Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries?:
We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries,...
Gespeichert in:
Hauptverfasser: | , |
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Format: | Buch |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
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Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13164 |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Zusammenfassung: | We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces more the electoral appeal of capitalism than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in their country are also more likely to lean left ideologically (and to declare support for a more intrusive government in economic matters). Finally, we present a model explaining the corruption-left connection. It exploits the fact that an act of corruption is more revealing about the fairness type of a rich capitalist than of a poor bureaucrat. After observing corruption, voters who care about fairness react by increasing taxes and moving left. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the electoral appeal of capitalism. |
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 35 - 37 |
Beschreibung: | 37 S. 22 cm |
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520 | 8 | |a We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces more the electoral appeal of capitalism than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in their country are also more likely to lean left ideologically (and to declare support for a more intrusive government in economic matters). Finally, we present a model explaining the corruption-left connection. It exploits the fact that an act of corruption is more revealing about the fairness type of a rich capitalist than of a poor bureaucrat. After observing corruption, voters who care about fairness react by increasing taxes and moving left. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the electoral appeal of capitalism. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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physical | 37 S. 22 cm |
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publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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spelling | Di Tella, Rafael Verfasser (DE-588)120891816 aut Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? Rafael Di Tella ; Robert MacCulloch Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 37 S. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13164 Literaturverz. S. 35 - 37 We find anecdotal evidence suggesting that governments in poor countries have a more left wing rhetoric than those in OECD countries. Thus, it appears that capitalist rhetoric doesn't flow to poor countries. A possible explanation is that corruption, which is more widespread in poor countries, reduces more the electoral appeal of capitalism than that of socialism. The empirical pattern of beliefs within countries is consistent with this explanation: people who perceive corruption to be high in their country are also more likely to lean left ideologically (and to declare support for a more intrusive government in economic matters). Finally, we present a model explaining the corruption-left connection. It exploits the fact that an act of corruption is more revealing about the fairness type of a rich capitalist than of a poor bureaucrat. After observing corruption, voters who care about fairness react by increasing taxes and moving left. There is a negative ideological externality since the existence of corrupt entrepreneurs hurts good entrepreneurs by reducing the electoral appeal of capitalism. MacCulloch, Robert Verfasser (DE-588)120891824 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13164 (DE-604)BV002801238 13164 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13164.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
spellingShingle | Di Tella, Rafael MacCulloch, Robert Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title_auth | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title_exact_search | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title_exact_search_txtP | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title_full | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? Rafael Di Tella ; Robert MacCulloch |
title_fullStr | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? Rafael Di Tella ; Robert MacCulloch |
title_full_unstemmed | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? Rafael Di Tella ; Robert MacCulloch |
title_short | Why doesn't capitalism flow to poor countries? |
title_sort | why doesn t capitalism flow to poor countries |
url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13164.pdf |
volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT ditellarafael whydoesntcapitalismflowtopoorcountries AT maccullochrobert whydoesntcapitalismflowtopoorcountries |