The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas: evidence from patent grant delays
This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the ne...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13234 |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the need to disclosure complementary (yet unprotected) knowledge, asymmetric information, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. We employ a dataset combining information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified). While pre-allowance licensing does occur, the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing agreement significantly increases after patent allowance. Moreover, the impact of the patent system depends on the strategic and institutional environment in which firms operate. Patent allowance seems to play a particularly important role for technologies with longer technology lifecycles or that lack alternative mechanisms such as copyright, reputation, or brokers. The findings suggest that imperfections in the market for ideas may be important, and that formal IP rights may facilitate gains from technological trade. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 26 - 29 |
| Beschreibung: | 38 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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| 520 | 8 | |a This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the need to disclosure complementary (yet unprotected) knowledge, asymmetric information, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. We employ a dataset combining information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified). While pre-allowance licensing does occur, the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing agreement significantly increases after patent allowance. Moreover, the impact of the patent system depends on the strategic and institutional environment in which firms operate. Patent allowance seems to play a particularly important role for technologies with longer technology lifecycles or that lack alternative mechanisms such as copyright, reputation, or brokers. The findings suggest that imperfections in the market for ideas may be important, and that formal IP rights may facilitate gains from technological trade. | |
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| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
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| spelling | Gans, Joshua 1968- Verfasser (DE-588)130571776 aut The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays Joshua S. Gans ; David H. Hsu ; Scott Stern Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 38 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13234 Literaturverz. S. 26 - 29 This paper considers the impact of the intellectual property (IP) system on the timing of cooperation/licensing by start-up technology entrepreneurs. If the market for technology licenses is efficient, the timing of licensing is independent of whether IP has already been granted. In contrast, the need to disclosure complementary (yet unprotected) knowledge, asymmetric information, or search costs may retard efficient technology transfer. In these cases, reductions in uncertainty surrounding the scope and extent of IP rights may facilitate trade in the market for ideas. We employ a dataset combining information about cooperative licensing and the timing of patent allowances (the administrative event when patent rights are clarified). While pre-allowance licensing does occur, the hazard rate for achieving a cooperative licensing agreement significantly increases after patent allowance. Moreover, the impact of the patent system depends on the strategic and institutional environment in which firms operate. Patent allowance seems to play a particularly important role for technologies with longer technology lifecycles or that lack alternative mechanisms such as copyright, reputation, or brokers. The findings suggest that imperfections in the market for ideas may be important, and that formal IP rights may facilitate gains from technological trade. Hsu, David H. Verfasser (DE-588)132667177 aut Stern, Scott 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)130571741 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13234 (DE-604)BV002801238 13234 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13234.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Gans, Joshua 1968- Hsu, David H. Stern, Scott 1969- The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title_auth | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title_exact_search | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title_exact_search_txtP | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title_full | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays Joshua S. Gans ; David H. Hsu ; Scott Stern |
| title_fullStr | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays Joshua S. Gans ; David H. Hsu ; Scott Stern |
| title_full_unstemmed | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays Joshua S. Gans ; David H. Hsu ; Scott Stern |
| title_short | The impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas |
| title_sort | the impact of uncertain intellectual property rights on the market for ideas evidence from patent grant delays |
| title_sub | evidence from patent grant delays |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13234.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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