Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure:
We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with thos...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
| Series: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
13014 |
| Online Access: | Volltext |
| Summary: | We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice. It also makes a number of predictions for the cross-sectional distribution of firm leverage. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, it implies persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms. An important new empirical prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, firms with more leverage should pay higher wages. |
| Physical Description: | 37 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
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| id | DE-604.BV023592927 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:31Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:14Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
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| physical | 37 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2007 |
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| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
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| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Berk, Jonathan B. 1962- Verfasser (DE-588)11200881X aut Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure Jonathan B. Berk ; Richard Stanton ; Josef Zechner Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2007 37 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 13014 We derive a firm's optimal capital structure and managerial compensation contract when employees are averse to bearing their own human capital risk, while equity holders can diversify this risk away. In the presence of corporate taxes, our model delivers optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice. It also makes a number of predictions for the cross-sectional distribution of firm leverage. Consistent with existing empirical evidence, it implies persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms. An important new empirical prediction of the model is that, ceteris paribus, firms with more leverage should pay higher wages. Stanton, Richard 1951- Verfasser (DE-588)129355402 aut Zechner, Josef 1955- Verfasser (DE-588)111040531 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 13014 (DE-604)BV002801238 13014 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13014.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Berk, Jonathan B. 1962- Stanton, Richard 1951- Zechner, Josef 1955- Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title_auth | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title_exact_search | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title_exact_search_txtP | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title_full | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure Jonathan B. Berk ; Richard Stanton ; Josef Zechner |
| title_fullStr | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure Jonathan B. Berk ; Richard Stanton ; Josef Zechner |
| title_full_unstemmed | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure Jonathan B. Berk ; Richard Stanton ; Josef Zechner |
| title_short | Human capital, bankruptcy and capital structure |
| title_sort | human capital bankruptcy and capital structure |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13014.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
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