Left behind by design: proficiency counts and test-based accountability
Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13293 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and principals to target children near current proficiency levels for extra attention, but these same systems provide weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are clearly proficient already or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term. We show based on fifth grade test scores from the Chicago Public Schools that both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Nonetheless, the least academically advantaged students in Chicago did not score higher in math or reading following the introduction of accountability, and we find only mixed evidence of score gains among the most advantaged students. A large existing literature argues that accountability systems built around standardized tests greatly affect the amount of time that teachers devote to different topics. Our results for fifth graders in Chicago, as well as related results for sixth graders after the 1996 reform, suggest that the choice of the proficiency standard in such accountability systems determines the amount of time that teachers devote to students of different ability levels. |
| Beschreibung: | 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593196 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080327000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070907s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)255805306 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV539975427 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Neal, Derek A. |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124566197 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Left behind by design |b proficiency counts and test-based accountability |c Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 60 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13293 | |
| 520 | 8 | |a Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and principals to target children near current proficiency levels for extra attention, but these same systems provide weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are clearly proficient already or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term. We show based on fifth grade test scores from the Chicago Public Schools that both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Nonetheless, the least academically advantaged students in Chicago did not score higher in math or reading following the introduction of accountability, and we find only mixed evidence of score gains among the most advantaged students. A large existing literature argues that accountability systems built around standardized tests greatly affect the amount of time that teachers devote to different topics. Our results for fifth graders in Chicago, as well as related results for sixth graders after the 1996 reform, suggest that the choice of the proficiency standard in such accountability systems determines the amount of time that teachers devote to students of different ability levels. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore |d 1972- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130632945 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13293 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13293 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13293.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908526 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138252490244096 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Neal, Derek A. Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore 1972- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124566197 (DE-588)130632945 |
| author_facet | Neal, Derek A. Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore 1972- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Neal, Derek A. |
| author_variant | d a n da dan d w s dw dws |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593196 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255805306 (DE-599)GBV539975427 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02806nam a2200325zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593196</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080327000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070907s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)255805306</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV539975427</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Neal, Derek A.</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124566197</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Left behind by design</subfield><subfield code="b">proficiency counts and test-based accountability</subfield><subfield code="c">Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">60 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">13293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and principals to target children near current proficiency levels for extra attention, but these same systems provide weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are clearly proficient already or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term. We show based on fifth grade test scores from the Chicago Public Schools that both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Nonetheless, the least academically advantaged students in Chicago did not score higher in math or reading following the introduction of accountability, and we find only mixed evidence of score gains among the most advantaged students. A large existing literature argues that accountability systems built around standardized tests greatly affect the amount of time that teachers devote to different topics. Our results for fifth graders in Chicago, as well as related results for sixth graders after the 1996 reform, suggest that the choice of the proficiency standard in such accountability systems determines the amount of time that teachers devote to students of different ability levels.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore</subfield><subfield code="d">1972-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130632945</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">13293</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">13293</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13293.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908526</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593196 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908526 |
| oclc_num | 255805306 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Neal, Derek A. Verfasser (DE-588)124566197 aut Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 60 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13293 Many test-based accountability systems, including the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB), place great weight on the numbers of students who score at or above specified proficiency levels in various subjects. Accountability systems based on these metrics often provide incentives for teachers and principals to target children near current proficiency levels for extra attention, but these same systems provide weak incentives to devote extra attention to students who are clearly proficient already or who have little chance of becoming proficient in the near term. We show based on fifth grade test scores from the Chicago Public Schools that both the introduction of NCLB in 2002 and the introduction of similar district level reforms in 1996 generated noteworthy increases in reading and math scores among students in the middle of the achievement distribution. Nonetheless, the least academically advantaged students in Chicago did not score higher in math or reading following the introduction of accountability, and we find only mixed evidence of score gains among the most advantaged students. A large existing literature argues that accountability systems built around standardized tests greatly affect the amount of time that teachers devote to different topics. Our results for fifth graders in Chicago, as well as related results for sixth graders after the 1996 reform, suggest that the choice of the proficiency standard in such accountability systems determines the amount of time that teachers devote to students of different ability levels. Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore 1972- Verfasser (DE-588)130632945 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13293 (DE-604)BV002801238 13293 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13293.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Neal, Derek A. Schanzenbach, Diane Whitmore 1972- Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| title | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| title_auth | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| title_exact_search | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| title_full | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach |
| title_fullStr | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Left behind by design proficiency counts and test-based accountability Derek Neal ; Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach |
| title_short | Left behind by design |
| title_sort | left behind by design proficiency counts and test based accountability |
| title_sub | proficiency counts and test-based accountability |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13293.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT nealdereka leftbehindbydesignproficiencycountsandtestbasedaccountability AT schanzenbachdianewhitmore leftbehindbydesignproficiencycountsandtestbasedaccountability |