Aid volatility and poverty traps:
This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13400 |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 18 - 19 |
| Beschreibung: | 19, [1] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593301 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080709000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 071218s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)254315311 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV546486843 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Agénor, Pierre-Richard |d 1957- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)12408009X |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Aid volatility and poverty traps |c Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 19, [1] S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13400 | |
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 18 - 19 | ||
| 520 | |a This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Aizenman, Joshua |d 1949- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124080057 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13400 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13400 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13400.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908631 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138252718833664 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- Aizenman, Joshua 1949- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)12408009X (DE-588)124080057 |
| author_facet | Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- Aizenman, Joshua 1949- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- |
| author_variant | p r a pra j a ja |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593301 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)254315311 (DE-599)GBV546486843 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02051nam a2200337zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593301</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080709000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">071218s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)254315311</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV546486843</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Agénor, Pierre-Richard</subfield><subfield code="d">1957-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)12408009X</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Aid volatility and poverty traps</subfield><subfield code="c">Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">19, [1] S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">13400</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturverz. S. 18 - 19</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Aizenman, Joshua</subfield><subfield code="d">1949-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124080057</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">13400</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">13400</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13400.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908631</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593301 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908631 |
| oclc_num | 254315311 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 19, [1] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- Verfasser (DE-588)12408009X aut Aid volatility and poverty traps Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 19, [1] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13400 Literaturverz. S. 18 - 19 This paper studies the impact of aid volatility in a two-period model where production may occur with either a traditional or a modern technology. Public spending is productive and "time to build" requires expenditure in both periods for the modern technology to be used. The possibility of a poverty trap induced by high aid volatility is first examined in a benchmark case where taxation is absent. The analysis is then extended to account for self insurance (taking the form of a first-period contingency fund) financed through taxation. An increase in aid volatility is shown to raise the optimal contingency fund. But if future aid also depends on the size of the contingency fund (as a result of a moral hazard effect on donors' behavior), the optimal policy may entail no self insurance. Aizenman, Joshua 1949- Verfasser (DE-588)124080057 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13400 (DE-604)BV002801238 13400 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13400.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Agénor, Pierre-Richard 1957- Aizenman, Joshua 1949- Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title | Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title_auth | Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title_exact_search | Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title_full | Aid volatility and poverty traps Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman |
| title_fullStr | Aid volatility and poverty traps Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aid volatility and poverty traps Pierre-Richard Agénor ; Joshua Aizenman |
| title_short | Aid volatility and poverty traps |
| title_sort | aid volatility and poverty traps |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13400.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT agenorpierrerichard aidvolatilityandpovertytraps AT aizenmanjoshua aidvolatilityandpovertytraps |