Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments:
This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equi...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13331 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence and economy-wide costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement. Compensation is provided either through lump-sum industry tax credits or industry-specific cuts in capital tax rates. We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost, reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement, and (2) a lump-sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation. The compensation requirement affects these components differently and thus can alter the cost-rankings of policies. When compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under performance standards and mandated technologies -- a reflection of the emission tax's higher compensation requirements. If in this setting the required pollution reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to become more costly than command and control policies. In contrast, if required abatement is extensive, the emissions tax emerges as the most cost-effective policy because its relatively low intrinsic abatement costs assume greater importance. |
| Beschreibung: | 44, [10] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |c A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen |
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13331 | |
| 520 | |a This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence and economy-wide costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement. Compensation is provided either through lump-sum industry tax credits or industry-specific cuts in capital tax rates. We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost, reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement, and (2) a lump-sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation. The compensation requirement affects these components differently and thus can alter the cost-rankings of policies. When compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under performance standards and mandated technologies -- a reflection of the emission tax's higher compensation requirements. If in this setting the required pollution reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to become more costly than command and control policies. In contrast, if required abatement is extensive, the emissions tax emerges as the most cost-effective policy because its relatively low intrinsic abatement costs assume greater importance. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Goulder, Lawrence H. |d 1951- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)128841664 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Jacobsen, Mark R. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)133777553 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13331 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13331 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13331.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
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| id | DE-604.BV023593232 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 44, [10] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| spelling | Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958- Verfasser (DE-588)124153933 aut Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 44, [10] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13331 This paper explores how the costs of meeting given aggregate targets for pollution emissions change with the imposition of the requirement that key pollution-related industries be compensated for potential losses of profit from the pollution regulation. Using analytically and numerically solved equilibrium models, we compare the incidence and economy-wide costs of emissions taxes, fuel (intermediate input) taxes, performance standards and mandated technologies in the absence and presence of this compensation requirement. Compensation is provided either through lump-sum industry tax credits or industry-specific cuts in capital tax rates. We decompose the added costs from the compensation requirement into (1) an increase in intrinsic abatement cost, reflecting a lowered efficiency of pollution abatement, and (2) a lump-sum compensation cost that captures the efficiency costs of financing the compensation. The compensation requirement affects these components differently and thus can alter the cost-rankings of policies. When compensation is provided through tax credits, the lump-sum compensation cost is higher under the emissions tax than under performance standards and mandated technologies -- a reflection of the emission tax's higher compensation requirements. If in this setting the required pollution reduction is modest, imposing the compensation requirement causes the emissions tax to become more costly than command and control policies. In contrast, if required abatement is extensive, the emissions tax emerges as the most cost-effective policy because its relatively low intrinsic abatement costs assume greater importance. Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)128841664 aut Jacobsen, Mark R. Verfasser (DE-588)133777553 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13331 (DE-604)BV002801238 13331 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13331.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Bovenberg, Ary Lans 1958- Goulder, Lawrence H. 1951- Jacobsen, Mark R. Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title_auth | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title_exact_search | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title_full | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen |
| title_fullStr | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen |
| title_full_unstemmed | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments A. Lans Bovenberg ; Lawrence H. Goulder ; Mark R. Jacobsen |
| title_short | Industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| title_sort | industry compensation and the costs of alternative environmental policy instruments |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13331.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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