State-dependent intellectual property rights policy:
What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We d...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Buch |
| Sprache: | English |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2006
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research
12775 |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Zusammenfassung: | What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader and also how much they have to pay to license past innovations. With full patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry either by making the same innovation(s) themselves or by making some pre-specified payments to the technological leaders. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the "trickle-down" effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less advanced than this threshold. |
| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 42 - 44 |
| Beschreibung: | 52 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
Internformat
MARC
| LEADER | 00000nam a2200000zcb4500 | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | BV023592697 | ||
| 003 | DE-604 | ||
| 005 | 20080327000000.0 | ||
| 007 | t | ||
| 008 | 070307s2006 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d | ||
| 035 | |a (OCoLC)255765451 | ||
| 035 | |a (DE-599)BVBBV023592697 | ||
| 040 | |a DE-604 |b ger | ||
| 041 | 0 | |a eng | |
| 044 | |a xxu |c XD-US | ||
| 049 | |a DE-521 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Acemoglu, Daron |d 1967- |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)124929575 |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |c Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge, Mass. |b National Bureau of Economic Research |c 2006 | |
| 300 | |a 52 S. |b graph. Darst. |c 22 cm | ||
| 336 | |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |v 12775 | |
| 500 | |a Literaturverz. S. 42 - 44 | ||
| 520 | |a What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader and also how much they have to pay to license past innovations. With full patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry either by making the same innovation(s) themselves or by making some pre-specified payments to the technological leaders. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the "trickle-down" effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less advanced than this threshold. | ||
| 700 | 1 | |a Akcigit, Ufuk |e Verfasser |0 (DE-588)132797402 |4 aut | |
| 776 | 0 | 8 | |i Erscheint auch als |n Online-Ausgabe |
| 810 | 2 | |a National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> |t NBER working paper series |v 12775 |w (DE-604)BV002801238 |9 12775 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |u http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12775.pdf |z kostenfrei |3 Volltext |
| 999 | |a oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908027 | ||
Datensatz im Suchindex
| _version_ | 1804138251418599424 |
|---|---|
| adam_txt | |
| any_adam_object | |
| any_adam_object_boolean | |
| author | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Akcigit, Ufuk |
| author_GND | (DE-588)124929575 (DE-588)132797402 |
| author_facet | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Akcigit, Ufuk |
| author_role | aut aut |
| author_sort | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- |
| author_variant | d a da u a ua |
| building | Verbundindex |
| bvnumber | BV023592697 |
| ctrlnum | (OCoLC)255765451 (DE-599)BVBBV023592697 |
| format | Book |
| fullrecord | <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim"><record><leader>03133nam a2200337zcb4500</leader><controlfield tag="001">BV023592697</controlfield><controlfield tag="003">DE-604</controlfield><controlfield tag="005">20080327000000.0</controlfield><controlfield tag="007">t</controlfield><controlfield tag="008">070307s2006 xxud||| |||| 00||| eng d</controlfield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(OCoLC)255765451</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">(DE-599)BVBBV023592697</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="040" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-604</subfield><subfield code="b">ger</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="041" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">eng</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="044" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">xxu</subfield><subfield code="c">XD-US</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="049" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">DE-521</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Acemoglu, Daron</subfield><subfield code="d">1967-</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)124929575</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0"><subfield code="a">State-dependent intellectual property rights policy</subfield><subfield code="c">Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cambridge, Mass.</subfield><subfield code="b">National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="c">2006</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">52 S.</subfield><subfield code="b">graph. Darst.</subfield><subfield code="c">22 cm</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">n</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="b">nc</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research</subfield><subfield code="v">12775</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="500" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Literaturverz. S. 42 - 44</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="520" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader and also how much they have to pay to license past innovations. With full patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry either by making the same innovation(s) themselves or by making some pre-specified payments to the technological leaders. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the "trickle-down" effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less advanced than this threshold.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Akcigit, Ufuk</subfield><subfield code="e">Verfasser</subfield><subfield code="0">(DE-588)132797402</subfield><subfield code="4">aut</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Erscheint auch als</subfield><subfield code="n">Online-Ausgabe</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="810" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.></subfield><subfield code="t">NBER working paper series</subfield><subfield code="v">12775</subfield><subfield code="w">(DE-604)BV002801238</subfield><subfield code="9">12775</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="1"><subfield code="u">http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12775.pdf</subfield><subfield code="z">kostenfrei</subfield><subfield code="3">Volltext</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="999" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908027</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |
| id | DE-604.BV023592697 |
| illustrated | Illustrated |
| index_date | 2024-07-02T22:41:30Z |
| indexdate | 2024-07-09T21:25:13Z |
| institution | BVB |
| language | English |
| oai_aleph_id | oai:aleph.bib-bvb.de:BVB01-016908027 |
| oclc_num | 255765451 |
| open_access_boolean | 1 |
| owner | DE-521 |
| owner_facet | DE-521 |
| physical | 52 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publishDateSearch | 2006 |
| publishDateSort | 2006 |
| publisher | National Bureau of Economic Research |
| record_format | marc |
| series2 | Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research |
| spelling | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Verfasser (DE-588)124929575 aut State-dependent intellectual property rights policy Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006 52 S. graph. Darst. 22 cm txt rdacontent n rdamedia nc rdacarrier Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 12775 Literaturverz. S. 42 - 44 What form of intellectual property rights (IPR) policy contributes to economic growth? Should technological followers be able to license the products of technological leaders? Should a company with a large technological lead receive the same IPR protection as a company with a more limited lead? We develop a general equilibrium framework to investigate these questions. The economy consists of many industries and firms engaged in cumulative (step-by-step) innovation. IPR policy regulates whether followers in an industry can copy the technology of the leader and also how much they have to pay to license past innovations. With full patent protection, followers can catch up to the leader in their industry either by making the same innovation(s) themselves or by making some pre-specified payments to the technological leaders. We prove the existence of a steady-state equilibrium and characterize some of its properties. We then quantitatively investigate the implications of different types of IPR policy on the equilibrium growth rate. The two major results of this exercise are as follows. First, the growth rate in the standard models used in the (growth) literature can be improved significantly by introducing a simple form of licensing. Second, we show that full patent protection is not optimal from the viewpoint of maximizing the growth rate of the economy and that the growth-maximizing policy involves state-dependent IPR protection, providing greater protection to technological leaders that are further ahead than those that are close to their followers. This form of the growth-maximizing policy is a result of the "trickle-down" effect, which implies that providing greater protection to firms that are further ahead of their followers than a certain threshold increases the R&D incentives also for all technological leaders that are less advanced than this threshold. Akcigit, Ufuk Verfasser (DE-588)132797402 aut Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe National Bureau of Economic Research <Cambridge, Mass.> NBER working paper series 12775 (DE-604)BV002801238 12775 http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12775.pdf kostenfrei Volltext |
| spellingShingle | Acemoglu, Daron 1967- Akcigit, Ufuk State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title_auth | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title_exact_search | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title_exact_search_txtP | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title_full | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit |
| title_fullStr | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit |
| title_full_unstemmed | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy Daron Acemoglu ; Ufuk Akcigit |
| title_short | State-dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| title_sort | state dependent intellectual property rights policy |
| url | http://papers.nber.org/papers/w12775.pdf |
| volume_link | (DE-604)BV002801238 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT acemogludaron statedependentintellectualpropertyrightspolicy AT akcigitufuk statedependentintellectualpropertyrightspolicy |