Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration:
This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13069 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of the market. Under certain conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms are not influenced by a desire to deter entry. Strategic investments, however, may be nonmonotone because entry deterrence is unnecessary in very small markets and impossible in very large ones, resulting in overall nonmonotonic investment. The pharmaceutical data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information for a sample of drugs which lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992. Among the findings consistent with an entry deterrence motivation are that incumbents in markets of intermediate size have lower levels of advertising and are more likely to reduce advertising immediately prior to patent expiration. |
| Beschreibung: | 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
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| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 13069 | |
| 520 | 8 | |a This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of the market. Under certain conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms are not influenced by a desire to deter entry. Strategic investments, however, may be nonmonotone because entry deterrence is unnecessary in very small markets and impossible in very large ones, resulting in overall nonmonotonic investment. The pharmaceutical data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information for a sample of drugs which lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992. Among the findings consistent with an entry deterrence motivation are that incumbents in markets of intermediate size have lower levels of advertising and are more likely to reduce advertising immediately prior to patent expiration. | |
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Datensatz im Suchindex
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| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Ellison, Glenn 1965- Verfasser (DE-588)126351783 aut Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration Glenn Ellison ; Sara Fisher Ellison Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 49 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13069 This paper develops a new approach to testing for strategic entry deterrence and applies it to the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents just before they lose patent protection. The approach involves looking at a cross-section of markets and examining whether behavior is nonmonotonic in the size of the market. Under certain conditions, investment levels will be monotone in market size if firms are not influenced by a desire to deter entry. Strategic investments, however, may be nonmonotone because entry deterrence is unnecessary in very small markets and impossible in very large ones, resulting in overall nonmonotonic investment. The pharmaceutical data contain advertising, product proliferation, and pricing information for a sample of drugs which lost patent protection between 1986 and 1992. Among the findings consistent with an entry deterrence motivation are that incumbents in markets of intermediate size have lower levels of advertising and are more likely to reduce advertising immediately prior to patent expiration. Ellison, Sara Fisher Verfasser (DE-588)12925164X aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13069 (DE-604)BV002801238 13069 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13069.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Ellison, Glenn 1965- Ellison, Sara Fisher Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title_auth | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title_exact_search | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title_full | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration Glenn Ellison ; Sara Fisher Ellison |
| title_fullStr | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration Glenn Ellison ; Sara Fisher Ellison |
| title_full_unstemmed | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration Glenn Ellison ; Sara Fisher Ellison |
| title_short | Strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| title_sort | strategic entry deterrence and the behavior of pharmaceutical incumbents prior to patent expiration |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13069.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ellisonglenn strategicentrydeterrenceandthebehaviorofpharmaceuticalincumbentspriortopatentexpiration AT ellisonsarafisher strategicentrydeterrenceandthebehaviorofpharmaceuticalincumbentspriortopatentexpiration |