Learning and disagreement in an uncertain world:

ormal, and the t-distributions), asymptotic agreement does not obtain even in the limit as the amount of uncertainty disappears. Lack of common priors has important implications for economic behavior in a range of circumstances. We illustrate how the type of learning outlined in this paper interacts...

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Hauptverfasser: Acemoglu, Daron 1967- (VerfasserIn), Chernozhukov, Victor (VerfasserIn), Yildiz, Muhamet (VerfasserIn)
Format: Buch
Sprache:English
Veröffentlicht: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research 2006
Schriftenreihe:Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research 12648
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Zusammenfassung:ormal, and the t-distributions), asymptotic agreement does not obtain even in the limit as the amount of uncertainty disappears. Lack of common priors has important implications for economic behavior in a range of circumstances. We illustrate how the type of learning outlined in this paper interacts with economic behavior in various different situations, including games of common interest, coordination, asset trading and bargaining.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 50 - 51
Beschreibung:51 S. 22 cm

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