Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening: the inefficiency of project selection
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oslo
1990
|
Schriftenreihe: | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo
1990,20 |
Beschreibung: | 23 S. graph. Darst. |
ISBN: | 8257084425 |
Internformat
MARC
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100 | 1 | |a Strand, Jon |d 1952- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)170056031 |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening |b the inefficiency of project selection |c by Jon Strand |
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490 | 1 | |a Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |v 1990,20 | |
830 | 0 | |a Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |v 1990,20 |w (DE-604)BV026082730 |9 1990,20 | |
999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-018350113 |
Datensatz im Suchindex
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any_adam_object | |
author | Strand, Jon 1952- |
author_GND | (DE-588)170056031 |
author_facet | Strand, Jon 1952- |
author_role | aut |
author_sort | Strand, Jon 1952- |
author_variant | j s js |
building | Verbundindex |
bvnumber | BV024369448 |
ctrlnum | (OCoLC)610709760 (DE-599)BVBBV024369448 |
format | Book |
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id | DE-604.BV024369448 |
illustrated | Illustrated |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:58:10Z |
institution | BVB |
isbn | 8257084425 |
language | English |
oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-018350113 |
oclc_num | 610709760 |
open_access_boolean | |
owner | DE-83 DE-188 |
owner_facet | DE-83 DE-188 |
physical | 23 S. graph. Darst. |
publishDate | 1990 |
publishDateSearch | 1990 |
publishDateSort | 1990 |
record_format | marc |
series | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
series2 | Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
spelling | Strand, Jon 1952- Verfasser (DE-588)170056031 aut Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection by Jon Strand Oslo 1990 23 S. graph. Darst. txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1990,20 Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo 1990,20 (DE-604)BV026082730 1990,20 |
spellingShingle | Strand, Jon 1952- Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection Memorandum from Department of Economics, University of Oslo |
title | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection |
title_auth | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection |
title_exact_search | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection |
title_full | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection by Jon Strand |
title_fullStr | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection by Jon Strand |
title_full_unstemmed | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection by Jon Strand |
title_short | Competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening |
title_sort | competitive credit markets with moral hazard and perfect screening the inefficiency of project selection |
title_sub | the inefficiency of project selection |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV026082730 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT strandjon competitivecreditmarketswithmoralhazardandperfectscreeningtheinefficiencyofprojectselection |