Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies:
Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts inv...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
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Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13711 |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts investment behavior. Over six years, we collect a unique panel of nearly 7,000 observations of probability distributions provided by top financial executives regarding the stock market. Financial executives are miscalibrated: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 38% of the time. We show that companies with overconfident CFOs use lower discount rates to value cash flows, and that they invest more, use more debt, are less likely to pay dividends, are more likely to repurchase shares, and they use proportionally more long-term, as opposed to short-term, debt. The pervasive effect of this miscalibration suggests that the effect of overconfidence should be explicitly modeled when analyzing corporate decision-making. |
Beschreibung: | 55 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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author | Ben-David, Itzhak Graham, John R. Harvey, Campbell R. 1958- |
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illustrated | Illustrated |
index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:32Z |
indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:15Z |
institution | BVB |
language | English |
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physical | 55 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
publishDate | 2007 |
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publishDateSort | 2007 |
publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
record_format | marc |
series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
spelling | Ben-David, Itzhak Verfasser (DE-588)135853834 aut Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies Itzhak Ben-David ; John R. Graham ; Campbell R. Harvey Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 55 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13711 Miscalibration is a standard measure of overconfidence in both psychology and economics. Although it is often used in lab experiments, there is scarcity of evidence about its effects in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and whether their miscalibration impacts investment behavior. Over six years, we collect a unique panel of nearly 7,000 observations of probability distributions provided by top financial executives regarding the stock market. Financial executives are miscalibrated: realized market returns are within the executives' 80% confidence intervals only 38% of the time. We show that companies with overconfident CFOs use lower discount rates to value cash flows, and that they invest more, use more debt, are less likely to pay dividends, are more likely to repurchase shares, and they use proportionally more long-term, as opposed to short-term, debt. The pervasive effect of this miscalibration suggests that the effect of overconfidence should be explicitly modeled when analyzing corporate decision-making. Graham, John R. Verfasser (DE-588)129349690 aut Harvey, Campbell R. 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)129251674 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13711 (DE-604)BV002801238 13711 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13711.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Ben-David, Itzhak Graham, John R. Harvey, Campbell R. 1958- Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title_auth | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title_exact_search | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title_exact_search_txtP | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title_full | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies Itzhak Ben-David ; John R. Graham ; Campbell R. Harvey |
title_fullStr | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies Itzhak Ben-David ; John R. Graham ; Campbell R. Harvey |
title_full_unstemmed | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies Itzhak Ben-David ; John R. Graham ; Campbell R. Harvey |
title_short | Managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
title_sort | managerial overconfidence and corporate policies |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13711.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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