On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements:
"Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested t...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2008
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
14067 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | "Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
| Beschreibung: | 47 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593948 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 00000000000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 081010s2008 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)254567370 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV571394256 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Maggi, Giovanni |d 1964- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128977515 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |c Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2008 | |
| 300 | |a 47 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 14067 | |
| 520 | 8 | |a "Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Staiger, Robert W. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128796499 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 14067 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 14067 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14067.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016909278 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138254069399552 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Maggi, Giovanni 1964- Staiger, Robert W. |
| author_GND | (DE-588)128977515 (DE-588)128796499 |
| author_facet | Maggi, Giovanni 1964- Staiger, Robert W. |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Maggi, Giovanni 1964- |
| author_variant | g m gm r w s rw rws |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593948 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254567370 (DE-599)GBV571394256 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02636nam a2200337zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593948</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">00000000000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">081010s2008 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)254567370</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV571394256</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Maggi, Giovanni</subfield><subfield code="d">1964-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128977515</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements</subfield><subfield code="c">Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2008</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">47 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">14067</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">"Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Staiger, Robert W.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)128796499</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">14067</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">14067</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14067.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016909278</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593948 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:32Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:16Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016909278 |
| oclc_num | 254567370 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 47 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateSearch | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Maggi, Giovanni 1964- Verfasser (DE-588)128977515 aut On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2008 47 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 14067 "Formal economic analysis of trade agreements typically treats disputes as synonymous with concerns about enforcement. But in reality, most WTO disputes involve disagreements of interpretation concerning the agreement, or instances where the agreement is simply silent. And some have suggested that the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) might serve a useful purpose by granting "exceptions" to rigid contractual obligations in some circumstances. In each of these three cases, the role played by the DSB amounts to "completing" various dimensions of an incomplete contract. Moreover, there is a debate among legal scholars on whether or not precedent-setting in DSB rulings may enhance the performance of the institution. All of this points to the importance of understanding the implications of the different possible degrees of activism in the role played by the DSB. In this paper we bring formal analysis to bear on this broad question. We characterize the choice of contractual form and DSB role that is optimal for governments under various contracting conditions. A novel feature of our approach is that it highlights the interaction between the design of the contract and the design of the dispute settlement procedure, and it views these as two components of a single over-arching institutional design problem"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site Staiger, Robert W. Verfasser (DE-588)128796499 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 14067 (DE-604)BV002801238 14067 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14067.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Maggi, Giovanni 1964- Staiger, Robert W. On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title_auth | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title_exact_search | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title_exact_search_txtP | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title_full | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_fullStr | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements Giovanni Maggi ; Robert W. Staiger |
| title_short | On the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| title_sort | on the role and design of dispute settlement procedures in international trade agreements |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w14067.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT maggigiovanni ontheroleanddesignofdisputesettlementproceduresininternationaltradeagreements AT staigerrobertw ontheroleanddesignofdisputesettlementproceduresininternationaltradeagreements |