Complementarity among vertical integration decisions: evidence from automobile product development
This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasin...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13232 |
| Online-Zugang: | kostenfrei |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29 |
| Beschreibung: | 44 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023593138 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080327000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070907s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)255573159 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)GBV538368608 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 050 | 0 | |a HB1 | |
| 100 | 1 | |a Novak, Sharon |d 1971- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)133485323 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Complementarity among vertical integration decisions |b evidence from automobile product development |c Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2007 | |
| 300 | |a 44 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13232 | |
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29 | ||
| 520 | 8 | |a This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Stern, Scott |d 1969- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)130571741 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 13232 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 13232 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908468 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138252379095040 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Novak, Sharon 1971- Stern, Scott 1969- |
| author_GND | (DE-588)133485323 (DE-588)130571741 |
| author_facet | Novak, Sharon 1971- Stern, Scott 1969- |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Novak, Sharon 1971- |
| author_variant | s n sn s s ss |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023593138 |
| callnumber-first | H - Social Science |
| callnumber-label | HB1 |
| callnumber-raw | HB1 |
| callnumber-search | HB1 |
| callnumber-sort | HB 11 |
| callnumber-subject | HB - Economic Theory and Demography |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255573159 (DE-599)GBV538368608 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>02835nam a2200349zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023593138</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080327000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070907s2007 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)255573159</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)GBV538368608</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="050" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">HB1</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Novak, Sharon</subfield><subfield code="d">1971-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)133485323</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Complementarity among vertical integration decisions</subfield><subfield code="b">evidence from automobile product development</subfield><subfield code="c">Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2007</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">44 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">13232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Stern, Scott</subfield><subfield code="d">1969-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)130571741</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">13232</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">13232</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908468</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023593138 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908468 |
| oclc_num | 255573159 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 44 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publishDateSearch | 2007 |
| publishDateSort | 2007 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Novak, Sharon 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)133485323 aut Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 44 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13232 Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29 This paper examines complementarity among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development. Though most research assumes that contracting choices are independent of each other, contracting complementarity arises when the returns to a single vertical integration decision are increasing in the level of vertical integration associated with other contracting choices. First, effective coordination may depend on the level of (non-contractible) effort on the part of each agent; contracting complementarity results if coordination efforts are interdependent and vertical integration facilitates a higher level of non-contractible effort. Second, effective coordination may require the disclosure of proprietary trade secrets, and the potential for expropriation by external suppliers may induce complementarity among vertical integration choices. We provide evidence for complementarity in product development contracting by taking advantage of a detailed dataset that includes the level of vertical integration and the contracting environment for individual automobile systems in the luxury automobile segment. Using an instrumental variables framework that distinguishes complementarity from unobserved firm-level factors, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that contracting complementarity is an important driver of vertical integration choices. The findings suggest that contracting complementarity may be particularly important when coordination is important to achieve but difficult to monitor. Stern, Scott 1969- Verfasser (DE-588)130571741 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13232 (DE-604)BV002801238 13232 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Novak, Sharon 1971- Stern, Scott 1969- Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title_auth | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title_exact_search | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title_full | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern |
| title_fullStr | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern |
| title_full_unstemmed | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development Sharon Novak ; Scott Stern |
| title_short | Complementarity among vertical integration decisions |
| title_sort | complementarity among vertical integration decisions evidence from automobile product development |
| title_sub | evidence from automobile product development |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13232.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT novaksharon complementarityamongverticalintegrationdecisionsevidencefromautomobileproductdevelopment AT sternscott complementarityamongverticalintegrationdecisionsevidencefromautomobileproductdevelopment |