Sequential versus independent commitment: an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
Wirtschaftswiss. Fak.
1998
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Schriftenreihe: | Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : Economics series
106 |
Beschreibung: | 19, VIII S. |
Internformat
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999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-019527206 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Güth, Werner |
author_facet | Güth, Werner |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Güth, Werner |
author_variant | w g wg |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV024850656 |
classification_rvk | QB 910 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)753309653 (DE-599)BVBBV024850656 |
discipline | Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV024850656 |
illustrated | Not Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T22:22:25Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-019527206 |
oclc_num | 753309653 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-11 |
owner_facet | DE-11 |
physical | 19, VIII S. |
publishDate | 1998 |
publishDateSearch | 1998 |
publishDateSort | 1998 |
publisher | Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : Economics series |
spelling | Güth, Werner Verfasser aut Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules Werner Güth Berlin Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. 1998 19, VIII S. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Discussion paper / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät : Economics series 106 Universität <Berlin, Humboldt-Universität> Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät Discussion paper 106 (DE-604)BV009546382 106 |
spellingShingle | Güth, Werner Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
title | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
title_auth | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
title_exact_search | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
title_full | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules Werner Güth |
title_fullStr | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules Werner Güth |
title_full_unstemmed | Sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules Werner Güth |
title_short | Sequential versus independent commitment |
title_sort | sequential versus independent commitment an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
title_sub | an indirect evolutionary analysis of bargaining rules |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV009546382 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT guthwerner sequentialversusindependentcommitmentanindirectevolutionaryanalysisofbargainingrules |