakeman, Enid |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Voting in democracies |b a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |c by Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert |
264 | 1 | |a London |b Faber and Faber |c 1955 | |
300 | |a 303 S. | ||
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700 | 1 | |a Lambert, James D. |e Verfasser |4 aut | |
785 | 0 | 0 | |i Später u.d.T. |t How democracies vote |
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adam_text | IMAGE 1
A -ARC
VOTING IN DEMOCRACIES A STUDY OF MAJORITY AND PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL
SYSTEMS
BY
ENID LAKEMAN
AND . .
JAMES D^;M ; M ; ^ERT
!G JS : I * . ! .^1
FABER AND FABER 24 RUSSELL SQUARE LONDON
IMAGE 2
CONTENTS
PAGE
DEDICATION BY T. EDMUND HARVEY, LL.D. 7
PREFACE BY J. F. S. ROSS, M.C, B.SC, PH.D. 9
I. THE PURPOSES OF ELECTIONS 19
SELECTION OF RULERS BY THE RULED. CONFLICTING REQUIREMENTS.
I II. THE FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM | ELECTION BY A RELATIVE MAJORITY
IN SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES. |. PARLIAMENT AS THE MIRROR 25
I LACK OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN PARTIES VOTES AND SEATS. EXAMPLES I
FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM, DOMINIONS AND U.S.A. I; THE BLOCK VOTE 31
I IF EACH ELECTOR HAS ONE VOTE PER VACANCY, MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITU- %*
ENCIES ACCENTUATE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FIRST-PAST-THE-POST I
SYSTEM.
I MAJORITY RULE, STRONG GOVERNMENT AND THE TWO- T PARTY SYSTEM 34
|; MOST BRITISH GOVERNMENTS LACK MAJORITY SUPPORT. THIS IS NOT DUE
I TO THE EXISTENCE OF A THIRD PARTY. MINORITY VICTORIES IN STRAIGHT
JGX FIGHTS: SOUTH AFRICA, UNITED KINGDOM. A LARGE PARLIAMENTARY
J* MAJORITY FOR ONE PARTY IS NOT ALWAYS PRODUCED.
?: PERSONALITIES A ND P R O G R A M M ES 37
; BRITISH ELECTIONS BECOMING A PLEBISCITE BETWEEN POTENTIAL GOVERN-
MENTS. ABSENCE OF CHOICE BETWEEN POINTS OF POLICY OR BETWEEN
PERSONALITIES. EXAMPLES OF IMPERSONAL VOTING. PROMINENT PERSON- ALITIES
LOST TO PARLIAMENT. ITHE RUBBER STAMP 45
DEPENDENCE OF MEMBER ON PARTY. CONSEQUENT RIGID DISCIPLINE. .THE GAMBLE
47
LARGE EFFECT OF SMALL CHANGES IN VOTES. DIFFERENT RESULTS FROM THE SAME
VOTES. J?OUND WANTING 49
THE FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM FAILS TO FULFIL WITH CERTAINTY ANY OF THE
PURPOSES OF ELECTIONS.
* 13
IMAGE 3
CONTENTS
III. VARIATIONS OF THE FIRST-PAST-THE-POST SYSTEM MINORITY MEMBERS 50
M.P. OFTEN ELECTED WITH FEWER VOTES THAN HIS OPPONENTS. ELECTORAL PACTS
AS A REMEDY.
THE SECOND BALLOT 53
OPPORTUNITY FOR SUPPORTERS OF LEAST POPULAR CANDIDATES TO CHOOSE AGAIN.
EXAMPLES OF USE: FRANCE, TRADE UNIONS. THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE 54
SIMPLIFIED FORM OFTHE SECOND BALLOT. MAJORITY MEMBERS AND MINORITY
GOVERNMENTS 56 ELECTION OF EACH MEMBER BY AN ABSOLUTE MAJORITY IS NO
GUARANTEE THAT A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS WILL ELECT A MAJORITY OF THE
MEMBERS.
OVER-REPRESENTATION OF A PARTY HAS NO RELATION TO THE NUMBER OF SEATS IT
WINS ON A MINORITY VOTE. EXAMPLES OF RESULTS UNDER SECOND BALLOT AND
ALTERNATIVE VOTE.
