Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing:
The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence,...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13251 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 53 - 60 |
| Beschreibung: | 70 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 520 | |a The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Wang, Neng |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130421359 |4 aut | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV023593157 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908487 |
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| physical | 70 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Albuquerque, Rui Verfasser (DE-588)128910097 aut Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing Rui Albuquerque ; Neng Wang Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 70 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13251 Literaturverz. S. 53 - 60 The separation of ownership and control allows controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits. We develop an analytically tractable dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study asset pricing and welfare implications of imperfect investor protection. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that countries with weaker investor protection have more incentives to overinvest, lower Tobin's q, higher return volatility, larger risk premium, and higher interest rate. Calibrating the model to the Korean economy reveals that perfecting investor protection increases the stock market's value by 22 percent, a gain for which outside shareholders are willing to pay 11 percent of their capital stock. Wang, Neng Verfasser (DE-588)130421359 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13251 (DE-604)BV002801238 13251 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13251.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Albuquerque, Rui Wang, Neng Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title_auth | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title_exact_search | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title_full | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing Rui Albuquerque ; Neng Wang |
| title_fullStr | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing Rui Albuquerque ; Neng Wang |
| title_full_unstemmed | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing Rui Albuquerque ; Neng Wang |
| title_short | Agency conflicts, investment, and asset pricing |
| title_sort | agency conflicts investment and asset pricing |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13251.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT albuquerquerui agencyconflictsinvestmentandassetpricing AT wangneng agencyconflictsinvestmentandassetpricing |