Ambiguity and extremism in elections:
"We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candid...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
14143 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
| Beschreibung: | 27 S. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Ambiguity and extremism in elections |c Alberto F. Alesina ; Richard T. Holden |
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| 520 | 8 | |a "We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Holden, Richard T. |d 1974- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)135807875 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV023594020 |
| illustrated | Not Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:32Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 27 S. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Verfasser (DE-588)125845804 aut Ambiguity and extremism in elections Alberto F. Alesina ; Richard T. Holden Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 27 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 14143 "We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces affect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions affect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambiguity balances voter beliefs about the appeal of candidates both to the median voter and to the campaign contributors. If primaries precede a general election, they add another incentive for ambiguity, because in the primaries the candidates do not want to reveal too much information, to maintain some freedom of movement in the policy space for the general election. Ambiguity has an option value"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Holden, Richard T. 1974- Verfasser (DE-588)135807875 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 14143 (DE-604)BV002801238 14143 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14143.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Alesina, Alberto 1957-2020 Holden, Richard T. 1974- Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title | Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title_auth | Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title_exact_search | Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title_full | Ambiguity and extremism in elections Alberto F. Alesina ; Richard T. Holden |
| title_fullStr | Ambiguity and extremism in elections Alberto F. Alesina ; Richard T. Holden |
| title_full_unstemmed | Ambiguity and extremism in elections Alberto F. Alesina ; Richard T. Holden |
| title_short | Ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| title_sort | ambiguity and extremism in elections |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14143.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT alesinaalberto ambiguityandextremisminelections AT holdenrichardt ambiguityandextremisminelections |