PARTY BARGAINING 62
SECOND BALLOT AND ALTERNATIVE VOTE INVOLVE OPPORTUNIST BARGAINS BETWEEN
PARTIES. THE WASTED VOTE BOGEY 65
FEAR OF WASTING ONE S VOTE CAUSES DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN VOTES AND
VOTERS WISHES EXPRESSED IN OTHER WAYS. ALTERNATIVE VOTE CAN REMOVE THIS
FEAR. HOW THE MINORITY WINS 67
VICTORY OF A MINORITY (E.G. SOUTH AFRICA, IGIJS AND 195$) RESULTS FROM
CONCENTRATION OF THE MAJORITY S STRENGTH IN CERTAIN DISTRICTS. CANNOT BE
PREVENTED IF SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES ARE USED. GERRYMANDERING 71
WITH SINGLE-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES, THE RESULT MAY DEPEND ON HOW THEIR
BOUNDARIES ARE DRAWN.
IV. SEMI-PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS WITH MULTI-MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES, FAIR
REPRESENTATION OF PARTIES, AND OF OPINIONS CONCERNING PERSONALITIES,
BECOMES POSSIBLE.
THE LIMITED VOTE 74
IF EACH ELECTOR HAS FEWER VOTES THAN THERE ARE VACANCIES, MINORITIES CAN
SECURE REPRESENTATION. UNCERTAIN IN OPERATION, AND OPEN TO PARTY
MANIPULATION. THE SINGLE NON-TRANSFERABLE VOTE 78
MOST EFFECTIVE FORM OF THE LIMITED VOTE. THE CUMULATIVE VOTE 79
MORE THAN ONE VOTE MAY BE GIVEN TO ONE CANDIDATE. MERITS AND DEFECTS
SIMILAR TO THOSE OF THE LIMITED VOTE.
THE POINTS SYSTEM 82
POINTS AWARDED TO CANDIDATES ACCORDING TO THE VOTER S ORDER OF PRE-
FERENCE. SIMILAR TO THE CUMULATIVE VOTE.
14
IMAGE 4
: CONTENTS
%. V. LIST SYSTEMS OF PROPORTIONAL I REPRESENTATION
|PAIR SHARES FOR THE PARTIES 84
I* PARTIES AWARDED SEATS IN PROPORTION TO THEIR TOTAL VOTES.
LARGEST REMAINDER 85
I IN CALCULATING PROPORTIONS, THE LARGEST FRACTIONS ARE TREATED AS 1. |:
THIS METHOD FAVOURS SMALL PARTIES. |JHE D HONDT RULE OR LARGEST AVERAGE
87
I MAKES THE NUMBER OF VOTES PER SEAT AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE EQUAL FOR -*
ALL PARTIES. FAVOURS LARGE PARTIES. UTILIZATION OF REMAINDERS; *I,
APPARENTEMENT.
^ELECTION BY THE PARTY 91
V PARTY S SEATS FILLED BY ITS CANDIDATES IN THE ORDER OF THEIR NAMES ON
;.; THE BALLOT PAPER.
CHOOSING FROM THE LIST 92
L_ VOTERS PREFERENCES MAY DETERMINE, WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY, WHICH K
CANDIDATES ARE ELECTED FROM EACH PARTY S LIST. P MIXED SYSTEMS 96
* . SINGLE-MEMBER MAJORITY SYSTEM COMBINED WITH ALLOCATION OF SEATS
* : ON A PROPORTIONAL BASIS. PERSONAL ELEMENT IS ILLUSORY.
1%:
F VI. THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE ; DESIGNED TO GIVE EACH ELECTOR AN
EFFECTIVE AND EQUAL VOTE. I VOTES WITHOUT VALUE 98
I IN ANY MAJORITY SYSTEM, A LARGE PROPORTION OF THE VOTES FAIL TO §|F A
S KI THE RESULT, AND HENCE ARE WASTED. JFFEIVING THE VOTE ITS VALUE 1 00
VOTE, LIKE MONEY, ASSURED OF VALUE BY BEING TRANSFERABLE. OPEN IY -
ELECTION, AND EQUIVALENT WITH BALLOT PAPERS. A CONSEQUENCE IS PRO-
PORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF ANY GROUPS THE VOTERS FORM. EXAMPLE
OF MECHANISM IN AN IRISH CONSTITUENCY.
