Political dynasties:
We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection bet...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13122 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 36 - 40 |
| Beschreibung: | 40, [32] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13122 | |
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 36 - 40 | ||
| 520 | 8 | |a We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Dal Bó, Pedro |d 1971- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)133431193 |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Snyder, Jason |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)133431436 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| id | DE-604.BV023593032 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908362 |
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| physical | 40, [32] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Dal Bó, Ernesto Verfasser (DE-588)133431150 aut Political dynasties Ernesto Dal Bó ; Pedro Dal Bó ; Jason Snyder Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 40, [32] S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13122 Literaturverz. S. 36 - 40 We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power. Dal Bó, Pedro 1971- Verfasser (DE-588)133431193 aut Snyder, Jason Verfasser (DE-588)133431436 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13122 (DE-604)BV002801238 13122 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13122.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Dal Bó, Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro 1971- Snyder, Jason Political dynasties |
| title | Political dynasties |
| title_auth | Political dynasties |
| title_exact_search | Political dynasties |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Political dynasties |
| title_full | Political dynasties Ernesto Dal Bó ; Pedro Dal Bó ; Jason Snyder |
| title_fullStr | Political dynasties Ernesto Dal Bó ; Pedro Dal Bó ; Jason Snyder |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political dynasties Ernesto Dal Bó ; Pedro Dal Bó ; Jason Snyder |
| title_short | Political dynasties |
| title_sort | political dynasties |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13122.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT dalboernesto politicaldynasties AT dalbopedro politicaldynasties AT snyderjason politicaldynasties |