R
VOTERS IN ACTION I IO
V BEHAVIOUR OF VOTERS IN THE IRISH CONSTITUENCY. VOTING ON PARTY LINES,
1 COMBINED WITH DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN CANDIDATES. MUTUAL SUP- PORT OF
RELATED PARTIES. .CCURACY OF REPRESENTATION 1 12
A HIGH PROPORTION OF THE VOTES BECOMES EFFECTIVE. ACCURACY OF REPRE-
SENTATION OF PARTIES AND OF OTHER GROUPS. ILLITY 115
POSSIBILITY OF VOTING ACROSS PARTY LINES. ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
LIST SYSTEMS AND THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. IN-POLITICAL ELECTIONS .
I L8
REPRESENTATION OF SEXES, AGE GROUPS, ETC. EXAMPLES. SPECIAL PRO- VISION
FOR REPRESENTATION OF PARTICULAR INTERESTS.
IMAGE 5
CONTENTS
OVERLAPPING INTERESTS 120
REPRESENTATION OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF GROUPS AT THE SAME TIME IS
IMPORTANT IN PLURAL SOCIETIES AND INTERNATIONAL BODIES. EFFECT ON
NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF WOMEN. ELIMINATING CHANCE 122
STANDARD METHOD IS ACCURATE ENOUGH FOR LARGE ELECTORATES. IN SMALL
ELECTORATES, ELEMENT OF CHANCE IS CONSIDERABLE; IT IS ELIMINATED BY THE
SENATORIAL RULES . CHANCE OF ERROR IN COUNTING IS SMALL. VALUES OF
PREFERENCES . 126
A VOTE IS OF THE SAME VALUE, FOR WHATEVER PREFERENCE IT IS USED. IT IS
MOST LIKELY TO BE USED FOR AN EARLY PREFERENCE. WHICH QUOTA? I2G
HARE AND DROOP QUOTAS. SMALLER QUOTA EXCLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTY
MANIPULATION. ESSENTIAL FEATURES 131
SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIALS OF THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE FORM OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.
VII. SOME TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF P.R. EXAMINATION OF PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS.
PERSONAL CONTACT 132
THIS IS SMALL UNDER THE PRESENT BRITISH SYSTEM. DIFFICULTY OF COVERING A
LARGE P.R. CONSTITUENCY IS OUTWEIGHED BY: VOTERS POWER OF CHOICE
BETWEEN PERSONS; LARGER NUMBER OF ELECTORS WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO A
MEMBER S ELECTION; GREATER SECURITY FOR THE
M.P.; ELECTION OF MORE LOCAL CANDIDATES. NOT TOO DIFFICULT . 134
MISTAKES BY VOTERS ARE NOT INCREASED APPRECIABLY BY EITHER THE SWISS
SYSTEM OR THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE. AN IMPROMPTU ELECTION I 4I
ELECTION OF A TOWN COUNCIL IN OCCUPIED ITALY. FEWER ABSTAINERS ( 142
AVAILABLE EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT VOTING IS STIMULATED BY PROPOR- TIONAL
SYSTEMS. HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE? 143
THE TIME TAKEN BY THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE COUNT IS NOT MUCH LONGER
THAN UNDER THE MAJORITY SYSTEM. WHAT DOES IT COST? 144.
THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VETE DOES NOT INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN
COST TO CANDIDATES OR TO PUBLIC FUNDS. BY-ELECTIONS 145
VARIOUS METHODS FOR FILLING CASUAL VACANCIES. ILLITERACY 147
PROCEDURE WITH ILLITERATE VOTERS.
16
IMAGE 6
CONTENTS
VIII. SOME POLITICAL ASPECTS OF P.R. POLITICAL OBJECTIONS ADVANCED
AGAINST P.R. FOR ELECTING PARLIAMENT. MULTIPLICATION OF PARTIES 149
NO CONSISTENT RELATION BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PARTIES AND THE VOTING
SYSTEM. COUNTRIES HAVING MANY PARTIES HAD THEM UNDER MAJORITY SYSTEMS.
SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE IS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAN LIST SYSTEMS TO CREATE
NEW PARTIES. BALANCING PARTY LESS
DANGEROUS THAN SMALL GROUPS OF VOTERS GIVEN EXAGGERATED POWER BY A
MAJORITY SYSTEM. TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN MODERN CONDITIONS ENTAILS MINORITY
RULE. STABLE AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT 154
NEED FOR OPPOSITION RECOGNISED. FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
NEED NOT BE ALLOTTED TO SEPARATE GROUPS. GOVERNMENT BY CO-OPERATION OF
PARTIES IS POSSIBLE AND PROVIDES GREATER CONTINUITY OF POLICY.
IX. EXPERIENCE UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, (I) LIST SYSTEMS
ELECTIONS AND GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES USING VARIOUS FORMS OF
PARTY LIST PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. SCANDINAVIA 158
DENMARK. 158
NORWAY. 161
SWEDEN. 163
FINLAND. 165
SWITZERLAND 168
BELGIUM . 172
THE NETHERLANDS I 77
ISRAEL L 8L
GERMANY 182
ITALY 187
GREECE IGO
FRANCE 192
EXPERIENCE UNDER PARTY LIST SYSTEMS 1 98
IN NONE OF THE ABOVE COUNTRIES HAS PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION CAUSED A
MULTIPLICATION OF PARTIES OR UNSTABLE GOVERNMENT.
X. EXPERIENCE UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, (II) THE SINGLE
TRANSFERABLE VOTE MUCH EVIDENCE AVAILABLE BUT INSUFFICIENTLY KNOWN.
ATTITUDE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES. THOUGH LESS READY TO ACCEPT
PROPORTIONAL VOTING THAN THE COUNTRIES OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE, GREAT
BRITAIN AND ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUN- TRIES HAVE ALWAYS PREFERRED THE S. T.
V. TO ANY PARTY LIST SYSTEM. 2 00 B 17
IMAGE 7
CONTENTS
THE UNIVERSITY MEMBERS 2O2
P.R. PROMOTED CONTESTS, AND THE ELECTION OF INDEPENDENTS.
THE SCOTTISH EDUCATION AUTHORITIES 2O4
THE CHURCH ASSEMBLY 206
TASMANIA 2O7
CONTINUOUS USE SINCE IGOY. ONLY TWO PARTIES.
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: THE SENATE 2OG
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2 10
PROVINCES OF CANADA. UNITED STATES.
BRITISH DEPENDENCIES 215
MALTA. GIBRALTAR. IRELAND 2 L8
SLIGO TOWN COUNCIL, FOLLOWED BY GENERAL APPLICATION OF P.R. TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS. ABANDONMENT OF P.R. IN NORTHERN IRELAND;
RESENTMENT OF THE MINORITY. PACIFYING EFFECTS OF P.R. IN EIRE;
OPPORTUNITY FOR A POPULAR VERDICT ON THE TREATY. STABILITY OF
GOVERNMENT. A SUCCESSFUL COALITION. IMPORTANCE OF THE PERSONAL FACTOR;
LARGE ELEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE IN THE DAIL.
XL CONCLUSION
APPENDICES
I APPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 2 34 II EXAMPLES OF
ELECTIONS UNDER PROPORTIONAL SYSTEMS 24O
III THOMAS HARE S PROPOSALS 2 45
IV STANDARD REGULATIONS FOR PROPORTIONAL RE- PRESENTATION BY THE SINGLE
TRANSFERABLE VOTE. 247
V THE SENATORIAL RULES* 2 76
VI THE SWEDISH AND DANISH SYSTEMS 280
V II THE FINNISH SYSTEM 282
V I II POINTS SYSTEM 285
IX ELECTION OF ONE PERSON BY A MAJORITY 2 88
X PROPOSALS IN THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT FOR REFORM OF THE VOTING SYSTEM 2
GL
XI BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 96
INDEX 299
18
|
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spelling | Lakeman, Enid Verfasser aut Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems by Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert London Faber and Faber 1955 303 S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Lambert, James D. Verfasser aut Später u.d.T. How democracies vote DE-601 pdf/application http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/417991444.pdf kostenfrei Inhaltsverzeichnis GBV Datenaustausch application/pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020206974&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA Inhaltsverzeichnis |
spellingShingle | Lakeman, Enid Lambert, James D. Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
title | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
title_auth | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
title_exact_search | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
title_full | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems by Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert |
title_fullStr | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems by Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert |
title_full_unstemmed | Voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems by Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert |
title_new | How democracies vote |
title_short | Voting in democracies |
title_sort | voting in democracies a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
title_sub | a study of majority and proportional electoral systems |
url | http://www.gbv.de/dms/sub-hamburg/417991444.pdf http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&local_base=BVB01&doc_number=020206974&sequence=000001&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA |
work_keys_str_mv | AT lakemanenid votingindemocraciesastudyofmajorityandproportionalelectoralsystems AT lambertjamesd votingindemocraciesastudyofmajorityandproportionalelectoralsystems |
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